[EAI Commentary] 100 Days After the Comfort Women Agreement: Where Do Korea-Japan Relations Stand?

Although a Korea-Japan summit was held on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on March 31, the two governments have unusually remained tight-lipped about the details of the meeting. In response, Son Yeol, Director of EAI's Japan Studies Center and Professor at Yonsei University, points out that the comfort women agreement reached at the end of last year reflects the current state of bilateral relations, which has not been embraced with universal acclaim. He further emphasizes that the comfort women issue is intricately linked to domestic politics, bilateral relations, and international politics in Northeast Asia, thus requiring a highly strategic approach. Even if clashes of identity make diplomatic confrontation inevitable, leadership is needed to manage the situation so that it does not impede cooperation in other areas such as security and economy.

The Silent Korea-Japan Relationship

One hundred days have passed since the intergovernmental agreement on the comfort women issue was reached on December 28 last year, yet both countries are exercising extreme restraint in their public statements. On March 31, amidst a whirlwind of summit meetings in Washington, President Park Geun-hye met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for 20 minutes. However, unusually, the content of their discussion was not publicly disclosed. Some Japanese media outlets reported that President Park confirmed her commitment to implementing the agreement, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confined its statements to explaining that preparations for the agreement's implementation were steadily underway during regular press briefings.

This opaque summit meeting reflects the current state of Korea-Japan relations, where the December agreement has not been met with universal acclaim. According to a poll conducted by Gallup Korea on January 8, 56% of South Koreans opposed the agreement, with only 26% in favor. 72% of the public believes Japan has not offered a sincere apology, and the same percentage opposes the relocation of the comfort women statue. In contrast, the mood in Japan, as indicated by a Mainichi Shimbun poll on January 30, shows 65% of Japanese people evaluating the agreement positively, yet only 19% believe the comfort women issue will be resolved by this agreement. Amidst growing pessimistic rhetoric, particularly from the Japanese right-wing, that South Korea will ultimately break the agreement, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Hagiuda made a cautionary remark on April 6, stating that the relocation of the statue and the establishment of the foundation must be executed as a package. However, the overall sentiment is one of observing South Korea's efforts to implement the agreement.

The ball is now in South Korea's court, and silence persists due to the political burden of domestic public opinion and opposition from affected parties. However, once the North Korean nuclear crisis and the election cycle are largely settled, the comfort women issue will likely resurface as a point of contention, and efforts to restore Korea-Japan relations will be put to the test. How should this be resolved?

The comfort women issue is a unique diplomatic challenge between South Korea and Japan. As it involves a clash of identity politics surrounding the painful history of comfort women, it is an issue deeply intertwined with domestic politics and requires highly political judgment. On the other hand, the comfort women issue is also closely linked to international politics in Northeast Asia. The United States and China, in their competition for regional order, approach historical issues from the perspective of pursuing their national interests, and Japan has also made subtle efforts to exploit this. Therefore, the comfort women issue possesses multifaceted dimensions: it is a domestic political issue of identity politics, a bilateral issue between Korea and Japan, and furthermore, an issue of international politics in Northeast Asia, necessitating a highly strategic approach. The lessons learned from the recent comfort women negotiations can be found in the answer to the question of whether complex diplomacy for such multifaceted issues has been conducted effectively.

A New Landscape: China's Wedge Strategy and U.S. Intervention in Historical Issues

To understand the significance of the comfort women agreement reached on December 28, it is necessary to trace back to its origins in the director-general level consultations in April 2014. Following the rise of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012 and the election of President Park Geun-hye, U.S. President Obama, seeking to mend the rapidly deteriorating bilateral relations, arranged a trilateral meeting with the leaders of South Korea and Japan on the sidelines of the Hague Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014. This meeting served as a stepping stone for improving bilateral relations by initiating director-general level consultations to resolve the comfort women issue. This was an unprecedented event in the history of Korea-U.S.-Japan relations, as the United States had never directly facilitated reconciliation between the leaders of the two countries since 1945.

The U.S. intervention in historical issues stems from the growing burden on its regional strategy due to the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations. In pursuing its pivot to Asia strategy, the U.S., seeking to delegate greater burdens and roles to its two key allies due to its relative decline in hegemony, perceives its national interests as being undermined by the conflict between the two countries over historical issues.

These U.S. concerns were amplified by China's actions. President Xi Jinping has been actively engaging South Korea by leveraging historical issues. During his state visit to South Korea in July 2013, he emphasized the "heart-to-heart" (肝膽相照) bond between the two nations and proposed a Korea-China historical alliance against Japan's historical revisionism, while also seeking to win over South Korea by promising to support the establishment of a memorial hall for Ahn Jung-geun, as requested by President Park. This strategy, aimed at distancing South Korea from Japan and drawing it closer to China, was a wedge strategy against the trilateral cooperation framework of Korea-U.S.-Japan, and the U.S. reacted sensitively. Despite the strong backlash from South Korea and China following Prime Minister Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, leading to a diplomatic offensive criticizing Japan, the U.S. exerted its diplomatic influence to facilitate the trilateral meeting in The Hague.

The U.S. hoped for a "two-track" approach from South Korea, where historical issues would be resolved through director-general level consultations, while actively cooperating on security and economic matters. Conversely, South Korea maintained its stance of a linked approach, arguing that without sincere efforts from the Japanese government on the comfort women issue, normalization of relations, let alone a summit, would be impossible. Instead, it reinforced identity politics, raising public expectations on historical issues through stronger demands towards Japan.

The U.S. intervened more actively in historical issues. In February 2015, Assistant Secretary of State Wendy Sherman warned against the manipulation of nationalistic public sentiment, stating, "Nationalistic popular sentiment can be exploited, and it is not difficult for political leaders to receive cheap applause by criticizing past enemies. However, such provocations lead to paralysis rather than progress [in regional cooperation]." This statement indirectly urged the separation of domestic politics from diplomacy.

Abe's Counterattack

These U.S. pressures, coupled with Japan's agile response, exacerbated the dilemma for South Korean diplomacy. Prime Minister Abe closely coordinated the historical content of his address to a joint session of Congress during his state visit to the U.S. in April and his so-called "Abe Statement" in August with Washington. Washington responded with welcoming remarks to both Abe's speech and his statement. The U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement (April 28, 2015) declared close solidarity to secure peace and prosperity in the region and the world through the combination of the U.S.'s "pivot to Asia strategy" and Japan's "Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Concept of International Cooperation," and stated that "the security and prosperity of our two countries are inextricably linked and cannot be defined by borders," thereby framing the Northeast Asian landscape as a 'U.S.-Japan vs. China' structure.

The improvement of Sino-Japanese relations also exerted diplomatic pressure on South Korea. Prime Minister Abe held a brief summit with President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Beijing in October 2014, and during a bilateral summit at the 60th anniversary commemoration of the Bandung Conference in April 2015, he secured a declaration from both countries to make efforts to prevent conflicts in the East China Sea from escalating into armed clashes and to manage security conflicts so they do not impede substantive cooperation in other areas.

As Japan integrated its alliance with the U.S. and improved relations with China, concerns about South Korea's diplomatic isolation grew, and its stance of holding firm against Japan visibly weakened. The South Korean government officially mentioned a "two-track" approach and initiated high-level contacts to conclude the comfort women negotiations ahead of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations normalization in June. The "preconditions" disappeared, and there was a restrained reaction to the Abe Statement in the August 15th National Liberation Day address. Subsequently, President Park's attendance at the Victory Day celebrations in Beijing on September 3, while pursued to secure China's support for handling North Korean issues, also became a factor that weakened her position during her subsequent visit to Washington (October 24) regarding U.S. demands for improved Korea-Japan relations. Under these circumstances, on November 2, the leaders of South Korea and Japan held their first bilateral summit since taking office and pledged to reach an early agreement on the comfort women negotiations.

What to Do and What Not to Do After the Comfort Women Agreement

Viewed in this light, the comfort women agreement of December 28 can be seen as a product reflecting the reality of South Korea's narrowed room for maneuver, shaped by the formation of a 'U.S.-Japan vs. China' structure and the subsequent improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. It could be argued that South Korea did its best within its limitations. However, circumstances are constructed. Had the historical issue been clearly recognized not only as a unique bilateral issue but also as being linked to the broader competition for regional order, a simple diplomatic approach that treated it as a precondition for normalizing relations could have been avoided. A complex, two-track diplomacy could have been pursued, allowing for the control of emotional excesses, such as the indictment of the Sankei Shimbun reporter, and thus securing a larger window of opportunity during the structuring of circumstances.

Taking this as a lesson, what should be done and what should not be done going forward?

First, the work should commence with the premise that the December agreement, while successful as a starting point for normalizing Korea-Japan relations, is not a decisive moment for the final resolution of the comfort women issue. The establishment of the foundation, the disbursement of 1 billion yen, and the relocation of the statue should be approached as part of a long process of resolution. The term "final and irreversible" should be understood as rhetoric.

Second, in this context, humble, sincere, and persistent dialogue and agreement must be achieved with stakeholders, including the comfort women survivors. It is true that close communication with the survivors was insufficient before and after the agreement, and it is regrettable that the Japanese Prime Minister did not directly express the apology and remorse contained in the agreement during the Korea-Japan summit on March 31.

Third, the execution of two-track diplomacy. The historical issue manifests as identity politics, making politicization of the issue inevitable, and thus, final and irreversible resolution is difficult. If diplomatic confrontation is unavoidable and one must argue and fight with Japan, then engage in a harsh diplomatic battle, but leadership must be exercised to manage this so that it does not spill over into other areas and hinder cooperation in security, economy, and emerging issues.

Fourth, the leaders of both countries should refrain from the temptation to use historical issues as a tool for political mobilization and guide the historical debate to be conducted as an intellectual contest within professional spheres as much as possible. The comfort women issue should not be swept up in international power dynamics or have its core purpose—restoring the dignity and honor of the women and healing their wounds—undermined by domestic political debates over the agreement's outcomes. Careful management is needed to ensure that the implementation of the comfort women agreement is not influenced by political schedules, leading to the shrinking of discussions or hasty resolutions.

Finally, a complex diplomatic system must be established to proactively manage the international politics of comfort women, which are interconnected across domestic, bilateral, and regional levels. ■

Author

Son YeolDirector of EAI's Japan Studies Center and Professor at Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has been a visiting scholar at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His primary research areas include Japanese and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and global governance.

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