[Japan Commentary] The First Summit Between Park Geun-hye and Abe: Directions for Responding to Key Agenda Items

Author

Cho Se-youngDirector, Center for Japanese Studies, Dongseo University. Served as Director-General of the Northeast Asian Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (August 2011–July 2012) and worked at the Embassies in Japan and China. Author of "50 Years of Korea-Japan Relations: A History of Conflict and Cooperation" (2014) and "Will the Seal Be Broken?: Japan's Constitutional Revision Issue from the Perspective of the Japan-US Alliance" (2004).

Korea-Japan Summit Aims for Limited Cooperation

The Korea-Japan summit is within sight. The first summit between President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is expected to take place on the occasion of the Korea-China-Japan trilateral summit, anticipated for late October or early November. This would be the first summit in two years and seven months since the launch of the Park Geun-hye administration, and the first Korea-Japan summit in three years and five months since the meeting between President Lee Myung-bak and Prime Minister Noda in Beijing on May 13, 2012.

The prolonged absence of annual Korea-Japan summits, held at least once a year since 1990, is clearly abnormal. While this may be due to specific diplomatic issues like the comfort women issue or the personalities of the leaders, it should fundamentally be attributed to structural changes in the international system surrounding both countries. Structural factors such as the end of the Cold War, the narrowing economic gap between Korea and Japan, and the reversal of China's and Japan's international standing mean that Korea-Japan relations will not be fully restored by one or two summits alone. Furthermore, given that a resolution acceptable to the Korean public regarding the comfort women issue is not easily achievable, the normalization of Korea-Japan relations will likely take more time.

Although efforts to shift the situation have been made this year, including the first visits and meetings between Foreign Minister Kishida and Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, and the attendance of both leaders at receptions in Seoul and Tokyo on June 22 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of normalized relations, sufficient trust has not yet been built between the two governments. The recent intense friction between working-level officials over the wording concerning forced mobilization in the UNESCO World Heritage inscription issue is evidence of the fragility of trust between working-level authorities. Therefore, it would be realistic to aim for the upcoming summit to restore Korea-Japan relations to a level of manageable limited cooperation rather than a comprehensive partnership.

The Importance of the East Asian Regional Order

With China's rapid rise in national power, the balance of power in East Asia is significantly shifting, leading to an expansion of divergences in the foreign policy orientations of Korea and Japan. Paradoxically, this underscores the increasing importance of jointly contemplating and seeking cooperation on how to foster a harmonious and stable regional order in East Asia, a matter that will be as crucial as historical issues or the Dokdo dispute in future Korea-Japan relations.

It is necessary to first articulate Korea's foreign policy strategy regarding the East Asian regional order, including the Korean Peninsula issue, as an overarching goal, and then deductively derive specific policies toward Japan from this. In this regard, a comprehensive analysis and prescription for Korea-Japan relations are well summarized in the East Asia Institute's special report, "Co-evolution of Korea and Japan for a New Era," which proposes "Co-evolution of Korea and Japan for the Construction of a New East Asian Complex Order" as a key theme.

Historically, the agenda items concerning international and regional affairs in Korea-Japan summits have remained at a general level or have been treated superficially, often getting bogged down by issues like North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles. However, in the future, in-depth discussions on the East Asian regional order must be given as much weight as bilateral diplomatic issues.

Reaffirmation of the Four Key Documents on Historical Perceptions

Since the launch of the Park Geun-hye administration, the strained Korea-Japan relations have been significantly influenced by Prime Minister Abe's revisionist remarks and actions regarding history. Therefore, attention at this summit is bound to focus on the issue of historical perceptions. While engaging in debates on historical perceptions or pre-negotiating the wording of Prime Minister Abe's statements is not advisable, it is essential to reaffirm the basic historical perceptions toward Korea.

Abe's statement on August 14th showed no sign of a sincere reflection on the colonial rule over Korea. Even within Japan, there were criticisms that Korea was treated too coldly. Although President Park Geun-hye refrained from a strong response in her Liberation Day address, citing the continuation of previous cabinets' stances such as the Murayama Statement, the significant regression in historical perception compared to previous cabinets cannot be overlooked.

There is widespread dissatisfaction in Japan that South Korea endlessly demands apologies. Therefore, demanding new statements of repentance and apology from Prime Minister Abe is feared to be counterproductive. Rather, it is desirable to demand that Prime Minister Abe affirm that he "adheres to the contents of the four major documents on Korea-Japan relations." Thus, it should be clarified that South Korea's demand is not for additional repentance and apology, but rather to refrain from words and actions that deviate from Japan's already stated position. This is also to prevent the wasteful debate between the two governments regarding historical perceptions and the resulting deterioration of public opinion. Japan has already reaffirmed the basic principles of Sino-Japanese relations in this manner with China, so there should be no reason for them to object.

The four key documents on Korea-Japan relations refer to the Kono Statement (1993), the Murayama Statement (1995), the Kim Dae-jung–Obuchi Partnership Joint Declaration (1998), and the Kan Statement (2010). In particular, the Kan Statement, issued by Prime Minister Naoto Kan on August 10, 2010, coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, stated: "Under the political and military circumstances of the time, the Korean people were deprived of their country and culture by colonial rule imposed against their will, and their national pride was deeply wounded." It further expressed, "We once again express our deep remorse and sincere apology for the great damage and suffering inflicted by colonial rule."

Although it did not go as far as acknowledging the illegality of colonial rule, it undoubtedly represents the most progressive historical perception among Japanese cabinets. Despite this, the existence of the Kan Statement has not received significant attention in South Korea. It is regrettable that while the need to reaffirm the Partnership Joint Declaration is mentioned in various proposals for improving Korea-Japan relations, the Kan Statement is rarely referenced.

Prime Minister Abe shows strong resistance to the Kan Statement, to the point of not even mentioning its existence. This is likely because it stands in direct opposition to his conservative historical views and was issued during the Democratic Party of Japan's administration. Furthermore, coincidentally or not, the Kan Statement is conspicuously absent from the Japan-Korea relations section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. This raises suspicions about whether the Abe administration's influence was at play in an attempt to "erase the Kan Statement." However, as the Kan Statement is an official position of the Japanese government, approved by the cabinet, it should be upheld with confidence towards the Abe administration. Prime Minister Abe's affirmation of the four key documents would be the first step toward restoring Korea-Japan relations.

Joint Declaration as a Balanced Package

There are suggestions that a new joint declaration should be issued at this summit, upgrading the 1998 Partnership Joint Declaration. However, a joint declaration that provides a future vision by surveying the overall Korea-Japan relationship requires meticulous preparation over a considerable period, and thus, it would be ill-advised to rush it for a summit just a month away. Moreover, such a joint declaration is more appropriately announced at a formal summit during a state visit rather than at a brief summit held on the sidelines of an international conference.

If a joint declaration on Korea-Japan relations is to be prepared, it is important to ensure that it is a balanced package reflecting the positions of both sides. For instance, the Partnership Joint Declaration included Japan's repentance and apology for past actions, along with South Korea's acknowledgment of Japan's contributions to post-war democratic development and prosperity in the international community. Furthermore, the accompanying Action Plan, adopted alongside the Partnership Joint Declaration, encompassed 43 cooperative projects, thereby reflecting the demands of both sides in a balanced manner.

The preparation of such a comprehensive joint declaration requires meticulous groundwork by working-level officials. Their involvement is also essential to clarify how the joint declaration will be positioned within Korea-Japan relations and how follow-up measures will be implemented.

However, the Kan Statement in 2010 was pursued through informal political channels with limited involvement from working-level officials on the South Korean side. Consequently, there was a lack of institutional memory within the South Korean government regarding the pursuit of the Kan Statement, and insufficient consideration was given to the efforts made by the Japanese side in announcing the Kan Statement in subsequent policies toward Japan. This has led to lingering dissatisfaction on the Japanese side, arguing that despite Japan's sincere repentance and apology through the Kan Statement and the return of the Joseon Dynasty's royal archives, South Korea's response has been limited to strong stances on the Dokdo issue and the comfort women issue. A more balanced outcome could have been expected if security cooperation and the resumption of negotiations for a Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) had been included as a package alongside Japan's repentance and apology.

Logical Consistency on Historical Issues

Regarding historical issues, the comfort women problem has emerged as the most significant pending issue, but it is unlikely that a resolution will be reached at this summit. President Park has emphasized that an agreement must be reached "at the level expected by the public" through working-level negotiations (New Year's press conference on January 12, 2015), while Prime Minister Abe stated, "The Japanese government's position is that there is no evidence of forced recruitment of comfort women, and Japan's honor should not be tarnished for false reasons" (interview with The Economist on December 15, 2014), indicating a significant gap in positions between Korea and Japan. In such circumstances, attempting a diplomatic compromise to meet the summit schedule would be inadvisable.

The issue of compensation for victims of forced labor carries as much explosive potential as the comfort women issue. If the Supreme Court's 2012 ruling, which affirmed the responsibility of Japanese companies to compensate victims, becomes final and enforcement actions are taken against the assets of Japanese companies in South Korea, it will escalate into a serious diplomatic problem.

Both the comfort women issue and the forced labor compensation issue stem from the interpretation of the Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement. The official position of the South Korean government on this matter is clearly stated in the press release issued by the Joint Public-Private Committee on the Disclosure of Korea-Japan Talks Documents on August 26, 2005. According to this press release, the comfort women issue is considered an "inhumane illegal act that cannot be resolved by the Claims Settlement Agreement, and legal responsibility remains with the Japanese government." In contrast, regarding the forced labor issue, it states that "funds for compensation for damages from forced mobilization were comprehensively considered" within the $300 million in grant aid. Therefore, a logically consistent stance for the South Korean government would be to thoroughly pursue accountability with Japan on the comfort women issue, while clarifying that compensation for forced labor victims should be resolved domestically by South Korea, rather than demanded from Japan. Attempting a diplomatic cover-up while leaving this point ambiguous will not lead to a sustainable solution.

The establishment of a 2+2 type foundation, jointly funded by the governments and corporations of Korea and Japan, has been proposed as one idea for a comprehensive resolution of historical issues. However, it is highly unlikely that Japan will respond favorably unless the South Korean government clarifies its position on the Claims Settlement Agreement. The desirable course of action would be for the South Korean government to first clarify its stance on the Claims Settlement Agreement, then establish a foundation independently with Korean companies, and subsequently seek voluntary participation from the Japanese side in a later stage.

Establishment of a High-Level Security Policy Consultative Body and Resumption of Korea-Japan FTA Negotiations

Japan's passage of security legislation in September, which includes the reinterpretation of the right to collective self-defense, marks a significant shift from its previous deterrent security policy. This means that Japan, as an important variable, is newly added to South Korea's security policy, further increasing the need for practical dialogue between Korea and Japan in the security domain.

At this summit, it will be necessary to acknowledge that Japan's shift in security policy contributes to strengthening South Korea's deterrence against North Korea, while also conveying concerns about the potential for increased mutual distrust and an arms race in the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the Abe administration's revisionist remarks and actions are exacerbating regional concerns about Japan's changes. Expanding practical dialogue channels between the two governments could also be a way to ensure transparency in Japan's new security policy. Consideration could be given to upgrading the Korea-Japan Security Policy Consultative Meeting, currently operating at the director-general level, to a 2+2 format involving vice-ministerial level officials or higher from the foreign affairs and defense ministries.

In the economic sphere, it is necessary to consider resuming negotiations for a Korea-Japan FTA. While South Korea's strategy of pursuing simultaneous FTAs with major economic blocs is nearing completion with the FTAs with the US, EU, and China, the Korea-Japan FTA remains an unresolved issue. As South Korea has rapidly pursued its hub strategy for bilateral FTAs, Japan, which had lagged behind, is now pursuing a 'mega FTA hub strategy' by simultaneously pursuing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Japan-EU FTA, after belatedly deciding to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

As a result, in South Korea, which is not participating in the current TPP negotiations, confidence built through aggressive FTA pursuits is waning, and a sense of crisis is growing that it may fall behind Japan's FTA strategy. If the TPP is concluded and South Korea subsequently joins, it would be tantamount to unilaterally accepting a Korea-Japan FTA with a very high level of liberalization. Therefore, it is more advantageous for South Korea to conclude a bilateral Korea-Japan FTA through equal negotiations before joining the TPP.

Currently, the final stages of TPP negotiations are facing difficulties. With the Upper House election in Japan next year and the US presidential election scheduled, if a conclusion is not reached within this year, it is projected that the early conclusion of the TPP will effectively be off the table. It is necessary to leverage this situation effectively and proactively raise the issue of resuming Korea-Japan FTA negotiations at this summit. ■

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