Constructing a New East Asian Order in the Age of Complexity: A Column by Ha Young-sun

Author

Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington. He previously served as a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Association of Peace Studies. He is currently a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Board and a civilian member of the National Unification Advisory Council. His publications include "Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011," "The Politics of a Complex World: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order," "A New Era for Korea-Japan Relations and a Symbiotic Complex Network," and "The Politics of Transformation."

With China's rapid rise, discussions on constructing a new East Asian order in the 21st century are gaining momentum in the United States and across the East Asian region. Historically, the East Asian order has evolved through traditional tributary systems, the modern international order, and the Cold War order, and is now entering an era of a complex future order. The construction of a new East Asian order in this age of complexity faces two core issues: first, the rise of 'Pax Chimerica,' and second, the future of the Asia-Pacific complex order.

Historical Transformation of the East Asian Regional Order

The political space of East Asia has historically been structured within a tributary system for a long time. This system, which remained firmly in place until its full confrontation with the Western modern international order in the mid-19th century, traces its origins back to the pre-Qin period (around 1000 BC) when the Western Zhou dynasty (1046-771 BC) overthrew the Shang dynasty and attempted to establish a hierarchical system based on the Mandate of Heaven. During the Spring and Autumn period (771-453 BC), the concept of 'Hua-Yi' (civilization and barbarism) emerged, based on cultural superiority. In the Warring States period (453-221 BC), more concrete visions of the tributary world order, such as the 'Nine Provinces Map' and the 'Five Zones Map,' were encountered. Through the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC) and Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), when the Chinese heartland was first unified, the tributary system, a comprehensive hierarchical order based on tribute and control, entered its second phase, encompassing the entirety of China. After overcoming the period of division during the Wei, Jin, and Southern and Northern Dynasties, it solidified through the Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-907) empires. With the military weakening of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and the rise of the Liao (907-1125), Jin (1115-1234), and Yuan (1271-1368) dynasties, the tributary system entered its third phase, facing the new reality of 'China among equals.' It sought to establish a multi-polar order based on the balance of power while simultaneously maintaining the traditional tribute system. The tributary system entered its fourth phase during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, exhibiting its most complex form in history. Specifically, in the 18th century, the Qianlong Emperor of the Qing dynasty conquered the Dzungar Khanate, causing it to disappear from the face of the earth, exerted strong influence over Tibet, and successfully maintained a typical tributary relationship with Korea.

The East Asian tributary system directly clashed with the European international order in the mid-19th century. China experienced the Opium Wars in the 1840s, and Japan encountered the American Black Ships in 1853. Korea, slightly later, faced the French expedition (1866) and the American expedition (1871). After much turmoil, East Asian countries had to accept the Western modern international order as the new standard of civilization, and in the 20th century, they were swept into the fierce competition of regional imperialism.

The post-World War II East Asian order was rebuilt within the framework of the Cold War order led by the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1947, the U.S. initiated a policy of non-military containment against the Soviet Union through large-scale economic aid to prevent Soviet influence from expanding into Western Europe. In June 1950, the Korean War began with provocations from North Korea, supported by the Soviet Union and China, leading to U.S. intervention. This expanded the non-military containment policy, which had been confined to Europe, into a full-scale containment policy encompassing military means across Asia and the globe.

In the 1970s, the mutually hostile United States and Soviet Union entered a period of détente due to the nuclear deterrence system and domestic political and economic difficulties. The U.S. and China also achieved détente through the historic Kissinger-Zhou Enlai negotiations. However, despite the July 4th South-North Joint Statement in 1972, Korea and North Korea failed to achieve détente on the Korean Peninsula and reverted to the vicious cycle of the Cold War. The détente international order of the 1970s shifted back to a neo-Cold War atmosphere with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, but the new policy line introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 ultimately brought the Cold War international order to a close.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 signified more than just the end of the global Cold War order. The departure of the Cold War order heralded the emergence of a new complex order. The historical transformation of the actors, stage, and performance in the 21st century foreshadows civilizational changes comparable to the revolutionary shifts experienced by East Asia in the 19th century. While the fierce competition and conflicts among modern nation-states on the grand stage continue unabated, new actors, termed 'network states,' have begun to engage in complex co-evolutionary performances on the complex stage of globalization and emerging powers. The 21st-century East Asian order is no exception. Particularly, with China's continued economic growth despite the 2008 global financial crisis, discussions about the emergence of 'Pax Chimerica' in East Asia have begun in earnest. In this era of complexity, the discussion on constructing a new complex order in East Asia is actively underway.

The Emergence of Pax Chimerica

In the post-Cold War transition period of the 21st century, the main actors on the stage still take the form of nation-states or empires. In an anarchic international order, the survival and prosperity of a state are primarily the responsibility of the individual state. This is because, unlike domestic politics, there is no central government in international politics, and the competition for survival and prosperity continues fiercely. In 21st-century East Asia, with China's rise being accepted as a given, attention is focused on the new era that East Asian international relations will face. Firstly, examining the distribution of military power in the East Asian order, the United States holds an overwhelming advantage, spending $610 billion out of a global total military expenditure of $1.78 trillion (as of 2014). Despite the reduction in U.S. military spending due to massive government budget deficits, it still surpasses the combined total of the top ten military-spending countries globally. Notably, U.S. military power holds an overwhelming superiority in all areas, including nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and cutting-edge weaponry. Meanwhile, China's military expenditure exceeded $200 billion for the first time, followed by Russia with $84.5 billion, Japan with $45.8 billion, and South Korea with $36.7 billion.

Next, examining the distribution of economic power in the East Asian order through Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reveals that in 2014, out of a global GDP of $77.3 trillion, the United States ranked first with $17.4 trillion (22.5%), and China ranked second with $10.4 trillion (13.5%). China had already surpassed Japan's GDP of $5 trillion in 2010. As of 2014, ASEAN had a GDP of $2.3 trillion, Russia $1.9 trillion, and South Korea and Australia each $1.4 trillion. According to the IMF's 2020 world GDP projections, the United States is expected to maintain its global lead with $22.5 trillion, while China, as the second-largest economy, is projected to reach $16.2 trillion, over 70% of the U.S. GDP, further widening the gap with Japan, the third-largest economy.

Next, examining the distribution of intellectual power in the East Asian order, the '2014 Global Think Tank Rankings' survey shows that more than half of the top 20 think tanks are located in the United States, proving its undisputed global dominance in this field. The remaining major think tanks are all located in Europe, with only the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) being selected among Asian countries.

Synthesizing the distribution of military power, economic power, and intellectual power in the Asia-Pacific region, we observe, first, the conspicuous rise of China, and second, the continued importance of America's relative superiority.

In this context, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered the following commencement address at West Point in 2014: "America is, by far, the world's strongest nation. Claims that America is in decline are merely the speculations of those who misunderstand history or are swayed by partisan politics. No country in the world can match America's defense capabilities. Therefore, the likelihood of America being exposed to threats from any external country is significantly low, and in fact, it does not even reach the level of danger we experienced during the Cold War. Furthermore, our economy is the most dynamic in the world, and our companies are the most innovative globally. America's energy independence is also increasing year by year. From Europe to Asia, America stands at the center of alliances as a superpower unmatched by any nation in world history."

However, Obama also pointed out that the rapidly changing world could present opportunities but also new threats. The question for future generations of Americans is not whether America will lead the world, but how it will lead. He emphasized that the U.S. must not only focus on achieving peace and prosperity at home but also extend peace and prosperity to the entire world.

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first introduced the U.S. strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region in her 2011 article "America's Pacific Century" in Foreign Policy. The rebalance strategy included six pillars: strengthening bilateral security alliances, enhancing relations with emerging powers like China, participating in regional multilateral organizations, expanding trade and investment, maintaining a broad overseas troop presence, and promoting democracy and human rights. Notably, Secretary Clinton stated, "We are well aware that fear and misunderstanding exist between China and the United States. Some in the U.S. view China's rise as a threat to America, and some in China believe that the U.S. is trying to hinder China's growth. We do not accept such views. A prosperous America is beneficial to China, and a prosperous China is beneficial to the U.S. This is a given."

Meanwhile, at the ceremony commemorating the 30th anniversary of the reform and opening-up policy in 2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that reform and opening-up, along with the Xinhai Revolution (1911) and the socialist revolution (1949), were the three great revolutions that led to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. He declared that by 2021, the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, China would build a 'society of high-level prosperity' (高水平的小康社会), and by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, it would establish a 'rich, strong, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized country' (富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家).

However, to achieve the dream of 'Civilized China 2049,' China must overcome three dilemmas. First, after achieving high-speed economic growth for over 30 years, China now faces a situation where growth and welfare are in conflict. Simultaneously, for China's economy to achieve long-term high growth, it is crucial to move beyond the single-party system of the Communist Party and implement a 21st-century political system. Furthermore, for China to become a developed country in the 21st century, it must think and act from a broad global nationalist perspective, transcending the narrow, nation-centric view of nationalism. Therefore, 21st-century China must carefully pursue both regionalization and globalization, going beyond mere Western-style modernization. China's future will be determined by how successfully and how quickly it resolves these three dilemmas.

More specifically, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is proposing a 'new type of international relations' centered on President Xi Jinping's concepts of a 'new type of great power relationship' with the United States and 'new type of neighborhood diplomacy' with surrounding countries. The first principle of China's foreign policy, the new type of great power relationship between China and the U.S., includes: first, 'no conflict, no confrontation' (不冲突、不对抗); second, 'mutual respect' (相互尊重); and third, 'cooperation for mutual benefit' (合作共赢). This indicates that China will maintain a strategy of 'hiding its capabilities and biding its time' (韬光养晦) towards the U.S. at least until 2021. In the first half of the 21st century, China will avoid military confrontation, focus on economic relations of competition and cooperation, and prioritize establishing a new regional order and securing legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the second principle of its foreign policy, President Xi Jinping particularly emphasizes new neighborhood diplomacy. Neighborhood diplomacy is based on four core values: amity (亲), sincerity (诚), mutual benefit (惠), and inclusiveness (容). Furthermore, China is pursuing the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI), a development strategy centered on two main policies: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In the long term, Xi Jinping has also frequently used the term 'community of common destiny for Asia' (亚洲命运共同体) to describe the construction of a shared future with neighboring countries.

However, in the process of conducting neighborhood diplomacy, China strongly asserts three core interests: First, safeguarding China's fundamental system and national security (维护基本制度和国家安全). Second, safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity (国家主权和领土完整). Third, pursuing the sustained and stable development of China's economy and society (经济社会 的持续稳定发展).

In the East Asian region, where risks such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, military and political issues on the Korean Peninsula, and territorial disputes with Japan exist, China seeks to promote a new principle of international relations that combines new great power relations and new neighborhood diplomacy. Therefore, the Chinese government has recently focused on territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and national reunification issues in the South China Sea territorial disputes, while simultaneously avoiding direct confrontation with the United States.

Constructing the New Complex Order in East Asia

The encounter between the U.S. rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific and China's new type of international relations theory is manifesting as the construction of a new Pax Chimerica. However, at the same time, Asia-Pacific countries continue to engage in fierce power struggles in the name of national interests, narrowly defined in the era of modern nationalism. Therefore, Pax Chimerica harbors inherent risks such as security dilemmas, economic crises, emotional conflicts, and postmodern challenges. Firstly, examining the current military landscape in the East Asian region, the possibility of a security dilemma between the U.S.-led alliance and China cannot be ignored due to mutual strategic distrust. Furthermore, in the Asia-Pacific economy, there is a potential risk of unproductive competition emerging in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) versus the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) versus the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). Moreover, with the historical remnants of regional imperialism and the Cold War still unresolved, the East Asian order is susceptible to the politics of emotion. Simultaneously, Pax Chimerica faces postmodern challenges in areas such as the environment, culture, digital knowledge, and global governance.

Even if the U.S. and China have successfully maintained a fragile stability between the established power and the rising power, the risk of strategic deterioration in their relationship looms large, given the current mutual strategic distrust. Particularly, the upcoming U.S. presidential election is expected to feature heated debates between the Democratic and Republican parties regarding the reality and myth of 'new type of great power relationship.' From the Republican perspective, China is unlikely to evolve into a 'responsible stakeholder' that voluntarily adopts Western civilizational standards, thus necessitating a more assertive U.S. foreign policy towards China in the 21st century. In this new context, while the possibility of direct military conflict between the two countries is low, strategic deterioration is a distinct possibility. Furthermore, amidst increasing security dilemmas, China will pursue its 'new neighborhood diplomacy' more actively to protect its core interests, thereby increasing the risk of military confrontation between China and its neighbors.

With the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the economic order in the Asia-Pacific, led by the U.S. and Japan, faces new challenges. Witnessing the 2008 global financial crisis and China's successful crisis management, discussions about the possibility of a Pax Chimerica economic order began. This discussion intensified in 2010 when China surpassed Japan's GDP. Although the active discussion of Pax Chimerica has somewhat subsided as China has lowered its economic growth target to 7% under the 'new normal' and the U.S. economy has successfully recovered, the discussion about a new Chinese-led East Asian economic order remains relevant, especially with China's successful promotion of the AIIB this year. It is arguable that the AIIB will compete with the ADB and the RCEP with the TPP, leading to an expansion of China's influence in the regional economic order. Given the Chinese government's current emphasis on cooperation for common prosperity in East Asia, the best-case scenario for East Asia would be the construction of a new complex network economy.

Examining the historical formation of national identities in East Asian countries reveals several key characteristics. First, the influence of the traditional world order remains significant. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explains that the new international relations, characterized by 'reciprocal prosperity,' stem from China's rich cultural traditions. Second, the identity formation of Asian countries has been heavily influenced by the global expansion of Western modern nationalism over the past 150 years. Consequently, while European countries are now striving to move beyond the negative aspects of modern nationalism, East Asian countries are still engaged in fierce nationalistic competition. Therefore, with historical animosities stemming from experiences of colonialism and war in the 19th and early 20th centuries remaining unresolved, East Asia is still not free from the politics of emotion.

To address the major challenges currently facing Pax Chimerica, the Asia-Pacific region requires a new architecture that can comprehensively encompass the current and future regional order. To this end, first, the U.S.-China relationship must move beyond the past confrontational Cold War dynamic and evolve into a new complex relationship that integrates the deepening U.S.-led alliance network with the expanding Chinese network.

The United States is making more active efforts than in the past to construct a new order in East Asia, including strengthening relations with its allies, building strong partnerships with emerging powers like China, and participating in East Asian regional organizations. However, the 'Asia rebalance' policy must be framed not as a Cold War containment policy but as a peace policy for a complex order. Furthermore, the U.S. must design a complex network in collaboration with key Asia-Pacific countries.

Simultaneously, Asia-Pacific countries must pay close attention to China's transformation. To build a high-level, comprehensive well-off society by 2021 and present a civilizational standard for the construction of a new East Asian order by 2049, China must resolve three major issues in line with its core interests and the complex interests of East Asia and the world: the harmony between development and welfare, political democratization, and genuine globalization. This requires China to work together with East Asian countries, and a network capable of leading these efforts to success is essential.

In response to China's rapid rise, Japan is pursuing a 19th-century modern power competition model in cooperation with the United States. However, by pursuing a 19th-century modern model in the complex 21st century, Japan will incur unexpected political and economic costs from its neighbors, including South Korea and China. Therefore, for Japan to address the challenges of the 21st century in a 21st-century manner, it must actively participate in the construction of a complex East Asian order. As a first step, Japan should initiate dialogues with South Korea to depoliticize issues such as Dokdo, historical textbook distortions, and the revision of the pacifist constitution. As a second step, both countries should cooperate not only in emerging arenas like the environment, culture, and knowledge but also on the modern stage of peace and prosperity. As a third step, in the long term, East Asian countries must share a regional identity for East Asia that can mitigate conflicts arising from individual identities.

South Korea faces a new challenge of developing and implementing complex diplomacy with other actors on the stage, moving beyond its current framework of simple self-reliance and cooperation. The relationships between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, and with China, should be woven together not as adversarial relationships of the Cold War order but as network relationships of a complex order. South Korea must play a role in connecting and integrating the deepening U.S.-Japan-Korea network with the expanding Chinese network. Furthermore, as part of its 21st-century complex diplomacy, South Korea must expand its network more intricately across regional, global, and cyber spaces.

Since its founding in the mid-20th century, North Korea has excessively emphasized a simple policy of national prosperity based on 19th-century anti-foreign self-reliance. The Kim Jong-un regime, entering the complex 21st century, continues to pursue the economic-nuclear parallel development line as a survival strategy, following Kim Jong-il's military-first policy. However, due to the inherent contradiction between economic development and nuclear development, the parallel development line will inevitably lead to a choice between economic development without nuclear weapons and economic decline with nuclear weapons.

Unlike Europe, the international relations of the Asia-Pacific, which are undergoing a 'modern adolescence' belatedly, inherently contain the possibility of conflict rather than understanding and cooperation. Therefore, relying solely on state efforts is insufficient. To overcome this dilemma, Asia-Pacific countries must build close and robust networks by weaving together complex actors both within and outside their states, thereby reducing the possibility of international conflict and maximizing cooperation.

Second, Asia-Pacific countries are beginning to construct a complex three-tiered stage, akin to a multi-storied pagoda, instead of the current simple stage of national prosperity. This complex stage is centered around issues such as security, prosperity, environment, and culture. The lower tier forms the foundation of information and knowledge, while the uppermost tier represents the political stage.

In the 21st century, the central stage of military and economy must contribute not only to national interests but also to the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. Furthermore, the central stage must transform into a stage of prosperity and security that simultaneously considers the interests of domestic civil society. At the same time, to mitigate the negative effects arising from excessive power competition and wealth competition in modern international relations, the stage of culture must be strengthened to foster the complexity of national and regional identities. Moreover, in response to the environmental issues currently facing the East Asian region, the importance of the energy and environment stage is rapidly increasing. Next, with the rapid development of information technology and digital knowledge driving the complex era, the knowledge stage is emerging as the foundation of the East Asian 'three-tiered complex stage.' And in the absence of a regional government responsible for East Asian regional governance, there is a need to develop a stage for regional governance to successfully manage the complex stages.

Third, complex actors must engage in complex performances on the complex stage. This means that various actors in the Asia-Pacific region must coexist and engage in performances of self-help, cooperation, and co-evolution across diverse stages. The performances of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as protagonists during the Cold War era were akin to those of self-centered wolves. However, as global actors become rapidly interconnected due to the information revolution, they have begun to perform like spiders, constantly weaving webs to successfully capture prey in a deeper and wider space. Ultimately, for successful survival in the 21st century, one must be able to perform the complex act of a wolf-spider.

If the actors, stage, and performances in the Asia-Pacific successfully undergo complex transformation in the 21st century, a beautiful complex order will be constructed, overcoming the limitations of overly narrow modern nationalism and overly expansive future globalism. If the actors, stage, and performances in the Asia-Pacific successfully undergo complex transformation in the 21st century, a beautiful complex order will be constructed, overcoming the limitations of overly narrow modern nationalism and overly expansive future globalism. Consequently, other global actors will adopt the complex order of the Asia-Pacific as a new standard model for future civilization. ■

※ This column is a Korean version of the author's English commentary, "The Architecture of the East Asian Order in the Age of Complexity", which has been revised and supplemented.

[EAI Ha Young-sun Column] is a commentary series planned to seek practical alternatives through analysis and foresight on major domestic and international diplomatic and security issues by Ha Young-sun, Chairman of EAI (Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University). Please cite the source when quoting.

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