[EAI Japan Commentary] Beyond the Abe Statement and the August 15th Commemorative Speech

Author

Ha Young-sun_ EAI Chairman, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and served as a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for Global Social Affairs, Director of the Institute for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. He is currently a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Board and a civilian member of the Committee for Unification Preparation. His publications include "Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011," "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "New Era of Korea-Japan Relations and Symbiotic Complex Networks," and "World Politics of Transformation."

Son Yeol_ Director of EAI Japan Center, Professor at Yonsei University. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has been a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His main research areas include Japanese politics and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and public diplomacy.

Korea-Japan Relations Amidst Civilizational Transformation

Korea and Japan, currently at their worst relations since normalization, are making strenuous efforts to improve ties. Following the reciprocal attendance of the two countries' leaders at the 50th anniversary of normalization, Japan, in the post-war 70th anniversary Abe Statement, mentioned all four keywords of contention: colonial rule, aggression, reflection, and apology. Korea, in its 70th anniversary of liberation August 15th commemorative speech, reaffirmed its will for improved relations by expressing a pragmatic approach. While efforts must be made to avoid emotional confrontation by suppressing mutual provocation, to move beyond the Korea-Japan relationship of old-era conflicts, we must embrace the trend of 21st-century East Asia undergoing civilizational transformation. This requires overcoming the past paradigm of pursuing national prosperity and strength centered on individual states and meeting with new ideas. Beyond simple measures to restore Korea-Japan relations, we must seek the start of a new Korea-Japan relationship by accurately reading the overall landscape of 21st-century transformation in East Asia with a macro and long-term perspective, and readjusting the goals, values, and roles of Korea-Japan relations within it.

The civilizational transformation of the 21st century signifies that the principles of power struggles and balance of power for the maximization of individual state interests in existing international relations are undergoing revolutionary changes in terms of actors, stage, and performance. The influence of non-state actors, both internal and external to states, is growing; the stage is expanding beyond wealth and power to new arenas such as climate change/environment, culture, and technology; and it is an era where complex roles of competition, cooperation, and symbiosis must be performed, considering not only national interests but also regional and global interests. In East Asia, amidst the power shift caused by China's rapid rise, traditional balance-of-power diplomacy centered on the US and China is unfolding. Simultaneously, various issue areas such as trade, finance, development, climate change, environmental pollution, energy, and culture are becoming intertwined, revealing a governance-oriented order where diverse non-state actors, including local governments, civil society organizations, and multinational corporations, participate in resolving issues through more horizontal and flexible networks.

Major powers, sensing the changing times where power struggles, balance of power, and network governance are intertwined, are engaging in fierce competition by actively initiating the construction of regional order to maximize their national interests. The United States, under the banner of 'rebalance,' is deeply intervening in the regional order in various ways. China, employing dazzling languages and concepts such as 'amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness,' 'community of common destiny,' and 'Belt and Road Initiative,' is making diplomatic efforts to seize the initiative in building regional order. Neighboring Japan, under the banner of "proactive pacifism based on international cooperation," is pursuing the path of becoming a normal state while simultaneously declaring its intention to resolve regional and global challenges through an integrated alliance with the United States.

It is paramount that efforts are made to ensure that this competitive phase of order-building leads to the symbiosis of the entire region, rather than the individual survival of each state. The goals, values, and roles of Korea-Japan relations must also be newly sought and found from this perspective. To build a complex East Asian order that embodies the value of symbiosis, the status of Korea-Japan relations must be redefined and its content enriched. It is time to seriously reflect on and discuss the future of Korea-Japan relations together, and within that context, to settle historical issues and formulate a vision that can become a new standard for future history.

In 1965, within the Cold War order, both Korea and Japan, needing each other for their national prosperity, decided to normalize diplomatic relations by setting aside the heavy burden of past history. Korea was able to achieve modernization through economic cooperation with Japan, and Japan was able to expand the benefits of economic cooperation by becoming Korea's largest trading partner. Furthermore, as allies of the United States within the Cold War system, they steadily built security cooperation while playing a bridgehead role for anti-communism. Amidst this sharing of interests, Korea and Japan also consistently made efforts to converge historical perceptions, achieving certain results such as the Kono Statement in 1992, the Murayama Statement in 1995, the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Korea-Japan Partnership Declaration in 1998, and the Kan Statement in 2010.

However, with the dawn of the 21st century and the changes in the East Asian strategic environment due to China's rise, coupled with Japan's long-term economic stagnation, Korea's entry into a low-growth trend, the resurgence of nationalism, and the emergence of new issues, East Asia is undergoing a process of dynamic transformation. In this reality, it has become difficult for Korea and Japan to develop bilateral relations based on past calculations of national interest. However, the strategic goal-setting and implementation by the governments of both countries currently bear significant traces of the old era. Japan's Abe administration is actively pursuing 'normalization' through a logic of nation-centric prosperity called Abenomics, military buildup, and security logic of strengthening its alliance with the United States, while domestically pursuing identity politics based on right-wing nationalism. The Park Geun-hye administration, by maintaining a hardline stance on historical issues based solely on anti-Japanese nationalism, has consequently weakened policy flexibility, resulting in limited strategic options. In this situation, looking at Korea-Japan relations, while short-term containment of conflict may be possible due to situational needs, it appears difficult to open a new era of full-fledged cooperation.

Six Tasks for Complex Resonance

Although efforts are currently being made by both countries to improve relations, as past experiences clearly show, it is difficult to expect significant results from a conventional approach that seeks cooperation based on narrow national interests while managing historical issues. The "two-track" approach currently pursued by both governments—resolving historical issues through intergovernmental negotiations while simultaneously seeking opportunities for security and economic cooperation—is insufficient to achieve desirable Korea-Japan cooperation in the 21st century. To usher in a new era and achieve transformation and resonance, both sides must address the following six tasks.

First, we must accurately read the transformation unfolding in 21st-century East Asia. While the changes currently experienced by both countries may not be on the same revolutionary scale as the transitions from antiquity to the Middle Ages or to modernity, they are civilizational changes of comparable magnitude, demanding new ideas and responses. The East Asian international order has been understood through the dichotomy of realism, dominated by power struggles and balance of power among great powers, or liberalism, where peace dividends spread due to deepening economic interdependence and win-win games, and where governance operates with horizontal networks among non-state actors as well as states. Recently, there has been growing interest in constructivist perspectives that focus on the differentiation of national identities. However, the reality is unfolding as a complex order where modern balance of power, post-modern governance, and differentiated identities are intertwined. In this context, the future of the 21st century can be gauged by accurately understanding how the leading, challenging, and middle powers of the current order perceive the new order and what principles and visions they are preparing for the future. In particular, the governments of Korea and Japan must accurately understand the complexity of policies where the US and China, while on one hand showing intense mutual checks and conflicts, are on the other hand pursuing exchanges and cooperation on various stages, and must jointly respond in a direction that minimizes conflict and expands possibilities for cooperation.

Second, the governments of both countries must establish a common vision for walking together into the future. By presenting a strategic vision that clearly outlines the direction and level of cooperation for Korea-Japan relations, they must be able to build trust in each other. If past Korea-Japan relations were based on the sharing of various interests arising from bilateral relations, future Korea-Japan relations must set goals and values centered on cooperation for peace, prosperity, and symbiosis in East Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, the future East Asian order should be transformed from a space of modern power politics dominated by power struggles and balance of power into a complex space where various actors are networked and horizontally coordinate and manage diverse modern and post-modern issues.

Korea must cooperate with Japan to deepen the Korea-US-Japan cooperation network while simultaneously expanding the Korea-China network, ensuring that these two networks do not conflict but coexist and are cooperatively linked. Both countries should deepen cooperation with the US as the axis of their alliance, while adopting a more inclusive approach towards China, considering China's security situation and economic interests from a future network perspective rather than a past Cold War perspective. Japan needs to carefully evaluate Korea's efforts to link China to the US-Japan network for the improvement of inter-Korean relations, economic revitalization, and the security and prosperity of East Asia, and understand that these network-oriented efforts contribute to Japan's national interests in the long term. On the other hand, Korea needs to understand that Japan has been in a competitive relationship with China for the past 150 years and faces significant burdens regarding the safety of its territory and people due to territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Based on such mutual understanding, Korea and Japan must build a complex East Asian network that embraces China.

Third, for Korea and Japan to share the macro and long-term goals presented above, efforts to reduce the existing differences in mutual perceptions between the two peoples are crucial. The lack of communication between the leadership of both countries and sensational media reporting in both nations have led to the spread of extreme perceptions of each other's national identity, resulting in the disregard of strategic perspectives or the shrinking of the domain of strategic thinking in the foreign policies of both countries. In Korea's case, within internalized anti-Japanese sentiment, there is a strong tendency to dangerously view Prime Minister Abe's historical actions, his push for constitutional revision, security policy shifts, and territorial policies through the prism of right-wing extremism, by excessively simplifying the political genetics of Prime Minister Abe. Conversely, Japan's perception of Korea also suffers from excessive simplification and a lack of objectivity. In Japanese society, phenomena such as 'apology fatigue' towards Korea or anti-Korean sentiment are emerging. With the spread of discourse about Korea leaning towards China and looking down on Japan, excessive simplification and a lack of objectivity are spreading, with sarcastic remarks that Korea is siding with China and criticizing Japan.

The core issue in current Korea-Japan relations stems not from existential differences but from epistemological ones. Therefore, efforts to reduce the perception gap are paramount. Korea must bear in mind that Japan's regional strategy or foreign policy is not solely a product of the Abe administration's specific policies; the containment of China centered on the US-Japan alliance and a critical stance towards Korea are likely to continue even after the Abe administration, and this is not solely due to right-wing tendencies. Japan also needs to recognize that despite the deep-rooted anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment in Korea, there are various sentiments within Korea, such as the consumption of Korean Wave (Hallyu), the study of Japanese models, and respect for the success of post-war Japanese economy. Various forms of public diplomacy are needed to reduce these perceptual differences between the two peoples. In the case of Korea-Japan relations, the most important aspect in conveying a favorable image of one's country is to help the other country accurately perceive the reality as it is. Measures must be devised for public diplomacy to enhance mutual understanding through the development of diverse content and the strengthening of media reporting responsibility, as well as for expanding and deepening exchanges among future generations. Furthermore, since the words and actions of political leaders are extremely important in shaping the perceptions of the other country, leaders of both nations must observe each other's circumstances and conduct with deep insight based on a broader historical and world view, and exercise caution in their words and actions to prevent the escalation of conflict.

Fourth, Korea and Japan must open a new era of cooperation by finding common interests to the greatest extent possible in security, prosperity, and emerging arenas. We must actively pursue Korea-Japan cooperation in established arenas, such as cooperation for peace on the Korean Peninsula regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and the future of North Korea, cooperation for regional and global security, the conclusion of comprehensive free trade agreements on a regional basis, and the design of institutions to prevent regional financial crises. Furthermore, emerging arenas, which are rapidly increasing in importance, have a strong "win-win" game character between the two countries. This is why there is great potential for cooperation in issue areas such as climate change, environment, advanced technology, energy, knowledge, cyber security, disaster relief, infectious diseases, and immigration. In the complexly intertwined established and emerging arenas, Korea must proactively set the framework for Korea-Japan cooperation and regional institutions by strengthening not only its hard power but also its soft power and network power, including knowledge, culture, and institutions.

Fifth, the biggest source of mutual distrust, which has become a core obstacle to cooperation between Korea and Japan, is the issue of past history. To resolve this issue, it is crucial, first and foremost, for the governments of both countries to make a political decision to liberate historical perception conflicts from domestic politics. If the governments of both countries incite or condone conflicts over historical issues to mobilize domestic support, the chasm of distrust will inevitably deepen. Furthermore, to avoid this, both countries need to establish a framework for historical perception and have their leaders confirm it, or, if that is difficult, at least create and announce to the public and internally a guideline that regulates the leaders of both governments to refrain from words and actions that could cause historical conflicts. This would help prevent government officials from expressing extreme historical perceptions that cause conflict and maintain a consistent historical perception, even if the government changes in either country.

Along with these efforts, both countries must develop a long-term strategy for historical reconciliation. To avoid the current reality of antagonism and confrontation between the governments of both countries over historical perception issues, historical issues should, in principle, be liberated from political and diplomatic agendas and returned to civilians engaged in historical research and education. Through accumulating experiences of private-level historical dialogue and joint historical development, mutual trust and solidarity should be built, and the scope of national understanding and empathy should be broadened. Within this context, both countries must abandon the attitude of viewing history too self-centrically, or perceiving the other party solely from the perspective of bilateral relations history. They must also move beyond a narrow view that understands the other party only through matters related to their own country and adopt an attitude of viewing the other party from various perspectives.

Finally, the ultimate goal of resonance between Korea and Japan should be the sharing of identity. If the identities of Korea and Japan have undergone several changes throughout their long history of over 2,000 years, another inflection point is now approaching. Only when the peoples of Korea and Japan come to possess a complex identity as members of individual states and simultaneously as members of the East Asian region will the long-standing historical conflicts and territorial disputes, which are zero-sum games between nations, find political solutions. Therefore, Korea and Japan need to pursue a creative project for building a regional identity that encompasses China from a long-term perspective. ■

*This commentary is a reconstruction based on the introduction and conclusion of the EAI Report on Korea-Japan Relations (forthcoming: authored by Ha Young-sun, Son Yeol, Lee Sook-jong, Lee Won-deok, Chun Jae-sung, and Jeong Jae-jeong).

[EAI Japan Commentary] is planned and presented by experts participating in the EAI Japan Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI). It provides a balanced perspective and analysis on key issues concerning Japan and offers opinions for the development of desirable policies. Please cite the source when quoting.

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