US-Japan Guidelines Revision and the Outlook for the Asia-Pacific Security Order

Author

Park Young-jun, Professor at the Graduate School of National Security, Korea National Defense University. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Tokyo. He has served as an instructor at the Korea Military Academy, a policy advisor to the National Security Council, a research fellow at the Korea-Japan New Era Joint Research Committee, and a visiting scholar at Harvard University. His main research areas include Japanese foreign and security policy, international relations in East Asia, and international security. His major works include "The Third Japan" (2008), "The International Politics of Security" (co-authored, 2010), "Japan and East Asia" (co-authored, 2011), "Challenges and Tasks for 21st Century International Security" (co-authored, 2011), and "The Birth of the Navy and Modern Japan" (2014).

From April 27th, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a state visit to the United States and held a summit with President Obama. Subsequently, the foreign and defense ministers jointly announced important documents, including the "US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines" (Guidelines 2015). While domestic media focused on whether Prime Minister Abe would address historical perceptions during his US visit, it is crucial for us to thoroughly examine the content of the "Guidelines 2015" and other joint documents, as the world's first and third largest economies have outlined a common strategic direction to anticipate and respond to future changes in the Asia-Pacific order and structure.

The Obama administration's strategic positioning in the Asia-Pacific region began around 2010. The United States has traditionally considered securing safety and security in both the Atlantic and Pacific as core objectives of its foreign and security policy. To this end, it formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, led by countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and pursued a strategy of promoting order and stability in the Asia-Pacific through bilateral alliances with countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia. While previous US administrations prioritized relations with Europe, President Obama began to focus on the so-called "rebalancing" policy towards the Asia-Pacific, driven by the region's economic vitality and the need for a strategic response to the rising China. China's ascent to the world's second-largest economy, its subsequent expansion into the East and South China Seas and challenges to the existing regional order, and the ongoing conflict with ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in the Middle East following the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, were all challenges the United States had to confront.

Through the "Defense Strategic Guidance" released in January 2012, the "Quadrennial Defense Review Report" in 2014, and the "National Security Strategy Report" released in February 2015, the US government has defined itself as an Asia-Pacific nation. It has consistently expressed its commitment to strengthening alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as partnerships with other countries, to counter China's rise and military buildup in the region, North Korea's nuclear and missile development and military provocations, and the unstable situation in the Middle East.

The Japanese Abe administration was one of the most proactive in responding to this US rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific. Prime Minister Abe, who took office in late 2012, may have been perceived by South Korea and China as a troublemaker due to issues related to history and territorial disputes, but he has pursued strategies and policies in alignment with the US regarding perceptions and responses to the Asia-Pacific region. In Japan's "National Security Strategy" and "Defense Program Outline" released in December 2013, Japan also identified China's naval and air force modernization and North Korea's nuclear and missile development trends as potential threats to the Asia-Pacific. In response, Japan announced its intention to enhance its security capabilities based on the concept of "Integrated Mobility Defense Power" and to expand security cooperation with the US-Japan alliance, as well as with South Korea and Australia. In line with this strategy, the Abe administration has pursued forward-looking security policies, including the establishment of the National Security Council, the decision to permit collective self-defense, the abolition of the three principles on arms exports and the adoption of new three principles on the transfer of defense equipment, and the enhancement of security response capabilities in space and cyberspace. While these policy packages are viewed by South Korea and China as moves towards becoming a military power, it is important to note that they reflect policy proposals that have been consistently made by the US political establishment since the "Armitage-Nye Report."

Amidst this mutual coordination, the US government granted Prime Minister Abe the honor of a state visit. Through his speeches at Harvard University and before the US Congress, and the promulgation of the "Guidelines 2015" signed by the foreign and defense ministers, Prime Minister Abe strongly asserted that Japan is an ally capable of contributing to the stability of the international order not only in the Asia-Pacific but also on a global scale. Compared to the previous revision of the "Guidelines 1997," the "Guidelines 2015" further strengthen the scope of the US-Japan alliance and the posture for combined operations.

While the "Guidelines 1997" envisioned the scope of the US-Japan alliance to include contingencies in areas surrounding Japan and direct attacks on Japan, the "Guidelines 2015" expand the scope of mutual security cooperation to include responses to armed attacks against third countries other than Japan, cooperation for peace and security in the regional and international security order, and security in space and cyberspace. When the 1997 guidelines were established, the Japanese government explained that "Japan would not engage in US military operations on the opposite side of the globe." However, the scope of US-Japan security cooperation has now expanded beyond the opposite side of the globe to include cyberspace and outer space.

Furthermore, under the "Guidelines 2015," the US and Japan have agreed to establish an "Alliance Coordination Mechanism" to discuss the operational division of roles between the Self-Defense Forces and the US military. Unlike the ROK-US alliance, the US-Japan alliance has maintained a system where both countries retain operational control individually, both in peacetime and wartime, which has often raised questions about the efficiency of combined operations. To address this issue, a joint operational consultation body comprising the Self-Defense Forces and the US military will be established at a central command post within Japan's Ministry of Defense.

Meanwhile, the "Guidelines 2015" do not explicitly state how the rising China is perceived or how it will be addressed. This appears to reflect the US's cautious approach, which also seeks to maintain cooperative relations with China. However, the "Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee" issued concurrently with the "Guidelines 2015" by the foreign and defense ministers of both countries explicitly states that the Senkaku Islands, which are the subject of territorial disputes between China and Japan, are covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. While the Japanese side's assertion of the need for explicit measures against China is not included in the main body of the guidelines, its inclusion in the joint statement of the 2+2 ministerial meeting represents a delicate compromise between the two sides.

Through these mutual agreements, the United States has elevated Japan's security capabilities and role, which were previously constrained by its pacifist constitution, to a level comparable to that of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany within the NATO alliance. Japan, on the other hand, has been able to accelerate its path towards becoming a normal military power, including the revision of its pacifist constitution, through the globalization of the US-Japan alliance.

There was intense interest in some US circles and in South Korea regarding the extent to which Prime Minister Abe's address to the US Congress and his speeches would include expressions of remorse and apology for historical issues. Aware of these critical opinions, Prime Minister Abe stated in his addresses to Congress and during the Q&A session at Harvard University that he expressed "remorse for the past war" and would inherit the views of previous prime ministers on historical issues. While these statements may not have been accepted by the Korean public's sentiments, they appear to have been perceived as a sincere effort from the US perspective.

We should pay attention to the relatively measured and calm assessment of Prime Minister Abe's US visit and speeches, and the globalization of the US-Japan alliance, by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, prior to his US visit, on April 22nd, Prime Minister Abe met with President Xi Jinping at the Bandung Conference and agreed on a direction for improving bilateral relations. President Xi Jinping, in his speech at the Boao Forum on March 28th, also presented a vision for building an economic community by 2020 that includes China, South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN countries. China's "China's Military Strategy," released for the first time by the Ministry of National Defense on May 26th, can be seen as a response to the US "National Security Strategy Report" released in February and the "Guidelines 2015" jointly released by the US and Japan. This strategy document points out that the US is strengthening its military alliances in the region and that changes in Japan's security policy are increasing regional instability. It announces the expansion of roles for the army, navy, air force, and the Second Artillery Corps under the concept of "active defense," while also stating its intention to pursue a "new model of military relations" with the US and military cooperation with neighboring countries based on the spirit of "friendship, sincerity, reciprocity, and inclusiveness." In line with this strategy, China is already pursuing cooperation amidst competition through strategic economic and security dialogue channels with the US, and practical dialogues between defense authorities to establish a maritime security mechanism with Japan are also underway. For the foreseeable future, a game of competition and cooperation is expected to unfold among major Asia-Pacific countries such as the US, China, and Japan to secure and maintain influence in the region, while preventing mutually destructive outcomes.

The coexistence of competition and cooperation, rather than unilateral confrontation or conflict, among the major powers in the region can create an opportunity for South Korea's diplomacy to realize its national interests. Within the remaining space for great power cooperation, expanding the horizon of regional multilateral security cooperation and forming international consensus on a direction for resolving the North Korean issue are crucial tasks that South Korean diplomacy should prioritize. ■

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