[EAI Japan Commentary] A Way to Resolve ROK-Japan Relations: Separating Summit Diplomacy from the Comfort Women Issue

EAI in the Media [Newsis] "ROK-Japan Summit and Comfort Women Issue Should Be Addressed Separately"

EAI in the Media [Huffington Post] "A Way to Resolve ROK-Japan Relations | Separating Summit Diplomacy from the Comfort Women Issue"

EAI in the Media [Naeil Shinmun] "Separating Summit Diplomacy from the Comfort Women Issue is Necessary"

EAI in the Media [Kyunghyang Shinmun] Where is Korean Diplomacy Headed? The Comfort Women Issue Stalemate Between ROK and Japan: Is Arbitration the Breakthrough?

Author

Cho Se-young, Special Professor at Dongseo University. He served as Director-General for Northeast Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (August 2011–July 2012) and worked at the Embassies in Japan and China. His publications include "50 Years of ROK-Japan Relations: A History of Conflict and Cooperation" (2014) and "Are They Trying to Lift the Seal?: Japan's Constitutional Revision Issue from the Perspective of the Japan-US Alliance" (2004).

The ROK-Japan summit, held eight times during the first two years of the Lee Myung-bak administration, has not taken place even once in the two years since the launch of the Park Geun-hye administration. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to speak of "normalizing ROK-Japan relations without summit diplomacy." Who could have imagined that the main theme of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic normalization would be consumed by "normalization of relations"? With the prevailing outlook that a turnaround in ROK-Japan relations is unlikely this year, two things seem clear. First, the ROK-Japan relationship under the "1965 system" will definitively end during the Park Geun-hye administration. Second, the current situation cannot be resolved with conventional thinking.

Japan's Transformation

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations, Japan, backed by a sense of debt towards its past and its advanced economy, had shown a certain degree of flexibility and magnanimity in its relations with Korea. However, this aspect has become difficult to find recently. In particular, the Japanese government's attitude in handling diplomatic issues between the two countries has shifted from the past, showing a tendency to actively question, assert, and not shy away from counter-responses. This attitude has been particularly evident in issues concerning Dokdo and the East Sea. In the announcement of the verification results of the Kono Statement in June of last year, Japan unilaterally disclosed diplomatic consultation details that had not even been declassified, launching an offensive on the comfort women issue.

Furthermore, trust in the South Korean government appears to have significantly weakened recently. Above all, the Japanese government harbors considerable dissatisfaction with South Korea's perceived tilt towards China. It also seems to have felt regret over the South Korean government's stance on various diplomatic matters, both large and small, such as the cancellation of the General Security of Military Information (GSOMIA) agreement just before signing (June 2012) and the commotion over the Self-Defense Forces' ammunition support for the Hanbit Unit in South Sudan (December 2013).

Meanwhile, sentiments towards Korea in Japanese society have significantly worsened over the past few years, with antipathy being starkly expressed, particularly regarding the comfort women issue. Conservative right-wing groups argue that baseless claims have been disseminated, damaging Japan's honor in the international community, and that Japan's sincere efforts, such as the "Asian Women's Fund," have been unjustly denigrated. Moreover, with the Asahi Shimbun's reporting error as a catalyst, these claims have gained considerable sympathy within Japanese society. While in the 1990s, when the comfort women issue first emerged as a diplomatic concern, there was considerable broad public support in Japan favorable to the issue, that sentiment has now dwindled to a minority. What is noteworthy is that even centrist and progressive forces in Japan, which previously supported Korea's position, now believe that Korea's attitude is excessively rigid, unilateral, and disregards Japan's sincerity.

It was expected that Korea would become more magnanimous towards Japan once it achieved economic growth with Japan's cooperation; however, the opposite has occurred: Korea's attitude towards Japan has become more rigid, and the general sentiment in Japanese society is that Korea now looks down on and disregards Japan.

Changes in South Korea and a "New Normal" in ROK-Japan Relations

In South Korea, dissatisfaction with historical issues and the Dokdo issue, which had to be suppressed under the "1965 system," began to erupt in earnest from the 1990s. This was an inevitable consequence of changes in the international landscape, such as the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, and the narrowing of the economic gap between Korea and Japan. Furthermore, with the realization of democratization and the development of the internet and social media, public opinion began to exert direct and strong influence on foreign policy. Public opinion demanded transparency and clarity in diplomacy, and political leaders became acutely aware of this, making it increasingly difficult to exercise flexibility in foreign policy. This trend has become particularly evident in ROK-Japan relations, where public sentiment is highly sensitive.

The phenomenon where emotional perceptions, rather than cool and rational considerations, dictate diplomacy is evident not only in South Korea but also prominently in Japan. The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, territorial and maritime issues such as the Southern Kurils and Senkaku Islands, and historical issues like visits to Yasukuni Shrine and comfort women are prime examples. This phenomenon has even led to the phrase "Japan's Koreanization" being used in Japan.

These changes in South Korea and Japan are not merely temporary phenomena. Japan's change in attitude towards ROK-Japan relations will be difficult to reverse easily, and it will be difficult for issues like Dokdo or historical matters to be suppressed as they once were within South Korean society. The influence of public opinion on diplomacy will also not weaken easily. It is possible that this "New Normal" state of ROK-Japan relations will continue until a new paradigm emerges to replace the "1965 system."

Therefore, a different approach is needed in policy towards Japan. It must possess both domestic persuasiveness that the South Korean public can accept and external persuasiveness that can convince the transformed Japanese society. From a broader perspective, the idea of setting aside current grievances for the moment cannot convince domestic public opinion. Merely attacking Japan by pointing out its past sins cannot garner sympathy from Japanese society any longer. The conventional approach will not work. Addressing what needs to be addressed based on right and wrong, and acknowledging what needs to be acknowledged, will be persuasive both domestically and towards Japan.

"Two Types of Persuasiveness": The Claims Settlement Agreement as a Test Case

The first test case for "two types of persuasiveness" is the ROK-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement. The current key issue in ROK-Japan relations is the comfort women problem. However, its core lies in the Claims Settlement Agreement and is intrinsically linked to the issue of forced laborers, being two sides of the same coin. Therefore, it cannot be properly resolved without comprehensively addressing the issue by tracing its roots through the Claims Settlement Agreement.

The Constitutional Court's ruling (August 2011) on the comfort women issue and the Supreme Court's ruling (May 2012) on the forced laborers issue acknowledged that the victims' individual claims for compensation remain valid. In response, the Japanese government directly refutes this, asserting that all claims between the ROK and Japan have already been settled through the Claims Settlement Agreement. In Japan, this ruling has led to criticism that South Korea's judiciary prioritizes public sentiment over inter-state agreements.

Meanwhile, South Korea's position on the Claims Settlement Agreement was clearly stated in August 2005 by the "Joint Public-Private Committee for the Disclosure of ROK-Japan Talks Documents." It stated that while the issue of forced laborers was resolved by the Claims Settlement Agreement, the issues of comfort women, Koreans in Sakhalin, and atomic bomb victims were not resolved. If this is the case, the direction of the South Korean government's response to the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court rulings naturally follows.

First, regarding the forced laborers issue, we must prevent a situation where the enforcement against Japanese companies, based on the Supreme Court ruling, escalates into a significant diplomatic problem between the ROK and Japan. To achieve this, the South Korean government must respect the Supreme Court's ruling while reaffirming its position that the issue has already been settled through the Claims Settlement Agreement between the two states. If necessary, it should also state that it will consider additional support measures for the victims. The utilization of the "Foundation for Support of Victims of Japanese Forced Mobilization," established in June of last year, could be one such measure. As an inter-state treaty has been concluded, it is appropriate for the South Korean government to fulfill its responsibilities, and this aligns with the interpretation of the Claims Settlement Agreement stated by the government. This must be explained and understood by the public. Despite potential backlash from victims and domestic public opinion, there is no choice but to persuade them with logical consistency in accordance with the government's stated position in 2005. Doing so will also serve as an opportunity to restore the South Korean government's credibility with Japan.

A Change in Direction for the Comfort Women Issue

Meanwhile, regarding the comfort women issue, since the South Korean government's position is that it was not resolved by the Claims Settlement Agreement, it must thoroughly press Japan on the interpretation of the agreement in accordance with the Constitutional Court's ruling. As Japan has not responded to the two requests for diplomatic consultations made under Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Claims Settlement Agreement, the next step is to request the establishment of an arbitration committee under Article 3, Paragraph 2. However, the current South Korean government is pursuing a different direction.

The South Korean government is demanding "sincere measures" from Japan in director-level consultations between diplomatic authorities. Furthermore, at her New Year's press conference in January, President Park Geun-hye mentioned that an agreement that meets "the public's expectations" must be reached. However, it is highly doubtful whether a resolution that meets "the public's expectations" can be achieved through diplomatic negotiations involving concessions and compromises. The Japanese government will never concede its position that the comfort women issue was resolved by the Claims Settlement Agreement. Therefore, it will attempt to resolve it based on moral responsibility and humanitarian measures, denying legal responsibility. However, South Korean victims and public opinion will not accept such compromise solutions. This is the same reason they opposed the "Asian Women's Fund" in the past.

Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the comfort women issue from scratch. The attempts at an indirect resolution over the past 20 years (South Korea's policy of not demanding monetary compensation and domestic measures to support victims, and Japan's Asian Women's Fund project) have hit a wall, and ultimately, the issue has returned to the interpretation of the Claims Settlement Agreement, triggered by the Constitutional Court's ruling. Thus, rather than seeking an indirect solution through diplomatic compromise once again, it is advisable to boldly shift direction towards requesting the establishment of an arbitration committee and directly confront the core of the problem.

This is an active implementation of the Constitutional Court's ruling and is consistent with the South Korean government's position on the Claims Settlement Agreement, thus holding significant persuasive power with victims and domestic public opinion. It proposes to settle the issue of differing interpretations of the Claims Settlement Agreement according to the agreement's provisions, which will be logically more persuasive to the Japanese side than demanding sincere measures as is currently being done.

Separating Summit Diplomacy from the Comfort Women Issue

Currently, the South Korean government is making the resolution of the comfort women issue a prerequisite for summit diplomacy. However, given the atmosphere in Japanese society and the Japanese government's stance, it is difficult to reach an agreement that meets "the public's expectations" in South Korea. Therefore, making the comfort women issue a prerequisite is by no means a method to enhance South Korea's negotiating power. Rather, it results in narrowing South Korea's room for maneuver. Furthermore, it is undesirable for the single issue of comfort women to entangle all of ROK-Japan diplomacy. Therefore, we must find a way to "separately address" summit diplomacy and the comfort women issue.

Requesting the establishment of an arbitration committee will enable this separate approach. It can be persuasively explained to domestic public opinion that separating the comfort women issue from summit diplomacy is not a concession to Japan, but rather an effort to properly address the issue of interpreting the Claims Settlement Agreement with Japan on a separate track from summit diplomacy.

Separate handling is also necessary as a basic principle of diplomacy towards Japan. While maintaining a firm stance on historical issues and Dokdo, cooperation should be pursued pragmatically in security and economic fields. However, this could be criticized as a convenient logic for Japan, allowing it to gain practical benefits in security and economy without showing sincerity on historical issues. Therefore, to secure domestic support for separate handling, it is necessary to clearly address issues like the comfort women problem while simultaneously cooperating in other areas. Employing separate handling based on right and wrong, while pursuing "two types of persuasiveness" simultaneously, is the new way of thinking to resolve ROK-Japan relations. ■

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