Kim Jong-un's 'Tojeong Bigyeol': Reading the New Year's Address Correctly

Author

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington and served as a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. He is currently a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council and a civilian member of the National Unification Advisory Council. His published works include "Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011," "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "Korea-Japan New Era and Symbiotic Complex Networks," and "World Politics in Transition."

Reading the New Year's Address Correctly

Every year, as the new year begins, I read North Korea's New Year's address as an annual event. This year was no exception. Last year around this time, I wrote a detailed article titled "North Korea's 2014 Maze: An Exegesis of the New Year's Address" (EAI Commentary No. 32, 2014/01/27) to introduce a method for deciphering the New Year's address, so I had intended not to provide repetitive explanations this year. However, due to the fact that many domestic and international analyses of the New Year's address are failing to grasp the core issues, I have decided to properly interpret North Korea's 2015 New Year's address before Seollal (Lunar New Year's Day) to divine Kim Jong-un's fortune for the Year of the Goat.North Korea's 2014 Maze: An Exegesis of the New Year's AddressThe basic framework of the 2015 New Year's address shows no significant changes. The address first evaluates 2014 as "a glorious year of victory that laid a solid foundation for hastening the final victory on all fronts of building a strong and prosperous state under the Party's leadership and demonstrated the invincible might of Korea," and presents the struggle slogan for 2015 as "Let us open the great path to independent reunification by uniting the strength of the entire nation in this year, the 70th anniversary of the fatherland's liberation." It emphasizes the strengthening of domestic, reunification, and international capabilities within the framework of strengthening the three revolutionary forces, which has guided North Korea's vision for the past half-century since the 1960s, as tasks and methods for its realization.

First Half Forecast: Risk of Weakened International Capabilities

To understand Kim Jong-un's 'Tojeong Bigyeol' for this year, one must correctly interpret this year's tasks and methods within the unchanging vision of North Korea. The first difficulty North Korea must face in the Year of the Goat is the risk of weakened international capabilities due to the deterioration of North Korea-U.S. relations. In his State of the Union address, President Barack Obama declared, with even greater confidence than in his West Point speech last May, that it is natural for the United States to lead the 21st-century world order and that the more important question is how it leads. He emphasized the combination of military and diplomatic power as a key means to achieve this. Specific examples cited include Russia, which prioritizes sanctions; Iran, which is in transition from sanctions to diplomacy; and Cuba, which prioritizes diplomacy. Although the United States does not explicitly include North Korea in its address, it has begun to systematically pursue a course of action aimed at ultimately handling North Korea through diplomacy, backed by strong sanctions.

President Obama, considering North Korea's cyberattack on Sony Pictures, the producer of the film 'The Interview' which satirized the assassination of First Secretary Kim Jong-un, as a significant challenge to U.S. national security, issued an executive order at the beginning of the year to add financial sanctions, which had proven more effective than expected in 2005, as the first step of strong sanctions. The United States is pursuing sanctions on North Korean human rights abuses, which have been actively discussed since the submission of the UN Commission of Inquiry report on North Korean human rights in February last year, and sanctions on North Korea's cyber capabilities, which have been deeply understood since 2010, in cooperation with allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia, as well as relevant parties including China. Finally, the United States is strengthening military deterrence through bilateral and trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Simultaneously, the United States is keeping the door open for North Korea-U.S. talks and the Six-Party Talks by demanding, as a prerequisite for returning to the Six-Party Talks, that North Korea take sincere and concrete actions toward denuclearization, even if immediate denuclearization is not possible.

North Korea has strongly criticized the Obama administration's North Korea strategy, calling it "a foolish attempt to foster an atmosphere of pressure through international cooperation" and dismissing the talk of opening doors for engagement and dialogue for denuclearization as a ploy to disarm the other party first, and characterizing President Obama's recent remarks on North Korea's collapse as a declaration that dialogue will not occur. The Kim Jong-un regime has stated that while it will prepare countermeasures against the various U.S. deterrence measures, including financial, human rights, cyber, and military sanctions, it is willing to halt its fourth nuclear test if the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, scheduled to begin in March, are suspended, and is ready to sit down with the United States at any time. It has also declared, "No matter how the international situation changes and the surrounding relationship structure shifts, as long as the enemy's schemes to crush our socialist system continue, we will unswervingly adhere to the military-first politics and the parallel development line and firmly defend the nation's sovereignty and the dignity of the people."

The most significant variable determining First Secretary Kim Jong-un's fortune in the first half of this year hinges on how successfully he navigates the waves of the U.S. policy toward North Korea. North Korea faces significant difficulties in strengthening its international capabilities due to the increased potential effectiveness of U.S. comprehensive sanctions compared to the past, and simultaneously, it struggles to find international support readily available for its parallel development policy. Therefore, if North Korea fails in its current efforts to minimize the damage from sanctions and commence negotiations under the most favorable conditions, its "defense of socialism" will face turbulent international challenges.

Mid-Year Forecast: Difficulties in Improving Inter-Korean Relations

Mid-term Outlook: Difficulties in Improving Inter-Korean Relations

Kim Jong-un's Tojeong Bigyeol forecast indicates that along with the difficulties in strengthening international capabilities in the first half of the year, the mid-year will bring challenges in improving inter-Korean relations for the strengthening of reunification capabilities. This year's New Year's address maintains the basic framework of last year's three principles of national reunification, struggle for the defense of security and peace, and improvement of relations, while elaborating on them in more detail. The New Year's address states that on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of liberation, to open the "great path to independent reunification," it is necessary to first remove the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula, ease tensions, and create a peaceful environment. Next, it emphasizes regime security in accordance with the three principles of national reunification—independence, peace, and great national unity. Finally, it states, "If the South Korean authorities genuinely intend to improve inter-Korean relations through dialogue, we believe that suspended high-level talks can be resumed, and partial talks can also be held. Furthermore, depending on the atmosphere and environment, there is no reason why top-level summits cannot be held." As prerequisites for improving inter-Korean relations, the New Year's address lists the suspension of ROK-U.S. military exercises, the prohibition of leaflet dissemination, and the lifting of the May 24th measures.

North Korea is proposing inter-Korean relations improvement not unconditionally, but as a condition for strengthening North Korean-style reunification capabilities based on the three principles of national reunification. Therefore, it is not fully accepting the South Korean government's various proposals for improving inter-Korean relations. Consequently, unless a consensus is reached between the South and the North on the basic principles for improving relations, even if improvements are made partially, there is a significant risk that they will be castles in the air, contrary to expectations.

Second Half Forecast: Limitations in Strengthening Domestic Capabilities

In the final assessment of Kim Jong-un's fortune for the second half of this year, the crucial factor is the extent of success in strengthening domestic capabilities. North Korea, which has maintained a fragile stability of its political system and achieved a certain level of economic growth since the execution of Jang Song-thaek, has called for "Let us all rise to the general offensive to hasten the final victory with the revolutionary spirit of Baekdu!" in its New Year's address, aiming to build a socialist civilized power in politics, military affairs, science and technology, economy, education, sports, culture and arts, and health, as well as ideology. However, as long as North Korea continues to pursue the parallel development line, now in its third year, international economic sanctions due to its nuclear weapons development make global economic assistance and investment, which are more crucial than ever, impossible. Consequently, with the existing strategy, substantial economic growth cannot be expected, and the path to becoming a civilized power in the 21st century remains arduous.

South Korea's 2015 Unification Policy

Amidst the prediction that Kim Jong-un's fortune in the Year of the Goat will face triple difficulties, for the Korean Peninsula's fortune to be auspicious, South Korea's 2015 unification policy must make triple efforts. First, cooperation with the United States is crucial for strengthening international capabilities. In the current phase where the Obama administration is pursuing strong comprehensive deterrence, we must proceed cautiously together to avoid discord, and in the phase of transition to full-fledged diplomatic negotiations, we must take a more active role. Furthermore, for the Korean Peninsula to transition from a sanctions phase to a negotiation phase, China's mediating role between North Korea and the U.S. must be supported. Also, to strengthen international capabilities, relations with relevant countries such as Russia and Japan must be closely intertwined.

For the improvement of inter-Korean relations, while the development of various exchange and cooperation programs that North Korea might find attractive is important, to translate these plans into action, a rudimentary agreement on the basic principles of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation must be sought. To this end, concrete measures that can promote improved relations, moving beyond the deterrence phase, must be prepared, and a full-fledged conception and discussion of a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, acknowledging each other's systems, is necessary.

Finally, for advanced unification on the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century, alongside strengthening international capabilities and improving inter-Korean relations, strengthening domestic capabilities is essential. This necessitates the urgent development of discourse and policies for a 'new unification' that transcends the outdated discussions of reunification between conservatives and progressives. More specifically, we must seek a 21st-century model of complex unification where the South and the North can function as one while simultaneously existing as two distinct entities.

[EAI Ha Young-sun Column] is a commentary series planned to seek practical alternatives through the analysis and outlook of Ha Young-sun, Chairman of EAI (Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University), on major domestic and international foreign policy and security issues. Please cite the source when quoting.

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