[EAI Japan Commentary] 2015 Relations between Korea and Japan: Can They Transcend the Legacies of Kishi and Park Chung-hee?

EAI in the Media [Newsis] "A New Era for Korea and Japan Begins, Possible After 2018 When Both Leaders Step Down"

EAI in the Media [Global Times] Korean Expert: Relations between Korea and Japan May Enter a New Era After Park Geun-hye and Abe Step Down

Author

Son Yeol, Director of EAI Japan Center, Professor at Yonsei University. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has served as a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His main research areas include Japanese politics, international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and global governance.

Retrograde New Year's Address

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's New Year's message, marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, is notably retrograde. Recalling the slogan "We can do it," frequently used by Coach Daimatsu of the women's volleyball team that won a gold medal through rigorous Spartan training at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, he expressed his resolve for a "year of reform." This evokes the glorious past when the women's volleyball team's dedication to the nation and people led to the success of the Olympic Games and propelled Japan to the center of the world stage.

President Park Geun-hye, struggling to escape the shockwaves of the so-called document scandal, reminisces about the South Korean miners in Germany and the foreign currency earnings from Vietnam during the "International Market" era, symbolized by the salute to the national flag, recalling the modernization of the nation. She delivered a New Year's address with a retrograde atmosphere, pledging a renewed leap forward for the Republic of Korea through the four major reforms and the three-year plan for economic innovation, driven by patriotism.

The future of the two leaders is regressing to a past fifty years ago, encountering Nobusuke Kishi and Park Chung-hee, the key figures of that era. Prime Minister Abe openly states that while he is the son of Shintaro Abe, he inherited the DNA of his maternal grandfather, Kishi. President Park has also recalled learning politics from her father and engaging in politics to politically vindicate him. However, Kishi and Park Chung-hee's approach to national development was based on the 19th-century doctrine of enriching the country and strengthening the military (Fukoku Kyōhei). If they faithfully follow them as political role models, it will be difficult to move forward from the confines of the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan, achieved through their mutual agreement in 1965. Both countries have made various efforts to improve relations, which are currently at their worst since normalization, and despite greater resolve in this 50th anniversary year, the outlook is far from bright.

Nobusuke Kishi's Legacy

Kishi, known as the "Yokai (monster)" of the Shōwa era, was a brilliant economic bureaucrat before 1945, leading Japan's industrial policy and being instrumental in the exploitation of Manchuria. After the defeat, he was imprisoned as a Class A war criminal but was rehabilitated due to the benefits of the Cold War. He rose to the position of Prime Minister like a phoenix and was a politician who led Japan's resurgence through high economic growth. He demonstrated the epitome of "enriching the country and strengthening the military" by promoting heavy and chemical industrialization through strategic economic planning in Manchuria, thereby expanding national defense capabilities and creating economic opportunities. After the war, within the constraints of the pacifist constitution and the pressures of the Cold War, he pursued a national strategy of entrusting security to the United States and focusing on economic growth. His insistence on revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, despite widespread public opposition, stemmed from the significant need for the U.S.-Japan alliance as a condition for enriching the country.

His ultimate goal was Japan's true independence, meaning opening the path to strengthening the military through constitutional revision, alongside enriching the country. Kishi engaged in efforts to revise the constitution under the pretext of solidifying the military alliance through treaty revision and amending Article 9 of the constitution to allow for the free use of force for the alliance, but his underlying belief was that independence would be complete only with a self-reliant constitution and self-defense. In this regard, rearmament and becoming a military power were moral issues for Kishi.

He often expressed the right-wing assertion that Japan's post-war mission was to widely convince the world that the intentions and actions of the past war were justified, and that Manchuria, as a field for experimenting with national harmony and royal governance, was a true modern state and a hope for Asia. As Prime Minister, he was the first to make two trips to Southeast Asia after the war, establishing the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund to provide aid and initiating substantive contact for diplomatic relations with Korea. This was an attempt to secure Japan's economic interests, similar to the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to build an anti-communist alliance in Asia in place of the United States. In short, Kishi set economic growth as a priority, strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance, and restored diplomacy with Asia as intermediate steps toward building a normal state and achieving true independence.

Shinzo Abe has inherited a strong nationalistic passion for Japan from his grandfather. The weekend after his landslide victory in the 2012 general election and reclaiming power, he visited Kishi's grave and pledged to inherit his predecessor's mission of "true independence." This implies a state of "normalcy," where "normal" refers to being militarily capable and having nothing particular to apologize for. This directly conflicts with the positions of South Korea and China, which consider a sincere apology for the past as a prerequisite for normalization. For Abe, one pillar of national strength is pride in one's country (patriotism), and the foundation of that pride lies in the blessings of the past.

Abe's Opportunity

During his first term in 2006, Abe fronted the ideological and foreign policy issue of "escaping the post-war regime" but lost public support due to his focus on economic reform and was ousted after only one year, a bitter memory he carries. Learning from this, upon his return to power in 2012, he reversed his policy sequence, adopting a strategy that prioritized the public's desire for economic revitalization and stable welfare. He expanded his support base by fronting bold monetary easing under the name "Abenomics" and participation in TPP negotiations as economic measures. After a landslide victory in the Upper House election in July 2013, he clearly revealed his move towards becoming a normal state by establishing the National Security Council (NSC), passing the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, visiting Yasukuni Shrine, and approving the exercise of collective self-defense.

Amidst this, as the economy declined and warnings of falling approval ratings emerged, Prime Minister Abe preemptively postponed the consumption tax increase scheduled for December of the previous year. He then dissolved the Diet, seeking a mandate on Abenomics, and achieved a landslide victory in the general election. With his coalition government securing a two-thirds majority, Abe is highly likely to win the LDP leadership election in September without significant internal rivals. Furthermore, with no prominent rival opposition parties emerging to challenge the LDP, a four-year extension of his term appears possible. However, whether he can achieve his goals of becoming a normal state and attaining true independence is a separate matter. In a parliamentary system, holding a majority of seats does not automatically make one a prime minister with presidential-like power.

First, the record-low voter turnout of 52% warrants careful consideration. The reason for half the electorate's non-participation was not political apathy but political distrust. According to an Asahi Shimbun poll, 43% of non-voters cited "politics will not change even if I vote" as their reason, and 18% stated "there is no party or politician I want to vote for." Furthermore, in this poll, a majority of voters who do not evaluate Abenomics favorably (51%) and do not feel the economic recovery (75%) cast their ballots for the LDP due to a strong distrust of the opposition parties. 72% of LDP voters responded, "Because the opposition parties are unattractive." Despite the overwhelming number of seats secured by the LDP, voter support is not solid.

The opposition Democratic Party gained 11 more seats but remains weak with only 73 seats, less than a quarter of the LDP's total. While they aim to rebuild the party under leader Katsuya Okada with a "return to the starting point" approach, they are unlikely to serve as a challenging force against the LDP in the near future. What is more noteworthy is the strengthened position of the Komeito party as a coalition partner. The pro-right-wing Your Party, which would have supported Abe's ideological projects, has been virtually annihilated, eliminating alternatives, and Komeito's position within the coalition government has further solidified. Prime Minister Abe must heed Komeito's voice, which has set limits on the reinterpretation of collective self-defense.

Although Abe holds an overwhelming two-thirds majority in the Diet, he does not possess a "concrete" base of support. His approval ratings are influenced by economic performance and the actions of the opposition parties. With Komeito being critical of constitutional revision, he is not in a position to immediately pursue the security system reforms he desires for a normal state. He will likely pursue economic growth through Abenomics over the long term, gain points through strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and diplomatic achievements, and strategically utilize the threats from China and North Korea to find the right timing for strengthening the military and revising the constitution.

Beyond Enriching the Country and Strengthening the Military

Abe is engaged in a four-year political game aimed at becoming a normal state. The reason Abe did not visit Yasukuni Shrine in 2014 was not due to disappointment from domestic conservative supporters, but rather a political calculation that intense diplomatic conflict with China and criticism from the United States would be greater obstacles on the path to becoming a normal state. In this regard, he will not be preoccupied with short-term achievements for the 50th anniversary of the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. Abe is demanding a forward-looking stance from South Korea on the comfort women issue as a condition for restoring relations, which are at their worst. However, he believes that the losses Japan would incur in terms of both enriching the country and strengthening the military would not be significant even if this demand is not met, making it unlikely that he will offer an apology that goes beyond the level of the Kono Statement. This situation differs from that of his grandfather, who had a strong need to align with the Cold War imperatives of the United States at the time, secure Asian markets, and join hands with Korea to gain strategic influence.

President Park Geun-hye is in a similar position. Designating 2015 as a golden time for reform, she is driving structural reforms in four key areas for economic growth and robust security, embodying the concept of enriching the country and strengthening the military. In this context, she does not have high expectations from Abe's Japan. Fifty years ago, her father needed Japan's economic assistance for national development and thus made the decision for the Korea-Japan Basic Agreement, despite compromising national pride. This situation is different from the present. If Park Chung-hee and Kishi needed each other, Park Geun-hye and Abe do not.

If both countries remain fixated on the growth-oriented concept of enriching the nation and the defense-centric notion of security, they will have little to expect from or offer each other. However, this is largely anachronistic. The concept of national power is changing in the 21st century, and we must adapt to the international political reality where soft power and network power, such as culture, ecology, norms, and knowledge, are increasingly emphasized, in addition to hard power like military and economic strength. Furthermore, the trend of the times is to pursue inclusive and sustainable growth rather than jobless or unbalanced growth, and to value coexistence with the region and the globe. In this regard, Korea and Japan need cooperation based on new ideas. On one hand, efforts should be made to depoliticize the comfort women issue and seek long-term solutions. On the other hand, constructive efforts should be made to select and address various post-Cold War and globalization challenges. If both countries cannot move beyond the framework of enriching the country and strengthening the military from the Cold War era, the opening of a new era for Korea and Japan will likely be postponed until after 2018, when both leaders step down. ■

[EAI Japan Commentary] is planned and published by experts participating in the EAI Japan Center. It provides a balanced perspective and analysis on key issues concerning Japan and offers opinions for the development of desirable policies. Please cite the source when quoting.

EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.