[EAI Commentary No. 34] The ROK-US-Japan Summit in The Hague and Seeking an Exit for ROK-Japan Relations Improvement

Lee Won-deok is a professor in the Department of International Studies at Kookmin University and currently serves as the Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Kookmin University. He received his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Tokyo.

On March 25th, in The Hague, a ROK-US-Japan summit, arranged by President Obama on the occasion of the Nuclear Security Summit, was held, narrowly achieving the first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan. As it was the first summit in 22 months and the first meeting since the two leaders took office as heads of government, it attracted unusual domestic and international attention. The scene where Prime Minister Abe used Korean greetings to express friendliness, and President Park turned her face away with a cold attitude, is highly impressive. It is no exaggeration to say that this scene symbolically represents the present and future of ROK-Japan relations. At this summit, the historical issues, the biggest point of contention between South Korea and Japan, were excluded from the agenda, and trilateral cooperation and collaboration among the ROK, US, and Japan were reaffirmed concerning security issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem.

Although this summit may have created some momentum for a slight improvement in the stagnant ROK-Japan relations, the path to restoring and normalizing relations remains fraught with difficulties. Despite Prime Minister Abe's promise in the National Diet to uphold the Kono Statement, there are internal discussions within the government regarding verification of the Kono Statement, and even if director-general level contacts occur from April, there is little prospect for a satisfactory resolution of the comfort women issue. As long as South Korea adheres to its principle of demanding Japan's correct historical perception as a prerequisite for improving relations, and Japan does not attempt a fundamental policy change regarding the comfort women and forced mobilization issues, the positions of the two countries will inevitably remain parallel, and public sentiment in both nations is likely to worsen.

Looking back, the fundamental cause of the worst state of ROK-Japan relations can be found in the lack of communication between leaders and the spread of extreme public sentiment mediated by biased reporting in the media of both countries. In other words, the current severe cooling of ROK-Japan relations is diagnosed as occurring from an epistemological perspective rather than an ontological one. What is more concerning is that a strategic perspective or thinking in ROK-Japan relations is being ignored or is gradually losing ground. Although issues of historical perception, security, economy, and culture should be treated separately, their linkage is actually deepening, and the favorability ratings of the two countries' publics toward each other are falling to dangerous levels.

South Korean Perception: Vigilance Against Abe's Japan's Return to Militarism

In short, South Korea perceives that Japan under Prime Minister Abe is heading down a dangerous path of right-wing extremism. The very words and actions of Abe himself have ignited this perception among Koreans. Prime Minister Abe has mentioned the possibility of 'retracting the Kono Statement' and stated that he would issue a new historical statement in 2015, revising the Murayama Statement. Furthermore, he is pursuing 'departure from the post-war regime' by attempting to revise the constitution and shift security policy, which have been carefully handled in Japan's post-war politics. In response, the South Korean media has collectively portrayed the Abe administration itself as a highly dangerous entity, while disseminating rhetoric that fuels a sense of crisis about whether Japan is returning to militarism.

As if to confirm these perceptions, problematic statements have recently emerged from the Japanese political scene. Prime Minister Abe's 'definition of aggressive war' remark, Mayor Hashimoto's 'comfort women remark,' and Deputy Prime Minister Aso's 'Nazi-style constitutional amendment remark' followed, culminating in Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine and moves to verify the Kono Statement. Moreover, the constitutional and security policy fronts have seen a series of unsettling developments. With the acceleration of fundamental shifts in security policy, such as the move to permit collective self-defense and the establishment of a Japanese-style NSC, South Korea's perception of the Abe government has decidedly tilted towards caution and concern. South Korea's perception of Japan is characterized by a tendency to simplify and interpret all of Abe's actions as extreme right-wing. Based on this perception, South Korea views Abe's historical rhetoric, constitutional revision efforts, security policy shifts, and territorial policies as a package of right-wing extremism. It is judged that President Park's reluctance to hold a summit with Prime Minister Abe stems from this perception.

Meanwhile, Japan's perception of South Korea also suffers from excessive simplification and a lack of objectivity. The recent rapid negative shift in Japan's perception of South Korea was likely triggered decisively by then-President Lee Myung-bak's surprise visit to Dokdo in the summer of 2012, his apology remarks to the Emperor, and his disparaging remarks about Japan. In addition, following the Constitutional Court's ruling on the unconstitutionality of the comfort women issue and the Supreme Court's ruling on forced mobilization, as pressure to resolve the comfort women issue intensified and demands for compensation to Japan surfaced, a phenomenon of 'apology fatigue' or anti-Korean sentiment emerged in some segments of Japanese society. Behind this perception lies an maladjustment to the fact that the previously vertical relationship between the two countries is gradually becoming horizontal, as South Korea has recently emerged as a strong competitor and rival to Japan. In other words, a sentiment of vague fear and discomfort regarding the rise of middle-power South Korea is surfacing in Japanese society.

Japanese Perception: Concern Over ROK-China 'Historical Alliance'

However, perhaps the most significant component of Japan's negative perception of South Korea is the theory of South Korea's tilt towards China. This perception was strengthened by the diplomatic activities and remarks regarding Japan made by the South Korean government leadership, including President Park. President Park has repeatedly stated that normalization of relations is difficult without Japan's correct historical perception as a prerequisite. Resentment has spread over President Park's open criticism of Japan's historical perception during summit diplomacy with major countries such as the United States, China, and European nations. Furthermore, the perception that President Park is intentionally avoiding summits and prioritizing China over Japan has become widespread throughout Japanese society. Japanese media and right-wing magazines have published special features fiercely criticizing the so-called 'ROK-China historical alliance' phenomenon that has recently appeared in part.

Japan's perception of China can be summarized as the 'China threat theory,' and the prevailing view in Japanese society is that South Korea views this 'dangerous China' too naively. Amidst the recent escalation of the Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan, it is true that many Japanese view China as an object of aversion. While China appears to have achieved high economic growth and become a major political and military power, it harbors numerous contradictions and problems internally, such as socioeconomic disparities, political dictatorship and corruption, ethnic issues, and a bubble economy. Yet, instead of being wary of such a China, South Korea is seen as pursuing an anti-Japan alliance in terms of historical perception and other issues.

What is serious is that these distorted mutual perceptions between the two countries are not subsiding but are instead falling into a vicious cycle over time. The biased reporting trends in the media of both countries and the lack of communication and dialogue between the political leaders of both nations are further fueling this vicious cycle. To overcome the recent abnormal deterioration of ROK-Japan relations and open a breakthrough for improvement, it is necessary to hold an early summit and seek solutions through candid dialogue on pending issues. However, given the current situation, considerable difficulties are predicted before a summit can be held. Until the centripetal force of the need for improved relations and cooperation can overcome the centrifugal force of deep-seated confrontation stemming from historical issues, it will be difficult to hold a summit for the time being.

Nevertheless, if a summit is held unexpectedly after overcoming various obstacles, the two leaders could pave the way for normalizing relations by achieving the following: first, confirmation of the Abe administration's stance on inheriting existing historical perceptions and policies; second, agreement on principles for resolving urgent pending issues in bilateral relations, namely the comfort women and compensation for forced mobilization; and third, agreement on adopting the 'ROK-Japan Future Cooperation 2015 Declaration.' If a meeting between the leaders is difficult, conversely, it would be possible to attempt to hold a summit after prior negotiations and coordination at the working level on these three points.

Division of Roles Between Government and Civil Society to Seek an Exit

In any case, with the upcoming ROK-Japan summit as an opportunity, both governments should strive to adopt the '2015 Declaration for a New Era of ROK-Japan Partnership in the 21st Century,' an upgraded version of the 1998 'Joint Declaration for ROK-Japan Partnership,' in 2015, the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations. Regarding the two pending issues of comfort women and post-war compensation, it is necessary to consider adopting an exit strategy that establishes a so-called 'New Joint Organization for ROK-Japan Historical Reconciliation' to conduct joint research and derive solutions by 2015, while government authorities focus on pressing issues such as security, economy, and culture. The composition of this joint organization should ideally include experts, legal professionals, and representatives from civil society from both countries, making it more comprehensive than existing history joint committees, which were primarily composed of scholars, and effectively operating as a track 1.5 initiative. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for its research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. EAI Commentary aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting EAI Commentary.