[EAI Commentary No. 31] The Path Forward for the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative: Maritime Territorial Disputes and South Korea's Trust Diplomacy

Professor Lee Sook-jong holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University and is currently a professor in the Department of Public Administration and the Graduate School of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University, and concurrently serves as the Director of the East Asia Institute. She is also a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council.

It is reported that the Park Geun-hye administration has launched a research team within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to flesh out the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the Northeast Asia Initiative). The current administration, which has emphasized trust in its North Korea policy, is also emphasizing trust in the Northeast Asia Initiative, which was one of the tasks of the Presidential Transition Committee. If trust exists in the Northeast Asian international relations, where interests are sharply divided, it can mitigate threat perceptions that are prone to exaggeration due to distrust, or reduce the possibility of small conflicts escalating into major disputes due to misjudgment of the other party's intentions. President Park Geun-hye has referred to the situation where conflicts and divisions persist in security and historical issues, despite deepening socioeconomic interdependence among regional countries in East Asia, as the "Asian Paradox." President Park believes that trust must be built to overcome this, and this initiative was positioned as a task of the Presidential Transition Committee. The government plans to build consensus among domestic experts and civil society once the logic of the Northeast Asia Initiative is refined, and to actively promote it to neighboring countries starting next year to gain their consent. Some have also proposed a roadmap, including the hosting of a Northeast Asia Summit, the adoption of a Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Declaration, and the establishment of a secretariat within the current administration's term. The countries included in this initiative are initially South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and Mongolia, totaling six countries (seven if North Korea is included).

As a result of sustained efforts to institutionalize cooperation in East Asia, numerous cooperation bodies have already been established, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). In the trade sector, not only have bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) proliferated like a spiderweb, but the creation of larger regional multilateral free trade zones such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is also actively being discussed. Despite the proliferation of such cooperation bodies, maritime disputes between China and Japan, and between China and Southeast Asian countries, as well as the conflict surrounding the Dokdo issue between South Korea and Japan, are unfolding in a very dangerous phase. Historical issues stemming from past colonial aggression remain unresolved, and Japan shows no signs of reconciliation with its neighbors regarding the issues of truth-finding, repentance, and compensation. Although there are discussions about creating an 'architecture' for security that can function properly due to the weakness of existing cooperation bodies, it is also true that the very discussion of what to create has led to fatigue, weakening institutional efforts. In this context, the Park Geun-hye administration's emphasis on 'trust' appears novel. However, when it comes to the methodology of how to build trust in the cold reality of Northeast Asian international relations, it fails to provide a clear answer.

Building Trust Through the Agenda of Territorial and Maritime Disputes Rather Than Comprehensive and Indirect Cooperation

While various ideas may be proposed, we can first consider what to avoid. It would be best to avoid comprehensive and abstract proposals. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who took office in December 2007, proposed the Asia-Pacific Community (APC) in June 2008, attracting attention, but made little progress with this initiative by the time he resigned in June 2010. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama also presented an East Asian Community initiative around his assumption of office in September 2009, but only left behind discourse as he resigned in June of the following year. In his second year in office, President Lee Myung-bak also announced a New Asia Initiative in 2009, but it remained mere rhetoric during his diplomatic tours. President Park Geun-hye's term is guaranteed for five years, which may offer better conditions than short-lived prime ministers under a parliamentary system, but even if this initiative is fully launched next year, only four years will remain. To avoid the Northeast Asia Initiative following the path of previous administrations, I would urge the government to institutionalize the initiative by focusing on one core issue from the outset, rather than pursuing comprehensive cooperation or premature community theories.

So, what issue should be the focus? A commonly agreed-upon idea is that cooperation on traditional security issues, where interests of Northeast Asian countries clearly diverge, will be difficult. Therefore, cooperation should begin on issues with relatively low levels of conflict and distrust, such as the environment, natural disasters, and cybersecurity. The idea is that if cooperation becomes habitual in various fields, trust will eventually be built. This is akin to the functionalist theory of peace, which posits that as economic interdependence deepens, countries will prefer peace. The biggest problem with this approach is that the deepening economic interdependence in the East Asian region has not led to trust-building that guarantees peace. Rather, we must not forget that diplomatic friction over territorial or historical issues has often delayed or thwarted economic cooperation. The discussion for a Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement, which began in 1997, entered the intergovernmental negotiation stage after extensive research, but was suspended in 2003 due to the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations over the Dokdo issue, and the agreement has yet to be concluded between the two countries. In essence, a cooling effect from security to economy has frequently occurred between Korea and Japan, rather than a spillover effect from economy to security. Looking at the current sharp conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese), it is concerning whether meaningful cooperation between the two countries will be possible in the future. The conflicts and potential for disputes arising from maritime territorial issues in Northeast Asia appear too urgent to bypass trust-building from a long-term perspective. Therefore, if the Northeast Asia Initiative aims to build trust to guarantee peace, it must directly address the root causes of mutual distrust and conflict.

If we are to start building trust on the issues with the least trust in the Northeast Asian region, we inevitably encounter two problems: maritime territorial disputes and historical conflicts. The historical issue concerns Japan reconciling with South Korea and China over the history of imperialist aggression. Over the years, efforts such as joint historical research between Korea and Japan and joint textbook writing have been made to reduce differences in historical interpretation and avoid biased historical education. Issues of human rights for victims, such as comfort women, have evolved towards pursuing multilateral solutions. Historical issues are resolved 'long-term' and 'voluntarily' as generations pass. While this may be a root of distrust at the level of public sentiment, it will not reach a level that escalates inter-state relations into confrontation and harms mutual peace. On the other hand, maritime territorial disputes are like powder kegs that could escalate into war, posing the most significant threat to regional peace. Therefore, the most crucial issue for the Northeast Asia Initiative to focus on for peace and cooperation is maritime territorial disputes.

The potential for maritime territorial issues to undermine peace in Northeast Asia and East Asia as a whole is structurally expected to increase. Let's consider China. The reason why China finds it difficult to concede on maritime dispute issues seems to be more related to domestic political circumstances than confidence stemming from its military power. As socioeconomic disparities widen, the conflict between pragmatic reformists and communist ideologues will intensify, and the ideologues will attack the ruling reformist faction for being weak on territorial issues. If the patriotic offensive of the ideologues intensifies, China will feel a strong political need to resolve the current situation following Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands. Let's consider Japan. Japan, which effectively controls the Senkaku Islands, can exercise its right to self-defense under its current legal framework. However, by passing collective self-defense next year, it may demand intervention from the United States in the event of a military clash with China. Leaders in Washington will strive to prevent military clashes between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands, but given that an accidental incident could trigger military action, they cannot help but be deeply concerned about this potential development. While the Dokdo issue has a low probability of physical conflict, if Japan aggressively pursues a case at the International Court of Justice, the conflict will intensify, and the possibility of specific right-wing elements engaging in provocative physical actions cannot be ruled out. The issue of the Northern Four Islands return between Russia and Japan, while the least likely to involve physical conflict among regional maritime territorial disputes, has remained one of the most important diplomatic issues between the two countries.

South Korea's Initiative for Trust-Building in Territorial and Maritime Disputes

There are typically two arguments against South Korea taking the initiative in Northeast Asian territorial and maritime disputes. First, would major powers like China or Japan accept leadership from South Korea, which is weaker than them? From this perspective, only a superpower like the United States can deter China's assertiveness in the South China Sea, preventing ASEAN countries from escalating maritime disputes, and manage Japan to prevent excessive reactions. This is a valid point. However, this is a negative prescription aimed at deterring physical conflict, not a positive prescription that prevents physical conflict through trust-building. China will not continue to tolerate the United States playing such a positive role near its own territory. In that case, can either China or Japan reach a grand compromise to maintain the status quo and prevent further clashes in the Senkaku dispute? It seems unlikely that the leaders of each country would accept domestic political criticism to offer such a compromise. From this perspective, South Korea's role is important. While South Korea cannot directly intervene in the disputes between China and Japan, it can lead the establishment of a multilateral dialogue on maritime territorial issues in the region. This is because South Korea is not perceived as a threat due to its weaker national power compared to China or Japan, and because each country holds a higher degree of goodwill towards South Korea than towards each other. Furthermore, South Korea, as a party involved in conflicts with neighboring countries over issues such as Dokdo, fisheries agreements, and illegal fishing, must engage in multilateral dialogue.

The second argument against South Korea taking the initiative in maritime territorial issues is that because this issue is directly linked to traditional security issues, no country, including South Korea, can begin substantive cooperation due to the nature of the problem. Maritime territorial issues are multifaceted. They are not solely about territorial claims or military strategy, which are difficult to compromise on. The utilization of marine resources, including fisheries, is divided into exclusive zones and joint zones. Joint development of seabed resources can actually increase benefits, and marine environmental conservation urgently requires multilateral cooperation. Therefore, in the case of territorial disputes, the primary goal of multilateral cooperation will be to manage them so that they do not escalate into military conflict, rather than to resolve them. In this regard, Northeast Asian countries have much to learn from the confidence-building process that ASEAN countries have undertaken. Although Southeast Asian countries' confidence-building efforts have been criticized for their weak binding force as legal and formal rules, they have established norms for the peaceful resolution of disputes through treaties and multilateral dialogues. For issues related to the utilization of marine resources, it will be important to establish equitable rules to adjust interests, and cooperation may be easier than for territorial disputes. Joint development of seabed resources and environmental conservation are likely areas where multilateral cooperation can be pursued relatively easily. Thus, maritime territorial issues encompass agendas of varying difficulty, allowing for cooperation to begin with easier agendas and build trust before moving on to more difficult ones.

Institutionalization Beginning with Trust-Building Among Political Leaders

Within the field of trust studies, trust has been discussed multidimensionally. From an economic perspective, trust is viewed as a strategy to reduce risk, emphasizing its outcomes in terms of costs and benefits. From an ethical perspective, it emphasizes the emotional state that arises through socialization within a structure of rules. A commonly cited definition of trust from the former perspective is Russell Hardin's "A trusts B to do x." This means that B acts as A believes B will do x, and A's trust is based on the premise that it is in B's interest to act in accordance with A's interests. Those who explain why people willingly take the risk of trusting others in their dealings do so by focusing on the utility of trust in resolving collective action dilemmas. A commonly cited definition from the latter perspective, which emphasizes dispositional or emotional trust, is by Denise Rousseau et al. According to them, trust is "a psychological state comprising the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of others." Confidence, a concept similar to trust, is based on the prediction that expected behavior will materialize, leading one to mechanically follow the opinions or actions of the other party without considering alternatives. Trust, on the other hand, is a belief chosen after considering alternatives, despite uncertainty about the other party's motives, intentions, and future actions; therefore, it can be withdrawn and is prone to being broken. While repeated positive experiences of exchange and systems with monitoring and sanctions play an important role in enhancing the sustainability of trust, in situations prior to institutionalization where trust has not yet formed, the trustor's willingness to take risks and extend trust is crucial.

Inter-state relations are ultimately conducted by political leaders, that is, people. Therefore, if the Northeast Asia Initiative is to be reflected upon from the perspective of trust diplomacy, a strong will or great courage on the part of the trustor to take risks and extend trust first is necessary. Viewed in this light, trust diplomacy, aimed at reducing conflict and guaranteeing peace, is more importantly about political leaders demonstrating trust to their counterparts first, rather than waiting for conditions to be created through functional cooperation. In the context of maritime territorial issues, as bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral summit diplomacy deepens and expands across multiple layers, the precedence of trust-building is essential for efforts toward institutionalization, such as the creation of an epistemic community, the formation of management mechanisms, and the establishment of common norms, to gain momentum.

Assets of the Park Geun-hye Administration for the Implementation of the Northeast Asia Initiative

With each new administration, new regional policies have been conceived and pursued. The scope of the region and South Korea's positioning within regional cooperation bodies have varied. The Kim Dae-jung administration positioned South Korea as a facilitator of cooperation in East Asia, the Roh Moo-hyun administration as a balancer among key stakeholders in Northeast Asia, and the Lee Myung-bak administration as a bridge connecting groups of countries with differing positions on the global stage. As a result of these diplomatic efforts, the Park Geun-hye administration has inherited South Korea's elevated status on the multilateral stage. The achievements of President Park in summit meetings with the United States and China during the first half of her term are also remarkable. In particular, the respect and goodwill that China currently holds for President Park personally will be beneficial in engaging China in the process of leading multilateral dialogues on maritime territorial issues in Northeast Asia. Diplomatic relations with Japan, which had deteriorated to their worst last year, must be normalized to lay the groundwork for regional multilateral dialogues.

President Park's domestic and international image possesses factors that can inspire trust in others, such as principle, integrity, and goodwill, thus providing her with valuable assets for engaging in multilateral dialogues in Northeast Asia. This 'trustworthiness' asset can be utilized in her leadership to extend trust to neighboring country leaders as she proposes the Northeast Asia Initiative. Becoming the first trustor entails two types of risks. First, neighboring country leaders may not respond positively to the proposal of the Northeast Asia Initiative imbued with trust, or may even exhibit more distrustful behavior. While unfortunate, this would result in nothing for President Park to lose. Second, the move to engage in multilateral dialogues for the management of maritime territorial issues may not receive domestic support. Given President Park's currently stable and high approval ratings, this is an unlikely prospect. Rather, the rise in approval ratings was due to the leadership demonstrated in the foreign and security policy fields since the advent of the Park Geun-hye administration; therefore, a meaningful proposal for the Northeast Asia Initiative is likely to be well-received domestically.

Proposing the Northeast Asia Initiative as a sign of trust diplomacy, beyond a calculation of these risks, has a beneficial effect on civic education. Empathy refers to an attitude of understanding the other party's perspective and viewing situations from their standpoint, and is effective in understanding different positions. While empathy does not necessarily entail 'sympathy,' or emotional agreement with the other party's position, it plays a crucial role in building trust by understanding positions that differ from or oppose one's own, thereby enabling continued dialogue. President Park's proactive practice of empathy can evoke a sense of inspiration and willingness to cooperate not only among the Korean people but also among citizens of neighboring countries. For the Northeast Asia Initiative to be distinguished from previous regional peace policies as trust diplomacy, the trust leadership of the leader, rather than institutions, is key. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is supported by a grant from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary].