[EAI Commentary No. 29] The Korean Peninsula After the US-China Summit: The Doctrine of Parallel Progress and the Tasks of the ROK-China Summit

The intense military confrontation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which lasted until late April, has ended, and a two-month diplomatic offensive is in full swing. Although it is a war of words without gunfire, its importance is no less than that of a military conflict. The diplomatic offensive, which began with the visit of Iijima Isao, Special Advisor to the Japanese Cabinet, to Pyongyang on May 14, has continued with the visit of Choe Ryong Hae, Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army, to China, North Korea's proposal for inter-Korean talks, the US-China summit, North Korea's proposal for high-level talks with the US, and the visit of Kim Kye Gwan, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, to China, and is expected to conclude with President Park Geun-hye's visit to China this week. Preparatory coordination for the new diplomatic offensive, set to begin in July, is fiercely underway, including meetings of the ROK, US, and Japan Six-Party Talks representatives, ROK-China representative meetings, and a press conference by North Korean Ambassador to the UN Shin Seon-ho on June 21.

North Korea's intention to pursue US-North Korea dialogue through China, using inter-Korean dialogue as a stepping stone, has changed as a result of the US-China summit. Without recognizing North Korea's parallel progress strategy, and in a situation where the US and China have solidified their joint commitment to denuclearization, the decision has been made to focus efforts on US-North Korea talks and Six-Party Talks for the time being, rather than on the stagnant inter-Korean dialogue. While China has agreed with the US on the broad framework of North Korea's denuclearization, it appears to be focusing on a faithful mediating role for dialogue, emphasizing the process of denuclearization through dialogue rather than denuclearization as a prerequisite for dialogue. In this process, South Korea's trust-building process for North Korea must lead the situation with correct principles, and the immediate task is the ROK-China summit.

Recently, North Korea's Ambassador Shin Seon-ho demanded the dissolution of the UN Command. This came five days after the proposal for high-level US-North Korea talks was made in a statement by a spokesperson for the National Defense Commission, and ten days after the collapse of inter-Korean talks. Going beyond the previous statement emphasizing "denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula," he raised his voice, stating that as long as the US maintains the UN Command, its "aggressive military tool," and continues its hostile policy and nuclear threat towards North Korea, North Korea will "never give up its nuclear deterrence." The statement, which claimed "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the last will of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il," reiterates the existing position by simultaneously proposing the denuclearization of the "entire Korean Peninsula," including US nuclear weapons, and a peace regime for stability on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, this should be viewed as a tactical first step to escalate North Korea's demands in the fierce diplomatic battle that will unfold.

The United States responded by extending sanctions against North Korea for another year, stating that North Korea continues to pose an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the US, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a presidential executive order. Meanwhile, on the 14th, President Park Geun-hye met with former Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and expressed her hope that "China would persuade North Korea to engage in sincere dialogue, not dialogue for the sake of dialogue," foreshadowing that cooperation between South Korea and China to resolve the North Korean issue would be a major agenda item at the bilateral summit on the 27th.

To consider how the ROK and Chinese leaders, who will meet and greet each other for the first time since taking office, should discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula, a careful review of the diplomatic efforts of the past month is necessary.

The US-China Summit and "New Model Great Power Relations"

US-China relations are a structural factor that determines the direction of Northeast Asian affairs. Therefore, the eight-hour conversation between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping on July 7-8 is of great importance. It is also worth noting that both countries, in their press conferences following the summit, described it as the most unique meeting in the history of US-China relations over the past 40 years and emphasized an unprecedentedly close communication.

The entire summit consisted of two official meetings, one working dinner, and a walk-and-talk session between the two leaders with only interpreters present. While the content of the three meetings excluding the walk-and-talk session was relatively detailed, it was introduced through briefings by US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and a press conference by Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi.

The first official meeting involved extensive discussions where the leaders of both countries explained the core content of their respective grand strategies and shared their vision for future US-China relations. Although no new content was discussed, the reaffirmation by the two leaders of the new relationship that both countries have emphasized since early 2012 enhanced mutual understanding and strengthened strategic trust.

President Xi Jinping focused his discussions on the "Chinese Dream" and the "new model of relationship between great powers" (新型大国关系). The Chinese Dream was summarized as national prosperity, rejuvenation of the nation, and happiness of the people. President Xi Jinping declared that China would continue its path of peaceful development and reform and opening up to achieve this dream. He also emphasized that a peaceful and stable international and regional environment is necessary for the realization of the Chinese Dream, and that China would contribute to this. The vision of a "new model of relationship between great powers," first mentioned by then-Vice President Xi Jinping during his visit to the US in February last year, was re-explained as the avoidance of conflict between major powers and the development of friendly relations. To this end, he emphasized that the two countries should not clash or confront each other, but should respect each other and achieve win-win cooperation.

President Obama emphasized the US's rebalancing strategy. The core elements are: first, strengthening cooperation with allies; second, building and developing partnerships with rising powers, especially China; third, strengthening regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit (EAS); and fourth, building an economic architecture for common prosperity. President Obama emphasized that the rebalancing strategy is not a containment policy towards China and that the door to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is also open to China. He also suggested that US-China relations should move towards "healthy competition" rather than "strategic rivalry," indicating no disagreement with President Xi Jinping's vision of a new model of great power relations.

The second official meeting, held on the morning of the second day of the summit, addressed various bilateral issues including economy, climate change, and human rights. Most of these were confirmations of previous discussions, but the new raising of cybersecurity issues in the context of intellectual property protection and the adoption of a joint US-China statement to actively reduce the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are noteworthy.

The most important outcome of this summit is the official reaffirmation by both countries of their agreement on the broad picture of building a new model of great power relations. This signifies that the trend of strengthening US-China cooperation based on the spirit of "seeking common ground while reserving differences" (求同存異) will continue for the time being.

The US-China Summit and the North Korean Issue

Within this broad framework, the North Korean issue was a key topic of discussion during the working dinner on the first day of the summit.

The US side, through its briefing, explained that during the dinner meeting, the two leaders agreed that the North Korean issue is one of the key issues for promoting US-China cooperation, and that they reached an agreement that North Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state and that denuclearization is the goal of US policy towards North Korea. It is noteworthy that the US emphasized that joint US-China efforts on the North Korean nuclear issue could become a leading issue in the new model of great power relations. They stated that the two leaders fully agreed to closely cooperate in implementing all sanctions against North Korea, including UN Security Council resolutions, to achieve the goal of North Korea's denuclearization. Furthermore, they emphasized that the two leaders agreed that North Korea must be continuously pressured to deter its nuclear proliferation capabilities, while clearly conveying to North Korea that nuclear weapons development and economic development cannot go hand in hand. It is noteworthy that the US explicitly stated that North Korea's parallel progress strategy is unacceptable.

China's reporting on the summit results shows a clear difference in tone compared to the US summary. First, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed to President Obama that China has consistently advocated its three principles for resolving the Korean Peninsula issue: denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. He added that the US and China have agreed on the principles and overall objective regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, and that China believes it is urgent to resume dialogue as soon as possible and wishes to maintain close communication and cooperation with the US in this regard. It is important to note that China's statement omits any mention of multilateral sanctions against North Korea, does not explicitly comment on the unacceptability of North Korea's parallel progress strategy, and emphasizes dialogue for denuclearization rather than dialogue predicated on denuclearization. Ultimately, regarding North Korea policy, China reiterated its three principles while showing a subtle shift in the emphasis placed on these principles.

Overall, there is a significant difference in positions compared to the US, which explained its policy goal as the denuclearization of North Korea (not just the Korean Peninsula), emphasized that it would make every effort to defend its allies from the threats posed by North Korea, and stressed that dialogue channels, including the Six-Party Talks, could only be activated if North Korea took concrete actions demonstrating "authentic" and "credible" dialogue. Furthermore, the US explanation that both the US and China share the same threat analysis regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons development, which is pushing Northeast Asian affairs in an undesirable direction, appears to be considerably distant from China's actual position.

What the US and China have agreed upon in terms of North Korea policy are the basic principles and final objectives for denuclearization. However, they still show clear differences in their specific roadmaps. The US views North Korea's pursuit of parallel progress in nuclear armament and economic development as impossible and believes that stronger sanctions and pressure are necessary. It also emphasizes that concrete actions by North Korea, demonstrating sincerity, are essential for resuming dialogue. China views denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a long-term task and maintains the position that it is most important to manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula stably by restoring dialogue channels as quickly as possible when North Korea shows willingness to engage in dialogue with neighboring countries.

Choe Ryong Hae's Visit to China and North Korea's Parallel Progress Line

China's emphasis on the urgent need to restore dialogue channels at the US-China summit began in earnest during the talks between North Korea and China during the visit of Director Choe Ryong Hae in late May.

According to Chinese reports, when President Xi Jinping met with Director Choe Ryong Hae on May 24, he explained China's three principles for resolving the Korean Peninsula issue mentioned earlier. In response, Director Choe Ryong Hae stated that North Korea hopes to develop its economy, improve people's livelihoods, and create a peaceful external environment (朝方真诚希望发展经济, 改善民生, 需要营造和平的外部环境), and that North Korea is willing to work with relevant parties to properly resolve related issues through dialogue and negotiation in various forms, including the Six-Party Talks, to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula (朝方愿与有关各方共同努力, 通过六方会谈等多种形式的对话协商妥善解决相关问题, 维护半岛和平稳定). In a meeting the previous day with Liu Yunshan, Standing Committee Member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, Choe Ryong Hae reportedly highly praised China's efforts to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, especially its efforts to resume dialogue and negotiation (推动半岛问题重回对话协商轨道所做的巨大努力), and stated that North Korea is willing to accept China's suggestion and engage in dialogue with relevant parties (愿接受中方建议, 同有关各方开展对话).

Interestingly, North Korea's summary of the same meeting is organized very differently from China's. North Korea only stated that they agreed to "consolidate and develop inter-Korean friendship generation after generation" and "exchanged views on issues of mutual concern regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula." These differing summaries clearly illustrate the gap in their positions.

China demanded that North Korea focus on economic development and improving people's livelihoods, rather than building nuclear capabilities, and return to the Six-Party Talks. In contrast, North Korea only mentioned economic development, improving people's livelihoods, and resuming dialogue, making it clear that it could accept principles 2 and 3 of China's three principles for resolving the Korean Peninsula issue, but not principle 1, denuclearization. As long as North Korea pursues the "parallel progress line" of simultaneously pursuing economic construction and nuclear capability building, it cannot possibly accept denuclearization, which is strongly demanded by all relevant parties. However, North Korea faces a dilemma: to achieve the economic construction aspect of the parallel progress line, it must show some sincerity in response to the prerequisite demand for denuclearization in order to receive necessary economic assistance from the international community.

This is the dilemma of the parallel progress line. From a political and security perspective, even if it conducts nuclear tests and missile launches, it cannot solely pursue strengthening nuclear capabilities because it needs to recover the economy. Conversely, although the normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the resumption of Mount Kumgang tourism, and reunions of separated families should be core agenda items for dialogue for economic reasons, the emphasis on the June 15 Joint Declaration and the July 4 South-North Joint Statement is unavoidable due to simultaneous political and security considerations.

Under the parallel progress line, North Korea must emphasize politics and military affairs along with the economy. The recent statement by the North Korean Ambassador to the UN again emphasized the "struggle to achieve brilliant victory in building a strong socialist economy and improving people's lives by thoroughly implementing the line of parallel progress in economic construction and nuclear armament," reaffirming North Korea's logic of building nuclear capabilities for economic strength. Within these structural limitations, North Korea, pursuing the parallel progress line, cannot realistically demonstrate the "sincere" actions that South Korea and the United States desire. Therefore, even if China strongly pushes its three principles in a situation where North Korea-US and inter-Korean dialogues are stalled, substantive Six-Party Talks are unlikely to proceed unless North Korea's Kim Jong-un regime adopts a new parallel progress line that does not include nuclear weapons.

The Four Principles of South Korea's Parallel Progress Doctrine for North Korea

So, how should President Park Geun-hye discuss the Korean Peninsula issue with President Xi Jinping?

The most urgent task is to establish the principles of South Korea's North Korea doctrine. As seen in the US-China summit, the US and China consistently present principles for their grand strategies and specific issues like the North Korean problem, and maintain their positions. Just as President Xi Jinping presented the Chinese Dream and China's three principles for resolving the North Korean issue to President Park Geun-hye, President Park should present South Korea's dream and explain the principles and process for resolving the North Korean issue. The trust-building process currently emphasized by the government is essential for adhering to specific principles. However, the mere design of a process to resolve the North Korean issue through phased trust-building, such as providing humanitarian aid to North Korea at a low level and then attempting higher-level economic cooperation if North Korea responds, is insufficient to overcome the current difficulties on the Korean Peninsula.

The first principle of South Korea's North Korea doctrine must be the denuclearization of North Korea for the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. The "Denuclearization, Opening 3000" policy of the previous Lee Myung-bak administration was a demand for denuclearization, stating that substantial denuclearization measures are necessary for full engagement with North Korea. The Obama administration in the US has a somewhat relaxed stance, suggesting that dialogue is possible only when North Korea takes concrete actions demonstrating sincerity, such as freezing its uranium enrichment program and observing a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, at a level similar to the February 29 agreement. Meanwhile, China holds a more relaxed position, arguing that if North Korea shows willingness and sincerity for dialogue, concrete denuclearization talks should begin immediately. The Park Geun-hye administration must determine the level of denuclearization measures it desires and seek cooperation with the US and China. Currently, it is necessary to align with the US while considering what level of denuclearization measures China can agree to. If the essence of the February 29 agreement was a freeze of the status quo, then North Korea's efforts to demonstrate a proactive willingness towards denuclearization, going beyond this, must be included.

The second principle is to support North Korea in pursuing a "Parallel Progress 2.0" that goes beyond the current parallel progress line of nuclear armament and economic construction, as a new strategy for survival and prosperity in the 21st century. Given the strict rules of the international community's non-proliferation regime regarding nuclear issues, it is practically impossible to achieve economic development while possessing nuclear weapons. However, merely conveying the message that the current parallel progress line is bound to fail will only intensify the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and will not be effective in inducing a move away from "Parallel Progress 1.0," as the parallel progress line has already been declared a "line" in North Korea. Sophisticated efforts are needed to present a blueprint, including discussions on a peace regime, that allows North Korea's political leadership to cautiously consider alternatives where security can be guaranteed without nuclear weapons. At the same time, it must be clearly stated that South Korea will actively support North Korea's efforts for economic development, improved livelihoods, and the creation of a peaceful environment. To this end, the relevant parties, led by South Korea, should jointly draw up a blueprint for a non-nuclear security-economic prosperity line.

The third principle proposes international parallel progress corresponding to North Korea's non-nuclear security-economic prosperity system as a concrete vision for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The current vision aims to overcome the "Asian Paradox" by gradually expanding the scope of cooperation, starting with areas where functional cooperation is easy. However, this has been criticized as an overly simplified design, both historically and theoretically, and requires more substantial supplementation. Expecting non-military cooperation to spill over into military cooperation underestimates the current severe security reality in the Northeast Asian region. The vision for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia must be structured in a way that integrates economic and security domains. From this perspective, it is necessary to develop an East Asian version of the parallel progress 2.0 proposal for North Korea.

The fourth principle is a phased approach to building trust on the Korean Peninsula. It is difficult to promote a new inter-Korean relationship that practically advances the three principles mentioned above by merely preparing trust-building measures limited to specific times and areas. The plan for building trust on the Korean Peninsula should be presented in a package form, encompassing various issues over multiple stages. While it is not necessary to include all issues in a single "grand bargaining" package, it is necessary to present a package that includes military, economic, political, and people-to-people exchanges, even at a low level of trust-building.

At the ROK-China summit, in addition to these four principles, attention should be focused on how to further develop the existing strategic partnership between South Korea and China into a new model of ROK-China relations for the 21st century, extending from the agreed-upon vision of new model great power relations that President Xi Jinping discussed with President Obama at the US-China summit. It is necessary to emphasize that East Asia is entering a new era and to propose pooling the wisdom of the Asia-Pacific region to build a new security and economic order befitting this new era, moving away from the traditional Cold War order. In particular, it is essential to seek ways with Asia-Pacific countries to resolve conflicts of core interests among regional nations multilaterally.

Repeatedly requesting China's role in resolving the North Korean issue at every ROK-China summit does not greatly contribute to presenting a new direction for the ROK-China strategic partnership. For close policy coordination between South Korea and China on the North Korean issue, building a stronger trust between the two countries is paramount at this juncture.

The Park Geun-hye administration must build a world, regional, and Korean Peninsula strategy with a broader perspective and pursue diplomacy based on consistent principles, so as not to repeat the history of 1972, when the US and China ushered in an era of détente, but the two Koreas failed to achieve reconciliation. ■

Chairman

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute

Member

Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Researcher at the East Asia Institute

Lee Dong-ryul, Professor at Dongduk Women's University

Chun Jae-sung, Professor at Seoul National University

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is supported by the MacArthur Foundation. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary].