[EAI Commentary No. 28] The Third Nuclear Test and South Korea's North Korea Policy: Seeking a Tripartite Comprehensive Response Strategy in Military, Economic, and Political Spheres

Various response measures are being discussed following North Korea's third nuclear test conducted on February 12. U.S. President Barack Obama warned that provocations like the nuclear test would further deepen North Korea's isolation, foreshadowing the strengthening of the Missile Defense (MD) system and a firm international response. China, through its Foreign Ministry's regular press briefing, emphasized a calm approach, calling for UN Security Council discussions that contribute to denuclearization and non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and peace and stability in Northeast Asia. South Korea stated that as the President of the UN Security Council, it would closely cooperate with the international community to take all necessary measures for North Korea's denuclearization. Some domestic voices have raised the possibility of postponing the handover of wartime operational control, considering the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, and even pursuing independent nuclear armament.

These response measures lack a comprehensive diagnosis of the situation. Before discussing response measures, it is necessary to understand the background behind North Korea's provocation and to accurately grasp the direction of the survival strategy pursued by the Kim Jong-un regime. Since the first nuclear test in October 2006 up to the third nuclear test, North Korea and the international community have been caught in a vicious cycle of UN sanctions, dialogue and negotiations through bilateral and Six-Party talks, missile launches, and nuclear tests. If we solely focus on devising countermeasures for the North Korean nuclear issue itself, we will, as always, be thrown into confusion once again by North Korea's 'peace offensive' following the nuclear test.

North Korea's Third Nuclear Test and the Nature of the Kim Jong-un Regime

To accurately grasp the intentions behind the Kim Jong-un regime's third nuclear test, it is necessary to carefully examine how North Korea's official statements regarding this test differ from those concerning the previous two nuclear tests.

First, in the statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson released immediately after the nuclear test, North Korea claimed that "the third nuclear test is a resolute self-defensive measure to cope with the hostile policy of the United States towards the DPRK," and stated that the purpose of the nuclear test was "to demonstrate the surging anger of our army and people towards the robber-like hostile acts of the United States and to showcase the will and capability of our Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the end." This is almost identical to the content of North Korea's official position expressed after the first nuclear test in 2006. Although Kim Jong-il has passed away and the Kim Jong-un regime has emerged, there has been no significant change in the analysis of international political situations and the pursuit of survival strategies from a Songun (military-first) perspective.

However, the next important point is that North Korea has begun to emphasize economic development along with sovereignty, using this nuclear test as an opportunity. In the Foreign Ministry spokesperson's statement, North Korea stated, "Our goal was to concentrate efforts on economic construction and improving the people's livelihood based on our self-defensive nuclear deterrence." This is consistent with the content of Kim Jong-un's speeches delivered twice in January. In his leadership speech at the National Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission on January 26, Kim Jong-un stated, "Our efforts to concentrate on economic construction so that the people no longer have to tighten their belts, based on our self-defensive war deterrence, have faced grave obstacles," indicating that the establishment of war deterrence, including nuclear capabilities, was originally intended to facilitate economic development. In his speech at the Party Cell Secretaries Conference on January 29, Kim Jong-un asserted, "Now that we have firmly grasped the initiative in the confrontation with the imperialists, it is only a matter of time before we achieve a breakthrough in building a strong economy and improving the people's lives."

Ultimately, it can be seen that the Kim Jong-un regime aims to achieve both 'sovereignty' and 'development' by "pursuing economic development based on nuclear sovereignty." It is clear that the Songun perspective still dominates the Kim Jong-un regime, as evidenced by his statement that "a nation and people who have lost their sovereignty are worse off than a dog at a funeral, a lesson from history," and that defending sovereignty is the "supreme interest" above all else. However, we must also pay close attention to the atmosphere that necessitates emphasizing the 'right to development.' In particular, the statement made at the Political Bureau meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee held on February 11, the day before the third nuclear test, is striking: "We pointed out the need to resolutely crush all the schemes of the anti-DPRK hostile forces seeking to isolate and obliterate the Republic through the glorious victory of economic construction and the improvement of people's lives." Responding to international pressure with economic development suggests that changes are currently underway in North Korea.

North Korea's Third Nuclear Test and the Future of the Kim Jong-un Regime

The problem is that it is impossible to secure both nuclear sovereignty and the right to economic development simultaneously. For North Korea to secure the momentum for economic development, external support through reform and openness is essential, but no country in the world will provide comprehensive support to a country possessing nuclear weapons. Only China, which seeks regional stability, can provide minimal support to maintain the North Korean regime. Even the development of the Wonsan area, which is being discussed in the Political Bureau meeting's resolutions, requires massive foreign investment to transform the region into a world-class resort, but this is impossible as long as North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.

The Kim Jong-un regime stands at a crossroads. If it continues to pursue sovereignty through nuclear weapon development, it will face increasingly stringent international sanctions. In the process of enduring these sanctions, North Korea will gradually become a 'vegetative state' and ultimately face regime collapse. To achieve economic development, comprehensive international support and investment are essential, and for this, abandoning nuclear weapons is unavoidable. The pursuit of economic development based on non-nuclear sovereignty is the only path for the Kim Jong-un regime to 'evolve' rather than 'collapse.' The Kim Jong-un regime is at its last chance to choose one of two paths, not to chase two rabbits.

The Park Geun-hye Administration's North Korea Policy and the Evolution of the Kim Jong-un Regime

If the pursuit of both sovereignty and development is the basic blueprint of North Korea's national strategy expressed through this nuclear test, then the response from South Korea and the international community must also be more complex.

The fundamental principles of the North Korea policy that the Park Geun-hye administration should adhere to in the future are self-evident: to guide North Korea away from its logic of survival based on nuclear weapons and military-first policy towards seeking a system of security and prosperity without nuclear weapons. First, the logic of rule of the Kim Jong-un regime, namely military-first politics, must be met with a firm response. Military and economic measures are needed to clearly convey the message that military-first is not a "powerful force that vigorously opens the path for the nation to forge its own destiny" or an "all-powerful treasure sword," but rather a 'cancerous cell' that will inevitably lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. At the same time, a clear message must be sent that if North Korea seeks to evolve from military-first to economy-first, South Korea will provide full support. The various attempts and policies pursued by the Kim Jong-un regime for economic construction and improving the people's livelihood must be actively and promptly supported.

To induce the evolution of the Kim Jong-un regime, two signals must be sent simultaneously: a firm response to the military-first strategy and a signal of full support from South Korea for the pursuit of alternative survival strategies. Specifically, a tripartite comprehensive response strategy encompassing military, economic, and political measures is necessary.

First, strengthening military deterrence. This is not only to clearly demonstrate the limitations of the military-first way of thinking but also because a firm response is necessary to protect national security. However, the independent nuclear armament or the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, currently advocated by some political circles, are not realistically viable options for strengthening South Korea's military deterrence.

While South Korea could partially enhance its deterrence by achieving a 'balance of terror' with North Korea's nuclear capabilities through independent nuclear armament, its value as a policy option is negligible when considering the overall costs involved. Pursuing independent nuclear armament would require confronting the global non-proliferation regime head-on and preparing for severe conflict and deterioration of relations with the United States. It should be remembered that when the Park Chung-hee administration declared its intention to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s, the United States initially responded with economic pressure, suspending support for nuclear power plant construction, followed by a halt in technology transfer, and finally, a severe ultimatum: the inability to continue supporting the modernization plan of the South Korean military, which was the most critical issue in the ROK-US alliance.

The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is also not a realistically feasible option. According to a report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service released in December of last year, since President George H. W. Bush declared the withdrawal and elimination of all ground and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons in September 1991, the United States currently possesses approximately 760 tactical nuclear weapons. Of these, about 200 are held by NATO air forces in Europe, and the remainder are stockpiled in the U.S. mainland for naval use. There are simply no ground or air-based tactical nuclear weapons available for redeployment to the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, President Obama, who is unfavorable towards the operation of tactical nuclear weapons, believes that extended deterrence can be sufficiently provided through strategic nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

Therefore, to realistically strengthen military deterrence, it is necessary to refer to the "Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)" proposed at the NATO summit in Chicago in May last year. The DDPR suggests the need for an "appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces" to ensure military deterrence in the post-Cold War security environment and proposes simultaneous capacity enhancement in four areas: MD, conventional weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, and arms control. Similarly, South Korea should strengthen its military deterrence by harmonizing a Korean-style MD, a conventional weapons deterrence system, and U.S. extended deterrence, rather than pursuing independent nuclear capabilities, in response to North Korea's escalating nuclear threat.

Second, economic measures. It is necessary to implement strong measures to effectively neutralize North Korea's military-first policy while also preparing support mechanisms in areas that can promote regime evolution and improve the living conditions of its people, adopting a complex approach.

First, given that North Korea has conducted its third nuclear test, financial sanctions and trade sanctions against North Korea must be implemented at a more strengthened level to block the flow of funds and materials related to missiles and nuclear weapons. In particular, targeted financial sanctions, similar to those imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau in September 2005, could be a potent policy tool. As evidenced by North Korea's strong demands for the lifting of financial sanctions through numerous official statements at the time, targeted financial sanctions can directly impact the Kim Jong-un regime by blocking North Korea's illicit financial activities. Indeed, in an April 2006 U.S. Congressional hearing, Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the U.S. Treasury Department, stated that targeted financial sanctions had successfully garnered broad international support and effectively blocked North Korea's 'proliferation-related transactions'.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that economic sanctions will again prove to be a panacea for neutralizing the military-first forces. This is because North Korea, which experienced considerable difficulties six years ago, has likely prepared various countermeasures in the interim. Furthermore, given that North Korea has been subjected to stringent international economic sanctions for nearly two decades, imposing even higher levels of sanctions is not easy. In particular, under UN Security Council Resolution 2087, unanimously adopted on January 23, a 'catch-all' type of sanction is already in effect, controlling the import and export of all items deemed to have potential military applications, including smuggling. From North Korea's perspective, there is nothing more to lose. Therefore, it is necessary to seek policy choices while recognizing both the effectiveness and limitations of economic sanctions. Ultimately, a complex strategy is needed that combines economic sanctions against the military-first forces with economic support to improve the living conditions of the people, thereby creating internal momentum for change in North Korea.

Third, political response. At the current juncture, it is important not merely to prevent North Korea's nuclear development, but to send signals that encourage North Korea to choose a path of regime evolution towards a security and prosperity system without nuclear weapons, moving away from its military-first policy. The collapse of the North Korean regime cannot be a desirable future for South Korea, considering the immense costs it would incur. While thorough preparations must be made for regime collapse and absorption, this should not be South Korea's fundamental unification strategy. It is necessary to create a new vision of "co-evolution" where the Kim Jong-un regime evolves instead of degenerating and collapsing, and along with this, a peace and prosperity system for the Korean Peninsula and East Asia is built through the joint efforts of South Korea and related countries. In this context, South Korea must send concrete and clear signals that it will actively pursue a complex peace and prosperity system involving North and South Korea, the U.S. and China, Japan and Russia, the European Union, and ultimately the UN, when North Korea seeks regime evolution.

To implement a tripartite comprehensive response policy in military, economic, and political spheres, a policy system that organically cooperates among the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Unification, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be established. Since South Korea desires the evolution of North Korea rather than its collapse, it must take military deterrence and economic sanctions measures to prevent the Kim Jong-un regime from pursuing the path of military-first, which leads to a dead end. Concurrently, a message must be consistently conveyed that South Korea will lead the establishment of a denuclearized security and prosperity system for the Korean Peninsula, which is a path of coexistence for both Koreas, and that South Korea will fully support the evolution of the Kim Jong-un regime if it chooses this path. In this context, as the Park Geun-hye administration repeatedly emphasized during the presidential campaign, it is hoped that South Korea will take what is necessary and discard what is not from past North Korea policies, overcoming the simple logic of sunshine and sanctions, and seek a path of common evolution on the Korean Peninsula. ■

Chairperson

Ha Young-sun, Chairperson of the East Asia Institute (EAI)

Member

Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI)

Jeon Jae-sung, Professor at Seoul National University

Cho Dong-ho, Professor at Ewha Womans University

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is financially supported by the MacArthur Foundation. [EAI Brief] aims to present in-depth analysis and relevant alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite [EAI Brief] when quoting. This brief is a revised and supplemented version of the [Special Interview Smart Q&A] “North Korean Nuclear Test and the Park Geun-hye Administration’s North Korea Policy: Diagnosis and Prescription” (East Asia Institute, February 21, 2013) by Ha Young-sun, Chairperson of EAI, and Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for Asian Security Studies.