[EAI Commentary No. 27] The Nuclear Security Summit from the Perspective of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official

Dr. Lee Sang-hyun holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently serving as the Director-General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit has successfully concluded. The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was an unprecedented diplomatic event in many respects. It was the largest-scale diplomatic event ever held in Korea. With the participation of 53 countries and 4 international organizations, it was the meeting with the highest number of participating countries held in a single nation, excluding the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, it was unusual for President Barack Obama, one of the busiest politicians in the world, to stay in Korea for three days and two nights, and for Chinese President Hu Jintao to stay for four days and three nights. Additionally, over the six days surrounding the summit, President Lee Myung-bak held 27 bilateral summit meetings. This is something no previous Korean president has ever accomplished. It surpasses President Lee's own record of 10 meetings during the G20 Summit in 2010, as well as the record of 14 meetings set by former President Kim Dae-jung during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 2000.

Beyond these external achievements, the Seoul Summit is evaluated to have yielded more concrete and practical results in addition to the achievements of the 2010 Washington Summit. The Seoul Communiqué, the outcome document of the summit, reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are common goals for humanity, and declared a shared commitment to nuclear security objectives in building a safer world for all. It also emphasized that states have the fundamental responsibility, in accordance with their national and international obligations, to maintain effective protection of nuclear materials, including those used in nuclear weapons under their control, and nuclear facilities, and to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear materials or obtaining the information or technology necessary to use such materials maliciously. At the same time, it reaffirmed that measures to strengthen nuclear security do not impede the rights of states to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Specifically, the Communiqué includes: ▲ Global Nuclear Security Architecture, ▲ Strengthening the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ▲ Protection and management of nuclear materials, ▲ Strengthening the protection of radioactive sources, ▲ Nuclear security and nuclear safety, ▲ Strengthening security during the transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, ▲ Developing national capacity for the prevention, detection, response, and prosecution of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, ▲ Enhancing nuclear forensics capabilities, ▲ Promoting a nuclear security culture, and ▲ Information security.

President Lee Myung-bak explained the outcomes of the summit at a press conference hosted by the presiding nation immediately after the summit. Firstly, the United States and Russia announced that they had converted over 3,000 highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons into low enriched uranium (LEU) over the past two years and plan to eliminate approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons worth of plutonium (68 tons) in the future. In addition to the US and Russia, eight other countries achieved the removal of 480 kilograms of HEU (equivalent to 18 nuclear weapons). Mexico and Ukraine returned all their HEU to the US and Russia. Korea, the United States, France, and Belgium agreed on technological cooperation, including joint experiments to convert HEU into high-density LEU. Furthermore, they agreed to increase the number of signatories to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to 97, the threshold for entry into force, from the current 55 countries by 2014, and to strengthen international norms and multilateral negotiation frameworks through support for the IAEA.

In summary, the Seoul Summit can be considered successful in addressing additional agenda items, such as the synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety, as a new agenda item. Consequently, it achieved concrete results, including discussions on the return of nuclear materials, the conversion of HEU to LEU, and the promotion of various joint cooperation projects. Moreover, the summit is evaluated to have significantly enhanced Korea's standing in the international community. Prior to the summit, on March 23rd, a Nuclear Security Symposium was held. In this symposium, which consisted of four sessions, approximately 170 representatives from international organizations, including the IAEA, and nuclear experts from 46 countries participated to intensively discuss nuclear terrorism threats and security, solutions to nuclear threats facing the international community, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The very fact that the Nuclear Security Summit was held on the Korean Peninsula, perceived as a vulnerable area for nuclear non-proliferation due to the North Korean nuclear issue, is highly significant. Hosting such a conference will undoubtedly serve as an opportunity to elevate Korea's national status and brand power. Korea has now reached a position where it is sufficiently capable of playing an active role as a proactive creator of global norms, rather than a passive beneficiary.

To properly evaluate the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, it is advisable to consider it based on several criteria. During the preparatory phase, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade recognized that for the Seoul Summit to be successful, it was crucial to advance the political commitments made at the Washington Summit to the stage of implementation. With this in mind, efforts were focused on including comprehensive and action-oriented measures. As a result, the Seoul Summit demonstrated that the commitments made by participating countries at the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit had achieved substantial progress. Of the 72 commitments made at that time, almost all have been completed or are in progress. Furthermore, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit emphasized the need to transition from political declarations on global nuclear security to practical implementation. It also successfully highlighted its differentiation from the first Nuclear Security Summit by expanding the agenda to include nuclear security, nuclear safety, and the protection of radioactive materials.

However, looking at the preparation process and the period after the summit, there are considerable limitations and challenges to overcome. One of the most significant issues pointed out during the preparation process was related to public outreach. The primary agenda of the Nuclear Security Summit was the prevention of nuclear terrorism, which is distant from issues directly related to Korea, such as the North Korean nuclear issue and ROK-US nuclear cooperation. Therefore, gaining public understanding as to why Korea was hosting this summit was one of the most difficult aspects. Nuclear security is, in fact, an area where even among experts, a conceptual consensus is insufficient. For this reason, during the preparation for the Seoul Summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade made efforts to gather broad advice and creative ideas, including holding plenary sessions of the advisory committee. Various events were also organized as side events, such as a mock Nuclear Security Summit for middle and high school students and a slogan contest, to raise public awareness.

A key future challenge is how to ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit does not end as a sporadic diplomatic event but becomes a sustainable non-proliferation mechanism. While the next Nuclear Security Summit is scheduled to be held in the Netherlands in 2014, there is no plan for subsequent meetings yet. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how to institutionalize the Nuclear Security Summit at the level of an international regime, looking beyond that point. Various alternatives are possible, but I personally would like to propose two. First, there is a need to actively utilize the G8 Global Partnership (GP) as a follow-up forum to build upon the achievements of the past two Nuclear Security Summits. The G8 Global Partnership was decided to be launched at the G8 Summit in 2002 and has since developed into a significant organization, with 23 countries contributing $21 billion. Although the GP was initially launched as a 20-year program, the G8 Summit in Deauville, France, in 2011 agreed to extend the GP beyond 2012. The GP is a representative framework for preventing the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a cooperative manner, as an extension of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Korea has also participated in the GP since 2005, contributing $5.5 million by 2011. The GP's CTR agenda ultimately aligns with the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit, as it focuses on the safe management and disposal of nuclear materials and the prevention of proliferation. Second, there is the option of expanding the non-proliferation agenda into the G20 framework, which Korea has already hosted. G20 countries possess 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and account for 70 percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80 percent of the world's population. Although the G20 is primarily a framework focused on international economy and global governance, if the perception that nuclear security is an important issue of global governance can be shared among G20 member states, there is no reason why nuclear security issues cannot be discussed within the G20.

Finally, we must explore ways to ensure that the non-binding Communiqué, a fundamental limitation of the Nuclear Security Summit, becomes a genuine international norm. For practical achievements in the removal and disposal of nuclear materials, the commitment of participating countries is crucial. Although agreements were made at this summit to bring the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) into force by 2014 and to voluntarily take measures to minimize the use of HEU by 2013, these are not legally binding, and it remains uncertain how effectively they will be implemented. Ultimately, the key lies in how effectively international leaders can build a global consensus on the importance of nuclear security. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is a core research institution selected for financial support by the MacArthur Foundation's 'Asia Security Initiative' program. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary]. This manuscript represents the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute.