[EAI Commentary No. 26] Putin's Return to Power and the Future of a New Russia

Professor Shin Beom-sik holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

Vladimir Putin, who entered the Kremlin presidential inauguration ceremony with a somewhat shy demeanor in March 2000, will return to the presidency in May with a seasoned and resolute appearance. According to the Russian Central Election Commission, candidate Putin secured 63.75 percent of the vote, decisively winning the presidential election against candidates Gennady Zyuganov (17.19 percent), Mikhail Prokhorov (7.82 percent), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (6.23 percent), and Sergey Mironov (3.85 percent). While some polling agencies had predicted that candidate Putin would narrowly win in a second round with support as low as the 40 percent range, or win comfortably with just over 50 percent of the vote, he ultimately achieved a landslide victory with nearly 64 percent of the vote.

Allegations of electoral fraud are not absent. International election observers, organized by bodies such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), raised concerns about the neutrality of the Russian Central Election Commission and its chairman, Vladimir Churov, and pointed to unequal opportunities for candidates due to media control, including television, during the election campaign. Even considering these criticisms, it appears highly unlikely that any other candidate could have overturned Putin's vote share. Furthermore, the Russian government made efforts to reduce allegations of fraudulent voting by installing surveillance cameras at polling stations and using transparent ballot boxes. Nevertheless, the absence of impartial adjudication has emerged as the most critical challenge for the future development of Russia's electoral system. Disputes over electoral fraud are likely to persist for some time, and protests by opposition forces in the streets are also expected to continue.

Domestic Political Implications

This election clearly demonstrated the deep psychological scars and memories that Russian citizens still harbor regarding the systemic instability of the 1990s. Putin, who came to power in 2000 by promising the construction of a "strong Russia" and "stability and order" after shedding the pathological phenomena brought about by democratization and market reforms during the transition of the 1990s, clearly understood the demands of the Russian people and the spirit of the times. He has now returned to power in the 2012 election, again campaigning on the themes of a "strong Russia" and "stable reforms." However, the new leadership must not overlook the fact that the demand for stability reflected in the popular vote this time differs from that of the past. While the demand for stability in 2000 stemmed from the suffering of citizens unable to endure the political disorder and near-anomie of the past, the demand this time is related to the desire for Russia's stable development and the restoration of its pride as a developed nation. Yet, Putin's campaign promises and policy orientations during the presidential election campaign give a strong impression of rehashing past platforms. The stage has changed, the audience has changed, but the same singer is still singing the same song. Whether by misfortune or good fortune, this song still seems to be accepted by the audience.

However, boos are already erupting from various parts of the audience. For someone who has enjoyed absolute power, consistently backed by over 70 percent support, such a reaction must have been extremely difficult to endure. The single tear shed by the "man of iron," Putin, at Manezhnaya Square after declaring his election victory seemed to reflect his inner turmoil. Yet, it is profoundly intriguing to ponder what this single tear signifies for the future of Russian politics. If it was a tear of resolve, signifying a genuine acceptance of the people's desire for change and democracy, and a commitment to become a communicative president rather than the autocratic leader of the past, then it would be a fortunate development. If, however, it was a tear of determination to wield the regained power to punish those who have caused him trouble and to advance new consolidation of power and control, then Russia is likely to enter a period of considerable political turmoil. This would simultaneously alienate and divide Putin's support base, which desires reform and development within stability, and lead to radicalization.

Therefore, is political change possible in Russia going forward? If so, under what conditions and circumstances? First, institutional changes are necessary to enable the entry of new political elite forces into the institutional political arena. The series of protests that emerged after last year's parliamentary elections not only demonstrated the rise of the middle class as a new political force in Russia but also raised expectations for the emergence of new political elites. The question is whether institutional changes will accompany this process to allow elites supported by the middle class to enter institutional politics. In this regard, amending election laws to allow various political forces to enter institutional politics and strengthening mechanisms for fair election management are essential. Consequently, Putin's victory should not lead to the consolidation of power by the old elites; rather, President Putin, entering his third term, needs to accept the task of managing new political shifts and creating conditions for stable political development, thereby minimizing the chaos of transformation. This is because such changes will greatly contribute to the development of Russian politics. Putin himself recognizes the urgent need to create new driving forces for the reform and modernization of Russia, which he strongly desires. Although political liberalization may not be easy in the near future, it is possible that the "wise leader" Putin will pursue a compromise-oriented centrism and balance that incorporates the demands of the youth and emerging elites.

Furthermore, the diversification of political elites and the growth of emerging mainstream forces are necessary. In this sense, it is noteworthy that businessman Prokhorov, running as a political newcomer this time, emerged as a new star by securing third place among the presidential candidates. While the second-place finish of Communist Party candidate Zyuganov can be explained by the existence of a stable Communist Party base, the emergence of a political newcomer who surpassed other established politicians in third place represents the Russian people's thirst for new political elites. Going forward, various emerging elites, including Prokhorov, who advocate for liberal democracy based on the middle class, will likely establish their initial political base through parliamentary entry, and thus must earnestly engage in the development of party politics for a new political era.

However, will they be able to win against the old elites? With Putin's election, the ruling elites, currently dominated by the Siloviki and Oligarchy, are likely to maintain strong influence for the time being. Yet, as evidenced by the street protests, a new counter-elite force is expected to gradually grow, supported by the highly educated urban middle class yearning for a new Russia. Therefore, competition between the new and old elites is expected to materialize gradually by the mid-2010s, with full-fledged competition commencing around the next Duma (lower house) elections. In this regard, the two Duma elections scheduled for the 2010s will be crucial junctures for future political change in Russia. If the entry of emerging elites into institutional politics successfully expands, the exclusive influence of the old ruling elites may weaken around the early to mid-2020s, potentially leading to a shift in the mainstream between the new and old elites. If the new elites form the mainstream, they are likely to strengthen the competitive system within the political institutions and become agents that accommodate the flow of capital and social changes that are becoming increasingly diversified. Alongside changes centered around these political elites, another crucial indicator of change in Russian politics will be the increase in the stable autonomy of regional governments. One of the most important tasks in establishing democratic governance in Russian politics is the issue of increasing the autonomy of regional governments from the central government and stabilizing their interrelationships. Considering Russia's characteristics as a multi-ethnic state, the question of whether Russia will achieve true national unity, beyond the passive goal of maintaining territorial integrity, can only be achieved with the support and coordination of these regional administrations. Therefore, the relationship between the center and the regions, along with the issue of elite and mainstream replacement in central politics, will be the most significant content of political change in Russia.

This election also demonstrated that the regions significantly influenced the election results. The anti-Putin protests and campaigns, intensified among the urban middle class, had limitations in spreading to the regions. It is judged that fear of rapid change is still strongly embedded in the minds of regional public opinion and regional elites. Some argue that the radical democratization protests in large cities had the opposite effect in the regions. Although research results on the voting patterns of regional voters in the last Duma election and the current presidential election will be released soon, it can be concluded that the regions were the largest supporting force that cast votes for Putin's presidency in this election. Therefore, new elites should not seek the solution to the problem of Russian political change solely in Putin's departure or in changes in central politics; they must present a vision for new center-regional relations and regional political change. If a democratic yet stable center-regional governance structure can be established by the early to mid-2020s, when a change in the central mainstream elite is anticipated, Russian political change will have a solid foundation.

Future Russian Foreign Policy

With Putin's return to power, there are high expectations that Russia's foreign policy will shift towards anti-Americanism, anti-Westernism, and belligerence, leading to widespread concerns about Putin's diplomacy. The elected Putin is likely to attempt to overcome difficult domestic political issues through foreign policy gambits. He will likely seek to establish a framework where Russia joins the United States and China as a global power. Indeed, during his presidential campaign, Putin firmly expressed his intention to deploy an additional 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 8 nuclear submarines, and 600 fighter jets to restore Russia's strong military power and to reinforce the vulnerable aspects of the Russian military. He also made it clear that he would not tolerate a situation where Western powers dictate Russia's affairs, openly expressing his displeasure with Western interference in internal affairs. However, it appears hasty to conclude that Russia's foreign policy is likely to lean towards anti-Americanism, anti-Westernism, and belligerence based on these circumstances. While Putin will undoubtedly strive to enhance Russia's image as a powerful nation and strengthen its influence, it is more important to note that Russia's national interests have not significantly changed compared to the past. Although it is true that President Dmitry Medvedev presented foreign policy with a softer image, even Medvedev's diplomacy was the result of discussions and compromises with Prime Minister Putin. Moreover, there are fundamental Russian national interests that remain unchanged regardless of who becomes president. In that sense, while Russia's diplomacy may change in terms of rhetoric or form, it is unlikely to change significantly in substance. Russia will continue its efforts to enhance its voice on global issues through strengthened energy diplomacy and military buildup, but at the regional level, it will continue to pursue pragmatic policies.

In particular, the strengthening of China's exclusive influence in the Northeast Asian region is not something that Russia can comfortably accept. Therefore, Putin's Russia will strive to enhance its presence and influence as a balancing power between China and the United States. Regarding Korean Peninsula policy, candidate Putin will fundamentally adhere to the principle of denuclearization and peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue based on equidistant diplomacy towards both Koreas. However, the possibility of Russia taking more active steps beyond this minimalist approach cannot be ruled out. In this regard, it is worth paying attention to how Russia will connect its Far East Siberia development plan with the North Korean issue. If projects such as the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline, development plans for energy, logistics, agriculture, and education in Russia's Far East, and the development of Vladivostok are pursued in a way that positively contributes to the balance of power in North Korea, the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia, Russia's position and influence as a regional power could significantly increase. In this context, Putin is also likely to actively pursue cooperation with South Korea.

Ultimately, what matters is not rhetoric, but how Putin, as Russia's leader, defines Russia's national interests and what policies he will pursue to realize them. Putin has already demonstrated his capabilities as a pragmatic diplomat during his previous presidential term, showing a willingness to cooperate with countries that recognize Russia's national interests and offer mutually beneficial proposals. Therefore, if the United States recognizes Russia's national interests and encourages Russia's constructive contributions as a strategic actor, a reasonable level of compromise and strategic cooperation will be possible. Similarly, the South Korean government has ample opportunity to guide Putin's Russia's foreign policy to constructively contribute to promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and building a unified Korea.

Conclusion

Russia is a vast empire. Empires often change due to their internal logic rather than external environmental shifts. In that sense, Russia's transformation will be driven by internal changes rather than external pressure. The song that will resonate in Russia in 2012, where Putin's return to power meets signs of internal change, may not be entirely new. However, it is crucial, both globally and for the Korean Peninsula, that the new leader, Putin, manages Russia's situation stably with "wise" policies that reflect and accommodate Russia's changes. Particularly, if Russia's foreign policy orientation supports stability and peace in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean Peninsula and aims for a balance of power among major nations, South Korea needs to further strengthen cooperation with Russia at the regional level. Specifically, strategic actions to develop Far East Siberia through cooperation between South Korea and Russia will not only contribute to the stability of Russia's domestic situation but also significantly contribute to regional stability and North Korea's transformation. It is hoped that the new leaders emerging in South Korea and the United States in the latter half of 2012 will properly assess Russia's potential for utilization at the global and regional levels, thereby strengthening positive cooperative relations with the newly formed Putin government. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's "Asia Security Initiative" program and receives financial support. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When quoting [EAI Commentary], please be sure to cite the source. This manuscript represents the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute.