The Dual Nature of the Party-State System Amidst COVID-19

[Editor's Note]

EAI is publishing a special commentary series of four articles titled “COVID-19 Shock and China,” offering expert analysis and forecasts on China, which stands at a crossroads of crisis and opportunity due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

1. Lee Dong-ryul: China's Foreign Relations and Korea-China Relations Post-COVID-19 Pandemic [Read Report]

2. Choi Pil-soo: Will China's Economic Standing Be Strengthened by the COVID-19 Crisis?[Read Report]

3. Ha Nam-suk: COVID-19 and China's Societal Response[Read Report]

4. Yang Gap-yong: The Dual Nature of the Party-State System Amidst COVID-19

This is the fourth report in EAI's special commentary series “COVID-19 Shock and China.” It features a special commentary by Yang Gap-yong, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, analyzing the evolving central-local government relations in China post-COVID-19. Unlike the United States and Europe, which fell into a state of 'social panic' following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, China, despite initially exacerbating the problem through undemocratic control, has managed to create a stable situation through the strong control of its party-state system. While the rigidity and authoritarianism of the party-state system have simultaneously revealed the crisis of epidemic spread and the efficiency of control, it is undeniable that this unprecedented disaster has caused some cracks in the credibility of the party-state system. Nevertheless, the author predicts that China's party-state system will strengthen its existing position through generational change while enhancing the adaptability of the regime to changing public sentiment by increasing the autonomy of local governments. However, the author points out that these new central-local relations could be a double-edged sword for the party. This is because in China, where there is a mythical belief that central authority must be strong, excessive strengthening of local autonomy could lead to social chaos. Therefore, the author argues that it is necessary to closely observe China's actions as it seeks the optimal central-local relationship after the COVID-19 crisis.

I. Impact of COVID-19 on Chinese Politics

The Dual Nature of Epidemics and the Party-State System

China's initial response to the outbreak was not sophisticated. It was more concerned with suppressing the spread of related news and identifying internal informants than with paying attention to the possibility of an epidemic outbreak. It did not show interest in building consensus governance for social prevention and control through the disclosure of epidemic-related information. Instead, it blocked and controlled the disclosure of epidemic-related information. The authoritarian approach of the party-state system exacerbated the problem. China's initial response provided an opportunity for the epidemic to spread. By the time the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic and officially recognized COVID-19 as a global issue, not just a problem for a few countries, the epidemic had already spread worldwide.

However, contrary to its initial response, China began to contain the epidemic within its borders in the latter half of the crisis by adopting the authoritarian control methods of the party-state system, prioritizing strong lockdowns. Unlike Europe and the United States, which fell into a state of 'social panic' due to the epidemic, China rapidly contained the spread and created a stable situation. The party-state system, which initially worsened the problem through undemocratic control, began to control the epidemic through strong control and efficient mobilization. This dual nature of the party-state system is perceived positively in China, as it enables strong and efficient control in unavoidable situations such as epidemics.

The mobilization system inherent in the party-state system demonstrated strong efficiency in containment and lockdowns. The dual nature of the party-state system, where undemocratic control and efficient mobilization coexist, was fully revealed during China's COVID-19 response. The narrative that although the authoritarian party-state system failed in its initial response, strong control proved more effective in the latter stages, has gained traction. The efficiency of China's party-state system is highly regarded, and the Chinese authorities are promoting it. This serves as a cautionary tale for the Chinese authorities on how to strategically utilize the dual nature of the party-state system in governance processes in the face of crises like COVID-19.

The 'Rally Effect' Towards the Regime and its Leader

Contrary to external perceptions, COVID-19 did not bring about rapid political changes within China. There was no systemic chaos, nor was there any noticeable erosion of leadership. The party-state system is functioning well, and President Xi Jinping's leadership remains unshaken. In other words, systemic instability or fluidity has not increased; rather, it has been utilized as an opportunity to enhance systemic adaptability. Despite external criticism, COVID-19 has paradoxically led to a 'rally effect' centered around China's regime and leadership. President Xi Jinping has enhanced his leadership by maintaining a low profile, and a new governance experiment is underway, mobilizing the party organization and its members to manage society.

Of course, it is undeniable that some cracks have appeared in the credibility of the party-state system during this process. Unlike SARS in 2003, personal social media platforms were highly active this time. News related to the death of Dr. Li Wenliang stirred up social media, and even online memorial services were established. However, the authorities responded with great flexibility rather than repression. It was a proactive response to a potential 'alienation of public sentiment' to manage public sentiment's movements so they would not directly translate into damage to the regime and leadership. The Wuhan city government's posthumous honoring of Dr. Li Wenliang and 13 others as 'martyrs' was also a result of proactive efforts to co-opt and manage public sentiment within the system.

Historically, China has responded to issues causing social unrest with authoritarian methods focused on systemic efficiency. However, as sources of social unrest like epidemics increase, social governance based on transparency, which involves the open disclosure of information, becomes necessary. Responding to these demands, China is pursuing a new approach to social governance during the COVID-19 crisis, combining authoritarian responses with attentiveness to public sentiment. During the COVID-19 prevention period, China sought to reform its social governance system in a direction that would relax the rigidity of the party-state system while listening to public sentiment. This movement can be seen as the first experiment in applying the governance issues proposed at the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee to concrete problems. A new experiment in social governance based on public sentiment is becoming a reality due to COVID-19.

Changes in the 'Tiao-Kuai Relationship' (條塊關係)

The COVID-19 outbreak originated in Wuhan. It spread from Wuhan to the rest of China and then to the world. During this process, the Wuhan city authorities became the focus of criticism, followed by Hubei Province and then China as a whole. This is a result of the approach based on the traditional central-local relations in China, known as the Tiao-Kuai relationship (條塊關係). However, during the COVID-19 period, the Wuhan city authorities could not take proactive independent decisions and responses. They had to report to their superiors and obtain approval. In a party-state system where accountability is crucial, the issue of responsibility is paramount. The Tiao-Kuai relationship, which emphasizes the 'Tiao' (條, vertical) aspect, leads to decision-making accustomed to vertical control. Lower-level agencies merely implement the decisions of higher agencies and do not proactively pursue matters independently, as they seek to avoid taking responsibility.

The Chinese authorities, judging the risks of COVID-19 and the potential for social disruption, imposed a lockdown on Wuhan on January 23rd and began efforts to contain the virus. On January 25th, they established the Party Central Committee's Leading Group for Epidemic Response as the central body to direct these efforts. This strengthened the vertical hierarchy for virus response at the central level. Such measures, even in emergencies, tend to revert to a system accustomed to organizational control, diminishing the importance of horizontal cooperation. During the initial outbreak, the lack of a functioning cooperation mechanism with surrounding regions or local governments resulted in less emphasis on mutual control and cooperation. Instead, the traditional Tiao-oriented approach led to repeated governance relying on orders from the center or higher authorities, based on vertical control, rather than autonomous mechanisms of horizontal cooperation. Of course, the mechanism of unified lockdown and control based on a vertical command system is highly attractive for epidemic prevention efficiency.

However, given that local issues are best understood locally, the command and cooperation systems must be improved to respect the autonomous decision-making of local governments for effective leadership. Even if vertical control is efficient, it should be limited to emergencies, and the governance of central-local relations should be improved to activate the 'Kuai' (塊, horizontal) aspect of horizontal cooperation systems. The COVID-19 crisis cannot be solely blamed on Wuhan city, as distortions or concealment of information could not have occurred under a purely vertical control system. COVID-19 necessitates a new 'Tiao-Kuai relationship' where horizontal cooperative relationships, allowing for autonomous decision-making, i.e., the 'Kuai' aspect, are institutionally guaranteed. In other words, it heralds the advent of new governance that enhances the autonomy of local governments without undermining the traditional 'Tiao-Kuai relationship'.

II. Prospects for Chinese Politics Amidst COVID-19

Enhancing the Adaptability of the Party-State System

As examined above, COVID-19 has fully revealed the dual nature of China's party-state system. The rigidity and authoritarianism of the system led to the crisis of epidemic spread, and its authoritarian nature allowed for rapid control and management of the crisis. Unlike the spread of epidemics in Europe and the United States, from the current perspective, China's party-state system's authoritarianism has demonstrated strengths in epidemic prevention. However, changing public sentiment has revealed certain limitations in the existing system's approach to factors of social instability. Some suspect whether China's party-state system is indeed corroding. In this process, China is expected to exhibit a very high level of adaptability.

There are numerous historical examples of the Chinese party-state system adapting itself. These include the pursuit of a republic to replace feudal dynasties, the bold adoption of capitalist methods when socialism proved difficult, and the acceptance of capitalists as Communist Party members when necessary. Therefore, if public sentiment becomes alienated due to COVID-19 and the party-state system erodes, it is likely that China will adopt bold and broad measures to incorporate the changing public sentiment into the system, thereby enhancing its adaptability. Furthermore, it is expected to overcome the current risks through new governance experiments that combine the proposed new governance models with concrete issues.

Despite efforts to enhance adaptability through governance innovation within the party-state system, distrust in the system itself has grown more than ever. In particular, the development of SNS, where individuals can access information autonomously, unlike the internet controlled by the government, poses certain limitations to systemic adaptability based on existing methods. That is, governance methods that preempt public opinion through one-sided propaganda are unlikely to achieve desired results in an era of changing personal social networks. Therefore, enhancing systemic adaptability is only possible through the expansion of autonomous spaces. In this process, how to internalize critical individual media will remain a challenge for the authorities.

Strengthening Xi Jinping's Leadership

During the COVID-19 crisis, Xi Jinping demonstrated his leadership by maintaining a low profile. While he presided over numerous Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee meetings and issued directives, thereby making his presence felt, his direct on-site visits were limited to a tour of Beijing on February 10th and a visit to Wuhan on March 10th. The fact that his leadership remains intact is due to a unique, almost 'faith-like' belief in the absolute authority of the central government in China. The continued stability of the leadership centered around Xi Jinping, even during the replacement of officials in Hubei Province and Wuhan city during the COVID-19 crisis, is based on this almost mystical 'faith' in the center. Instead, responsibility for the problems is concentrated at the local level, and the situation is resolved by replacing local leaders.

As the top leader, Xi Jinping faces the critical task of putting economic and social development back on track and achieving 'decisive results' in 2020, alongside the response to COVID-19. Regardless of the reasons, the deaths of over 3,000 'people' due to the epidemic represent a political and humanitarian responsibility. Even if dismissed as an unavoidable disaster, it is an irreversible tragedy for the supreme leader responsible for the well-being of the 'people.' While the party-state system may have achieved some success in crisis management by mobilizing party organizations and members, the 'alienation of public sentiment' is a negative factor for maintaining leadership. In particular, any manifestation of doubt regarding the supreme leader's leadership erodes the ruling legitimacy of the party-state system.

In contrast to the near 'faith-like' belief in the central government, trust in officials at various levels is very weak. The central government has mostly mitigated the impact of public anger directed at these officials by replacing them. From Xi Jinping's perspective, to innovate the atmosphere created by COVID-19 and restore new development momentum, a bold generational change and reshuffling of the cadre corps are necessary. In particular, it is highly likely that the authorities will use the card of 'reinforcement' by clearly distinguishing achievements and failures in the process of overcoming COVID-19 among officials at all levels of local government. In this process, the promotion of young cadres, especially those born in the '70s, is anticipated to achieve the dual goals of generational change and innovation. This will be closely linked to the possibility of extending Xi Jinping's term in office, and thus they will be given significant importance. To this end, the role of the party will be strengthened, and ideology, propaganda, and thought emphasizing the firm consolidation of the 'core' status will be intensified.

Enhancing the Proactiveness of Local Governments

In March 2018, the First Session of the 13th National People's Congress passed a measure granting legislative power to prefectural-level city governments. This institutionalized the ability of local governments to autonomously decide and implement their affairs through legislation when necessary, such as for attracting foreign investment or establishing special economic zones. Through COVID-19, the demand for increased autonomy for local governments has grown, not only in areas like foreign investment and special zones but also in various social issues. The authorities are likely to respond proactively to these trends and significantly expand the scope of autonomy for local governments. China, judging that Wuhan city's response to the virus was inadequate, is likely to grant local governments a broader scope for autonomous decision-making, both to alleviate the burden on the central government and to contain criticism directed at the center at the local level.

This heralds a new change in central-local relations, represented by the existing 'Tiao-Kuai relationship.' The new central-local governance through changes in the 'Tiao-Kuai relationship' will materialize as an enhancement of local government autonomy, and efforts to establish the legal and institutional framework to enable this will likely be undertaken. This will manifest as measures that reduce the burden on the central government while somewhat increasing local autonomy. Experiments with local government bond issuance are already underway. These measures aim to proactively enhance the autonomy of local governments, which tend to rely solely on central government directives, in order to maintain central authority. Institutionalization through legislation at the National People's Congress is expected. The increase in local government autonomy signifies a gradual reduction in the vertical control relationship (條) with the center and a strengthening of autonomous control mechanisms based on horizontal cooperative relationships (塊) among local governments.

Enhancing the proactiveness or autonomy of local governments is a double-edged sword for the authorities. China holds a kind of mythical belief that central authority must be strong. There is also a concern that excessive strengthening of local autonomy could fuel social chaos. Therefore, adjusting the weaknesses of the central-local relationship, which has been heavily reliant on vertical control as highlighted by COVID-19, through increased local government autonomy carries certain risks. Nevertheless, given the widespread recognition that the excessive emphasis on 'Tiao' in the 'Tiao-Kuai relationship' is suppressing the autonomy of 'Kuai,' it is clear that the current challenge for Chinese authorities is to create an optimal alternative for central-local relations. It remains to be observed whether this alternative will manifest as increased autonomy for local governments. ■

■ Author: Yang Gap-yong_ Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Fudan University, specializing in Chinese government and politics. He has previously served as an HK Professor at the Center for Chinese Humanities and Social Sciences at Kookmin University and as Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at Sungkyunkwan University. His recent translated works include <Modern Chinese Politics> (co-translated), and his authored works include <China's Regime Legitimacy and Elite Politics>.

■ Editor: Yoon Jun-il EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) junilyoon@eai.or.kr

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