[EAI Special Commentary Series - COVID-19 Shock and China] ③ COVID-19 and the Response of Chinese Society

[Editor's Note]

EAI is publishing a special commentary series of four articles titled "COVID-19 Shock and China," offering expert analysis and forecasts on China, which stands at a crossroads of crisis and opportunity due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

1. Lee Dong-ryul: The Impact and Outlook of COVID-19 on China's Foreign Relations and Korea-China Relations [Read Report]

2. Choi Pil-soo: Will the COVID-19 Pandemic Strengthen China's Economic Standing?[Read Report]

3. Ha Nam-seok: COVID-19 and the Response of Chinese Society

4. Yang Gap-yong: The Dual Nature of the Party-State System Changing Due to COVID-19[Read Report]

This is the third report in EAI's Special Commentary Series "COVID-19 Shock and China." It features a special commentary by a professor at the University of Seoul who studied the COVID-19 pandemic and public sentiment within Chinese society. This commentary analyzes the Chinese authorities' crisis response and the continuity and changes in public sentiment by comparing the unprecedented COVID-19 crisis, which could have led to a regime crisis, with the situation during the SARS outbreak. The author argues that in China, where information control is commonplace, whistleblowers have always been the ones to expose the reality of national crises. Whenever public sentiment was shaken by whistleblowing, the authorities have appeased angry public opinion by 'scapegoating' and 'hero-making.' In the current COVID-19 situation, the Chinese authorities similarly appointed scapegoats through disciplinary actions and appeased public sentiment by elevating Dr. Li Wenliang, who first revealed that COVID-19 was similar to SARS and later died from the infection while treating patients, to the status of a national hero. Furthermore, as developed countries including the United States and Europe struggled with epidemic prevention, the crisis stemming from COVID-19 in China is evolving into regime confidence. The author predicts that Xi Jinping's position will not be shaken by the COVID-19 crisis, but argues that unlike during the SARS outbreak, online public sentiment is not easily subdued, making China's future response to the anticipated economic and social crises after COVID-19 the key to restoring public trust.

I. The Shock of the COVID-19 Virus

2019 was a year that brought many hardships to China. Among the Chinese people, the saying "When you meet a nine, there will surely be chaos (逢九必亂)" has been circulating, implying that since the founding of the People's Republic of China, years ending in nine have always brought great difficulties to the nation. 2019 was no exception. Amidst the escalating US-China trade dispute, protests against the 'Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (反送中)' spread in Hong Kong, and news emerged of an acute respiratory illness originating in Wuhan, Hubei Province. Although it was initially reported in December that this viral illness was not transmissible between humans, this information was incorrect. It subsequently spread rapidly, transcending the year and sending shockwaves not only through China but across the globe.

While China has experienced several significant events that could be considered serious threats to the regime, such as the large-scale protests in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur issue, these were not perceived as major crises due to strong patriotism and nationalism within China. However, the COVID-19 situation is somewhat different. Although it is true that as China recovers and Western countries like the US and Europe fail in epidemic prevention after the pandemic was declared, regime confidence is being restored. Nevertheless, it is also true that initial failures in epidemic prevention, the collapse of the healthcare system in Wuhan and Hubei Province, and the subsequent numerous deaths, leading to the lockdown of the country, showed signs of the COVID-19 crisis developing into a regime crisis. Following the outbreak, the sentiment of the Chinese people was worse than during various disasters and safety issues China had faced in the 21st century, such as the Wenchuan earthquake, the melamine milk scandal, and the SARS outbreak. The unprecedented epidemic originating in Wuhan was considered the greatest risk since Xi Jinping came to power.

One reason why infectious diseases like COVID-19 are considered serious threats to the regime is related to the East Asian tradition of viewing epidemics. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, a photo of a man in a rural Chinese village holding a spear and controlling outsiders with a sign reading "No entry for outsiders" went viral on social media, ostensibly to prevent the spread of the virus. While this was cited abroad as satire of China's backward epidemic prevention methods, the Chinese character for epidemic, '疫' (yì), is composed of the radical for illness (疒) and the character for control with a spear or club (殳). Therefore, this scene can be seen as a continuation of China's ancient cultural traditions and an illustration of the Chinese people's desperation to prevent disease.

In particular, in East Asia, including China, it has traditionally been believed that rulers must govern the heavens and earth in balance and foster harmony through virtuous governance (德治) according to the concept of the Mandate of Heaven (天命). It was believed that significant deviations from this would be seen as defying the will of heaven, leading to disasters such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, and epidemics. This belief has carried over into the modern socialist system, with the 1976 Tangshan earthquake being interpreted as a sign of the end of the Mao Zedong era.

II. Comparison with the SARS Outbreak in 2003

Following the global spread of COVID-19, East Asian regions have achieved relative success in epidemic prevention and are regaining stability, while the United States and Western European countries have been overwhelmed by the virus. Various analyses are emerging regarding this situation, ranging from broad discussions on civilizational differences to detailed analyses of each country's healthcare system and cultural differences related to digital surveillance. While all these analyses have merit, one reason for the relative stability in epidemic prevention in East Asia is the experience of having severely endured the COVID-19 virus in the 21st century. China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore experienced SARS in 2003, and South Korea experienced MERS in 2013. Canada, among the G7 countries, is also relatively successful in epidemic prevention compared to other Western developed nations, likely because it suffered the most casualties outside of East Asian countries during the SARS outbreak in 2003. In other words, the experience gained from the failures and subsequent management of epidemic prevention during SARS and MERS has had a certain influence on how governments, medical professionals, and civil society are responding to the current COVID-19 situation. In this context, comparing the situation during SARS with the current COVID-19 crisis in China is considered meaningful.

1. Information Control and the Existence of Whistleblowers

In the case of SARS, reports of an unknown fatal respiratory illness had already emerged in Guangdong Province, China, around November 2002. The central government confirmed this in January 2003, and it was reported to the WHO in February. Consequently, the Chinese health authorities could not take measures to prevent the spread of infection during the Spring Festival population migration. By March, the infection had spread to Beijing, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada, and deaths began to occur. Despite this, the Chinese authorities continued to conceal and downplay the situation, claiming effective control over SARS. Dr. Jiang Yanyong (蔣彦永), a senior official at the People's Liberation Army General Hospital 301, felt a sense of crisis and exposed the internal situation to CCTV in China, Phoenix TV in Hong Kong, and TIME magazine in the United States. This ultimately led the authorities to admit their mistakes and implement strong epidemic prevention measures.

In the current COVID-19 situation, as with SARS, there was information control by the authorities and the existence of whistleblowers. Even in Wuhan, information about severe pneumonia occurring since December 2019 was suppressed by the local health authorities. On December 30, Dr. Li Wenliang (李文亮), a doctor at Wuhan Central Hospital, saw a report indicating the disease was similar to SARS and shared it in a WeChat group with his medical school classmates. This information spread through Chinese social media, and on January 3, 2020, the Wuhan Public Security Bureau summoned him, warned him for spreading rumors online, and made him write a letter of admonishment. Li Wenliang later contracted the virus while treating COVID-19 patients at the hospital and died on February 7. Upon learning of this news, a strong movement to mourn him and criticize the Chinese administrative authorities for information control spread throughout China.

2. Scapegoating and Hero-Making

When the concealed and downplayed situation became known and public sentiment began to waver, the authorities' response was to scapegoat and make heroes. During the SARS outbreak, Zhang Wenkang (張文康), the then Minister of Health, and Meng Xuenong (孟學農), the Mayor of Beijing, were dismissed for information concealment and inadequate response. Similarly, in relation to the current COVID-19 outbreak, health policy officials in Hubei and Wuhan were dismissed for similar reasons, and Jiang Chaoliang (蔣超良), the Hubei Provincial Party Secretary, and Ma Guoqing (馬國強), the Wuhan Municipal Party Secretary, were removed from their posts.

This is related to China's unique central-local relationship. When public sentiment turns against the government, the problems of mismanagement are often attributed to local officials, positioning the central government as a judge and thereby mitigating criticism of the top leadership. The populace often holds the sentiment that it is right for the powerful central government to control lower-level local governments that act arbitrarily, as expressed in the saying, "Oppose corrupt officials, but not the emperor (只反貪官, 不反皇帝)." This method of creating a buffer for accountability through scapegoating was employed once again.

Meanwhile, another method employed to appease public criticism was hero-making. During the SARS outbreak, the sacrifices of medical personnel and volunteers fighting the disease were emphasized daily. Furthermore, top leaders staged appearances to direct and encourage efforts on the front lines, attempting to restore public trust. In the current COVID-19 situation, Premier Li Keqiang visited Wuhan, staging scenes of the party leadership dedicating all their efforts to epidemic prevention. However, criticism arose regarding President Xi Jinping's absence from the scene. He finally visited Wuhan on March 10, when epidemic prevention was considered relatively successful, and on April 4, during the Qingming Festival, he staged a large-scale campaign to mourn and commemorate the deceased victims, appearing to compensate for his earlier absence. He even elevated Dr. Li Wenliang, who had become a symbol of criticism against the authorities' information control and mismanagement, to the status of a national hero, thereby absorbing critical voices within the system.

III. Mourning Li Wenliang and the Response of Chinese Civil Society

As mentioned above, although the authorities elevated Dr. Li Wenliang to the status of a hero within the system, tributes and criticisms of the regime are continuously censored and deleted on Chinese online platforms. However, unlike during the SARS outbreak, the internet is now widely accessible, and with a majority of the population using smartphones, critical voices are spreading through various social media platforms, including WeChat.

Indeed, before Dr. Li Wenliang contracted the virus and died, he stated in an interview with a media outlet, "I believe that in a healthy society, there should not be only one voice." This statement, upon becoming known, fueled strong public criticism against the authorities. Chinese netizens resisted by launching a campaign on social media, sharing phrases that countered the two items in the admonishment letter: "Can you stop your illegal activities in the future?" and "Do you understand that you will be subject to legal punishment if you engage in illegal activities in the future?" Their responses were "Cannot (不能)" and "Do not understand (不明白)" instead of the required "Can (能)" and "Understand (明白)" that Li Wenliang had to give. Furthermore, Chinese netizens demanded freedom of the press and posted videos of themselves whistling or blowing whistles to honor Li Wenliang, the whistleblower.

Intellectuals have also joined the online government criticism movement. So far, three instances have been confirmed: ① an appeal from ten professors in the Wuhan region, ② an open letter to the National People's Congress, the State Council, and compatriots from 28 individuals including lawyers, professors, and independent intellectuals, and ③ an open letter to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress from eight alumni of Renmin University, including Xu Zhangrun and Zhang Qianfan. The common themes in these appeals and open letters were the restoration of Dr. Li Wenliang's honor, the punishment of those responsible, and the protection of constitutional values such as freedom of the press. Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution states, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration." Article 51 states, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society, and of collective organizations, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens." It is important to note, however, that these movements do not signify a desire for regime overthrow or the adoption of Western political systems. The tradition of democratic movements in China has focused on mourning and rehabilitating those who died unjustly, and on protecting socialist democracy and the values of the Chinese Constitution. This was also the case during the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, where it is often believed that the protesters demanded the adoption of Western liberal democratic systems. In reality, the students at the time referred to themselves as 'patriotic socialists' and demanded the rehabilitation of Hu Yaobang, who had died unjustly, and that the authorities uphold the freedom of the press guaranteed by the constitution. The current movements should be understood as an extension of that historical context.

Meanwhile, on Chinese online platforms, articles primarily from some left-leaning intellectuals are being shared, with a main focus on criticizing the marketization of healthcare. One such article was an interview with Professor Li Ling (李玲) of Peking University, which was rapidly shared online, sparking discussions about the link between healthcare marketization and the COVID-19 crisis. According to data from 2017, Wuhan had 96 public hospitals and 258 private hospitals, with private hospitals accounting for 72.9%, a figure significantly lower than the national average of 64%. However, this content has since been completely deleted from Chinese online platforms. Wang Shaoguang (王绍光), a Chinese neo-leftist intellectual who has emphasized China's state capacity, had his paper "The Crisis of China's Public Health" from over a decade ago widely shared. This paper analyzed the SARS crisis of 2003 and used various statistics to illustrate how the marketization of healthcare had weakened the quality of public health.

IV. Future Outlook

To summarize, Chinese public sentiment significantly worsened after the initial failure of epidemic prevention during the COVID-19 outbreak, but it appears to have stabilized since March. Instead, as Western countries have fallen into crisis, criticism of the Chinese regime has weakened, and confidence in the system has been restored. Indeed, articles suggesting that China has won the systemic competition with the West due to COVID-19 have been widely shared on Chinese online platforms recently.

However, the current COVID-19 situation has moved beyond the initial epidemic prevention phase, and attention is now focused on how to address the various economic and social problems that have worsened in the aftermath of the pandemic. While China appears to have managed epidemic prevention relatively well compared to other Western developed countries in the current situation, the key to restoring public trust will lie in the measures it takes to achieve economic recovery and support livelihoods. China requires economic growth of at least 6% to achieve one of its two centenary goals, the construction of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020. However, this target is becoming unattainable according to almost all forecasts. The most recent IMF forecast predicts only 1.2% growth for China, and this figure could shrink further if the COVID-19 pandemic continues globally for an extended period.

Specifically, the people are significantly fatigued due to over two months of stringent epidemic control measures, economic contraction, and unemployment issues. Furthermore, the impact on the working class, including migrant workers, from the sharp decline in demand from Western societies cannot be disregarded. According to one analysis, the worst-case scenario posits that unemployment in China due to COVID-19 could exceed 100 million, potentially reaching 200 million. Additionally, with approximately 8 million university graduates entering the labor market each year, their employment prospects are expected to worsen considerably, raising concerns about growing discontent with the regime.

Meanwhile, as of April 16, the total death toll from COVID-19 in China was 3,342, with the majority, 3,212, concentrated in Hubei Province, particularly Wuhan. The trauma experienced by the residents of Wuhan and Hubei Province is immense, and discrimination and even hatred towards Wuhan have emerged within China. On March 27, when the lockdown in Hubei Province was lifted, a large-scale clash occurred when police in Jiangxi Province blocked Hubei residents attempting to cross the Jiujiang Yangtze River Bridge in search of work. Hubei residents overturned police cars and resisted fiercely, shouting "Go Hubei (加油)!" The residents of Hubei and Wuhan lost many lives due to the collapse of the medical system during COVID-19 and could not maintain their daily lives due to the authorities' strict lockdown policies, leading to widespread discontent with the current regime. How the Chinese authorities will address the wounds of the residents of Hubei and Wuhan and restore public trust in these regions will be a crucial issue going forward.

In conclusion, while the current crisis is unlikely to cause the collapse or significant damage to Xi Jinping's position or the Chinese Communist Party's one-party rule, it is crucial how China responds to potential secondary pandemics and economic problems in the future to restore public trust. ■

■ Author: Ha Nam-seok_ He received his Ph.D. in Chinese Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and worked as a researcher at the East Asian Institute, Sungkonghoe University, before becoming a professor in the Department of Chinese Language and Culture at the University of Seoul. His main research areas include regime change and popular resistance in China, intellectual society, and the Tiananmen Square incident. His major works include "The Politics of Mourning: Death and Memory in Modern and Contemporary East Asia" (co-authored), "Modern China Read Through Cities" (co-authored), and "China Changes Capitalism" (co-translated).

■ Responsible Editor: Yoon Jun-il EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) junilyoon@eai.or.kr

The EAI Commentary is a series of commentaries planned to provide a platform for discourse where experts can offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.