[New Year Special Commentary Series - EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy] VI. Electoral System Reform in 2019 and the 2020 General Election: Prospects and Tasks

Editor's Note

To mark the new year, EAI is publishing a series of six special commentaries titled "EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy."

1. Ha Young-sun: North Korea in 2020: A Frontal Assault on Two Major Obstacles (Published January 6, 2020)

2. Jeon Jae-sung: South Korea's Strategy for US-China Relations and its US Strategy in 2020 (Published January 8, 2020)

3. Lee Dong-ryul: South Korea-China Relations and South Korea's Diplomatic Strategy Toward China (Published January 13, 2020)

4. Sohn Yeol: South Korea-Japan Relations and Policy Toward Japan in 2020: Conflict Resolution Visible When Broadening the Horizon (Published January 15, 2020)

5. Lee Seung-ju: US-China Trade War and South Korea's Trade Policy: Middle Power Diplomacy for the Recovery of Multilateralism and the Reshaping of Regional Economic Order (Published January 20, 2020)

6. Choi Tae-wook: Electoral System Reform in 2019 and the 2020 General Election: Prospects and Tasks (Published January 22, 2020)

As the sixth report in the "EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategies" special commentary series for the new year, a commentary by Professor Choi Tae-uk of Hallym University of Graduate Studies has been published, evaluating the 2019 electoral system reform and presenting the outlook and tasks for the 2020 general elections. There is no room for disagreement that Korea, which has achieved remarkable economic growth since liberation, must complete the task of political reform to become a developed democratic nation. The Moon Jae-in administration also aims to establish "cooperative and decentralized democracy" for an "innovative inclusive nation" as its vision or goal for political reform, and has revealed its reform intentions through various speeches and government documents. As part of these efforts, the revised election law was passed on December 27, 2019. The new election law, centered on the quasi-proportional representation system, is expected to serve as a cornerstone for developing the party system, which has been criticized for being centered on regions and individuals, into a system based on ideology and policy, thereby enhancing representativeness and overcoming the ills of the existing structured two-party system. However, the author points out that the revised election law was agreed upon in an incomplete state, far from its original intent, due to the selfishness and trickery of the two major parties. The author emphasizes that in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes in political reform, a process of reaching social consensus must precede it, and proposes the convening of a "Citizens' Assembly" as an alternative for gathering public opinion.

1. Introduction

As can be seen from the <Innovative Inclusive Nation Future Vision 2045> announced by the Presidential Committee for Future and Innovation on December 12, 2019, the Moon Jae-in administration aims to establish 'cooperative and decentralized democracy' for an 'innovative inclusive nation' as its vision or goal for political reform. It identifies the transition from the existing 'majoritarian democracy' system to a 'consensus democracy' system as a key task for achieving this goal.

Consensus democracy is a system of representative democracy with proportional representation and coalition government as its two main pillars. It can be considered an alternative system that is almost diametrically opposed to the '1987 democratic system,' which is based on the single-member district plurality system and a winner-take-all power structure. Therefore, the transition to consensus democracy would be achieved by reforming the current parliamentary election system, which is centered on single-member districts, into a proportional representation system, and by reforming the current hegemonic presidential system into a parliamentary system or a decentralized presidential system.

From the outset of its term, the Moon Jae-in administration held the view that electoral system reform should precede power structure reform. In a meeting with the floor leaders of the five major parties on May 19, 2017, immediately after his inauguration, President Moon suggested that if the electoral system were reformed properly, it might be possible to change the presidential system to another power structure. He meant that if the National Assembly could be reborn as a true representative body of public will through electoral system reform, constitutional amendment towards a parliamentary system could then be pursued. Reformers in academia, civil society, and politics, who had longed for a great transformation of the 1987 system, welcomed President Moon's remarks. This was because they hoped that through the sequential institutional reforms of the 'Candlelight Government,' which accurately read public sentiment, the entrenched regional power structure of the two major parties would finally be dismantled, leading to politics that accurately reflect public will, and ushering in a consensus democracy system of communication and coexistence rather than hatred and confrontation.

However, establishing a new democratic system is a process of creating new political institutions, and such institutional changes can only be made through legislation via the National Assembly. Yet, the Moon Jae-in administration spent two and a half years without passing a single political institutional reform bill. The revised election law, passed by the National Assembly on December 27, 2019, was the first reform bill. This was after 2 years and 7 months since its inauguration. However, it is questionable whether the new election law can make a meaningful contribution to the development of consensus democracy, as the degree of proportionality it guarantees appears insufficient.

2. Evaluation of the 2019 Revised Election Law

Meaningful developments regarding electoral system reform began in the winter of 2018 under the Moon Jae-in administration. On December 15, after much deliberation, the floor leaders of the five major parties announced an agreement stating that they would 'actively consider concrete measures for the introduction of a concurrent proportional representation system.'

However, the Liberty Korea Party soon changed its stance. The Liberty Korea Party argued that 'considering' the introduction of a concurrent proportional representation system did not mean 'agreeing' to it, and thus put the brakes on the concrete discussion of electoral system reform. Subsequently, the Liberty Korea Party consistently maintained an uncooperative attitude, naturally forming a confrontation between the Liberty Korea Party and the 'four parties of the ruling and opposition parties' (Democratic Party, Bareunmirae Party, People's Party, and Justice Party). The confrontation created by the Liberty Korea Party's obstructionism ironically forged the alliance for electoral system reform that the 'three opposition parties' (Bareunmirae Party, People's Party, and Justice Party) had so desired.

However, it was difficult to say that the alliance of the four parties was solid. In fact, a majority of the Democratic Party's lawmakers harbored considerable anxiety and dissatisfaction with the introduction of a concurrent proportional representation system, which was likely to disadvantage their party in electoral politics. They simply could not openly oppose the formation of a reform alliance with the three opposition parties due to its connection with the establishment of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), which the government and party leadership were earnestly pursuing. The fact that President Moon Jae-in had repeatedly included electoral system reform as a campaign pledge in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections, and that the introduction of a concurrent proportional representation system had been the party's official stance since 2015, were other reasons why Democratic Party lawmakers could not ignore the reform discussions. Ultimately, the alliance of the four parties in the electoral reform process moved forward incrementally amidst the contrasting dynamics of a reluctant ruling party, whose majority of members were reluctantly following the party leadership, and proactive opposition parties seeking to expand their influence through a new election law.

The result of that sluggish progress was the designation of the so-called 'quasi'-concurrent proportional representation system as a fast-track bill by the Special Committee on Political Reform on April 30, 2019. The 'full' concurrent proportional representation system, often referred to as the German-style proportional representation system, was already clearly beyond the scope of agreement from the early stages of the four-party alliance formation, due to the strong opposition from the Democratic Party. Subsequently, the focus of discussion shifted to how much to reduce the proportionality guaranteed by the concurrent system while maintaining its framework. Starting from the reform proposal suggested by the National Election Commission in 2015 (200 constituency seats, 100 proportional seats, 100% proportionality adjustment rate), the final proposal, which reduced proportionality through repeated negotiations, was the quasi-concurrent proportional representation system (225 constituency seats, 75 proportional seats, 50% proportionality adjustment rate) that was submitted to the Special Committee on Political Reform that day. Four months later, on August 29, the quasi-concurrent proportional representation system was officially approved by the Special Committee on Political Reform and confirmed as a legislative bill that could be automatically submitted to a plenary session of the National Assembly after a certain period.

The evaluations of the quasi-concurrent proportional representation system by scholars and experts were generally favorable. Although it was not as good as a full concurrent proportional representation system, there was an expectation that it would provide meaningful proportionality. For instance, it was widely believed that any party that secured just 10% of the national vote would be able to form a parliamentary negotiation group, becoming a significant political force. With that level of proportionality, it was almost certain that the current party system, centered on regions and individuals, would gradually evolve into a system centered on ideology and policy, thereby enhancing the representation of different classes, sectors, and professions.

The problem arose afterward. This was due to the Democratic Party's argument that since the fast-tracked reform bill could be modified and supplemented before being submitted to the plenary session of the National Assembly, it should be refined into a more 'realistic' proposal. The Democratic Party proposed reducing the number of proportional representation seats from 75 to 60, and then to 50. Furthermore, they insisted on weakening the quasi-concurrent system, which originally aimed for 100% adjustment, to a 50% adjustment, and imposing a 'cap' on 30 seats, allowing concurrent adjustment only within that range.

The backlash from minor opposition parties and reform-oriented civil society was inevitable. However, the Democratic Party disregarded these objections and largely pushed through its proposals. Consequently, on December 23, the so-called '4+1 consultative body' (Democratic Party, Bareunmirae Party leadership faction, Justice Party, People's Party + Alternative Coalition) finalized a significantly diluted proposal (253 constituency seats, 30 concurrent proportional seats with a 50% adjustment rate, and 17 parallel proportional seats). Four days later, on December 27, the revised election law incorporating this as its core content passed the plenary session of the National Assembly.

Although I hope my prediction is wrong, the proportionality provided by this revised election law is unlikely to be sufficient to drive the development of a structured multi-party system or a consensus democracy. Let's assume that Party K, a policy-oriented national party similar to the Justice Party in many aspects, contests the general election under the new electoral system and achieves 10% of the party vote and secures 3 constituency seats. In this case, Party K's parallel proportional seats would be about 2, which is 10% of the 17 seats. Under a full concurrent system, like the German or New Zealand model, Party K should receive 27 seats (10% of total seats, which is 30, minus 3 constituency seats) as adjustment. However, under this system, it can only receive about 13 seats, which is 50% of the 25 seats remaining after subtracting the 3 constituency seats and 2 parallel proportional seats from the 30 seats available for adjustment. But even that is not guaranteed. This is because the total number of concurrent proportional seats available for adjustment is only 30. If we assume there are three small parties that achieve similar results to Party K, and each of these three parties needs about 13 seats for adjustment, Party K could receive a maximum of about 10 seats. In this scenario, Party K would remain a minor party with only 15 seats, or 5% of the total seats, despite securing 10% of the party vote, and would not even be able to form a parliamentary negotiation group.

In short, under the new electoral system, there is no guarantee that a party achieving 10% of the national vote will become a significant political force. This is because the number of seats available for adjustment is limited to 30, making it highly probable that the adjustment rate will fall below 50% (especially if there are many parties seeking adjustment). Of course, if a party can win a sufficient number of constituency seats, it could compensate, but this is never easy for ideology or policy-oriented parties that lack a regional base or have a weak one.

3. Prospects and Future Tasks for the 2020 General Election

However, this does not mean that the new electoral system will bring about no change. It is likely that it will be difficult for any single party to secure a majority of seats in the National Assembly in the 2020 general election. The two major parties will likely take seats in constituencies and parallel proportional representation proportional to their support rates, as they have in the past, and thus the 30 seats available for concurrent adjustment will largely go to minor parties. Furthermore, thanks to these concurrent proportional seats, the share allocated to minor parties will certainly increase compared to the past (as long as they clear the entry barrier of over 3% of the party vote), leading to an increase in the number of political forces attempting to enter the National Assembly, and consequently, the number of parliamentary parties is likely to increase. Therefore, the situation where the two major parties alternately held the reins of government alone, as has been the case so far, is unlikely to occur under normal circumstances. The era of the two-party system may be coming to an end.

However, it is also possible that a 'two-bloc system' will emerge in place of the two-party system. As mentioned above, the proportionality guaranteed by the new election law is significantly lower than that of a 'full' concurrent proportional representation system with a 100% adjustment rate, and even lower than the original 'quasi'-concurrent proportional representation system with a 50% adjustment rate. This means that the outcome of electoral politics will still be largely determined by each party's performance in constituency races. Therefore, it will be difficult for policy or ideology-centered minor parties with weak regional bases to significantly increase their seat share and become a third major party, although they may fare better than in the past. Consequently, the two parties that have formed the two-party system are likely to retain their status as major parties (although it may be difficult for them to secure an outright majority). They may then use this status to attract minor parties with similar ideologies and form 'their own blocs.' This could lead to a regressive system where, for example, a left-wing coalition bloc (or coalition) led by one major party and a right-wing coalition bloc (or coalition) led by the other major party confront each other, and democracy is operated in a majoritarian manner once again. In such a system, the development of political or social consensus is unlikely to proceed smoothly.

The fundamental reason for these concerns is, of course, the low proportionality of the new election law. Therefore, if a strong third party centered on ideology and policy does not emerge as expected in the 2020 general election, or fails to show even its potential, and the party system centered on major parties based on regions and individuals continues, then we must truly 'start all over again.' Electoral system reform must be pursued once more.

After the general election, the primary focus of the political circles and civil society will likely shift to the issue of power structure reform, rather than the revision of the election law (even if the results are poor). Above all, the next general election is four years away, but the presidential election is only two years away. Therefore, it would be wise to address the issue of electoral system reform as part of the constitutional amendment issue at that time.

As I reiterate, when the constitutional amendment process begins, we must properly go through the process of reaching social consensus this time, without repeating past mistakes. The method of constitutional amendment most favored recently by academia and civil society is the convening of a 'Citizens' Assembly.' For example, in Ireland, when a constitutional amendment is necessary, a Citizens' Assembly is convened with a deadline of one year (usually specifying the relevant provisions) to facilitate the formation of social consensus through this public forum. It is natural that the content and feasibility of reform increase when constitutional amendments are pursued through the active participation of citizens.

The Moon Jae-in administration proposed a government-initiated constitutional amendment bill at the end of March 2018. While it contained many meaningful provisions, such as strengthening basic rights and decentralization, it was drafted somewhat hastily by a small elite without forming social consensus or public agreement. Naturally, it failed to gain broad public support and was therefore ignored by the National Assembly. The National Assembly declared 'voting failure' due to a lack of quorum for this constitutional amendment bill. This incident starkly demonstrated how fragile a constitutional amendment bill is when it is not based on social consensus or public agreement. This is why the Citizens' Assembly method is emphasized again.

Although it is a slightly different topic, President Moon Jae-in's proposed constitutional amendment included the principle of proportionality in elections, stating that 'the seats in the National Assembly shall be allocated in proportion to the voters' will.' I earnestly hope that this principle of proportionality will be included in the new constitution during the process of amending the constitution before the 2022 presidential election. If this is achieved, we can confidently pursue the revision of the election law based on the principle of proportionality declared in the constitution. There is also ample time. A new election law that properly guarantees high proportionality will, at the earliest, be applied to the 2024 general election.

4. Conclusion

Not only constitutional amendment but also electoral system reform should be pursued again through methods such as a Citizens' Assembly. Even if a law is enacted, it is difficult to achieve its purpose if the people to whom the law applies do not respect its intent. Laws should be the product of consensus. The higher the level of consensus, the greater the respect people have for the law. The reason why the Liberty Korea Party can openly resort to trickery, such as creating a separate 'Proportional Liberty Korea Party,' by disregarding the new election law, is fundamentally because the level of consensus for the new election law is low. Lawmakers of the Liberty Korea Party argue, 'Why should we respect a "backroom deal among themselves" that excluded a significant portion of the direct stakeholders of the election law?' This would not have happened if the new election law had been born out of a process of high-level social consensus. Who would dare to ignore the general will of the people?

The reason why parties like the Liberty Korea Party do not appear in countries like Germany or New Zealand, which have adopted a concurrent proportional representation system, is that their election laws are based on social consensus. In Korea, where the initiative and referendum systems are either absent or weak, the most convenient and effective way to reach social consensus is to convene a Citizens' Assembly. Electoral system reforms that include a Citizens' Assembly have already been attempted several times under the leadership of provincial governments in countries such as Canada and the Netherlands. The Korean political sphere has also seriously discussed the promotion of a Citizens' Assembly system. The time has finally come to implement it. To reiterate, we must not repeat past mistakes this time.

■ Author: Choi Tae-wook_ Professor at Graduate School of International Studies, Hallym University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from UCLA. He has served as an editorial board member for Changbi, a standing committee member for the People's Solidarity for Participatory Self-Governance, co-representative of the Proportional Representation Democracy Network, and a consultative member for the Speaker of the National Assembly. His main research areas include democracy and market economy, political economy of welfare states, and East Asian economic integration. His recent publications include "Making a Welfare Korea" (co-edited), "Discussing Korean-style Consensus Democracy," and "The Youth Party."

■ Contact: Yoon Jun-il, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I junilyoon@eai.or.kr

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