[New Year Special Policy Commentary Series - EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy] ② South Korea's Strategy for US-China Relations and its Strategy Toward the US in 2020

Editor's Note

To mark the year 2020, EAI is publishing a series of six special New Year policy commentaries titled "EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy."

1. Ha Young-sun: North Korea in 2020: A Frontal Assault on Two Major Obstacles (Published January 6, 2020)

2. Jeon Jae-seong: South Korea's Strategy for US-China Relations and its Strategy Toward the US in 2020 (Published January 8, 2020)

3. Lee Dong-ryul: South Korea-China Relations and South Korea's Diplomatic Strategy Toward China (Scheduled for publication January 13, 2020)

4. Son Yeol: South Korea-Japan Relations in 2020 and Policy Toward Japan: Broadening Perspectives for Conflict Resolution (Scheduled for publication January 15, 2020)

5. Lee Seung-ju: US-China Trade Dispute and South Korea's Trade Policy: Middle Power Diplomacy for the Recovery of Multilateralism and the Restructuring of Regional Economic Order (Scheduled for publication January 20, 2020)

6. Choi Tae-wook: Electoral System Reform in 2019 and the General Election in 2020: Outlook and Tasks (Scheduled for publication January 22, 2020)

This is the second report in the special New Year policy commentary series, "EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy." It features commentary by Jeon Jae-seong, Director of EAI's Center for National Security Studies and a professor at Seoul National University, who presents an outlook on US-China relations in 2020 and South Korea's strategy. Amidst the US-China trade competition, unilateral foreign policies are intensifying among nations. Both the US and China have designated each other as actors undermining international norms and are confronting each other through their respective regional strategies. The US-China economic war is ongoing, and the future direction of the international order remains uncertain. In this labyrinth, South Korea's strategy for US-China relations is at a turning point, necessitating a strategic review to swiftly adapt to this unfamiliar environment as a middle power. The author emphasizes the importance of establishing a basic principle that acknowledges the unpredictability of the future policy environment while pursuing multilateralism and proactively presenting concrete policy objectives for South Korea's US-China relations strategy. Furthermore, the author points out that South Korea's strategy toward the US is overly focused on Korean Peninsula issues, arguing that a policy is needed to proactively lead the US by forming common ground between South Korea and the US in the Asian region to achieve the desired regional order.

I. Changes in the Geopolitical Landscape of 2020

1. The Trump Administration's Strategy of Hegemonic Reinforcement

The international geopolitical landscape in 2020 presents a significantly different picture compared to mid-2017 when the Moon Jae-in administration took office. The Trump administration, in its effort to restore weakened US global leadership, implemented policies that undermined the existing liberal international order, causing tension for South Korea and the international community alike. Contrary to the initial warm reception President Trump extended to President Xi Jinping, the US pursued aggressive protectionist trade policies to resolve its trade deficit with China, and the US-China economic war is still ongoing. The US is demanding greater burden-sharing from its allies, including South Korea, Japan, and NATO, and its approach is unilateral.

It is not historically unprecedented for the US to demand greater burden-sharing to restore its national strength when its hegemonic power weakens. However, amidst neoliberal globalization, the rise of global populism, and an atmosphere of political polarization, US policies have become more assertive and sensitive to domestic US political logic.

Trumpism, initiated by the US, is proving highly contagious, turning other major powers into "Trumps." While all major powers claim to uphold the liberal international order, they are increasingly inclined to distort or undermine norms to maximize their own national interests. It remains uncertain whether the US will regain its strategic intent of benevolent hegemony, and with the future of the existing order in doubt, South Korea's strategy toward the US is at a critical juncture.

2. The Continuation of US-China Strategic Competition

2019 will be remembered as the year the US Indo-Pacific Strategy solidified its presence in economic, diplomatic, and security sectors. China's rise has long been a major agenda item for US foreign policy, and President Obama also pursued an Asia pivot strategy. However, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has further specified this approach and allocated more resources to its implementation.

Given that China has been designated as a violator of international norms, US containment of China's Belt and Road Initiative influence and the second island chain it seeks to secure by pushing back the US, as well as its actions in the South China Sea, are inevitable. The Trump administration, advocating for peace through strength, is not only strengthening its containment of China through a whole-of-government approach but also seeking to weaken China's sphere of influence by connecting various countries in the Indo-Pacific region through a multidimensional network. South Korea is not only suffering economic repercussions from the US-China economic conflict but will also face a more difficult position in the competition for regional architecture between the US and China. If the US and China gradually decouple and other countries regroup accordingly, a situation where retaliation and damage from one side become unavoidable may emerge.

3. The Moon Jae-in Administration's Strategy for US-China Relations

In the foreign policy section of his 2020 New Year's address, President Moon Jae-in stated, "We will develop the traditional alliance relationship with the United States to a higher level and work together to complete the 'Korean Peninsula Peace Process.'" He also declared, "We will strengthen exchanges and cooperation with China in various fields and strive to elevate South Korea-China relations to the next level, with state visits by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang scheduled for this year." While these are all important principles, the emphasis on US-China relations is relatively minor compared to issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue or Korean Peninsula affairs. The principles for navigating US-China relations are not concretely articulated. It is a critical time to establish a specific direction for pursuing a higher level of ROK-US relations and strengthened exchanges and cooperation with China.

Upon its inauguration, the government set goals to continuously deepen and develop a mutually responsible alliance relationship with the US, solidify the ROK-US alliance through active diplomacy targeting US political circles, strengthen combined defense posture, and rationally resolve pending issues between the two countries. Regarding policy toward China, the government aimed to foster active exchanges between leaders, enhance communication on the THAAD issue, and solidify a substantive strategic cooperative partnership with China through trust-building.

While these are all important foreign policy objectives, the issue is that South Korea's strategies toward the US and China are increasingly likely to conflict and contradict each other due to the evolving dynamics of US-China relations. A strategy for managing US-China relations must now emerge as a critical agenda item.

II. South Korea's Strategy for US-China Relations

1. Basic Principles of Strategy for US-China Relations

In the current era of intensifying US-China strategic competition, the basic principles of South Korea's strategy for US-China relations can be summarized as follows. First, it is crucial to recognize the extreme difficulty in accurately predicting the future policy environment, given that the US is adjusting its hegemony and the US-China strategic competition is still in its early stages. Since the advent of the Trump administration, US strategy toward China has evolved from President Trump's economic war with China to a comprehensive containment policy by the Republican administration, and then to the emergence of an engagement strategy in response to the side effects of the containment policy.

The current US strategy toward China is difficult to predict due to domestic political polarization in the US, a shortage of Asia and China experts within the Trump administration, and the marginalization of US China strategists. Furthermore, even if the trade balance improves in the US-China economic war, the number of affected groups within the US is increasing, and a quantitative trade surplus does not guarantee long-term recovery of the US economy. It remains unconfirmed how competent the Trump administration will be in constructing a comprehensive international economic order that urges structural changes in China's foreign economic policy. It is necessary to cautiously observe and respond to how US strategy toward China will evolve with the upcoming presidential election and the subsequent administration.

China's policy toward the US also makes its strategic direction difficult to discern. It is unclear whether China possesses the strategic intent to emerge as a hegemon replacing the US, or if it is merely demanding a status and authority commensurate with its increased national strength and influence. China's strategy is strongly characterized by its response to the US, and the direction of China's foreign strategy will be shaped by how it resolves various domestic economic, political, and socio-cultural issues.

Second, assuming that US-China relations will undergo various phases, South Korea needs to proactively present concrete policy objectives that major powers cannot easily refute or use as grounds for retaliation. Both the US and China, albeit rhetorically, advocate for the protection of the liberal international order and a rules-based order. Liberalism internationally is an ambiguous concept, often subject to arbitrary interpretation based on a nation's self-interest. The term "rules-based order" can also have conflicting implications depending on who created the rules and what those rules are. Nevertheless, these terms capture the general trend in the international community to overcome a power balance order centered on military strength and aim to avoid power politics dictated by major powers.

In any case, South Korea needs to advocate for an open and free rules-based order. This is because South Korea has survived and prospered within a free economic order and a multilateral security order, and will continue to do so in the future. South Korea can define the meaning of the liberal international order and the content of its rules in its own way. This includes the meaning of a comprehensive and participatory order that encompasses middle and small powers, rejecting great power-centrism.

South Korea has been developing discourse aimed at establishing middle power diplomacy as a pillar of its foreign policy. While it is true that the current order is US-led, the leading power has not determined all aspects of the order. Neither the US nor China has grounds to criticize the policies of other countries based on international liberal norms. South Korea needs to remind the international community that the existing order was established through the active participation and coordination of many countries under US leadership. Furthermore, it should take on the role of articulating the necessity of a multilateral order to the international community while clearly conveying expectations regarding the US's hegemonic role.

2. Means of Strategy for US-China Relations

Pursuing a strategy for US-China relations is challenging for a middle power dealing with major powers. Without appropriate policy tools, it is difficult to achieve clear results. The first policy tool for pursuing a strategy for US-China relations is knowledge and expertise. The issues raised between the US and China are prepared from the perspective of strategic competition, and if issues are resolved according to the intentions of the US and China, South Korea will inevitably face a dilemma of choice. If South Korea frames issues between the US and China as strategic competition, both powers will pay closer attention to South Korea's choices, thereby intensifying sanctions and pressure. South Korea must avoid the mistake of perceiving conflicts between the US and China as strategic issues of hegemonic competition. Before these issues take on the meaning of strategic choices, South Korea must proactively assign meaning to them and resolve them from a specialized perspective.

Upcoming specific issues must be resolved proactively, professionally, and universally on a case-by-case basis. When South Korea resolves issues based on universal norms from a global perspective, it can gain recognition and respect from the US, China, and other countries. It is necessary to emphasize that South Korea's choices are based on universal norms, not as part of great power politics.

Achieving proactive, professional, and universal resolution requires mobilizing domestic capabilities to the fullest. How South Korea responds to individual issues is evaluated not only from the perspectives of the US and China but also through comparison with the responses of other countries facing similar dilemmas. South Korea must closely observe the responses of countries facing similar dilemmas, adopt what is appropriate, and develop creative responses by pooling specialized knowledge on each issue within South Korea. This requires mobilizing all domestic policy resources, and political acumen to overcome political confrontation and partisan logic is necessary in this process.

Determining the appropriate timing for response on each issue is also crucial. Some issues require prompt proactive choices, while others necessitate careful judgment after observing the unfolding situation. However, postponing the choice itself is not a good alternative. The competition between the US and China sometimes manifests as a zero-sum relationship over mutual interests, but it is also a competition for soft power to secure legitimacy, thus initially tending to take the form of rules-based competition. It is advantageous for South Korea to determine its position within the context of games that take the form of universal competition or standard competition between the US and China. This is because if it takes the form of a naked zero-sum game of hegemonic competition, the dilemma of choice will be further exacerbated.

Second, cooperation with other middle powers and leadership within that cooperation are crucial as means for a US-China relations strategy. Cooperation with as many countries as possible is necessary, and strengthening cooperation with other middle powers, such as ASEAN, is particularly important. There is no room for debate that South Korea's pursued policy of cooperation among Asian middle powers must extend beyond bilateral cooperation to encompass cooperation regarding the East Asian order and US-China relations. Economic cooperation between ASEAN countries and South Korea has already reached a significant level, and socio-cultural cooperation is also close. The institutional mechanisms for regular cooperation are also more robust than with any other partners. For the time being, the confrontation between the US and China is likely to be a competition for leadership centered on institutions, or "institutional balancing," rather than a direct military confrontation. South Korea and middle powers should strive to shift the direction of institution-centered competition, which is dominated by the US and China, by jointly pursuing inclusive and participatory institutional balancing, rather than exclusive institutional balancing.

The question is whether this cooperation is leading to more strategic cooperation. It is true that ASEAN centrality has weakened amidst the US-China conflict, and South Korea must seek ASEAN centrality and middle power centrality in Asia from a broader perspective. To this end, South Korea and ASEAN must further develop cooperative measures for confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution that they have pursued, apply them to issues between the US and China to resolve problems, and simultaneously work to alleviate strategic distrust between the US and China. It is necessary to mitigate great power confrontation between the US and China by actively utilizing norms and rules established not only in East Asia but also globally.

Third, South Korea's expertise can serve as an important policy tool in US-China relations, and there is a need to redefine the North Korean nuclear issue as an area of cooperation between the US and China. In particular, it is necessary to remind North Korea of its strategic choices between the US and China. The areas where the US and China can engage in bilateral cooperation are gradually shrinking. When President Obama and President Xi Jinping proclaimed a new type of major power relationship in 2013, cybersecurity and the North Korean nuclear issue were undeniably important areas of cooperation. The North Korean nuclear issue, in particular, can serve as a major turning point in the changes in US-China relations, not only from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation but also as cooperation surrounding the geopolitical issue of North Korea's normalization. Chairman Kim Jong-un will also inevitably face the dilemma of US-China relations in his strategic choices, including the denuclearization process. To reduce economic dependence on China and establish itself as a member of the international community, cooperation with the US is inevitable, and China's containment may arise in this process. North and South Korea must establish common ground for cooperation not only on denuclearization and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula but also on the more fundamental issue of foreign policy to alleviate the dilemma of choice between the US and China.

Fourth, however, it is important not to forget that all issues are ultimately determined by national power, and long-term efforts must be made to enhance national power. For South Korea to establish itself as a mediator or a respected actor, strong national power, namely technological, economic, and military capabilities, is essential. In an era where technology is becoming a game-changer with the Fourth Industrial Revolution, possessing significant national power, especially military strength, that can bridge the gap between the US and China, can contribute to safeguarding South Korea's national interests. Therefore, while playing the role of a promoter of universal norms as a middle power in the rules-based competition between the US and China, South Korea must simultaneously pursue realistic national power enhancement strategies to prepare for the next phase.

III. Diplomacy Toward the United States

1. The Current State of ROK-US Relations

Currently, ROK-US relations are characterized by pending alliance issues such as negotiations on defense cost-sharing, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), and the future status and role of the UN Command, all centered around the issue of North Korean denuclearization and the pursuit of a peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Last year, discussions surrounding the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) brought ROK-US-Japan security cooperation to the forefront, but due to the current deterioration of ROK-Japan relations, ROK-US-Japan security cooperation is not a topic of discussion. Thus, the focus is on pending issues rather than a shared vision for the future.

The ROK and the US have closely cooperated on the North Korean issue. However, as North Korea-US negotiations face difficulties, various alternative approaches are emerging within both countries. South Korea inevitably pursues efforts to develop inter-Korean relations independently of North Korea-US negotiations, which raises concerns for the US about a potential easing of pressure on North Korea. South Korea believes the US is not sufficiently responding to North Korea's demands for security assurances, while the US is increasingly firm in its stance of not providing rewards before North Korea takes concrete steps toward complete denuclearization. In preparation for a scenario where the North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved, strategic dialogue between South Korea and the US on a mid- to long-term basis is necessary.

A more critical issue is the differing perspectives of the US and South Korea on regional strategy in Asia, and more specifically, strategy toward China. Perceptions of China's foreign policy and the national interests of South Korea and the US regarding China may not always align. However, in a situation where many Asian countries are adopting their own stances and actions regarding US-China relations, remaining neutral out of caution is not a viable option. Early last November, the ROK and the US issued a joint statement on "Cooperation on the New Southern Policy and Indo-Pacific Strategy," advancing discussions on regional strategies between the two countries. We anticipate discussions on the regional order ahead of President Xi Jinping's visit to South Korea this year.

However, a concrete regional strategy is needed to avoid falling behind other countries. For instance, Japan is pursuing both strengthening the Japan-US alliance and engaging with China, while appearing to exclude South Korea from the regional strategy framework. By marginalizing South Korea, Japan is emphasizing the need for its own military capabilities and advocating for constitutional revision. As the Japan-US alliance strengthens, China also feels the need to engage with Japan, leading to an increase in Japan's regional standing. In the current context of intense US-China competition surrounding Asia, South Korea must consider how to discuss regional strategies with the US at what level and through what methods, while maintaining its own distinctiveness.

2. Future Strategy Toward the US

The necessity of close cooperation between South Korea and the US for the smooth progress of North Korea-US nuclear negotiations is undeniable, as the denuclearization of North Korea and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula are goals that must be achieved. Pending issues between South Korea and the US are closely linked to the peace process that will emerge with North Korea's denuclearization. This is because the end-of-war declaration and the establishment of a peace regime will directly impact alliance matters.

The problem is that ROK-US relations are not confined to the Korean Peninsula issue but are closely linked to global and regional geopolitical matters. Even regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, the US tends to approach it from the perspective of President Trump's personal views or from the standpoint of global nuclear non-proliferation. Within the context of US-China competition, US geopolitical considerations in Asia are not directly aligned with the North Korean nuclear issue. In a speech at the University of Michigan on September 7, 2019, Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Biegun mentioned that if the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, North Korea could be closely linked to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, overall, a clear framework for North Korea's position within the US strategic structure after denuclearization has not emerged. If the denuclearization of North Korea is limited to the passive goal of eliminating North Korea's nuclear missiles capable of attacking the US mainland, then US proactive efforts will inevitably have limitations.

A crucial part of South Korea's strategy toward North Korea is to facilitate North Korea-US dialogue, which requires viewing the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of the US's regional strategy in Asia. It is important to note that strategic dialogue and consultations between South Korea and the US regarding the North Korean nuclear issue are closely related to the regional structure. While promoting North Korea-US dialogue and strengthening inter-Korean relations are important, efforts are needed to clarify South Korea's regional strategy in Asia and to position the North Korean nuclear issue within a regional strategy that South Korea and the US jointly consider.

It is important to recognize that pending alliance issues and the North Korean nuclear issue can be smoothly resolved when South Korea's overall strategy for dealing with US-China relations precedes it, and a clear blueprint for ROK-US cooperation on regional strategy in Asia is established accordingly. The South Korean government emphasizes strengthening the ROK-US alliance and policy harmonization between the two countries, but most issues are focused on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK and the US attempted to find common ground between the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and South Korea's New Southern Policy by issuing a joint statement on "Cooperation on the New Southern Policy and Indo-Pacific Strategy." While this is a significant achievement, the future challenge will be to establish the relationship between the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and the ROK-US alliance. We are entering a phase where the absence of strategic consultation between South Korea and the US regarding the regional structure itself is becoming a problem. It is necessary to refine the strategy toward the US based on the principles of US-China relations discussed earlier.

Tasks such as sharing assessments of the situation between South Korea and the US, presenting a future alliance vision, developing specific policy issues, and establishing an implementation framework must be carried out. Otherwise, limitations will inevitably arise regarding pending issues such as defense cost-sharing and the transfer of wartime operational control. The US will demand greater burden-sharing for an ROK-US alliance whose function is limited to the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea, lacking a regional cooperation framework, will inevitably be passive about an alliance where it holds wartime operational control and leads.

A policy is needed to proactively lead the US toward the regional order that South Korea desires. At a macro level, South Korea should pursue a role in designing the Asian regional architecture and, based on the logic of establishing an open, liberal East Asian order, clarify its positions on specific issues and present a role appropriate for South Korea's circumstances within the US and its alliance system. South Korea needs to develop a strategy for the future of East Asia and make efforts to share and coordinate it with the US. It is necessary to avoid the Trump risk while simultaneously maintaining continuous and strengthened relations with mainstream strategic discourse within the US. It is crucial to accurately assess the extent to which the Trump administration deviates from US strategic discourse and to formulate and implement approaches targeting Congress, expert groups, public opinion, and public diplomacy strategies. ■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-seong_ Director of EAI's Center for National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Responsible and Edited by: Yoon Jun-il, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I junilyoon@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series planned to provide a forum for discourse where experts from various fields can present in-depth analyses and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual authors.