[EAI Commentary] Trends in the Enhancement of UNC Functions and its Role After Wartime Operational Control Transfer

Editor's Note

Amidst growing concerns about the ROK-US alliance due to recent events such as the termination of the ROK-Japan Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and disputes over defense cost-sharing, controversies surrounding the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) are escalating between South Korea and the United States. Jeong Kyung-young, Adjunct Professor at Hanyang University's Graduate School of International Studies, states, "It is necessary to approach the issue of the UNC comprehensively, considering not only its role after OPCON transfer but also its role during the armistice and its future in the event of a peace treaty." He suggests that the future role and functions of the UNC should be established in a way that benefits both South Korea and the UNC. The author emphasizes, "By transforming the DMZ into a peace zone and reorganizing the UNC to include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the two Koreas, and the UNC participating nations, the UNC could fulfill its role as a guide towards unification without incurring further conflict."

Reports of conflict between South Korea and the United States regarding the authority of the UNC during the initial operational capability assessment phase of the OPCON transfer during the 2019 ROK-US Combined Command Post Exercise have surfaced, amplifying the controversy surrounding the UNC's role.

It is necessary to approach the issue of the UNC comprehensively, considering not only its role after OPCON transfer but also its role during the armistice and its future in the event of a peace treaty. This paper aims to examine the historical development and functional enhancement trends of the UNC and derive implications. It will then discuss the background and significance of the OPCON transfer, and the command relationship and roles of the UNC and the future Combined Forces Command (CFC) during the armistice and wartime after the OPCON transfer. Subsequently, the role of the UNC in inter-Korean military agreements and future arms control efforts, as well as the future of the UNC in the event of a peace treaty, will be discussed, followed by policy recommendations.

Trends in the Enhancement of UNC Functions and Implications

In 1950, when North Korea launched the Korean War, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on June 26th demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and urging withdrawal north of the 38th parallel. As the North Korean authorities did not cease hostilities, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 83 on June 27th, recommending UN member states provide assistance to restore international peace and security. Subsequently, on July 6th, it adopted Resolution 84, establishing a unified military command under the responsibility of the United States, with the commander appointed by the US government and reporting periodically to the UN Security Council. In response, the Truman administration appointed General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the Far East Command, as the Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces.

On July 14, 1950, President Syngman Rhee sent a letter to Commander MacArthur, stating, "During the current crisis, I hereby transfer the command authority of all Army, Navy, and Air Force units of the Republic of Korea to the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Forces." The UNC then conducted operations during the Korean War under a unified command structure that included the ROK Armed Forces, the US Eighth Army, the US Far East Air Force and Seventh Fleet, and the UN participating forces. On October 7, 1950, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 376(V), recommending "the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of Korea."

At the time of the signing of the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, the UN participating nations issued the "Declaration by the Sixteen Nations Participating in the Korean War," declaring that they would break the armistice and that the UN forces would re-enter the war if hostilities resumed. On February 19, 1954, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded between the UNC and the Japanese government, allowing the use of US naval and air force bases in Japan. On November 17, 1954, the Agreed Minutes stipulated that "as long as the UNC carries out its defense mission on the Korean Peninsula, the operational control over the ROK forces shall remain with the Commander of the UNC," thereby allowing the UNC to continue exercising operational control over the ROK forces. Furthermore, on July 1, 1957, the UNC was relocated from Tokyo to Seoul, and the Commander of the UNC concurrently served as the Commander of the US Forces in Korea.

On November 7, 1978, in accordance with ROK-US Strategic Directive 1, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established, transferring the operational control over the ROK forces, previously exercised by the UNC Commander, to the CFC Commander. The UNC continued to perform its function of managing the Armistice Agreement under the direction of the UN Security Council and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CFC, under the strategic directives and operational guidance of the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the Military Committee Meeting (MCM), was tasked with deterring war and achieving victory if deterrence failed. On December 1, 1994, according to ROK-US Strategic Directive 2, peacetime operational control was transferred from the CFC to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CFC Commander exercised Combined Delegated Authority (CODA), including peacetime crisis management, intelligence surveillance, wartime operational plan development and combined exercises, and interoperability.

Meanwhile, regarding the enhancement of UNC functions, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Terms of Reference (TOR) for the UNC Commander in 1983, stipulating that "in the event of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC and CFC would maintain separate legal and military structures and operate UNC units." This was subsequently issued as UNC General Order No. 1 on January 1, 1998. Furthermore, in January 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instructed UNC Commander Leon J. Laporte to enhance the UNC's role as a Force Provider, involving more nations beyond just member states. Consequently, the UNC established the UNC Multi-nations Coordination Center (MNCC) in 2008, referencing the Multinational Coordination Center of US Central Command. During the 2009 Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, Australia and France participated as part of the UNC MNCC. In 2014, UNC Commander Curtis M. Scaparrotti advanced the UNC Revitalization Program to expand the UNC's role. In May 2018, Vincent K. Brooks, who assumed command in 2016, appointed Canadian Army Lieutenant General Wayne D. Eyre, a non-US national, as the first Deputy Commander of the UNC. The UNC took measures to reduce concurrent positions between the CFC and the UNC to operate independently in fulfilling its role of overseeing the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and pursuing dialogue with North Korea. The number of third-country officers in UNC positions was expanded. Although South Korea was also requested to participate as UNC staff members, it has not yet dispatched personnel. The trend of strengthening the UNC's independent role has led to increased participation of UNC member nations in ROK-US combined exercises such as Key Resolve. The UNC Commander hosts monthly meetings with ambassadors from troop-contributing nations to share progress on various matters. The number of personnel serving in the UNC, which was around 30-40, has increased by two to three times, with approximately 8 countries, including Australia and France, dispatching UNC staff officers, thereby reinforcing and expanding UNC functions. Notably, on January 16, 2018, amidst heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, a meeting of foreign ministers from 20 countries, including the United States and the 16 UN participating nations, was held to support inter-Korean dialogue and devise contingency plans for the Korean Peninsula.

At the 50th SCM in 2018, the ROK and US defense ministers agreed on a new command structure for the future CFC, with a four-star ROK general as Commander and a four-star US general as Deputy Commander. They also reaffirmed that the UNC and US Forces Korea would continue to be stationed on the peninsula after the OPCON transfer. On July 27, 2019, Australian Navy Vice Admiral Stuart Mayer became the second Deputy Commander of the UNC, succeeding Wayne Eyre.

The UNC's efforts to enhance its functions are likely driven by lessons learned from the Iraq War, which was conducted with a limited coalition force without a UN Security Council resolution, proving challenging. It is believed that a UNC-led multinational force operation, already established and operating under a UN Security Council resolution, would be more effective in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula compared to the ROK-US CFC. Furthermore, strengthening the UNC's role clarifies its function during the armistice, prepares for its role in contingencies, and allows it to perform a monitoring function in the event of a peace treaty. It also holds the potential to evolve into a peacekeeping force and could possibly develop into a Northeast Asian NATO-style collective security system as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy, serving to counterbalance China.

What are the background and intentions behind the US agreement to have a four-star US general as the Deputy Commander of the future CFC? This likely stems from a forward-looking assessment of the ROK military's capability to conduct theater operations on the Korean Peninsula, enabling the Deputy Commander of the CFC and Commander of US Forces Korea to facilitate requests for US reinforcement forces. Additionally, having a three-star general as Deputy CFC Commander would avoid the cumbersome process of seeking guidance and reporting to the UNC Commander and Commander of US Forces Korea for every matter. Given the significant authority of commanders and deputy commanders in military organizations, a command structure with officers of the same rank could overcome limitations. It also allows the UNC Commander to be integrated into the future CFC command structure and prepare for wartime missions through armistice-period combined exercises. If operations are conducted under the name of the UNC, the aspect of preparing for post-conflict occupation and governance of North Korea cannot be ruled out. If these considerations materialize, there is a possibility of dual operations between the future CFC and the UNC during wartime, or a re-transfer of OPCON from the CFC to the UNC during wartime, leading to operations under a unified UNC command. In this scenario, the OPCON transfer would be merely nominal, and the overall architecture of the ROK military would be challenged.

Background and Significance of OPCON Transfer

It is necessary to reflect on why the OPCON transfer was pursued and what its objectives and significance are. The pursuit of OPCON transfer symbolizes the emphasis on self-reliant defense since the early 1970s and the evolution of ROK defense towards ROK-centricity. With the transfer of peacetime operational control in 1994 and the advent of the 21st century, South Korea, possessing overwhelming national strength compared to North Korea, an elevated international status, strong national pride, and a military that has grown to international standards, is capable of leading ROK-US combined defense. The United States, in response to potential threats from China and terrorism, has been pursuing overseas troop redeployments under the Global Posture Review. In line with the strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea to simultaneously address threats from North Korea and the Indo-Pacific region, a new combined defense system led by South Korea with US support is being pursued, which is to be achieved through OPCON transfer.

At the ROK-US Summit in June 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration agreed to "continue cooperation at the alliance level to enable the timely transfer of OPCON to the ROK military based on conditions." Furthermore, as one of the 100 national governance tasks announced on July 9, it has pursued "the early transfer of OPCON based on a strong ROK-US alliance." In his National Armed Forces Day address in 2018, he emphasized, "Our military will protect the lives and safety of our people from any threat, and we will possess the capabilities to exercise operational control in our territory, skies, and seas under our leadership."

The OPCON transfer is a symbol of self-reliant defense and a goal that an independent nation should naturally achieve. Moreover, this transfer signifies the determination of the Republic of Korea, the owner of this land, to defend its national spirit, identity, homeland, and democracy with its own will, capabilities, and strategy, without excessive reliance on the alliance. Exercising OPCON over the ROK military signifies the restoration of defense identity and the recovery of autonomy in military force operations. Furthermore, when considering North Korea's obsession with completing its nuclear armament as a strategic means for unification through force, the objective is to build a nation capable of leading a war in contingencies through OPCON transfer, in preparation for a catastrophic nuclear war.

Furthermore, the OPCON transfer will serve as an opportunity to bolster the pride of our military and elevate national self-esteem, thereby restoring public trust in the military. Exercising OPCON is essential for pursuing a unified strategy during both wartime and peacetime, and effective peace-creation functions can only be achieved through OPCON transfer. Additionally, ROK-led military operations in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula would preempt any justification for Chinese intervention, thus achieving the great task of unification. The OPCON transfer carries the historical significance of achieving the ROK-centricity of Korean defense, which the ROK-US alliance has pursued since the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the North Korean military will fear the ROK military exercising OPCON transfer. The North Korean military will inevitably be conscious of the ROK military, which has unified command systems in wartime and peacetime and possesses the authority to retaliate, and will be deterred from provocation due to the certainty of immediate response to any North Korean provocation. Even if North Korea engages in armed provocation, our military will respond with immediate and decisive retaliatory strikes not only against the point of provocation but also against its command and support elements.

Furthermore, through the transfer of wartime operational control, the Republic of Korea, with the support of the ROK-US alliance, will achieve self-reliant security following economic growth and political development, thereby being evaluated and praised as a model of alliance. The OPCON transfer will also provide an opportunity to expand its horizons on the international stage by exercising diplomatic autonomy. The OPCON transfer will foster the development of doctrines suited to the operational environment and military strategy of the Korean Peninsula, cultivate a military capable of fighting and winning through weapons development, and invigorate the defense industry, creating numerous jobs and boosting defense exports, thereby contributing to national interests.

Role of the UNC After OPCON Transfer

This section examines the relationship between the UNC, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the future CFC during the armistice and in contingency situations after the OPCON transfer. Even after the OPCON transfer, the UNC will continue to be responsible for managing the Armistice Agreement during the armistice, in accordance with Article 17 of the Armistice Agreement, which states, "The responsibility for the observance and enforcement of the provisions and regulations of the Armistice Agreement shall rest with the signatory of this Agreement and his successors in command."The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff is presumed to maintain the position that it should exercise the authority to respond to localized provocations during peacetime after the OPCON transfer.The UNC is credited with playing a crucial role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula, but it is assessed to have failed in deterring localized provocations. This is because the ROK military's operational authority was constrained, leading to criticism that it could not adequately fulfill its primary mission of defending national sovereignty and protecting the lives and property of its citizens. One of the reasons for the ROK military's failure to deter North Korean provocations has been the delay in response due to the need for upward approval when faced with attacks involving high-casualty weapon systems, in accordance with the principle of proportionality under the UNC's armistice engagement rules. North Korea has exploited this vulnerability, engaging in constant provocations and acts of terrorism. In his memoir "Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War," former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates testified, "During the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, I, along with the President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael G. Mullen, telephoned our South Korean counterparts to instruct them to respond only with prisoners in accordance with the principle of proportionality, and to refrain from any retaliatory bombing by fighter jets."

The UN Command is assessed to have critically contributed to deterring war on the Korean Peninsula, but failed to deter localized provocations. This is because the Korean military cannot escape criticism for becoming a military unable to properly fulfill its inherent mission of defending national sovereignty and protecting the lives and property of its people, due to constraints on its operational authority. One of the reasons the Korean military has failed to deter North Korean provocations thus far is that, in the event of North Korean armed provocation, the Korean military faced delays in retaliatory fire due to the principle of proportionality stipulated in the UN Command's rules of engagement during the armistice, and due to the upward escalation of approval authority when provoked with high-lethality weapon systems, leading to missed opportunities. North Korea has continuously exploited this vulnerability to perpetrate provocations and acts of terror. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates testified in his memoir, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War" that "during the Yeonpyeong Island shelling provocation on November 23, 2010, I, along with the President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael G. Mullen, telephoned our Korean counterparts to ensure they responded only with artillery fire in accordance with the principle of proportionality, and absolutely did not retaliate with fighter jets or bombing, despite their inclination to respond disproportionally with fighter jets and artillery against North Korea." While the concern was to prevent escalation into full-scale war, our fighter jets, which had been scrambled in response to North Korean forces violating South Korean territory in broad daylight, should have carried out a resolute and decisive retaliation.

According to the ROK-US Joint Plan for Response to Localized Provocations, signed by ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Jeong Seung-jo and UNC Commander James D. Thurman in March 2013, the engagement rules for wartime are understood to have been supplemented. In the event of localized provocations by North Korea, the ROK military should exercise its right to self-defense by immediately and decisively retaliating against the point of provocation as well as its command and support elements. The UNC, in turn, needs to implement measures to prevent escalation, such as the rapid deployment of additional US forces.

In the event of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, as discussed earlier, the UNC will assume the role of the command responsible for combat operations based on the TOR for the UNC Commander and UNC General Order, which stipulate that "the UNC and CFC will maintain separate legal and military structures and operate UNC units, including US reinforcement forces." This conflicts with our position that the future CFC should be the war command for theater operations on the Korean Peninsula. Should this concern materialize, a chaotic and unmanageable wartime operational scenario is anticipated.

The lessons learned from the dual command structure during the Korean War are severe. During the counteroffensive operations, ground operations were conducted under separate command structures: the US Eighth Army, responsible for the western sector, and the US X Corps, which was deployed for the Incheon landing operation and then redeployed to Wonsan for operations in the eastern sector, were directly commanded by General MacArthur. The lack of coordinated operations, such as the intervention of Chinese forces along the combat boundaries of these two units, highlights the difficulties encountered. Therefore, a dual command structure should never be repeated. Consequently, in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, the future CFC Commander should be the sole theater commander for the Korean Peninsula, the UNC should fulfill the role of force provider, and combat units participating as members of the UNC should be placed under the tactical control of the CFC to unify the command structure.

Furthermore, in the event of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in North Korea, including volcanic eruptions like Baekdu Mountain, conducted under a UN Security Council resolution or at the request of the North Korean authorities, the future CFC Commander should exercise operational control. North Korea is not a foreign country; it is in a unique relationship with South Korea, moving towards unification based on the principle of self-determination, as outlined in the Basic Agreement between the North and South. Article 3 of the Constitution states, "The territory of the Republic of Korea shall be the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands." Therefore, HA/DR operations or peace enforcement operations should be conducted under the unified command structure of the future CFC Commander, who takes precedence over factors such as the North Korean military, operational area, and language.

Role of the UNC in the Event of a ROK-DPRK Peace Agreement

The September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement was reached in close consultation with the UNC and was faithful to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, including the demilitarization of the DMZ. Notably, the operation of a trilateral consultation body involving the ROK, North Korea, and the UNC to discuss and implement the Panmunjom demilitarization agreement is significant for the UNC's role.

UNC and Polish/Czech personnel could also return to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) as part of the communist bloc and, along with Swiss and Swedish NNSC members, monitor the implementation of the inter-Korean military agreement. In the future, the UNC could play a role in promoting and monitoring the implementation of inter-Korean arms control in close cooperation with the UNC.

Regarding the UNC's role in inter-Korean cooperation projects, the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command concerning the Connection of Inter-Korean Railways and Roads Passing Through the DMZ" signed on October 3, 2010, stipulates that "the UNC shall continue to exercise Jurisdiction Authority, and the ROK military shall exercise Administrative Authority." Based on this agreement, the UNC can contribute to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula by providing military support for future inter-Korean cooperation projects.

Meanwhile, this section discusses the role of the UNC in the event of a peace agreement. There are opposing views: one argues that the UNC's raison d'être would be lost as North Korea would no longer be an adversary, leading to its dissolution. The other argues that the UNC, established based on UN Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84, would not be significantly affected even if the Armistice Agreement were replaced by a peace agreement. Some even maintain that the UN General Assembly's October 7, 1950, resolution on "the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of Korea" remains valid for the UNC.

Examining the positions of relevant countries regarding the future of the UNC, we can infer the following: The United States believes it should remain to manage peace on the Korean Peninsula and maintain stability in Northeast Asia. North Korea, however, has persistently argued for the dissolution of the UNC as an obstacle to unification and insists that the UNC should be dissolved upon the conclusion of a peace agreement. China, perceiving the UNC, dominated by Western powers, as a means to contain China, will advocate for its dissolution due to a sense of encirclement. Japan, on the other hand, believes the UNC should remain and perceives that if the ROK government opposes its continued existence and the UNC is relocated back to Tokyo, it would enhance Japan's own security.

If a peace agreement is concluded, potential issues arising from the dissolution of the UNC include the loss of rights to use UNC rear bases, the dissolution of the commitment by Korean War participating nations to re-enter the conflict if hostilities resume, and the diminished likelihood of adopting a UN Security Council resolution for intervention due to potential vetoes by China and Russia in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. The absence of a binding body to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement, as exemplified by the Paris Peace Accords of the Vietnam War which allowed for armed attacks by North Vietnam, serves as a cautionary tale, underscoring the need for prudence in dissolving the UNC upon the conclusion of a peace agreement.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The recent enhancement of the UNC's functions is partly to more effectively manage the armistice system and to prepare for its potential evolution into a peacekeeping force upon the conclusion of a peace agreement, should denuclearization progress. Furthermore, its potential role as a war command in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula cannot be ruled out, nor can its development into a Northeast Asian NATO-style collective security system as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy to counterbalance revisionist powers like China. In any case, the role and functions of the UNC need to be established in a manner that benefits both the Republic of Korea and the UNC.

The transfer of wartime operational control represents a fundamental shift in the framework of national security. While respecting the UNC's role in managing the Armistice Agreement during the armistice, the UNC's armistice engagement rules should be supplemented to allow our military to regain operational control and immediately retaliate against any North Korean challenge. The command relationship between the future CFC and the UNC should be one of support and cooperation, not subordination. In the event of contingencies, the future CFC should be the sole war command for theater operations on the Korean Peninsula, and the UNC should fulfill the role of force provider. Combat units participating as members of the UNC should be placed under the tactical control of the future CFC to unify the command structure.

In the event of a peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula, in-depth consultations between South Korea and the United States are required regarding the future of the UNC. Options such as a joint inter-Korean military committee, the UNC, a reorganized UNC, or a Peacekeeping Organization (PMO) could be considered as mechanisms for monitoring the peace agreement. Considering factors such as international support, feasibility of adoption, effectiveness of monitoring functions, and national interests, transforming the DMZ into a peace zone and reorganizing the UNC to include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the two Koreas, and the UNC participating nations would enable the UNC to perform its peace agreement monitoring functions, serving as a guide towards unification without further conflict. ■

■ Author: Jeong Kyung-young, Adjunct Professor, Hanyang University Graduate School of International Studies. He graduated from the Korea Military Academy and the US Army Command and General Staff College, and holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Maryland. He has participated in strategy formulation and policy development at the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, CFC, and Army Headquarters, and has lectured on security studies at the National Security Council, the Ministry of National Defense Policy Advisory Committee, National Defense University, and Catholic University. His main research areas include ROK-US military relations, North Korean military affairs, multilateral security cooperation, and conflict management. His major works and edited volumes include "Security Challenges and Resolve Towards a Unified Korea," "South Korea's Centripetal Foreign and Security Policy," "East Asian Territorial Disputes and International Cooperation" (edited),North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia(London: Ashgate) (co-authored).

■ Editor: Baek Jin-kyung, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr

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