[EAI Commentary] Abe Cabinet's New Korean Peninsula Policy: Background and Korea's Position

Editor's Note

The relationship between South Korea and Japan has been continuously deteriorating due to a series of events, including Japan's export restrictions on three semiconductor materials, the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on wartime forced labor victims, and the trade war. Park Jeong-jin, a professor at Tsuda University, states, "While the economic impact on South Korea from its exclusion from the whitelist is uncertain, it will undoubtedly bring about changes in the security environment." He emphasizes the need to pay attention to the Abe cabinet's new Korean Peninsula policy, which maintains a hardline stance against South Korea while repeatedly expressing openness to dialogue with North Korea. Furthermore, the author suggests that with the end of the premise that "progress in inter-Korean relations will lead to progress in North Korea-Japan relations," there is a need for South Korea to present a strategy that considers new South Korea-Japan relations and an inter-Korean peace regime, if necessary.

A 'Trade War' Between South Korea and Japan?

The deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations shows signs of becoming prolonged. While it is too early to predict future prospects, an interim assessment is necessary. Let us first reflect on South Korea's response. Regarding Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's 'Export Control Measures on Three Semiconductor Materials to South Korea' dated July 1, 2019, the South Korean government perceived it as retaliation for the Supreme Court's ruling on wartime forced labor victims (hereinafter referred to as the 'forced labor issue') and considered it a declaration of war targeting South Korea's future industries. It is interpreted that the Japanese government is attempting to escalate the subsequent 'trade war' into a security issue. According to this interpretation, the South Korean government's declaration to terminate GSOMIA becomes a natural measure from a reciprocal perspective.

Is this truly the case? The fact that Japan's strengthened export controls are retaliatory measures for historical issues is clear. However, the interpretation that historical issues have been incrementally expanded into trade and security issues is inconsistent with the facts. The first item in the announcement by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which initiated the issue, already included a notice to exclude South Korea from the whitelist. This implies that the measure was not based on economic and trade logic from the outset. The exclusion of a specific country from the whitelist is part of a process of redefining that country's status in security policy. Despite the long-standing conflict over historical issues, it was security cooperation that underpinned South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, a reassessment of security interests leads to a fundamental restructuring of bilateral relations. The Japanese government has just announced the beginning of that process.

When excluding South Korea from the whitelist, the Japanese government cited 'suspicions' of strategic material transfer to North Korea as justification. South Korea countered that these 'suspicions' were merely a ploy to legitimize trade 'restrictions.' This is also based on the judgment that the essence of Japan's retaliatory measures lies in 'economic aggression,' i.e., trade relations. However, South Korea-Japan trade relations are reciprocal. Although Japan has a surplus in its trade balance, it is not in a position to impose sanctions on South Korea using this as a weapon. The Japanese government is aware of this, and therefore, the possibility of imposing an embargo while tolerating damage to its own companies or industries is slim. In reality, what the Japanese government intended was not 'restriction' but the 'suspicion' itself. And its purpose can be interpreted as creating a form of 'Korea Risk.' This is not reciprocal in that it can cause unilateral damage to South Korea.

The method of exerting pressure by downgrading the security credibility of the opposing country based on its domestic laws is reminiscent of the 2005 Banco Delta Asia (BDA) incident surrounding North Korea. In the case of the BDA incident, the process itself became an issue, and as the issue expanded, a pattern emerged where risks increased regardless of the truth. This is because suspicions related to national security are inherently impossible to fully resolve. These suspicions led to the freezing of North Korea's entire foreign exchange funds. Of course, there is no need to overestimate the practical impact on South Korea as being the same as that on North Korea. The term 'Korea Risk' is also not an official term used by the Japanese government. However, the expression 'Korea Risk' is not new among conservative opinion leaders in Japan. They cite foreign exchange and financial crises as economic damages that the South Korean government could incur if the situation prolongs. The logic is that global investors focus on the location of risk occurrence rather than the truth of the suspicion.

Restructuring of South Korea-Japan Relations and Its Driving Force

While the economic impact on South Korea from its exclusion from the whitelist is uncertain, it is clear that changes in the security environment will occur. The unprecedented provocation of incursions into South Korean territory by Chinese and Russian military forces is not unrelated to this. However, changes in the security environment are not matters that the Abe cabinet can execute alone. Although it was outwardly a trade war, the role of the United States became critically important from the initial phase. The US intervention and mediation in past South Korea-Japan relations were all based on the need for traditional security cooperation between the two countries. If the intention is to maintain the conventional mode of cooperation, the US should have intervened or mediated from the stage when South Korea's exclusion from the whitelist was first announced. In South Korea, the US response and mediation became headline news, but it was belated. In contrast, Japanese media outlets predicted from the outset that US intervention would not occur. In fact, the US has not taken any meaningful action regarding this unprecedented confrontation between South Korea and Japan.

The Abe cabinet is confident that it has the agreement or support of the Trump administration. This is because they believe that their interests are perfectly aligned in terms of the new international order and strategies to respond to it. In Japan, the term 'Second Cold War' (第二次冷戦) is commonly used, and its advent is not a matter of possibility but a present reality. The US response to China's rise, represented by the 'Belt and Road Initiative,' has reverted to a containment policy since the Trump administration took office, and this has been materialized as the Indo-Pacific strategy. In November 2017, when this strategy was still in its conceptual stage, the South Korean government clearly expressed its refusal to participate, citing concerns about provoking China. In contrast, Japan has made diplomatic efforts to play a key role in a new defense line connecting India and Australia, and in the Indo-Pacific strategy officially formulated this year, it has positioned itself as the 'cornerstone.' Consequently, as an expansion of Japan's military status is anticipated, the 'specialness' of South Korea-Japan relations, based on traditional South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation, is deemed unnecessary by some within the Liberal Democratic Party. The Abe cabinet's confidence in South Korea stems from this.

Japan's retaliatory measures against South Korea were not an impulsive reaction stemming from Shinzo Abe's personal right-wing tendencies. The two countries have clashed in various areas, not just historical issues, including the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation under the comfort women agreement, the WTO complaint regarding Fukushima seafood, and the radar and patrol aircraft incidents. During these clashes, South Korea's reactions were relatively insensitive, while Japan's were excessively sensitive. These instances of conflict are actively being utilized as justifications for restructuring South Korea-Japan relations. The forced labor issue was the final line drawn by the Abe cabinet. Following the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on this issue, the Japanese government began to act, and around this time, various compromise proposals were presented as a way to restore relations. However, for the Abe cabinet, which envisions a different future for South Korea-Japan relations, it is difficult to expect further concessions on historical issues. South Korea's termination of GSOMIA cannot be a bargaining chip for returning to the whitelist. Rather, the South Korean government's hardline response is becoming material for the Abe cabinet to reshape South Korea-Japan relations.

A majority of the Japanese public supports the Abe cabinet's unfamiliar approach to South Korea. This cannot be explained solely by the rightward shift in Japanese society. What the Abe cabinet appeals to the Japanese public is that 'South Korea is an untrustworthy country,' with suspicions of strategic material transfer to North Korea, i.e., distrust in its North Korea policy, being presented as a key justification. Previous Japanese cabinets had adopted the terminology of South Korea's North Korea policies, such as the Sunshine Policy, Engagement Policy, and Reconciliation and Peace Policy. After the Six-Party Talks during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, they began using the term 'appeasement policy' (宥和政策). This term is translated as 'appeasement policy.' They are deliberately negating the South Korean government's official stance, which hopes it will be understood as an engagement policy. Currently, all Japanese media outlets invariably refer to South Korea's North Korea policy as 'appeasement policy' (融和政策). The evolution of the term 'appeasement' (유화) to 'melting and integration' (융화) in the context of existing misunderstandings of South Korea's North Korea policy seems natural. Melting and integration is not a diplomatic term but a common everyday word, and above all, its Japanese pronunciation ('yuuwa') is identical to that of appeasement.

However, the dictionary definition of 'melting and integration' (융화) is 'melting and integration.' In other words, current Japanese society misunderstands South Korea's North Korea policy as a policy of integration between the two Koreas, that is, unification. Behind the Japanese society's 'natural misunderstanding' that the goal of South Korea's North Korea policy is 'inter-Korean integration,' the political frame of 'anti-Japan Korea' operates as two sides of the same coin. As a result, the perception is spreading that the reconciliation led by South Korea is not about building peace on the Korean Peninsula for denuclearization, but about expanding anti-Japanese 'Korean nationalism.' This perception self-generates into the absurd logic that if unification is realized, North Korea's nuclear weapons will become South Korea's nuclear weapons. For Japan (and Japanese people), the rapid changes in the situation towards unification on the Korean Peninsula are understood as a disruption of the international relations surrounding them, and in some cases, as a similar situation on the Korean Peninsula, i.e., 'Korean contingency' (朝鮮有事). This is in line with 'China's rise' and serves as an important logical basis for Prime Minister Abe's argument for constitutional revision.

The Rise of North Korea-Japan Relations and South Korea's Dilemma

The misunderstanding of South Korea's North Korea policy within Japanese society is also a result of the Abe cabinet's 'intentional misunderstanding.' This is accompanied by an independent approach to North Korea. At the time of the first inter-Korean summit and the Panmunjom Declaration in March 2018, the Abe cabinet, rather than joining the South Korea-led denuclearization process for North Korea, appealed for a unified response with the Trump administration while sequentially holding summit meetings with President Putin and Premier Xi Jinping. Japanese diplomatic officials at the time referred to this approach to North Korea as 'great power diplomacy.' In September, Prime Minister Abe expressed his intention to hold a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un and declared his resolve to resolve the abduction issue. This statement was linked to the domestic political schedule of the Liberal Democratic Party's presidential election, which was scheduled shortly after, rather than the third inter-Korean summit held just before. The full-fledged shift in North Korea policy was becoming visible in conjunction with Prime Minister Abe's long-term rule plan.

In the cabinet reshuffle following the Liberal Democratic Party election, the reappointment of Yoshihide Suga is noteworthy. He was given the portfolio of 'Minister in charge of the Abduction Issue.' It is unprecedented for the Chief Cabinet Secretary to be given a 'special mission' related to North Korea. This indicates the intention of the Prime Minister's Office, beyond the cabinet, to lead North Korea policy. The move towards a Prime Minister's Office-led North Korea policy was already planned. On July 1, 2018, immediately after the North Korea-US summit, the Northeast Asia Division (アジア大洋州北東アジア課) of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, which was responsible for the Korean Peninsula at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reorganized into two departments (Division 1 and Division 2). The intention was to establish a department exclusively for North Korea (Division 2). This measure was a top-down initiative by the Prime Minister's Office, not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself. At its center is Takaya Imai, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister. Around him, Isao Iijima, former Special Advisor to Prime Minister Koizumi, and Shigeru Kitamura, Director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, have been leading North Korea policy and directly overseeing North Korea-Japan contacts.

In August 2019, Kitamura was elevated to the position of head of the National Security Council (NSC). His predecessor, Shotaro Yachi, was the architect of the South Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women. In contrast, Kitamura, a North Korea expert, has no significant ties to South Korea. He can be seen as symbolizing the direction of the Abe cabinet's security and Korean Peninsula policies. Subsequently, in September, the new Foreign Minister, Toshimitsu Motegi, maintained the traditional hardline stance towards South Korea while repeatedly stating the possibility of dialogue with North Korea, including future summit meetings. In parallel with this, visits by Japanese economic organizations and politicians to North Korea are currently underway. The restructuring of South Korea-Japan relations and the exploration of North Korea-Japan relations are unfolding simultaneously. This also implies a direct engagement with the North Korean threat without going through South Korea. This movement by the Abe cabinet targeting the entire Korean Peninsula reflects a change in the overall Japanese security policy and can be considered a new approach. Regardless of its success, it is a change that the South Korean government should pay attention to.

While pursuing denuclearization policy for North Korea, the South Korean government had an atmosphere of underestimating Japanese factors, and reflecting this, the term 'Japan passing' was often circulated in the South Korean media. This is based on empirical judgment derived from past precedents. The belief is that if inter-Korean relations progress, North Korea-Japan relations will automatically follow. However, progress in North Korea-Japan relations is an essential process and a catalyst for North Korea's denuclearization. And since the Pyongyang Declaration in 2002, North Korea-Japan relations have unfolded independently of inter-Korean relations. Symbolizing this is the so-called abduction issue, a bilateral agenda between North Korea and Japan. North Korea and Japan have engaged in various forms of talks using the abduction issue as a starting point and have discussed issues beyond the abduction issue. The premise that progress in inter-Korean relations will lead to progress in North Korea-Japan relations no longer exists.

The Abe cabinet will continue to actively pursue engagement with North Korea, and if the current trend continues, confrontation between South Korea and Japan will accompany it. Of course, there will be no sudden nullification of security cooperation between South Korea and Japan or dramatic normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan, as the US will not permit it. North Korea's response is also unpredictable. However, the possibility of rapid progress in North Korea-Japan relations through summit meetings or other means remains open. In this case, the South Korean government will have no choice but to express its support, but its leading role in North Korea's denuclearization will be significantly undermined. This is a dilemma. If the stagnation of inter-Korean relations is added to this, the dilemma will inevitably grow. Is the South Korean government's response to this adequate? So far, President Moon Jae-in has proposed the establishment of a peace economy system between the two Koreas as an alternative to Japan's 'economic aggression,' and at the August 15th commemorative event, he mentioned a future vision of unification for the two Koreas. Since then, Japan has shown no reaction, and North Korea has responded with successive missile launches. If necessary, one must speak of 'anti-Japan' and 'unification.' And within those words, there must be a strategy that considers new South Korea-Japan relations and an inter-Korean peace regime. ■

■ Author: Park Jeong-jin, Professor of International Relations at Tsuda University. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Area Studies from the University of Tokyo and previously worked as a research professor at the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies before assuming his current position. His main research areas include East Asian international politics and studies on South Korea-Japan and North Korea-Japan relations. His major works include "The Birth of the Japan-North Korea Cold War Structure 1945-65," edited "What Was the Repatriation Movement?", and co-authored works such as "The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia," "Japan's Security 6: The Korean Peninsula and East Asia," and "History of South Korea-Japan Relations 1965-2015."

■ Editor: Baek Jin-kyung, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr

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