[EAI Commentary] North Korea's Biochemical Weapons and the Path to Complete Denuclearization

Editor's Note

Despite the summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, which raised high expectations for progress in North Korea-U.S. negotiations, North Korea has once again hinted at the possibility of augmenting its nuclear arsenal by firing short-range ballistic missiles and new long-range artillery pieces on multiple occasions. The military threat posed by North Korea, which remains an obstacle to the Korean Peninsula peace process, is not limited to nuclear weapons but also includes biochemical weapons. Baek Jin-kyung, EAI Research Fellow, and Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies (Professor at Seoul National University), emphasize that biochemical weapons, which can cause immediate military threats comparable to nuclear weapons at a lower development cost, should not be ignored. The authors suggest that if biochemical weapons are not included in the denuclearization process of North Korea, a significant military threat will persist, and therefore, efforts must be made to achieve 'comprehensive negotiations' for the establishment of genuine peace.

Biochemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction comparable to nuclear weapons and are known as the 'poor man's nuclear weapons' due to their low production cost relative to their effectiveness. The biochemical weapons possessed by North Korea constitute one axis of its asymmetric capabilities against South Korea and could inflict fatal damage if used with delivery systems such as long-range artillery or short-range ballistic missiles. As the peace process on the Korean Peninsula progresses, all elements of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, missiles, and biochemical weapons, must be verifiably dismantled. Amidst the denuclearization negotiations between North Korea and the U.S., there is ongoing debate regarding whether biochemical weapons are included in the negotiations and what position they hold in the ultimate goal or concept of denuclearization. While there is a moral imperative to dismantle all weapons of mass destruction, there is also a need for a cautious approach to ensure the success of the negotiations.

Immediately after the June 12, 2018, Singapore Summit, the United States expressed the view that North Korea's biochemical weapons should be included in the denuclearization process. National Security Advisor John Bolton's statement on July 1, 2018, defining North Korea's denuclearization as 'weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including nuclear and biochemical weapons,' sparked controversy. At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 25, 2018, Secretary Pompeo, in response to a question from Senator Ed Markey, stated that both sides had discussed biochemical weapons and had a mutual understanding that they were part of the denuclearization process ("We’ve talked about CBW. Their CBW program is being part of that denuclearization and as I said they have indicated that they fully understand the scope of what denuclearization entails.").

Following the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in late February 2019, Bolton stated in several interviews that the 'denuclearization' demanded of North Korea encompassed a broad scope, including not only nuclear weapons and missiles but also biochemical weapons. Furthermore, on March 5, 2019, Senator Cory Gardner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, mentioned after receiving a briefing on the Hanoi Summit outcomes from Ambassador Biegun that biochemical weapons, in addition to nuclear weapons, were part of the discussion ("So not only nuclear but we're talking weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons as well. And there was discussion of human rights as well at the summit.").

Considering the negotiation process between North Korea and the U.S. over the past 18 months, it is crucial to pay attention to whether North Korea's biochemical weapons are included in the ultimate goal of denuclearization and, if so, in what order they will be addressed.

The international community has continuously speculated about the status of North Korea's biochemical weapons, and North Korea is currently assessed to be the world's third-largest possessor of biochemical weapons, following the United States and Russia. Chemical weapons, which began to be produced in the 1980s, are estimated to have a current stockpile of approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons. This is understood to include chemical agents such as adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS), chlorine (CL), cyanogen chloride (CK), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard agents (H, HD, or HL), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA), and nerve agents (VM and VX). Furthermore, it is speculated that North Korea possesses numerous lethal biological agents, including Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium botulinum (botulism), Vibrio cholerae (cholera), Hantavirus (hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome), Yersinia pestis (plague), Variola virus (smallpox), Salmonella Typhi (typhoid fever), Shigella (dysentery), Brucella (brucellosis), Staphylococcus aureus (staphylococcal infections), Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus), and Staphylococcus aureus enterotoxin (food poisoning).

Unlike the status of nuclear weapons and missile development, and the locations of launch sites, it is difficult to accurately ascertain the production and locations of biochemical weapons and agents in North Korea. This is due to the fact that highly toxic biochemical weapons are produced under the guise of chemical plants and fertilizer factories. Biochemical weapons can be produced at relatively low costs in facilities such as fertilizer plants, pesticide factories, pharmaceutical companies, and biological research institutes. Their production is difficult to verify, and evidence can be easily destroyed. These characteristics make it impossible to accurately assess the current status of biochemical weapons. Moreover, in the case of binary or ternary chemical weapons, such as VX, which do not exhibit toxicity until two or three components are mixed, the producers are unaware that they are manufacturing materials for chemical weapons, as the weapon only becomes lethal when the components are mixed. North Korea also cannot escape controversy regarding the inhumane testing of its produced biochemical weapons. Defectors' testimonies have repeatedly emerged alleging that the North Korean regime has conducted human experiments on political prisoners or disabled North Korean residents at facilities such as Political Prison Camp No. 22, Kim Il Sung University of Medicine, the Radiation Research Laboratory of the Kim Man Yu Memorial Hospital, and Institutes 201 and 501 for Biological Weapons Research to evaluate the efficacy of produced biochemical weapons. Experts have published reports based on these testimonies and have cited them as examples of human rights abuses in North Korea.

Speculation regarding North Korea's biochemical weapons is supported by several actual use cases. The assassination of Kim Jong Nam at a Malaysian airport in February 2017 is a prime example; the chemical warfare agent VX nerve agent was detected in Kim Jong Nam's body and belongings, and the cause of death was determined to be acute VX nerve agent poisoning. Four North Korean suspects are believed to have left Malaysia shortly after Kim Jong Nam's assassination. As explained earlier, since VX requires the mixing of two or three components to become toxic, preventing its production is significantly limited. Cases of North Korea exporting chemical weapons also lend weight to the speculation. According to a confidential UN report published in February of last year, North Korea has been supporting Syria's chemical weapons production and dispatching technicians since the 1990s. It is highly probable that North Korea's chemical weapons exports played a role in the mass casualty incidents where the Syrian government forces used chemical weapons against rebel forces in 2013 and 2017. Additionally, the possibility of using biological agents to incapacitate defectors exists, and the combination of biochemical weapons with other weapons has also been raised.

Due to the characteristics of biochemical weapons described above, it is practically difficult for the international community to accurately ascertain their status and impose sanctions through various regulatory measures, unlike nuclear weapons, unless North Korea voluntarily declares and abandons them. In fact, North Korea is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), having joined in March 1987, three months before South Korea. When former U.S. President Trump raised suspicions about North Korea's biological weapons development, the North Korean Foreign Ministry's Institute for American Studies, through a statement by its press office director, asserted that North Korea, as a state party to the BWC, 'consistently maintains its position against the development, production, stockpiling, and possession of biological weapons.' However, despite the BWC's primary objective of completely prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons, it lacks a formal international mechanism for verifying compliance. Therefore, there are limitations in proving Chairman Kim Jong Un's claims. The three main elements of the BWC Protocol are mandatory declarations, regular visits to declared facilities, and short-notice investigation of suspicious activities. If these elements, along with the BWC verification protocol, were implemented, verifying the facilities of an open country might be easier. However, these three elements are based on voluntary declarations, and given doubts about whether North Korea would comply, verifying the existence of offensive biological capabilities in North Korea may still be difficult. Furthermore, under the BWC verification protocol, if related activities are detected, North Korea could exploit the dual-use nature of the biological agents described earlier. This is because offensive biological capabilities could be disguised as peaceful biological capabilities not prohibited by the BWC. In the worst-case scenario, the protocol could lead to North Korea's withdrawal from the BWC, similar to its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The situation regarding chemical weapons is even more challenging than that of biological weapons. Paradoxically, it is more systematized to verify a state's possession of chemical weapons compared to biological weapons. This is because there is an official international body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), that conducts investigations in various ways, and member states of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been assisted in destroying their existing chemical weapons in accordance with CWC regulations. The CWC, which South Korea joined in April 1997, mandates the complete destruction of all chemical weapons and facilities within 10 years of accession. However, as North Korea is not a party to the convention, there are limitations in destroying any chemical weapons or verifying North Korea's exact possession status, even if they exist. The OPCW cannot comprehensively investigate non-member states. Theoretically, one method to verify North Korea's chemical weapons would be through verification and sanctions via a joint UN-OPCW mission. However, joint missions invariably clash with issues of sovereignty, and moreover, the possibility of verification and sanctions through a joint UN-OPCW mission for North Korea is extremely slim.

North Korea's biochemical weapons have not received widespread public attention for a long time compared to its nuclear weapons, which are consistently highlighted by the international community. However, biochemical weapons can pose an immediate military threat comparable to nuclear weapons at a lower development cost than nuclear weapons. Furthermore, their development is more likely than that of nuclear weapons even under sustained economic sanctions against North Korea, making their risks impossible to ignore. Moreover, when combined with other weapons such as missiles, they can lead to more devastating consequences. In other words, even if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons, the threat to the international community persists due to the existence of biochemical weapons.

Following the meeting between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un on June 30, 2019, there were high expectations for progress in North Korea-U.S. negotiations. However, North Korea has cast a shadow over the Korean Peninsula atmosphere by firing short-range ballistic missiles and improved long-range artillery pieces on multiple occasions. While North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims this is a reaction to the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, it clearly demonstrates North Korea's enhanced capabilities for delivering threats to the South. Even if denuclearization negotiations succeed and North Korea's nuclear weapons are dismantled, if biochemical weapons remain, they will continue to pose a significant military threat to South Korea when combined with enhanced delivery systems. The Congressional Research Service recently published a report (North Korea: What 18 Months of Diplomacy Has and Has Not Achieved) on the challenges of North Korea-U.S. negotiations, urging consideration of whether to pursue a 'grand bargain' by including biochemical weapons in the scope of denuclearization. From South Korea's perspective, while it is important not to overload the initial stages of denuclearization negotiations with too many issues, efforts should be made to achieve comprehensive negotiations for genuine peace between the two Koreas in the final stages. ■

■ Author: Baek Jin-kyung_ Research Fellow at EAI, responsible for North Korea and Security Studies, and Asian Democracy Studies. Holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the University of Warwick, UK. Currently manages the project to build and operate EAI's comprehensive English website on North Korea, 'Global North Korea,' and the Asia Democracy Research Network project. Primary research areas include North Korean studies, international relations, and international security.

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies, Professor at Seoul National University. Holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University, USA, and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. Primary research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. Major works include 'The Threat of War and Peace Between North and South Korea' (co-authored), 'Is Politics Moral?', and 'East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory'.

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series designed to provide a platform for experts from various fields to offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution, independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not attributable to EAI and represent solely the views of the individual author.