[EAI Commentary] Protests for Human Rights and Democratization in Hong Kong and China's Response: Background and Prospects

Editor's Note

Protests by Hong Kong citizens against the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance are continuing for an extended period despite the Hong Kong authorities' strong response. Professor Yoo Young-soo of the Graduate School of North Korean Studies assesses that these protests are part of a continuum with previous demonstrations since Hong Kong's handover in 1997, including the 2014 Umbrella Movement. In other words, these protests also express the strong will of Hong Kong citizens to protect their autonomy and limit China's expanding influence. The Chinese government, in turn, has warned of a strong response, stating that these protests have crossed a "red line." Furthermore, considering China's past responses to human rights issues, the author predicts that regardless of the outcome of these protests, China's intervention in Hong Kong's internal affairs will gradually intensify.

2019 Hong Kong Protests

Protests by Hong Kong citizens against the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance have continued for several weeks despite the Hong Kong authorities' strong response. Moreover, the situation has become increasingly serious with recent clashes between police, who have disallowed gatherings, and protesters, and even instances of "white terror" against protesters. The protests, which began out of concern for the extradition of Hong Kong citizens critical of China, continued even after Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor expressed her intention to suspend the amendment. Protesters and Hong Kong citizens are demanding the complete withdrawal of the amendment bill, the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam, an independent investigation into the excessive use of force during the protests, and the expansion of democracy.

The concerns of Hong Kong citizens are not unfounded. Not only have booksellers critical of Xi Jinping disappeared from Hong Kong, but prominent business figures have also gone missing. More fundamentally, however, these protests are a continuation of the resistance by Hong Kong citizens that has occurred whenever China has sought to expand its legal jurisdiction and practical influence since the handover of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom in 1997. This was the case in 2003 when the Chinese government attempted to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law concerning treason, secession, sedition, and espionage through subsequent legislation. It was also the case in 2014 when a white paper on China's jurisdiction over Hong Kong was published, and the direct elections promised by the Chief Executive were broken, leading instead to restrictions on candidate qualifications and the Umbrella Movement. In 2016 and 2017, the disqualification of pro-independence and democratic lawmakers also triggered protests, primarily among legal professionals. From past protests to the current one, these demonstrations express the strong will of Hong Kong citizens to protect their civil and political freedoms, the rule of law, limited democracy, and the autonomy that enables all of these.

The problem lies in the Chinese government's apprehension that these demands for human rights and democracy in Hong Kong might spread to the mainland. Chinese state-controlled media emphasize the violence of the protests, propagating the need to maintain the rule of law both domestically and internationally, while simultaneously confronting Western countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, by labeling their criticism as interference in internal affairs. The media have also implicitly suggested the possibility of military intervention by releasing photos of the People's Liberation Army training off the coast of Hong Kong, and a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense has made remarks alluding to the deployment of the PLA in Hong Kong. Finally, on July 29, for the first time in the 22 years since the handover of Hong Kong, the Chinese government officially stated its position on the current situation in Hong Kong through the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council. The Chinese government adopted a firm stance, stating that the Hong Kong protests had gone too far and that it would suppress violent protests and uphold the rule of law.

How Will China Respond?

The outcome of the 2019 Hong Kong protests will depend on how the Chinese government responds to the demands of the protesters and Hong Kong citizens, and how the protesters react to the responses of the Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities. Firstly, the Chinese government could choose to support the Hong Kong authorities, as stated on July 29, allowing them to take actions to maintain order, such as arresting and detaining protest leaders, and wait for the protests to subside. The question then becomes whether the protesters and Hong Kong citizens can sustain their protests or if they will lose momentum and eventually fade away as the Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities wish. If the protests continue, the Chinese government will face a situation where it must decide on a course of action again. In such a scenario, waiting for the protests to decrease will no longer be an option. As China's intervention gradually intensifies, and protesters realize they cannot resist, they may shift their focus to achieving their demands through other means rather than continuing the protests.

Secondly, the Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities could accommodate the demands of the protesters and Hong Kong citizens to an appropriate extent. For example, the complete withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment, the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam, and some other demands of the protesters could be met. However, given that the protesters are not well-organized and the will of Hong Kong citizens is not consolidated through institutionalized procedures, there is a possibility that the Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities will offer a compromise involving concessions while simultaneously strengthening order maintenance to pressure the protesters. Furthermore, it does not seem likely that the Chinese government, which took a hardline stance on July 29, will suddenly change its attitude. We must pay attention to the concessions made so far by the Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities, alongside the Chinese government's hardline stance. This concession was the suspension of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment. It is highly probable that they will announce the suspension or, with further concessions, the withdrawal of the amendment bill, while simultaneously implementing a crackdown.

Thirdly, China could directly intervene, disregarding Hong Kong's autonomy. This could include measures such as the deployment of military forces and the imposition of martial law. Such actions might occur if the protests escalate and the Chinese government feels compelled to address the situation due to concerns about the mainland. Considering the international repercussions of direct intervention, such as international condemnation and sanctions, it is currently expected that the Chinese government will exercise restraint. However, even without direct intervention, a strong crackdown on protests and maintenance of order by mobilizing Hong Kong's police force to the maximum extent possible can be considered a highly probable outcome.

What Path Will the Hong Kong Issue Take?

Regardless of the outcome of the 2019 Hong Kong protests over the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment, it is anticipated that China's intervention in Hong Kong's internal affairs will increasingly intensify as a result of these protests. Whether this intervention will deepen in ways that are not outwardly visible or become more overt may depend on the methods used by the Chinese government and Hong Kong authorities to suppress the protests, but the overall trend is unlikely to change significantly. China's intervention in Hong Kong's internal affairs will likely not differ greatly from what has been observed thus far. The selection of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council members, which are far removed from democratic processes, will continue to be tools for ensuring the election of pro-China figures. Furthermore, the judiciary will be further brought under control, weakening the rule of law. Censorship and control over the media will be tightened, diminishing the media's influence on Hong Kong citizens while simultaneously blocking information about the situation in Hong Kong from reaching the mainland. The control of the judiciary and media can be achieved without abolishing or amending the Basic Law, maintaining it nominally. This is a typical phenomenon observed in countries that have regressed from liberal democracy, such as Turkey, Hungary, and Russia. While many measures that institutionalize authoritarian rule may follow, as seen in Turkey and Russia, initially, methods that suppress opposition without institutional change will be adopted.

In the case of the judiciary, the Anglo-American common law system adopted during the British colonial era has been maintained under the "One Country, Two Systems" agreement, leading to the appointment of judges capable of adjudicating under the previous legal framework. Many foreign judges remained after the handover of Hong Kong, serving as symbols of judicial independence and positively contributing to attracting foreign investment. However, recently, the number of foreign judges has sharply decreased, and they have faced criticism from the Chinese government and pro-China factions in Hong Kong for allegedly delivering unfair judgments linked to Western forces. Judges with pro-China leanings will increasingly fill the judiciary. In 2016 and 2017, when some members of the Legislative Council were disqualified, a resolution by the National People's Congress of China, which precedes court rulings under Chinese law, was established before the Hong Kong courts issued their judgments, infringing upon Hong Kong's judicial independence. The potential for institutional obstruction of autonomy exists and will likely grow.

The media are also perceived to be increasingly subordinate to mainland China. A majority of media owners are representatives to the Two Sessions, namely the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. While many media outlets are pointed out to have commercial ties with the mainland, the flagship English-language daily, the South China Morning Post, has faced criticism for its diminished independence after being acquired by Alibaba Chairman Jack Ma. Freedom House, a prominent organization that publishes press freedom indices, evaluated Hong Kong's press freedom index as "free" until 2008, and then as "partly free" from 2009 to 2017. The press freedom ranking of Hong Kong, measured by Reporters Without Borders, has continuously declined, from 18th place in 2002 to 73rd place in 2019.

What Basis Can Be Found for Predicting China's Actions on Human Rights Issues?

As a member of the international community, China has not shown any serious efforts to adhere to international human rights norms. Although it signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, one of the most important international human rights instruments, it has not ratified it and does not accept the individual petition procedures of the International Human Rights Covenants. Furthermore, it has sought to deny its own human rights issues and neutralize criticism. Since the 1997 Tiananmen Square incident, China has consistently adopted a defensive stance in response to international pressure for human rights improvements, denying human rights issues and stating that it would do its best to narrow the gap in views with Western countries on human rights. It has also rallied "like-minded countries" to jointly thwart international pressure for human rights improvements through mechanisms such as the UN Human Rights Council/Commission. It has obstructed votes on Chinese human rights resolutions at the UN Human Rights Commission, attempted more than ten times since the Tiananmen Square incident, by submitting motions of no-confidence to prevent discussion, and even when votes were held, it successfully united opposing countries to block criticism. In 1997, when Denmark led a resolution on Chinese human rights, China took measures such as canceling official state visits and threatening political and economic retaliation.

Ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China showed a more proactive stance, resuming the US-China human rights dialogue that had been suspended in 2004 to ensure the successful hosting of the Olympics. However, it brutally suppressed protests by Tibetan separatists, and after the Olympics, no efforts were made to improve human rights. More recently, regarding the issue of the forced internment of one million Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China denied the problem and rallied 37 countries, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, to garner support for China.

Recently, China has gone a step further and actively participated in international human rights protection mechanisms to utilize international human rights norms to its advantage. In 2017, it led a resolution emphasizing that development is essential for the improvement of human rights, which was successfully adopted. This resolution highlighted the right to collective development over individual rights, implying that human rights are dependent on development. In 2018, a China-led resolution was adopted to promote mutually beneficial cooperation in the human rights field. This resolution proposed constructive dialogue, technical assistance, and capacity building as primary methods, rather than the traditional "naming and shaming" approach that international human rights protection mechanisms relied on. This is interpreted as an attempt to prevent international criticism and intervention against China. Although not adopted, China also submitted amendments to resolutions related to civil society, emphasizing that the request, receipt, and use of financial assistance by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be conducted in a legal and transparent manner, thereby justifying increased oversight of NGOs and attempting to add provisions requiring NGOs to respect national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In conclusion, China does not appear to seriously consider the human rights or democratization issues in Hong Kong, nor does it place importance on human rights and democracy itself. It is highly likely that China will proceed with further intervention in Hong Kong's internal affairs to suppress the protests and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents in the future, while avoiding situations where Western countries become heavily involved in the Hong Kong issue. While media reports and assessments such as 'Two million out of Hong Kong's seven million population participated in the protests,' 'Hong Kong citizens have become more united than during the Umbrella Movement,' and 'international solidarity for human rights and democracy is being formed' are not untrue, it is necessary to view the Hong Kong issue as an extension of the consistent actions China has demonstrated over the past 22 years since the handover of Hong Kong, or over 30 years since the Tiananmen Square incident. ■

■ Author: Yoo Young-soo_ Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of North Korean Studies. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University, State University of New York. His research interests include transitional justice, human rights, international human rights protection mechanisms, and North Korean human rights issues.

■ Responsible Editor: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Research Fellow at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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