[EAI Commentary] The Future of US-China Competition - Military Security Aspect: US-China Military Security Competition: The Likelihood of Conflict Becoming a Reality

Editor's Note

Since 2018, the East Asia Institute (EAI) has been planning and operating a mid-to-long-term research project titled "China's Future Growth and the Construction of a New Asia-Pacific Civilization" to design a desirable order for the Asia-Pacific region that can lead to humanity's symbiosis and sustainable development, and to suggest Korea's role. As the first phase of this project has been completed, EAI published the research results as an English working paper series in April and May. As a follow-up series, EAI has planned the "Future of US-China Competition: Four Stages of Competitive Dynamics" special issue briefing series, consisting of four reports that examine the future of US-China relations.

As the final report in this series, we are publishing an issue brief on US-China military security competition, authored by Dr. Chun Jae-sung, Director of EAI's National Security Research Center (and Professor at Seoul National University). While competition between the US and China is gradually expanding into trade, technology, and energy sectors, the possibility of it extending into the military security domain is also being raised. Although the US still holds a significant advantage over China in terms of defense spending, military technology, and alliances, the gap is narrowing. The author analyzes that situations requiring the use of military force may arise due to changes in the national strategies of both countries and their interrelationships. While the nuclear deterrence effect may play a role to some extent as both are nuclear powers, the author adds that this does not exclude the possibility of limited conflicts, such as localized wars.

Problem Statement

As the US-China trade dispute fails to find a resolution and persists, observations are emerging that it may be escalating into a hegemonic war. Not only are the two countries clashing over fair trade, but terms like a "new tech Cold War" are appearing concerning intellectual property rights and technological standards, exhibiting characteristics of a so-called "multi-dimensional complex game." The linkage between economy and security is also strengthening (Lee Seung-ju 2019). Furthermore, theories of civilizational clash, stemming from differences in values and worldviews between the "West and the non-West," are also surfacing. The conflict, which began in economics and technology, is expanding into the energy and socio-cultural spheres, leading to serious concerns about its potential expansion into the military security domain.

Currently, the military balance between the US and China can be characterized by a significant US advantage. This is because the US leads in various aspects, including defense spending, military technology, and alliances. However, China, under President Xi Jinping, is pursuing a robust military reform, presenting the "strong military dream" of building a modernized military capable of fighting and winning. At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, Xi Jinping outlined phased goals for realizing the vision of the Chinese Dream: 2020, 2035, and 2049, ultimately aiming to build a great power with Chinese characteristics, supported by corresponding defense visions and reforms. If China continues its economic development and modernizes its military technology amidst the wave of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, thereby securing strong military capabilities, the military balance between the US and China may shift in the distant future, potentially leading to actual warfare.

Both the US and China possess nuclear capabilities that can strike each other's homelands, leading to expectations that nuclear deterrence will prevent war. However, there is also the paradox of stability-instability, where, while wary of nuclear escalation, conventional warfare remains possible. War could erupt in the form of high-intensity, short-term regional conflicts, and given that both sides may employ a combination of military force, diplomatic negotiation, and economic sanctions, optimism regarding the outbreak of war cannot be maintained.

There are many variables regarding the future trajectory of US-China relations. First, the progress of China's economic development and national strategy is a key variable. China itself has presented a vision for its national strategy with clear timelines, and as long as its economic development momentum is maintained, the time when China's GDP will surpass that of the US is approaching.

Second, changes in US national strategy are a factor. Since the advent of the Trump administration, there are observations that while the US still possesses the capacity to maintain its hegemony, its willingness to provide international public goods has structurally declined significantly. If the US, prioritizing its own interests as a great power over its hegemonic status, and the so-called "Trumpism" aimed at realizing this, become entrenched, US involvement in East Asia will be considerably weakened. Of course, the possibility that the US may resolve its current economic difficulties, regain its hegemonic power, and revive its strategic intentions as a hegemonic power cannot be entirely dismissed. US-China relations will change depending on future shifts in US strategy and the evolution of domestic public opinion supporting it.

Third, changes in the US-China interrelationship warrant attention, primarily concerning how the US-China trade dispute will be resolved. Since the trade dispute cannot continue indefinitely, it will eventually conclude based on mutual interests and endurance. If a significant party feels dissatisfied, conflicts in the military security dimension may present various possibilities. The Chinese leadership, facing frustrated economic development, might resort to military force as a diversion, or the US, fearing a loss of superiority, might consider preemptive military action.

This paper analyzes the future military security relationship between the US and China. It aims to examine the military strategies and capabilities that both countries are pursuing in the mid-to-long term, the possibility of conflict arising from these, and the potential patterns of such conflict. In the short to mid-term, the likelihood of a full-scale conflict between the US and China is not high, as the military gap between them remains substantial, and US allies can play a significant role in containing China. Of course, there is a possibility of a shift in the balance of power in the long term. However, even with a significant military disparity, the possibility of military conflict through asymmetric strategies is not entirely eliminated. Therefore, we will first examine the military capabilities, strategies, and mutual perceptions of both the US and China to assess the potential for conflict.

2019 China's Military Capabilities and Defense Strategy as Seen Through its Defense White Paper

Published in July of this year, China's Defense White Paper is the first since 2015 and, unlike previous editions, is extensive, exceeding 50 pages (27,000 characters in English and Chinese). It was released amidst the Trump administration's visible implementation of containment policies against China and also serves as a response to the US's National Security Strategy Review and National Defense Strategy published in December 2017.

In these reports, the US explicitly identified China as a strategic competitor and characterized it as a revisionist power posing a significant threat to US security. On June 1, 2019, the US Department of Defense released the Indo-Pacific Strategy Review, clarifying that the Indo-Pacific strategy carries the meaning of a military strategy to contain China. On the same day, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, explicitly stated that China is a country that undermines the liberal international order led by the US and is a revisionist power. He argued that China is developing and employing various policy tools to coerce neighboring countries, necessitating containment. The US stated that it does not seek conflict but will not shy away from competition, vowing to strengthen rules-based competition, maximize US military power, and enhance security relationships with its allies.

In response, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe emphasized that China pursues peaceful development and does not adopt policies that undermine the international order. He asserted that China is a country that adheres to the international order, including freedom of navigation. However, he also stressed that if the US intervenes in issues concerning China's core interests, particularly territorial issues such as cross-strait relations, China will resolutely repel such intervention with military force (Ha Young-sun & Chun Jae-sung 2019).

China's Defense White Paper explicitly criticizes US defense policy. It analyzes that the world has entered a security environment of intense international strategic competition, and particularly that the US has adopted a unilateral strategy in its national security strategy, significantly increasing defense spending, enhancing capabilities in nuclear, space, cyber, and missile defense, and undermining global strategic stability. It criticizes the US for strengthening its military alliances in the Asia-Pacific and increasing military deployments and interventions, thereby adding complexity to regional security. Furthermore, it criticizes the deployment of THAAD in South Korea for severely undermining regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of regional countries, and also criticizes Japan for pursuing an aggressive strategy by strengthening its military and security policies. It also mentions Australia, criticizing the strengthening of the US-Australia military alliance and the increasing military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, along with Australia's growing role.

The Defense White Paper defines the core of China's military strategy as "active defense." The principle is "we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if we are attacked." Furthermore, China reaffirms its nuclear policy of never being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and its policy of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China also presents long-term defense development strategic goals that align with the long-term national goals outlined by President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress and are consistent with the military reforms pursued by China since 2013. First, to achieve mechanization with significantly improved informatization and strategic capabilities by 2020. Second, to comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military strength, weapons, and equipment in line with national modernization, and to essentially complete the modernization of national defense and the military by 2035. Finally, to completely transform its military capabilities to world-class standards by the mid-21st century, with 2049 as a milestone.

To this end, China emphasizes the technologies of the ongoing Fourth Industrial Revolution, placing significant importance on military technology modernization. The Defense White Paper analyzes that cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things are being rapidly applied in the military domain, driven by new technological and industrial revolutions. Consequently, military competition among nations is intensifying, and advanced military technologies based on informatization are rapidly developing, leading to informatized warfare and intelligent warfare. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has not yet completed its mechanization and urgently needs to improve its informatization, facing challenges due to the increasing generational gap in technology.

Although lagging behind in overall military balance with the US, the White Paper mentions that military conflict could certainly occur if issues concerning China's core interests arise. The Defense White Paper states that China's military capabilities defend important maritime areas, islands, and reefs in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the West Sea of Korea, conduct joint rights protection and law enforcement operations in adjacent waters, appropriately respond to maritime and aerial situations, and resolutely counter maritime security threats, intrusions, and provocations. In fact, if core interests related to sovereignty are compromised, the Chinese leadership would have no choice but to respond decisively for domestic political legitimacy. It is argued that since 2012, the Chinese military has deployed ships for over 4,600 maritime security patrols and 72,000 rights protection and law enforcement missions, maintaining maritime peace, stability, and order.

Information on China's defense budget is also an important aspect for understanding the future trajectory of China's military development. Currently, the defense budgets of the US and China, the world's top two economies, combined account for half of the global defense spending, and their combined military personnel exceed 3 million. China emphasizes that its defense spending is not excessive compared to other countries and that its growth rate is also decreasing, highlighting its peaceful rise and defense-oriented strategy.

According to the Defense White Paper, overall defense spending has increased in line with the growth of the national economy and government expenditure. The defense budget as a percentage of GDP decreased from 5.43% in 1979 to 1.26% in 2017 and has remained below 2% for the past 30 years. As a percentage of government expenditure, defense spending fell from 17.37% in 1979 to 5.14% in 2017, a drop of over 12 percentage points, indicating a clear downward trend.

China's defense budget is divided into three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Personnel costs primarily cover salaries, allowances, food, clothing, insurance, subsidies, and pensions for officers, soldiers, and contract civilians, as well as retired military personnel receiving support from the defense budget. Training and maintenance costs are mainly applied to troop training, institutional education, construction and maintenance of facilities and equipment, and other expenditures for routine consumables. Equipment costs are primarily designated for research and development, testing, procurement, repair, maintenance, transportation, and storage of weapons and equipment.

China announces that the increase in defense spending since 2012 has been primarily for the following purposes, offering a glimpse into future trends: First, current expenditure to improve welfare in line with national economic and social development trends, ensure regular military service, and enhance the living, training, and working conditions of the troops. Second, expenditure to increase investment in weapons and equipment development, phase out obsolete equipment, upgrade existing equipment, and continuously modernize weapons and equipment by developing and procuring new items such as aircraft, fighter jets, missiles, and main battle tanks. Third, expenditure for the expansion of defense and military reforms to support major reforms in military leadership and command systems, troop structure and composition, policies, and institutions. Fourth, costs for training support in actual combat situations, strengthening strategic-level training, weapons training, simulations, and improving network and forced training conditions. The global projection of China's military power is also gradually increasing, with expenditures mentioned for various military tasks, including UN peacekeeping operations, ship protection activities, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts.

Regarding specific aspects of the defense budget, China announced that its defense spending increased from 66.9192 billion yuan to 104.3237 billion yuan between 2012 and 2017. During this period, China's GDP and government expenditure showed average annual growth rates of 9.04% and 10.43%, respectively, while defense spending increased by an average of 9.42%. Statistics were presented showing that defense spending accounted for 1.28% of GDP and an average of 5.26% of government expenditure. While emphasizing that China's defense spending is the second highest in the world, it is highlighted as being defensive in nature, and in terms of total expenditure, it was less than a quarter of that of the US as of 2017.

China's average defense spending as a percentage of GDP from 2012 to 2017 was approximately 1.3%. This is compared to other major countries: approximately 3.5% for the US, 4.4% for Russia, 2.5% for India, 2.0% for the UK, 2.3% for France, 1.0% for Japan, and 1.2% for Germany, emphasizing that China's level is relatively low. It is also pointed out that this is the lowest figure among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The expenditure ratio to government spending, averaging 5.3% from 2012 to 2017, is also noted as being in the middle range compared to countries like the US (9.8%), Russia (12.4%), India (9.1%), the UK (4.8%), France (4.0%), Japan (2.5%), and Germany (2.8%). Per capita defense spending in China in 2017 was 750 yuan, which is emphasized as being low compared to 5% of the US, 25% of Russia, 231% of India, 13% of the UK, 16% of France, 29% of Japan, and 20% of Germany.

China's Defense Strengthening and Military Strategy Changes: US Perception

Contrary to the image of peaceful rise and defensive defense strategy emphasized by China, the US perceives China's defense strategy as revisionist and expansionist. In May 2018, the US renamed the Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command and has since appeared to be pursuing an Asian strategy with China in mind. One aspect of the US perception of China can be seen in the testimony of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, at a hearing. At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 12, 2019, Admiral Davidson expressed concern about China's military buildup. He explained that significant efforts have been made over the past 20 years to grow and modernize the PLA, which now poses a significant threat to the so-called First Island Chain countries, stretching from northern Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia to northern Japan. Furthermore, he noted that China's ability to project military power and influence beyond the First Island Chain is increasing, pursuing both qualitative and quantitative efforts to modernize its military while simultaneously increasing the number of platforms. Reports indicate that China has also conducted live-fire exercises with coastal artillery in the Taiwan Strait, and its air force bombers have also practiced in preparation for cross-strait contingencies.

As is well known, Beijing's first aircraft carrier group joined the Chinese Navy in 2019, and the RENHAI-class missile cruiser was launched in 2017, with three more added in 2018, becoming the backbone of the Chinese Navy. It is also reported that the FUYU-class fast combat support ship, which supports the aircraft carrier fleet, has recently been completed.

In terms of air power, China's first fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, was developed in February 2018, and a sixth-generation fighter is reportedly under development. The Y-20, a domestically produced heavy transport aircraft, was deployed in 2016, possessing significantly greater payload capacity and range than previous aircraft, thereby enhancing China's strategic airlift capabilities. Additionally, the S-400 advanced surface-to-air missile system, acquired from Russia in 2018, has a range of 250 miles, potentially extending its aerial coverage to the Taiwan Strait and other regions.

China is also focusing on developing advanced weapons, continuously pursuing hypersonic vehicles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, and unmanned/AI-equipped weapons, while also striving to significantly reduce the effectiveness of US detection capabilities and defensive weapons. China has tested hypersonic missiles, including the WU-14, since 2014, with speeds approaching Mach 10, and it is reported that Beijing successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft in August 2018.

According to Admiral Davidson, China is also modernizing its nuclear capabilities. The Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), China's third generation, is expected to be armed with the JL-3 sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and construction is anticipated to begin in the early 2020s. Furthermore, reports indicate that China has deployed the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile with mobile launchers, extending its precision strike capability to the Second Island Chain (connecting the southern Aleutian Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Republic of Palau, and northern Papua New Guinea). China continues to test the DF-41 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a maximum range of 9,300 miles.

Regarding maritime disputes, the Admiral reported that in April 2018, China deployed advanced military systems, including missiles and electronic warfare equipment, further enhancing its power projection capabilities and continuing the militarization of its forward bases. Moreover, military transport aircraft have landed on the Spratly Islands on several occasions, and long-range bombers have landed on the Paracel Islands. Chinese coast guard vessels are currently under the command of the Central Military Commission and are engaging in aggressive actions against fishing boats from the Philippines and other regional countries. Territorial claims in the South China Sea persist, and surface combat patrols remain at a high level.

Through its "Made in China 2025" strategy and state-backed investments, China is pursuing global leadership in strategic industries. For example, it aims to become a global leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, and many of the core technologies China targets are essential for rapid technological change across various industries. These capabilities are a key consideration not only for economic growth but also for the US to maintain its military advantage (U.S. Department of Defense 2018).

In conjunction with these perceptions, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific, Mary Beth Morgan, also demonstrated the US perception of China in her testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 20, 2019. China has set major economic and political milestones for 2020, 2035, and 2049, looking towards its centennial, and China's military ambitions are linked to these goals. By 2035, China aims to complete military modernization, and by 2049, to establish a world-class military. In this regard, China's efforts are seen as having a clear objective to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Morgan views the PLA as undertaking long-term, comprehensive military modernization efforts to fight and win short-term, high-intensity conflicts in its surrounding regions to counter "significant military threats." To this end, China continues to implement extensive military restructuring, including organizational reforms, personnel reductions, and the creation of new institutions such as strategic support forces. China is also developing and deploying new types of weapon systems, which in recent years have included precision-guided cruise and ballistic missile systems, second and third aircraft carriers, modern combat and support aircraft, and a robust space launch program. China's nuclear capabilities are also focused on expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, pursuing a viable nuclear triad, and developing precision strike capabilities against US territory and those of its allies and partners.

Chinese leaders are also focusing on expanding the operational scope of the PLA to match the global nature of China's economic and national interests. According to media reports in 2018, China seeks to expand its military bases and access in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. President Xi Jinping, in January 2019, "demanded the completion of a security system to strengthen the protection of overseas interests and ensure the safety of major overseas businesses and personnel." In this context, the PLA Navy has been pursuing a long-term strategy of acquiring foreign bases through methods such as long-term leases, port construction, and acquisitions, to gain rights to foreign ports.

This global military projection by China is also related to China's future energy demands. According to projections by the International Energy Agency, China's oil import ratio is expected to increase by 9% by 2035, reaching 80% of its total demand. Overseas projection by the PLA is a crucial condition for China's future energy imports. The Belt and Road Initiative is also related to this, as China seeks to sustain maritime deployments in distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean through port investments and access, and to secure necessary logistical support. In 2018, China focused on securing military bases in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific, and is collecting military intelligence through 110 overseas diplomatic missions worldwide. This observation is evident in the utilization of Djibouti, China's first overseas base, where China is seen to be meeting overseas military logistical demands by securing foreign commercial ports and logistics facilities. Djibouti is assessed to be deploying significant military equipment as a new operational area for the rapidly expanding PLA Marine Corps.

Regarding China's defense budget, the US estimates it to be higher than China's reported figures and also emphasizes the potential for future increases. According to the US Department of Defense, China's reported defense budget omits several major expenditure items, such as research and development (R&D) and overseas arms procurement. Actual military-related expenditures are estimated to be higher than the official budget, exceeding $200 billion in 2018. Due to China's lack of accounting transparency, it is difficult to calculate the actual military spending.

China's official defense budget is projected to increase by an average of 6% annually over the next few years, reaching $260 billion by 2022. Following China's reforms since 2015, the PLA has reduced its size by 300,000 personnel for training, operations, and modernization, allowing for greater budget allocation. Future economic projections suggest that China's economic growth rate may slow from 6.6% in 2018 to around 3% by 2030, potentially leading to a slowdown in the growth of defense spending. As shown in the table below, while the overall trend indicates that defense spending has increased even as economic growth has slowed, China is estimated to spend the most in the Indo-Pacific region besides the US in the long term (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019, 95).

<Figure 1> China's Official Defense Budget (2009-2018)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019, 94)

US Defense Spending Trends and Military Strategy Toward China

The United States has been struggling with a massive budget deficit and has made efforts to cut military spending. However, since the advent of the Trump administration, defense spending has continued to increase, and congressional constraints on the ceiling for defense spending increases have been repeatedly adjusted. The Trump administration advocates for "peace through strength" and emphasizes strategies of offsetting China and Russia, and the need for innovation.

On March 11, 2019, President Trump submitted the fiscal year (FY) 2020 budget request of $783 billion to Congress. The budget aims to invest in emerging space and cyber warfare domains, modernize capabilities in air, sea, and land combat domains, foster innovation to enhance competitive advantage, and improve troop readiness and morale. The US anticipates that future wars will occur not only in the air, land, and sea but also in space and cyberspace, increasing the complexity of warfare. The FY2020 budget includes $58 billion for advanced aircraft, $35 billion for shipbuilding (the largest request in over 20 years), $14 billion for space systems, $10 billion for cyber warfare, $4.6 billion for AI and autonomous systems, and $2.6 billion for hypersonic weapons. It focuses on modernizing capabilities across all combat domains and on technologies required for advanced combat, with the largest shipbuilding request in 20 years and the largest R&D request in 70 years. This budget proposes a 3.1% military pay raise, the highest increase in a decade, with the goal of countering the threats from China and Russia by maintaining a competitive edge.

The total annual cost for the US Department of Defense from 2020 to 2023 is projected to remain nearly the same as in 2019. However, a transition plan is underway to move many costs currently covered by the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget into the base budget. Consequently, costs included in the base budget are expected to increase by an average of $47 billion annually. Based on the DoD's estimates, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the 2019 budget will continue to increase beyond 2023. The base budget is projected to reach $73.5 billion by 2033, a real increase of 11% over 10 years. This includes various costs: approximately 25% of the total increase from 2024 to 2033 will be for military personnel costs, 55% for operations and maintenance, and 20% for weapons system development and procurement.

These defense expenditures and weapons development are expected to maintain a lead over China for a considerable period. Furthermore, the US possesses several advantages in its military buildup against China. These include: first, the US's ability to rapidly deploy and sustain combat and support forces throughout much of the Western Pacific and project power; second, the existence of highly capable and reliable regional allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia; third, China's operational difficulties in projecting military power by land and sea; fourth, the US's ability to protect its vulnerabilities through technological superiority; and fifth, the US's capability to escalate conventional conflicts with China.

China's Future Military Power

En el futuro, no será fácil para China obtener la supremacía en el equilibrio militar entre China y Estados Unidos y amenazar a Estados Unidos. En primer lugar, deben cumplirse las siguientes condiciones. Primero, la economía china debe seguir creciendo para suministrar los recursos que permitan cubrir el gasto militar, y segundo, la industria de defensa china debe mejorar continuamente para la innovación tecnológica militar. Según el RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), será muy difícil que el crecimiento económico de China sea el mismo que en los últimos 30 años. RAND estima que la economía crecerá a una tasa anual promedio del 5% hasta 2025, por lo que es obvio que el gasto en defensa se verá limitado.

A medida que la población china envejece y se urbaniza, el gobierno se enfrentará a una fuerte presión para gastar más dinero en programas sociales necesarios como pensiones y atención médica, e infraestructura pública. Se espera que estas demandas limiten los recursos disponibles para el gasto militar de China. Sin embargo, la industria de defensa de China, aunque todavía tecnológicamente atrasada, se está desarrollando rápidamente y esta tendencia continuará si el gobierno chino sigue impulsando reformas y aumenta el gasto en defensa.

A pesar de ello, la fuerza militar de China para contrarrestar a Estados Unidos aumentará constantemente, y su núcleo reside en la mejora de las capacidades A2AD. Es muy probable que China posea cuatro portaaviones para 2030. Es probable que se trate de dos portaaviones STOBAR tipo Liaoning y dos portaaviones CATOBAR convencionales. Estados Unidos disfrutará de una superioridad cualitativa general, pero China tiene la posibilidad de alcanzar una superioridad local temporal al principio de un conflicto. China también desplegará submarinos y buques de superficie en gran número sin necesidad de dispersar su poder naval por todo el mundo. La Fuerza Aérea del Ejército Popular de Liberación desplegará bombarderos furtivos B-21 y bombarderos existentes, y lanzará J-10 y J-11, igualando a su flota con las fuerzas existentes de F-15, F-16 y F/A-18 de Estados Unidos. Aunque la modernización de China no será suficiente para igualar el nivel de Estados Unidos para 2030, la brecha se reducirá. Al desplegar abundantes bases y un gran número de misiles balísticos, de crucero y antiaéreos, y al utilizar aviones furtivos avanzados, armas autónomas, misiles de crucero supersónicos y otras armas sofisticadas, puede mejorar eficazmente su estrategia A2AD.

Una de las tendencias para 2030 será probablemente las plataformas no tripuladas. Aunque es difícil predecir con exactitud qué plataformas serán centrales, es posible que drones aéreos, navales y submarinos compitan entre sí o combatan junto a plataformas tripuladas. Estos drones se utilizarán para sistemas de reconocimiento y comunicación a gran escala, y la guerra de interferencia mutua será intensa.

Guerra comercial y competencia militar-seguridad entre China y Estados Unidos

Dependiendo de cómo termine la actual guerra comercial entre China y Estados Unidos, la posibilidad de una competencia militar y un conflicto se concretará más. Se pueden establecer aproximadamente los siguientes tres escenarios. El primer escenario es una guerra comercial total, donde las economías de China y Estados Unidos se desacoplen lo máximo posible. Es una alternativa donde ambas partes, China y Estados Unidos, no ceden en sus posturas y construyen sus propias esferas económicas en la mayor medida posible. El aumento de las barreras arancelarias y no arancelarias hará imposible que las empresas chinas hagan negocios en Estados Unidos y viceversa. Los altos aranceles aumentarán los costos para proveedores, fabricantes, minoristas y consumidores; cuando los precios suban, la producción disminuirá, los beneficios se reducirán, las empresas cerrarán y los empleos desaparecerán. China comenzará a invertir activamente en mercados como Europa, África, Asia y América Latina, y Estados Unidos puede hacer lo mismo. Las empresas estadounidenses intentarán trasladar sus cadenas de suministro de China al sudeste asiático en la medida de lo posible, y las empresas chinas también buscarán socios económicos diversificados de Estados Unidos. En este caso, la posibilidad de un conflicto de seguridad entre China y Estados Unidos aumentará naturalmente. En un estado de alta interdependencia económica entre China y Estados Unidos, existen actores en ambas partes que intentan prevenir un conflicto militar real. Una vez que ocurra un conflicto, ambos países sufrirán daños económicos máximos, por lo que habrá una fuerte presión para terminar el conflicto a corto plazo.

El segundo escenario es el restablecimiento del statu quo, donde tanto China como Estados Unidos ponen fin a las hostilidades comerciales y acuerdan un compromiso en conversaciones bilaterales. Es un escenario que restaura la relación original entre China y Estados Unidos en la mayor medida posible, buscando beneficios mutuos y retirando el aumento de aranceles. Se restaurará la anterior relación de interdependencia, pero se mantendrá una relación cautelosa y mutua, anticipando al máximo los riesgos que puedan surgir en el futuro. En este caso, la posibilidad de un conflicto militar entre China y Estados Unidos disminuirá. Mientras China y Estados Unidos se esfuercen por buscar beneficios mutuos en el ámbito económico y resolver disputas mediante negociaciones bilaterales, la necesidad de recurrir a medios militares disminuirá. Sin embargo, se producirá un aumento constante de los armamentos, anticipando futuros conflictos.

El tercer escenario es establecer normas para una nueva relación económica entre China y Estados Unidos y esforzarse por sentar las bases de un orden económico internacional liberal. Esto llevará mucho tiempo y requerirá no solo los esfuerzos de China y Estados Unidos, sino también la participación de otros países. Ambos gobiernos necesitarán llegar a acuerdos en diversas áreas, como el acceso bilateral al mercado, la protección de la propiedad intelectual, la competencia justa en el sector privado chino y el fortalecimiento de la transparencia regulatoria y aduanera. Si estos esfuerzos tienen éxito, es probable que la cooperación en el ámbito de la seguridad también se fortalezca. Esto se debe a que si China y Estados Unidos reconocen mutuamente el desarrollo mutuo como recíproco y crean normas que puedan institucionalizarlo, y si otros países también lo apoyan, se puede establecer un nuevo orden cooperativo.

Escenarios de conflicto militar entre China y Estados Unidos

Considerando la posibilidad de un conflicto entre China y Estados Unidos en los próximos diez años, la probabilidad de un conflicto total no es alta. Sin embargo, a medida que las disputas económicas y tecnológicas entre China y Estados Unidos, y más allá, la competencia por la energía, continúen, el incentivo para el uso de la fuerza militar puede aumentar. Se puede concebir un conflicto que comience por operaciones militares para lograr objetivos limitados, frustraciones internas en ambas partes, o la necesidad de un ataque preventivo. Un ejemplo es el informe de RAND que analiza el patrón de una guerra entre China y Estados Unidos hasta 2025 (Gombert et al. 2016). Si estalla una guerra, se espera que ocurra en Asia Oriental y se limite a Asia Oriental. El patrón de la guerra será una guerra multiespacio de guerra naval, aérea, espacial y cibernética. El Pacífico occidental será el principal campo de batalla, y aunque la guerra empeore, ambas partes no considerarán que la guerra haya empeorado hasta el punto de arriesgarse a una guerra nuclear. Se espera que China no ataque el territorio continental de Estados Unidos, excepto en la guerra cibernética, ya que se considera que no tiene suficiente poder militar. Por el contrario, Estados Unidos puede establecer varios objetivos en el territorio continental de China como objetivos de ataque para llevar a cabo con éxito combates en Asia Oriental.

El desarrollo de la tecnología militar, que se espera que movilice el reconocimiento, las armas guiadas, las redes digitales y otras tecnologías de la información, permitirá a Estados Unidos y China infligirse daños graves mutuamente. La probabilidad de que Estados Unidos y China movilicen fuerzas terrestres para el combate es muy baja. En última instancia, la guerra será muy probablemente una lucha de movilización industrial, tecnológica y militar.

La forma de la guerra se puede clasificar en corto y mediano plazo, y la intensidad de la guerra en baja y alta intensidad. El corto plazo se referirá a días o semanas, y el mediano plazo se puede suponer arbitrariamente alrededor de un año.

Las pérdidas militares que afectan el resultado de la guerra incluyen la fuerza aérea, la flota, los submarinos, los lanzadores de misiles y los depósitos, el sistema C4ISR, así como la ciberdefensa y las capacidades de ataque antisatélite. Si la guerra cibernética se intensifica y los bloqueos o sanciones que causan pérdidas en el comercio y la inversión continúan, las pérdidas económicas también pueden afectar la voluntad de guerra.

En el futuro, el panorama y el resultado de la guerra diferirán según el equilibrio de poder económico y tecnológico entre Estados Unidos y China. Alrededor de 2035, cuando el PIB per cápita de China alcance los 20.000 dólares, el PIB total entre Estados Unidos y China se acercará a un punto de paridad, y se espera que China alcance significativamente a Estados Unidos en tecnología. Por supuesto, se pueden crear otras trayectorias dependiendo del resultado de la actual disputa económica entre Estados Unidos y China.

En primer lugar, si se produce una guerra a corto plazo y de alta intensidad, el equilibrio de las fuerzas militares de ambas partes, especialmente las fuerzas militares de alta tecnología, será importante. El desarrollo de la capacidad A2AD de China será crucial y determinará el daño a las fuerzas navales y aéreas de Estados Unidos. Las bajas militares sufridas por China también serán muy elevadas, y la situación económica en torno a China, especialmente las cadenas de suministro necesarias para el comercio exterior, podría verse afectada.

En segundo lugar, si se produce una guerra a largo plazo y de alta intensidad, toda Asia Oriental se convertirá en un campo de batalla y los daños sufridos por ambas partes, Estados Unidos y China, serán muy graves. Dado que la capacidad A2AD de China sigue desarrollándose, las pérdidas militares de Estados Unidos serán considerables y, en última instancia, Estados Unidos atacará objetivos en el territorio continental chino. Se formará un campo de batalla que abarca desde el Pacífico occidental hasta el Mar de China Meridional, lo que provocará un grave deterioro de las condiciones de actividad económica exterior de China.

En tercer lugar, si se produce una guerra a corto plazo y de baja intensidad, ambas partes sufrirán daños militares mínimos y buscarán objetivos negociables. Se puede encontrar un punto de compromiso antes de sufrir grandes daños políticos o económicos internos, y luego se pueden buscar soluciones diplomáticas.

En cuarto lugar, si se produce una guerra a largo plazo y de baja intensidad, las pérdidas militares de ambas partes aumentarán gradualmente, pero la cuestión clave será quién sufre mayores pérdidas políticas y económicas internas. Es más probable que gane la parte que pueda asegurar la base para apoyar una guerra a largo plazo.

Se puede considerar que el poder económico de ambas partes, Estados Unidos y China, se verá gravemente afectado durante la guerra. Se prevé que China sufra un mayor impacto en su PIB, con el RAND Corporation estimando una caída del 25-35% para China y del 5-10% para Estados Unidos. Si el crecimiento económico de China se ve afectado, podrían surgir críticas al gobierno chino por parte de la población, y las voces de las fuerzas descontentas y separatistas dentro de China podrían intensificarse.

Además, la participación de aliados y países amigos será muy importante. Japón podría participar en la guerra entre Estados Unidos y China invocando su derecho a la autodefensa colectiva. Australia también podría participar en cierta medida. Por otro lado, no está claro si Rusia participará del lado de China, ya que un conflicto militar entre Estados Unidos y Rusia podría generar problemas mayores.

La capacidad económica y tecnológica a largo plazo de China para invertir en A2AD determinará el panorama de la guerra. Sin embargo, el fortalecimiento del poder militar de China no significa necesariamente que ganará la guerra contra Estados Unidos, ya que Estados Unidos tampoco podría lograr sus objetivos de guerra. Por lo tanto, no se puede concluir que China ganará.

La estrategia asimétrica y la ventaja del ataque sorpresa de China

Aunque Estados Unidos puede utilizar el uso de la fuerza militar centrado en sí mismo como estrategia principal para contrarrestar la estrategia A2AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) de China, también puede apoyar la estrategia de negación activa de sus aliados o socios estratégicos. Países como Taiwán, Japón, Vietnam, Indonesia y Filipinas colaboran con Estados Unidos para implementar una estrategia de negación contra la expansiva estrategia marítima de China. En la situación actual, no es fácil para China obtener la superioridad militar en lugares como Taiwán, el Mar de China Oriental y el Mar de China Meridional. Como se muestra en la figura siguiente, la superioridad naval de China en Asia no es muy alta, incluso sin tener en cuenta a Estados Unidos, y especialmente porque el uso de capacidades ofensivas, como la proyección de fuerza militar, requiere muchos más costos y esfuerzos que el uso de capacidades defensivas. La estrategia de ataque o bloqueo de China a Taiwán tampoco tiene altas probabilidades de éxito en la actualidad, considerando la fuerza militar de Taiwán, especialmente con el apoyo de Estados Unidos. La capacidad A2AD de países como Vietnam, Malasia e Indonesia contra la fuerza naval china en el Mar de China Meridional tampoco es algo que China pueda subestimar fácilmente. China no puede ser optimista sobre un enfrentamiento con Japón en el Mar de China Oriental (Beckley 2017).

<Figura 2> Comparación de las fuerzas militares de China y los países que se oponen a ella en el Mar de China Oriental y el Mar de China Meridional (1977-2017)

Fuente: Beckley (2017, 82)

Por supuesto, en caso de que estalle una guerra, es difícil saber si el equilibrio de poder militar global entre Estados Unidos y China, o el equilibrio de poder militar en toda Asia Oriental, determinará necesariamente la victoria o la derrota. Existe un claro desequilibrio de poder militar entre Estados Unidos y China, pero también son posibles las amenazas asimétricas y las estrategias asimétricas. El poder militar de Estados Unidos contra China se concentra en un número limitado de bases en Asia y dos grupos de portaaviones. Si China aumenta su capacidad A2AD y puede concentrar ataques contra estas bases y portaaviones, la capacidad de ataque a corto plazo de Estados Unidos contra China podría verse gravemente afectada. China está adquiriendo la capacidad de atacar objetivos móviles como portaaviones, así como bases estadounidenses, con misiles como el DF-21 y el DF-26.

China podría lograr parcialmente sus objetivos de ataque en Taiwán y el Mar de China Oriental al destruir una parte significativa de las fuerzas de contraataque de Estados Unidos mediante un ataque sorpresa contra la capacidad de ataque liderada por la alianza actual entre Estados Unidos y Japón. Estados Unidos, en particular, estuvo sujeto al Tratado INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), mientras que China no lo estuvo, lo que le impidió operar misiles de alcance intermedio tierra-tierra y tierra-aire que pudieran atacar a China. Ahora que el tratado ha sido eliminado, Estados Unidos buscará operar nuevas fuerzas para contrarrestar la capacidad de ataque sorpresa de China contra sí mismo y sus aliados.

Posibilidad de escalada a guerra nuclear entre Estados Unidos y China

Al discutir la transferencia de hegemonía, los casos pasados presuponían necesariamente la ocurrencia de una guerra hegemónica, pero es cierto que existe una expectativa vaga de que, a partir del siglo XX, las armas nucleares como factor de disuasión impidan la guerra hegemónica. Incluso si ocurre un conflicto militar entre Estados Unidos y China, se espera que la disuasión nuclear actúe, lo que dificultará la escalada, e incluso se espera que el propio conflicto militar se disuada. Sin embargo, no se puede descartar por completo la posibilidad de que un conflicto militar entre Estados Unidos y China escale a una guerra nuclear. Existen tanto un optimismo que considera que China nunca utilizará armas nucleares en una guerra entre Estados Unidos y China, como un pesimismo que cree que podría utilizarlas en ciertas circunstancias. China ha adherido al principio de no primer uso de armas nucleares, que establece que no realizará un primer ataque nuclear a menos que sea atacada con armas nucleares. Sin embargo, también existe la opinión de que China podría considerar el uso de armas nucleares si Estados Unidos ataca y amenaza inicialmente la red de mando y control de China, sus submarinos de misiles balísticos, sus lanzadores terrestres móviles de misiles, sus bases de misiles y su sistema de defensa aérea. A medida que continúa la guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos y China, Estados Unidos puede atacar objetivos militares clave en el territorio continental de China, y esto podría incluir las bases de misiles nucleares de China. Si estalla una guerra, Estados Unidos podría atacar bases de misiles y submarinos como objetivos militares importantes, lo que podría hacer que China piense que Estados Unidos está realizando ataques para neutralizar sus instalaciones de entrega nuclear. Por supuesto, es poco probable que la posibilidad de escalada a una guerra nuclear sea alta, ya que China distingue entre sus armas nucleares y sus bases de armas convencionales, y Estados Unidos también será cauteloso con los ataques A2AD de China (Talmadge 2017). Sin embargo, no se puede descartar la situación en la que China evalúe que sus fuerzas nucleares se están destruyendo gradualmente bajo el ataque convencional de Estados Unidos y considere un uso preventivo de armas nucleares.

Conclusión

Considerando el poder militar abrumador de Estados Unidos en comparación con China, la red de alianzas liderada por Estados Unidos, la evolución de la Estrategia del Indo-Pacífico con profundas implicaciones de seguridad, y la situación de China, que necesita un entorno internacional estable para centrarse en el desarrollo económico y realizar una potencia socialista, y resolver muchos problemas internos, es difícil predecir fácilmente la posibilidad de un conflicto militar entre Estados Unidos y China. Existe un gran debate sobre la naturaleza de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y China, coexisten muchas opiniones y discursos estratégicos dentro de Estados Unidos y China, y la etapa de competencia ha comenzado con el comercio y abarca muchas áreas temáticas. La competencia continuará en muchas áreas como el comercio, la tecnología y la energía, y junto con ello, la carrera armamentista y la competencia de alianzas continuarán, y es probable que el conflicto militar ocurra más adelante.

Sin embargo, aunque queden varias etapas hasta un conflicto militar, y más aún hasta una guerra a gran escala, no significa necesariamente que quede mucho tiempo. Esto se debe a que la situación puede empeorar más rápido de lo esperado, y las etapas de competencia pueden completarse rápidamente una tras otra. Recientemente, la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China tiende a ir más allá del enfrentamiento de políticas y se ha convertido en una confrontación de identidades y sistemas, basada en la desconfianza hacia la identidad del oponente. Cuando la relación de identidades cambia de la interacción mutua a la confrontación mutua, los intereses nacionales y la percepción pública no pueden dejar de verse afectados. En ambos países, surgen cada vez más diversas discusiones que contemplan la guerra, y en el caso de Estados Unidos, muchos artículos académicos contienen investigaciones detalladas sobre posibles conflictos militares entre Estados Unidos y China. Es importante asegurarse de que esta situación no se convierta en una profecía autocumplida.

Dado que es evidente que un conflicto militar generará hostilidades irreversibles y causará grandes dificultades a muchos países de Asia Oriental, debemos anticipar los daños que traerá la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China y buscar caminos para que ambas naciones avancen hacia un nuevo orden de compromiso y cooperación. ■

Referencias

Lee, Seungjoo. 2019. “La guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos y China: un juego complejo multidimensional.” EAI Special Issue Briefing. 11 de julio.

Ha, Youngsun, y Jeon, Jaesung. 2019. “El despliegue estratégico de Estados Unidos y China en torno al Indo-Pacífico y las cuatro tareas futuras de Corea.” EAI Special Commentary. 6 de junio.

Beckley, Michael. 2017. “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion.” International Security 42(2): 78–119.

Gompert, David C., Astrid Stuth Cevallos, y Cristina L. Garafola. 2016. War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2019. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019. Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Defense. Mayo 2.

Caitlin Talmadge. 2017. “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States.” International Security 41(4): 50–92.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access.

Diciembre.

■ Autor: Jae-sung Lee_ Director del Centro de Estudios de Seguridad Nacional del EAI y profesor en la Universidad Nacional de Seúl. Obtuvo un doctorado en Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Northwestern y ha servido como asesor de políticas para el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y el Ministerio de Unificación. Sus principales áreas de investigación incluyen la teoría de las relaciones internacionales, la historia de las relaciones internacionales, la alianza Corea del Sur-EE. UU. y los estudios sobre la península de Corea. Sus obras publicadas incluyen "Amenaza de guerra y paz entre las dos Coreas" (coautor), "¿Es la política moral?" y "Relaciones Internacionales en Asia Oriental: De la Historia a la Teoría".

■ Editor y responsable: Choi, Su-yi, Investigadora Principal del EAI

Contacto: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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