[EAI Commentary] The Future of US-China Competition - Military Security Edition: US-China Military Security Competition: The Possibility of Conflict Becoming a Reality

Editor's Note

EAI is planning and operating a mid- to long-term research project titled "China's Future Growth and the Construction of a New Asia-Pacific Civilization" since 2018, aiming to design a desirable order for the Asia-Pacific region that can lead to humanity's coexistence and sustainable development, and to suggest Korea's role. As the first phase of this project has been completed, EAI published the research findings as an English working paper series in April and May. As a follow-up series, EAI has planned a special issue briefing series, "The Future of US-China Competition: Dynamics of Competition in Four Stages," consisting of four reports that examine the future of US-China relations.

As the final report in this series, we are publishing an issue brief on US-China military security competition, authored by Dr. Chun Jae-sung, Director of EAI's National Security Research Center (and Professor at Seoul National University). While competition between the US and China is gradually expanding into trade, technology, and energy sectors, the possibility of it extending into the military security domain is also being raised. Although the United States still holds an overwhelming advantage over China in terms of defense spending, military technology, and alliances, the gap is gradually narrowing. The author analyzes that situations requiring the use of military force may arise due to changes in the national strategies of both countries and their interrelationships. While the nuclear deterrence effect may play a role to some extent as both are nuclear powers, the author adds that this does not entirely rule out the possibility of limited conflicts, such as localized warfare.

Problem Statement

As the US-China trade dispute fails to find a resolution and persists, there are observations that it may be escalating into a hegemonic war. Not only are the two countries clashing over fair trade, but terms like a new technological Cold War are emerging over intellectual property rights and technological standards, exhibiting the characteristics of a so-called "multi-dimensional complex game." The linkage between economy and security is also strengthening (Lee Seung-ju 2019). Furthermore, theories of a clash of civilizations, stemming from differences in values and worldviews between the West and the non-West, are also surfacing. There are serious concerns that the conflict, which began in economics and technology, is expanding into energy and socio-cultural fields, and ultimately into the military security domain.

Currently, the military balance between the US and China is characterized by a significant US advantage. This is because the US leads in various aspects such as defense spending, military technology, and alliances. However, China, under President Xi Jinping, is pursuing a strong military reform, presenting the vision of a "strong military dream" to build a modernized military capable of fighting and winning. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, phased goals for realizing the "China Dream" vision presented by President Xi Jinping were set for 2020, 2035, and 2049, ultimately aiming to build a great power with Chinese characteristics. In support of this, defense visions and reforms were presented. If China continues its economic development and modernizes its military technology amidst the wave of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the military balance between the US and China may shift in the distant future, potentially leading to actual warfare.

Both the US and China possess nuclear capabilities that can strike each other's homelands, leading to expectations that nuclear deterrence will prevent war. However, there is also the paradox of stability-instability, where conventional warfare is possible while mutual vigilance against nuclear escalation is maintained. War could also erupt in the form of high-intensity, short-term regional conflicts, and since both sides may employ a combination of military force, diplomatic compromise, and economic sanctions, an optimistic outlook on the outbreak of war cannot be maintained.

There are many variables regarding the future evolution of US-China relations. First, there is the variable of China's economic development and the progress of its national strategy. China itself has presented a vision for its national strategy with clear timelines, and as long as its economic development momentum is maintained, the time when China's GDP will surpass that of the US is approaching.

Second, there is the variable of changes in US national strategy. Since the advent of the Trump administration, while the US still possesses the capacity to maintain its hegemony, there are observations that its willingness to provide international public goods has structurally declined significantly. If the US, as a great power prioritizing its own interests over its hegemonic status, and the so-called "Trumpism" aimed at realizing this, become entrenched, US involvement in East Asia will be significantly weakened. The possibility that the US may recover its hegemonic power by resolving its current economic difficulties and revive its strategic intentions as a hegemonic power cannot be denied. US-China relations will change depending on future shifts in US strategy and the evolution of domestic public opinion supporting it.

Third, there is the variable of changes in the US-China interrelationship. Primarily, attention needs to be paid to how the US-China trade dispute will be resolved. Since a trade dispute cannot continue indefinitely, it will be resolved based on mutual interests and endurance. If a party with significant grievances exists, then disputes in the military security dimension may also present various possibilities. The Chinese leadership, facing frustrated economic development, might use military force as a diversion, or the US, losing its superiority over China, might consider preemptive military action out of concern for future reversals.

This paper analyzes the future military security relationship between the US and China. It aims to examine what military strategies and capabilities both countries are pursuing in the mid- to long-term, the possibility of conflict arising from this, and the potential patterns of such conflict. In the short to medium term, the likelihood of a full-scale conflict between the US and China is not high, as the military gap between them remains substantial, and the US's allies can also play a significant role in containing China. Of course, there is a possibility of a shift in the balance of power in the long term. However, a significant difference in military power does not completely eliminate the possibility of military conflict using asymmetric strategies. Therefore, we will first examine the military capabilities, strategies, and mutual perceptions of both the US and China to assess the possibility of conflict.

2019 China's Military Power and Defense Strategy as Seen Through its Defense White Paper

Published in July of this year, China's Defense White Paper is the first in four years since 2015 and, unlike previous white papers, contains a substantial amount of content exceeding 50 pages (27,000 characters in English and Chinese). It was published amidst the US, under the Trump administration, visibly implementing a comprehensive containment policy against China, and it also serves as a response to the US's National Security Strategy Review and National Defense Strategy published in December 2017.

In these reports, the US designated China as a strategic competitor and characterized it as a revisionist power posing a significant threat to US security. On June 1, 2019, the US Department of Defense published the Indo-Pacific Strategy Review, clarifying that the Indo-Pacific strategy carries the meaning of a military strategy to contain China. On the same day, acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan explicitly stated in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue that China is a country that undermines the liberal international order led by the US and is a revisionist power. He argued that China is developing and using various policy tools to coerce neighboring countries, and that containment is essential. The US stated that it does not seek conflict but will not shy away from competition, and that it will strengthen rules-based competition, maximize US military power, and reinforce security alliances.

In response, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe emphasized that China pursues peaceful rise and does not adopt policies that undermine the international order. He asserted that China is a country that abides by the international order, including freedom of navigation. However, he also stressed that if the US intervenes in territorial issues that are core to China's interests, particularly cross-strait relations, China will use military force to repel such intervention (Ha Young-sun & Chun Jae-sung 2019).

China's Defense White Paper explicitly criticizes US defense policy. It analyzes that the world has entered a security environment of intense international strategic competition, and that the US, in particular, has adopted an unilateralist strategy in its national security strategy, significantly increasing defense spending, strengthening capabilities in nuclear, space, cyber, and missile defense, and undermining global strategic stability. It criticizes the US for strengthening military alliances in the Asia-Pacific and increasing military deployments and interventions, thereby adding complexity to regional security. It also criticizes the deployment of THAAD in South Korea for severely undermining regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of regional countries, and criticizes Japan for pursuing an aggressive strategy by strengthening its military and security policies. It also mentions Australia, criticizing the strengthening of the US-Australia military alliance and the increasing military cooperation and Australia's growing role in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Defense White Paper defines the core of China's military strategy as "active defense." The principle is "we will not attack unless attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked." Furthermore, China consistently adheres to a nuclear policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and reaffirms the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China also presents long-term defense development strategic goals that align with the long-term national goals announced by President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress and are consistent with the military reforms pursued by China since 2013. First, by 2020, achieve mechanization with significantly improved informatization and strategic capabilities. Second, comprehensively advance military theory, organizational structure, military strength, and modernization of weapons and equipment in line with national modernization, and essentially complete the modernization of national defense and military by 2035. Finally, by the mid-21st century, with 2049 as a milestone, completely transform the military into a world-class force.

To this end, China places great emphasis on military technology modernization, highlighting technologies from the ongoing Fourth Industrial Revolution. The Defense White Paper analyzes that cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things are being rapidly applied in the military domain, driven by new technological and industrial revolutions. Consequently, military competition among nations is intensifying, and advanced military technologies based on informatization are developing rapidly, leading to information warfare and intelligent warfare. On the other hand, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has not yet completed its mechanization and urgently needs to improve its informatization, facing challenges due to the increasing generational gap in technology.

Although lagging behind in overall military power balance with the US, the White Paper states that military conflict could sufficiently occur if issues related to China's core interests arise. The Defense White Paper specifies that China's military power defends important maritime areas, islands, and reefs in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, conducts joint rights protection and law enforcement operations in adjacent waters, appropriately prepares for maritime and aerial situations, and resolutely responds to maritime security threats, intrusions, and provocations. In fact, if core interests related to sovereignty are undermined, the Chinese leadership will be in a situation where they must respond resolutely for the sake of domestic political legitimacy. It is argued that since 2012, the Chinese military has deployed vessels for over 4,600 maritime security patrols and 72,000 rights protection and law enforcement missions, maintaining maritime peace, stability, and order.

Information on China's defense budget is also an important aspect for observing the future trend of China's military power development. Currently, the defense budgets of the US and China, the world's first and second largest economies, combined account for half of the global defense expenditure, and their combined military personnel exceed 3 million. China emphasizes that its defense spending is not excessive compared to other countries and that the growth rate is also decreasing, highlighting its peaceful rise and defense-oriented strategy.

According to the Defense White Paper, overall defense spending has increased in line with the growth of the national economy and government expenditure. The defense budget as a percentage of GDP decreased from 5.43% in 1979 to 1.26% in 2017 and has remained below 2% for the past 30 years. Defense spending as a percentage of government expenditure fell from 17.37% in 1979 to 5.14% in 2017, a decrease of over 12 percentage points, indicating a clear downward trend.

China's defense budget is divided into three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and armament. Personnel costs primarily include salaries, allowances, food, clothing, insurance, subsidies, and pensions for officers, soldiers, and contract civilians, as well as retired military personnel supported by the defense budget. Training and maintenance costs are mainly applied to military training, institutional education, construction and maintenance of facilities and equipment, and other expenditures for daily consumables. Armament costs are primarily designated for research and development, testing, procurement, repair, maintenance, transportation, and storage of weapons and equipment.

China has announced that the increase in defense spending since 2012 has been primarily for the following purposes, offering a glimpse into future trends. First, current expenditure to improve welfare in line with national economic and social development trends, ensure regular military service, and improve living, training, and living conditions for the military. Second, expenditure to increase investment in the development of weapons and equipment, phase out obsolete equipment, upgrade existing equipment, and continuously modernize weapons and equipment by developing and procuring new items such as aircraft, fighter jets, missiles, and main battle tanks. Third, expenditure for the expansion of defense and military reforms to support major reforms in military leadership and command systems, military structure and composition, policies, and institutions. Fourth, costs for training support in actual combat situations, strengthening strategic-level training, weapons training, simulations, and improving network and forced training conditions. The global projection of China's military power is also gradually increasing, with expenditures supporting various military tasks, including UN peacekeeping operations, vessel protection activities, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts, also mentioned.

Regarding specific aspects of defense spending, China announced that its defense budget increased from 66.9192 billion yuan to 104.3237 billion yuan between 2012 and 2017. During this period, China's GDP and government expenditure showed average annual growth rates of 9.04% and 10.43%, respectively, while defense spending increased by an average of 9.42%. Statistics were presented showing that defense spending accounted for 1.28% of GDP and an average of 5.26% of government expenditure. China emphasizes that although its defense budget is the second largest in the world, it is defensive in nature, and points out that in terms of total expenditure, it was less than one-fourth of that of the United States as of 2017.

China's average defense spending as a percentage of GDP from 2012 to 2017 was approximately 1.3%. This is compared to other major countries: approximately 3.5% for the US, 4.4% for Russia, 2.5% for India, 2.0% for the UK, 2.3% for France, 1.0% for Japan, and 1.2% for Germany, emphasizing that it is at a lower level. It is also pointed out that this is the lowest figure among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The ratio of defense spending to government expenditure, at 5.3% from 2012 to 2017, is also pointed out as being at an intermediate level compared to 9.8% for the US, 12.4% for Russia, 9.1% for India, 4.8% for the UK, 4.0% for France, 2.5% for Japan, and 2.8% for Germany. It is also emphasized that China's per capita defense spending in 2017 was 750 yuan, a low figure compared to 5% of the US, 25% of Russia, 231% of India, 13% of the UK, 16% of France, 29% of Japan, and 20% of Germany.

China's Defense Strengthening and Military Strategy Changes: US Perception

Contrary to the image of peaceful rise and defensive defense strategy that China emphasizes, the US perceives China's defense strategy as revisionist and expansionist. In May 2018, the US renamed its Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command and appears to be pursuing an Asian strategy with China in mind. One aspect of the US perception of China can be seen in the testimony of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command. At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 12, 2019, Commander Davidson expressed concern about China's military buildup. He explained that tremendous efforts have been made over the past 20 years to grow and modernize the People's Liberation Army, which now poses a significant threat to the so-called First Island Chain countries, stretching from northern Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia to northern Japan. Furthermore, he noted that China's ability to project military power and influence beyond the First Island Chain is increasing, and that it is pursuing qualitative and quantitative efforts to modernize its military while simultaneously increasing the number of platforms. Reports indicate that China has also conducted live-fire exercises with coastal artillery in the Taiwan Strait, and its air force bombers have also conducted drills in preparation for cross-strait contingencies.

As is well known, Beijing's first aircraft carrier group joined the Chinese Navy in 2019, and the RENHAI-class missile cruiser was launched in 2017, with three more added in 2018, becoming the backbone of the Chinese Navy. It is also reported that the FUYU-class fast combat support ship, which supports the aircraft carrier fleet, has recently been completed.

In terms of air power, China's first 5th-generation stealth fighter jet, the J-20, was developed in February 2018, and a 6th-generation fighter jet is reportedly under development. The Y-20, a domestically produced heavy transport aircraft, was deployed in 2016, possessing significantly greater payload capacity and range than previous aircraft, enhancing China's strategic airlift capabilities. Additionally, the S-400 advanced surface-to-air missile system, acquired from Russia in 2018, has a range of 250 miles, potentially extending its aerial coverage to the Taiwan Strait and other regions.

China is also focusing on the development of advanced weapons, continuously pursuing hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, and unmanned/AI-equipped weapons, while also striving to significantly reduce the effectiveness of US detection capabilities and defensive weapons. China has tested hypersonic missiles, including the WU-14, since 2014, with speeds approaching Mach 10, and Beijing successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft in August 2018.

According to Commander Davidson, China is also modernizing its nuclear capabilities. The Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), China's third generation, is expected to be armed with the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and construction is likely to begin in the early 2020s. Furthermore, China is reportedly deploying the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile with mobile launchers, extending its precision strike capability to the Second Island Chain (connecting the southern Aleutian Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Republic of Palau, and northern Papua New Guinea). China continues to test the DF-41 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a maximum range of 9,300 miles.

Regarding maritime disputes, the Commander reported that in April 2018, China deployed advanced military systems, including missiles and electronic warfare equipment, further enhancing its power projection capabilities and continuing the militarization of its forward bases. Additionally, Chinese military aircraft have landed multiple times on the Spratly Islands, and long-range bombers have landed on the Paracel Islands. Chinese coast guard vessels are currently operating under the command of the Central Military Commission and are engaging in aggressive actions against fishing boats from the Philippines and other regional countries. Territorial claims in the South China Sea are also ongoing, and surface combat patrols are maintained at a high level.

Through its "Made in China 2025" strategy and national support investments, China is pursuing global leadership in strategic industries. For example, it aims to become a global leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, and many of the core technologies targeted by China are essential for rapid technological change across various industries. These capabilities are a key consideration not only for economic growth but also for the US to maintain its military advantage (U.S. Department of Defense 2018).

In conjunction with these perceptions, Mary Beth Morgan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, also demonstrated the US perception of China in her testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 20, 2019. She stated that China has set major economic and political milestones for 2020, 2035, and 2049, looking towards the centenary of its founding, and that China's military ambitions are linked to these goals. By 2035, China aims to complete military modernization, and by 2049, to establish a world-class military. In this regard, China's efforts are seen as having a clear objective to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Morgan views the People's Liberation Army as undertaking long-term and comprehensive military modernization efforts to fight and win short-term, high-intensity conflicts in surrounding regions to counter "formidable military threats." To this end, China continues to implement extensive restructuring of its military, including organizational reforms, personnel reductions, and the creation of new institutions such as the Strategic Support Force. China is also developing and deploying new types of weapon systems, which in recent years have included precision-guided cruise and ballistic missile systems, a second and third aircraft carrier, modern combat and support aircraft, and a robust space launch program. China's nuclear capabilities are also focused on expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, pursuing a viable nuclear triad, and developing precision strike systems against US territory and allies and partners.

Chinese leaders are also focusing on expanding the operational scope of the People's Liberation Army to match the global nature of China's economic and national interests. According to media reports in 2018, China seeks to expand its military bases and access in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. In January 2019, President Xi Jinping "demanded the completion of a security system to strengthen the protection of overseas interests and ensure the safety of major overseas projects and personnel." In connection with this, the People's Liberation Army Navy has been pursuing a long-term strategy of acquiring foreign bases through methods such as long-term leases, port construction, and acquisitions, to gain rights to foreign ports.

This global projection of China's military power is also related to China's future energy demands. According to projections by the International Energy Agency, China's oil import ratio is expected to increase by 9% by 2035, reaching 80% of its total demand. The overseas projection of the People's Liberation Army is a crucial condition for China's future energy imports. The Belt and Road Initiative is also related to this, as China seeks to sustain maritime deployments in distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean through port investments and access, and to secure necessary logistical support. In 2018, China focused on securing military bases in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific, and is collecting military intelligence through 110 overseas diplomatic missions worldwide. This observation is evident in the utilization of Djibouti, China's first overseas base, where China is seen as meeting overseas military logistical demands by securing overseas commercial ports and logistics facilities. Djibouti is assessed as a new operational area for the rapidly expanding People's Liberation Army Marine Corps, with significant military equipment being deployed there.

Regarding China's defense budget, the US estimates China's defense spending to be higher than officially announced and considers future increases to be significant. According to the US Department of Defense, China's announced defense budget omits several major expenditure items such as research and development (R&D) and overseas arms procurement. Actual military-related expenditures are estimated to be higher than the official budget of over $200 billion in 2018. Due to China's lack of accounting transparency, it is difficult to calculate actual military spending.

China's official defense budget is projected to increase by an average of 6% annually over the next few years, reaching $260 billion by 2022. Following China's reforms in 2015, the People's Liberation Army reduced its size by 300,000 personnel for training, operations, and modernization, allowing for greater budget allocation. Future economic projections suggest that China's economic growth rate may slow from 6.6% in 2018 to around 3% by 2030, potentially leading to a slowdown in the growth of defense spending. As shown in the table below, overall trends indicate that defense spending has continued to increase even as economic growth has slowed, and in the long term, China is estimated to spend the most in the Indo-Pacific region after the US (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019, 95).

<Figure 1> China's Official Defense Budget (2009-2018)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019, 94)

US Defense Spending Trends and Military Strategy Towards China

The United States is grappling with a significant budget deficit and has been making efforts to cut military spending. However, since the advent of the Trump administration, defense spending has continued to increase, and congressional constraints on the upper limit of defense spending have been repeatedly adjusted. The Trump administration advocates for "peace through strength" and emphasizes strategies of offsetting China and Russia, and the need for innovation.

On March 11, 2019, President Trump submitted the fiscal year (FY) 2020 budget request of $783 billion to Congress. The budget aims to invest in emerging space and cyber warfare domains, modernize capabilities in air, sea, and land combat domains, foster innovation to enhance competitive advantage, and improve troop readiness and morale. The US anticipates that future wars will occur not only in the air, land, and sea, but also in space and cyberspace, increasing the complexity of warfare. The FY2020 budget includes $58 billion for advanced aircraft, $35 billion for shipbuilding (the largest request in over 20 years), $14 billion for space systems, $10 billion for cyber warfare, $4.6 billion for AI and autonomous systems, and $2.6 billion for hypersonic weapons. It focuses on modernizing capabilities across all combat domains with the largest shipbuilding request in 20 years and the largest R&D request in 70 years, emphasizing technologies needed for advanced combat. This budget proposes a 3.1% military pay raise, the highest increase in 10 years, and aims to counter the threats from China and Russia by maintaining a competitive edge.

The total annual cost for the US Department of Defense from 2020 to 2023 is projected to remain nearly the same as in 2019. However, a transition plan is underway to move many costs currently covered by the Overseas Contingency Operations budget into the base budget. Consequently, costs included in the base budget are expected to increase by an average of $47 billion annually. Based on the Department of Defense's estimates, the Congressional Budget Office projects that the 2019 budget will continue to increase beyond 2023. The base budget is projected to reach $73.5 billion by 2033, a real increase of 11% over 10 years. This includes various costs: approximately 25% of the total increase from 2024 to 2033 is expected to be for military personnel costs, 55% for operations and maintenance, and 20% for weapons systems development and procurement.

These defense expenditures and weapons development are expected to maintain US superiority over China for a considerable period. Furthermore, the US possesses several advantages in enhancing its military power against China. These include: first, the US's ability to rapidly deploy and sustain combat and support forces throughout most of the Western Pacific and project power; second, the existence of highly capable and reliable regional allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia; third, China's operational difficulties in projecting military power by land and sea; fourth, the US's ability to protect its vulnerabilities through technological superiority; and fifth, the US's capability to escalate conventional conflicts with China.

China's Future Military Power

It is unlikely that China will gain a military advantage over the U.S. in the future military balance. First, the following conditions must be met. First, China's economy must continue to grow to supply the resources to fund military spending, and second, China's defense industry must continuously improve to innovate military technology. According to RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), it will be very difficult for China's economic growth rate to match that of the past 30 years. RAND estimates that the economy will grow at an average annual rate of about 5% by 2025, and it is clear that defense spending will be constrained accordingly.

As China's population ages and urbanizes, the government will face strong pressure to spend more on essential social programs such as pensions and healthcare, as well as public infrastructure. These demands are expected to limit the resources available for China's military spending. However, while China's defense industry still lags technologically, it is rapidly developing, and this trend will likely continue if the Chinese government continues to pursue reforms and increase defense spending.

Nevertheless, China's military power to counter the United States will steadily increase, with the core being the enhancement of A2AD capabilities. China is likely to possess four aircraft carriers by 2030. These will likely consist of two STOBAR carriers of the Liaoning class and two conventional CATOBAR carriers. While the U.S. will enjoy an overall qualitative advantage, China may achieve a tentative local superiority in the early stages of a conflict. China will also deploy submarines and surface vessels in large numbers without needing to disperse its naval power globally. The Chinese Air Force will deploy B-21 Raider stealth bombers and existing bombers, along with J-10 and J-11 fighters, to match the U.S. fleet's existing forces of F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s. While China's modernization program may not be sufficient to bring its military power up to U.S. levels by 2030, the gap will narrow. By deploying numerous bases and a vast number of ballistic, cruise, and anti-aircraft missiles, while utilizing advanced stealth aircraft, autonomous weapons, hypersonic cruise missiles, and other sophisticated weaponry, China can effectively enhance its A2AD strategy.

One axis of change by 2030 is likely to be unmanned platforms. While it is difficult to predict precisely which platforms will be central, aerial, naval, and undersea drones may compete with each other or engage in combat alongside manned platforms. These unmanned vehicles will be used for large-scale reconnaissance and communication systems, and intense combat will occur to disrupt each other.

U.S.-China Trade Dispute and Military Security Competition

The possibility of military competition and conflict will become more concrete depending on how the ongoing U.S.-China trade war concludes. Broadly, three scenarios can be set. The first scenario is a full-scale trade war leading to maximum economic decoupling between the U.S. and China. This is an alternative where both sides remain firm in their positions and build independent economic spheres to the greatest extent possible. Increased tariffs and non-tariff barriers will make it impossible for Chinese companies to do business in the U.S., and vice versa. High tariffs will increase costs for suppliers, manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, leading to reduced production, lower profits, business closures, and job losses. China will begin to actively invest in markets in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the U.S. may exhibit similar behavior. U.S. companies will seek to shift supply chains from China to Southeast Asia as much as possible, and Chinese companies will also seek diversified economic partners away from the U.S. In this case, the likelihood of security conflicts between the U.S. and China naturally increases. When economic interdependence between the U.S. and China is high, actors exist in both countries who seek to prevent actual military conflict. Should a conflict arise, the immense economic damage to both sides will create strong pressure to end the conflict quickly.

The second scenario involves a return to the status quo, where both the U.S. and China agree to end trade hostilities and reach an agreement through bilateral talks. This scenario entails returning to the original U.S.-China relationship as much as possible, pursuing mutual benefits, and withdrawing tariff increases. While the previous interdependent relationship will be restored, a cautious relationship will be maintained, anticipating potential future risks. In this case, the likelihood of military conflict between the U.S. and China will decrease. As long as the U.S. and China strive to pursue mutual benefits in the economic sphere and resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations, the immediate need for military means will diminish. However, military buildup will continue in anticipation of future conflicts.

The third scenario involves establishing norms for a new U.S.-China economic relationship and working to lay the foundation for a liberal international economic order. This will take a very long time and require the efforts of not only the U.S. and China but also other countries. Both governments will need to reach agreements in various areas, including bilateral market access, intellectual property protection, fair competition in China's private sector, and enhanced transparency in regulations and customs. If these efforts are successful, cooperation in the security domain may also be strengthened. This is because if both the U.S. and China mutually recognize the benefits of development and create norms that institutionalize this, while other countries also support it, a new cooperative order can be established.

Scenarios of U.S.-China Military Conflict

Considering the possibility of U.S.-China conflict over the next decade, the likelihood of a full-scale conflict is not high. Nevertheless, as U.S.-China economic disputes, technological disputes, and further energy competition continue, the incentives for using military force may increase. Conflicts could arise from military operations to achieve limited objectives, domestic frustrations in both the U.S. and China, or the perceived need for a preemptive strike. The RAND report analyzing the dynamics of a U.S.-China war by 2025 is one example (Gombert et al. 2016). If a war breaks out, it is expected to occur in and be confined to East Asia. The war would likely involve multiple domains, including naval, air, space, and cyber warfare. The Western Pacific would be the primary theater of operations, and even if the war escalates, neither side is likely to believe the situation has deteriorated to the point of risking nuclear war. China is unlikely to attack the U.S. mainland, except through cyber warfare, due to its insufficient military capabilities. Conversely, the U.S. could target various objectives on the Chinese mainland to successfully conduct operations in East Asia.

As military technology advances, with reconnaissance, guided weapons, digital networks, and other information technologies being fully mobilized, the U.S. and China could inflict severe damage on each other. The possibility of ground troop engagement is very low. Ultimately, war is likely to be a contest of industrial, technological, and military mobilization.

The form of war can be categorized into short-term and medium-term, and the intensity of war into low-intensity and high-intensity. Short-term would last a few days or weeks, while medium-term could be arbitrarily set at around one year.

Military losses affecting the outcome of a war include air power, fleet, submarines, missile launchers and storage, C4ISR systems, and cyber and anti-satellite attack capabilities. Economic losses, coupled with intensified cyber warfare and sustained blockades or sanctions that harm trade and investment, could also influence the will to wage war.

The outcome and winner of a war will vary depending on the future balance of economic and technological power between the U.S. and China. Around 2035, when China's GDP per capita reaches approximately $20,000, the total GDPs of the U.S. and China will move towards parity, and China is expected to significantly catch up to the U.S. in technological capabilities. Of course, the outcome of the current U.S.-China economic conflict could lead to different trajectories.

First, in the event of a short-term, high-intensity war, the balance of military power, particularly advanced technological military power, will be crucial. The extent of China's A2AD capabilities will be important, determining the damage to U.S. naval and air forces. Military damage to China will also be severe, and the economic situation around China, especially its supply chains necessary for foreign trade, could be affected.

Second, in the event of a long-term, high-intensity war, all of East Asia will become a battlefield, and the damage to both the U.S. and China will be immense. As China's A2AD capabilities continue to advance, U.S. military losses will be significant, and the U.S. will eventually target objectives on the Chinese mainland. The battlefield will span from the Western Pacific to the entire South China Sea, severely deteriorating China's external economic activities.

Third, in the event of a short-term, low-intensity war, both sides will seek mutually acceptable objectives with minimal military damage. They may find a compromise and pursue diplomatic solutions before suffering significant domestic political or economic damage.

Fourth, in the event of a long-term, low-intensity war, military losses on both sides will gradually increase, but the key battle will be who suffers greater domestic political and economic damage. The side that establishes a foundation to sustain a long-term war will have a higher probability of winning.

During the course of the war, the economies of both the U.S. and China are expected to suffer significant damage. China's GDP is projected to be hit harder, with the RAND report estimating a decline of 25-35% for China and 5-10% for the U.S. If China's economic growth is impacted, criticism of the Chinese government by its citizens could arise, and the voices of dissatisfied factions and separatist groups within China could also grow louder.

Furthermore, the participation of allies and friendly nations will be crucial. Japan could participate in a U.S.-China war by exercising its right to collective self-defense. Australia could also participate to some extent. However, it is unclear whether Russia would join China's side, as a military conflict between Russia and China could lead to greater problems.

China's long-term economic capacity and technological capability to invest in A2AD will shape the course of the war. However, an increase in China's military power does not necessarily guarantee victory in a war, just as the U.S. failing to achieve its war objectives does not necessarily mean China wins.

China's Asymmetric Strategy and Surprise Attack Advantage

In response to China's A2AD strategy, the U.S. may primarily rely on its own military power, but it could also support the active denial strategies of its allies or strategic partners. Countries such as Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines could cooperate with the U.S. to implement denial strategies against China's expansive maritime strategy. Currently, it is not easy for China to gain a military advantage in areas like Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. As shown in the figure below, China's naval superiority in Asia, even excluding the U.S., is not particularly high, and the use of offensive capabilities like military power projection requires significantly more cost and effort than defensive capabilities. China's strategy of attacking or blockading Taiwan, considering Taiwan's military strength and especially U.S. support, is unlikely to succeed at present. The A2AD capabilities of countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia against the Chinese navy in the South China Sea are also not something China can easily dismiss. Confrontation with Japan in the East China Sea is not something China can be optimistic about (Beckley 2017).

<Figure 2> Comparison of China's Military Power and Countries Confronting China in the East China Sea and South China Sea (1977-2017)

Source: Beckley (2017, 82)

Of course, if a war actually breaks out, it is difficult to say whether the global military balance between the U.S. and China, or the military balance in East Asia as a whole, will necessarily determine the outcome of the war. While there is a clear imbalance in military power between the U.S. and China, asymmetric threats and strategies are also possible. U.S. military power against China is concentrated in a limited number of bases in Asia and two carrier strike groups. If China enhances its A2AD capabilities and can concentrate attacks on these bases and carriers, the U.S.'s short-term offensive capabilities against China could be severely damaged. China is developing capabilities, such as the DF-21 and DF-26, to strike mobile targets like U.S. bases and aircraft carriers.

Against the anti-China offensive capabilities currently centered around the U.S.-Japan alliance, China might be able to achieve some of its objectives in Taiwan and the East China Sea by destroying a significant portion of the U.S.'s counterforce through a surprise attack. The U.S. was particularly constrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, while China was not, preventing the U.S. from operating intermediate-range ground-to-ground and surface-to-air missiles capable of striking China. With the treaty's abrogation, the U.S. will seek to operate new forces to counter China's surprise attack capabilities against itself and its allies.

Possibility of Escalation to U.S.-China Nuclear War

When discussing hegemonic transition, past cases have invariably assumed that hegemonic wars would occur. However, since the 20th century, there has been a vague expectation that hegemonic wars would not occur due to nuclear deterrence. Even if a military conflict occurs between the U.S. and China, it is expected that nuclear deterrence will prevent escalation, and some even expect that military conflict itself will be deterred. However, if a military conflict occurs between the U.S. and China, the probability of escalation to nuclear war cannot be entirely dismissed. There are both optimistic views that China will never use nuclear weapons during a U.S.-China war and pessimistic views that it might use them under certain circumstances. China adheres to the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, meaning it will not launch a preemptive nuclear strike unless attacked with nuclear weapons. However, some argue that if the U.S. attacks and threatens China's command and control networks, ballistic missile submarines, mobile land-based missile launchers, missile bases, and air defense systems early on, China might consider using nuclear weapons. As conventional war between the U.S. and China continues, the U.S. could strike key military targets on the Chinese mainland, which could include China's nuclear missile bases. If war breaks out, the U.S. could attack missile bases and submarines as key military targets, which might lead China to believe that the U.S. is attacking to neutralize its nuclear delivery facilities. Of course, China has separate facilities for nuclear and conventional weapons, and the U.S. will likely exercise caution regarding China's A2AD attacks, making escalation to nuclear war unlikely (Talmadge 2017). However, it cannot be ruled out that China might consider preemptive nuclear use if it assesses that its nuclear forces are being progressively destroyed amidst U.S. conventional attacks.

Conclusion

Considering the overwhelming U.S. military power compared to China, the evolution of the U.S.-led alliance network and the Indo-Pacific strategy with strong security implications, and China's situation, which needs to focus on economic development to achieve its status as a socialist great power and requires a stable international environment to resolve numerous domestic issues, it is difficult to easily predict the possibility of a U.S.-China military conflict. There is considerable debate about the fundamental nature of U.S.-China relations, and diverse opinions and strategic discourses coexist within both the U.S. and China. The competition spans from trade to many other issue areas. Competition will continue in many areas such as trade, technology, and energy, along with arms races and alliance competitions, and military conflict may eventually become possible.

However, just because there are several stages remaining before military conflict, or even a full-scale war, does not necessarily mean there is ample time. The situation can deteriorate faster than expected, and the stages of competition can be rapidly concluded one after another. Recently, the competition between the U.S. and China has moved beyond policy confrontation to a distrust of each other's identity and a systemic confrontation. When the relationship shifts from mutual engagement to mutual confrontation, national interests and public perception are inevitably significantly affected. Various discussions envisioning war are increasingly emerging in both countries, and in the U.S., many academic papers specifically research potential U.S.-China military conflicts. It is important to prevent this situation from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Since military conflict will clearly generate irreversible animosity and bring great hardship to many East Asian countries, we must anticipate the damage that U.S.-China competition will bring and seek paths for the U.S. and China to move towards new compromise and a cooperative order. ■

References

Lee, Seungju. 2019. “U.S.-China Trade War: A Multi-dimensional Complex Game.” EAI Special Issue Briefing. July 11.

Ha, Young-sun, and Jae-sung Lee. 2019. “U.S.-China Posturing in the Indo-Pacific and South Korea's Four Future Tasks.” EAI Special Project Commentary. June 6.

Beckley, Michael. 2017. “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion.” International Security 42(2): 78–119.

Gompert, David C., Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola. 2016. War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2019. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019. Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Defense. May 2.

Caitlin Talmadge. 2017. “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States.” International Security 41(4): 50–92.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access.

December.

■Author: Jae-sung Lee_ Director of the EAI National Security Research Center and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "North and South Korean War Threats and Peace" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a series of commentaries planned to provide a platform for experts from various fields to offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.