[EAI Special Feature Commentary] US-China Strategic Maneuvering in the Indo-Pacific and Korea's Four Future Tasks

Editor's Note

This is the first commentary in the special series, "The Shangri-La Aftermath: The Accelerating 'Indo-Pacific vs. Belt and Road' Dynamic and Korea's Strategy." We are pleased to publish this commentary jointly authored by Ha Young-sun, EAI Chairman (Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University), and Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI National Security Center (Professor, Seoul National University). Based on an analysis of the evolving patterns and characteristics of US-China competition, the authors offer the following recommendations for Korea's path forward. First, Korea must accurately assess the rapidly changing landscape of the new 21st-century Asia-Pacific order and formulate a strategy for its survival and prosperity. Second, rather than rushing into a strategic choice between the US and China, Korea should develop issues where normative diplomacy, such as nuclear non-proliferation, can be effective. Third, Korea should foster cooperation among Asian nations facing similar circumstances within the US-China confrontation. Finally, domestically, the authors emphasize the need to consolidate fragmented capabilities and promote national-level cooperation.

Indo-Pacific Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative

The 21st-century Asia-Pacific order is entering a new phase with the full-scale deployment of strategic assets by the US and China. In June 2013, President Obama and President Xi Jinping declared at the Sunnylands Summit their intention to build a new model of great power relations, avoiding military conflict, respecting core interests, and cooperating for common prosperity. However, merely six years after proclaiming this new model, the United States and China have begun a full-fledged strategic competition with the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. At the Asia Security Summit held at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore on May 31, hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan and Chinese Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe presented visions for their respective regional strategies, engaging in sharp exchanges. The US Department of Defense's "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report" and China's "China's Position on Sino-US Economic and Trade Consultations" white paper, released around the same time, clearly illustrate the conflict between the two countries' perceptions of reality and their implementation strategies.

In 2013, the same year China began pursuing a new model of great power relations with the US, it announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a cornerstone of its new model of peripheral relations. This initiative primarily aims to create a network for infrastructure development in Asia, while also establishing trade, investment, and socio-cultural networks connecting Europe and Africa. As the project has progressed, China has undertaken joint ventures with nearly 100 countries and established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), injecting over $1 trillion in funds. Furthermore, it was announced at the second BRI Forum that an additional $64 billion in funding would be provided. The forum hosted leaders from 40 countries and heads of international organizations to articulate the principles, achievements, and significance of the BRI, while a naval review was simultaneously held to showcase China's enhanced military capabilities.

The BRI is not merely a strategy for overseas economic development assistance; it plays a central role in China's new model of peripheral relations, which, alongside the new model of great power relations, forms the twin pillars of China's emphasis on new international relations. Among the many ongoing joint projects, some countries that borrowed Chinese capital for large-scale projects are now facing difficulties in repaying their debts. High-risk countries caught in the so-called "debt trap" are showing a tendency to cede control of sovereign assets, such as key ports, to China. In the midst of these controversies, concerns have been raised that China prioritizes the interests of Chinese companies over the economic development of recipient countries, and that the methods of joint project implementation are harmful to the environment. Witnessing China's debt diplomacy, many countries have canceled projects with China, leading to questions about whether China's intentions extend beyond simple construction assistance to geopolitical expansion. In response to these criticisms, China has presented a vision for developing a green and clean BRI that pursues qualitatively improved investment and openness, while protecting the environment and ensuring transparency.

Amidst the progress of China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy has gradually taken shape over a considerable period. Driven by an "America First" policy, the US has withdrawn from existing multilateral institutions and engaged in trade disputes with China. However, during his Asia tour in November 2017, President Trump articulated a vision for America's commitment to the security, stability, and prosperity of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," marking the first use of the Indo-Pacific regional concept. Efforts to view the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single strategic space had already been underway in India and Australia for some time, and Japanese Prime Minister Abe had also mentioned the Indo-Pacific Strategy in a speech in India in 2007.

In 2018, the United States actively employed the Indo-Pacific Strategy concept across diplomatic, economic, and military arenas. In May 2018, the US renamed the existing Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command, signaling its military strategic concept for the region. However, the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command expressed the view that the concept carries as much economic as military implication, thus maintaining a cautious stance, suggesting that the Indo-Pacific Strategy is not intended to militarily contain or confront China.

On July 30, 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, former Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, and GE Chairman Karan Bhatia, among 15 high-level government and industry representatives, presented more concrete economic aspects of the Indo-Pacific Strategy at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum. Secretary Pompeo stated that, similar to past US contributions to foundational sectors, the US would invest $113 million in new initiatives for future foundations such as the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure, describing this funding as an initial investment for a new era of American pursuit of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. He expressed hope that these government efforts would catalyze private US investment, thereby expanding support for a free and open Indo-Pacific rooted in national sovereignty, the rule of law, and sustainable prosperity. Specifically, the initiative begins with investments in digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnerships. To enhance the digital connectivity of partner countries and expand export opportunities for US technology, the US has planned an investment of $25 million. The US plans to support the development of communication infrastructure through technical assistance and public-private partnerships, expand market-based digital regulatory policies, and build the cybersecurity capabilities of partner countries to address common threats.Wilbur RossSecretary of Commerce, Rick PerryCarlos Gutierrezformer Secretary of Commerce, Karan BhatiaGE Chairmanand 15 high-level government and industry representatives, presented more concrete economic aspects of the Indo-Pacific Strategy at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum. Secretary Pompeo stated that, similar to past US contributions to foundational sectors, the US would invest $113 million in new initiatives for future foundations such as the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure, describing this funding as an initial investment for a new era of American pursuit of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. He expressed hope that these government efforts would catalyze private US investment, thereby expanding support for a free and open Indo-Pacific rooted in national sovereignty, the rule of law, and sustainable prosperity. Specifically, the initiative begins with investments in digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnerships. To enhance the digital connectivity of partner countries and expand export opportunities for US technology, the US has planned an investment of $25 million. The US plans to support the development of communication infrastructure through technical assistance and public-private partnerships, expand market-based digital regulatory policies, and build the cybersecurity capabilities of partner countries to address common threats.

Second, the Asia EDGE (Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy) Initiative aims to invest $50 million in 2018 to support Indo-Pacific partner countries in exporting, producing, transferring, storing, and implementing their energy resources. The US possesses abundant energy capabilities, including vast natural resources, world-leading private companies, sophisticated development finance tools, and unparalleled technological expertise. By mobilizing these capabilities, the US aims to seek sustainable growth and secure energy markets in the Indo-Pacific region. Following the shale revolution, the US has become not only energy self-sufficient but also an energy exporter, gaining a comparative advantage over China, an energy importer, which has led to the formulation of this strategy.

Third, an initiative to promote infrastructure development involves an infrastructure project and support network, with an investment of $30 million. This plan includes coordinating and strengthening mechanisms for project identification, financing, and technical assistance, establishing an interagency body for sharing these efforts, and creating an Indo-Pacific project advisory fund to enable partner countries to access private legal and financial advisory services.

In November 2018, Vice President Pence introduced the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act at the APEC meeting, which aims to more than double the US government's development finance to $60 billion to support strategic overseas private investment. He also announced initiatives such as investing $10 billion in regional energy in cooperation with Japan, the US-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, and the establishment of a five-country partnership to provide electricity to Papua New Guinea.

On another front, amidst escalating trade disputes, the US began imposing a 25% tariff on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods starting June 1. China retaliated by imposing tariffs of up to 25% on $60 billion worth of US products. In addition to tariff hikes, the Trump administration has placed Huawei and its 68 affiliates on a trade restriction list citing national security concerns, leading many companies, including Intel and Google, to cease business with Huawei. Furthermore, the US is urging its allies and strategic partners to join these measures. It is anticipated that China will consider additional measures beyond tariff increases, such as boycotts of US products, restrictions on rare earth exports, and sales of US Treasury bonds, suggesting a deepening confrontation between the two countries.

The Trump administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy has also begun to manifest on the diplomatic stage. The US is strengthening cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India, countries that have shown interest in the Indo-Pacific concept. Japan and Australia, mindful of China's rise, have actively considered the Indo-Pacific Strategy concept and used it in government documents, including defense white papers, prior to 2017, emphasizing cooperation among relevant countries. India has also emphasized cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, but as it pursues various cooperative relationships with China, it has not explicitly used the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a containment concept. The US, along with Australia, Japan, and India, pursued strategic cooperation among the four countries as early as 2007. However, this four-party cooperation did not last long as Australia pursued friendly relations with China and showed a lukewarm response to the four-party cooperation due to Chinese pressure. Since 2017, the US has been pursuing new four-party cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India. These four nations will form a multilateral framework, serving as a pillar of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, in addition to active mutual cooperation.

Kiron Skinner, Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State, reflects the US perception of China's rise. Skinner has stated that China, as a non-Western power, is moving in a direction that confronts US strategy, sparking controversy by suggesting this is not merely a clash of national interests but a clash of civilizations between "liberalism and authoritarianism." The US does not seek military confrontation or hostile conflict with China but will not shy away from intense competition. The US-China trade war, ongoing since last year, along with the Asian development strategy centered on energy, strong containment of China's technological development, and the intensification of freedom of navigation operations against China's expansion in the South China Sea, all underpin these changes. The US is not concealing the fact that its Indo-Pacific Strategy is gradually evolving into a full-fledged strategy to contain China and emphasizes the importance of the US response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan detailed the contents of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report" in his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue. While this report primarily focuses on the military aspects of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, it effectively illustrates the overall strategic framework. The conclusion of the preface emphasizes the three pillars of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: economy, diplomacy, and security. The introduction points out that the US has historically been an Indo-Pacific power and then elaborates on the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, specifically including respect for sovereignty and independence, peaceful resolution of disputes, free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment relations, protection of intellectual property rights, and upholding international norms and rules, including freedom of navigation and overflight.

The report then identifies four key challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region: revisionist powers like China, the resurgent evil embodied by Russia, rogue states such as North Korea, and transnational challenges like terrorism. Among these, China is emphasized the most. China is criticized as a country that undermines the rules-based international order and uses various coercive means to hinder the free and open activities of neighboring countries. It is criticized not only for failing to uphold its commitments to international norms but also for not making such commitments in the first place. Regarding such a China, the US states that it will not shy away from competition, if necessary, based on rules, which does not necessarily mean conflict.

Within the new Indo-Pacific strategic landscape, the US is pursuing a national security strategy to protect its citizens, promote its prosperity, and maintain peace through strength by defending its homeland, maintaining its position as the world's strongest military power, preserving the balance of power in key regions, and building an international order for security and prosperity. In the Indo-Pacific region, compared to other regions, the US has deployed 370,000 troops centered around a command four times larger than elsewhere, maintaining a high state of readiness with powerful weapon systems and multi-domain combat operations. In addition, the US secures allied military forces in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand, strategic partners in India, Indonesia, Singapore, Mongolia, Taiwan, and Palau, and security cooperation with European countries such as France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain. The formation of a networked region is emphasized as a key concept in building America's new Asian security order.

Meanwhile, China, sending its Minister of Defense to the Shangri-La Dialogue for the first time in eight years, emphasizes the importance of President Xi Jinping's vision of a community of shared future for mankind. Minister Wei clearly stated China's opposition to US efforts to create military blocs or undermine China's interests, criticizing the US for opposing global trends under unilateral protectionism, withdrawing from international treaties and organizations, and prioritizing its own interests. In contrast, he highlighted that over 150 countries and international organizations are participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, and that the second forum was attended by over 6,000 delegates from 150 countries and 92 international organizations. He also referred to the recent Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations, asserting that in accordance with the principle of civilizational pluralism, China will not invade other countries, will pursue peaceful development, and will not seek hegemony or create spheres of influence. He stated that China's military strategy is one of active defense, with all military power focused on defense.

Concurrently, Minister Wei addressed key issues, stating that China is prepared for both dialogue and competition in trade disputes, will not tolerate US intervention that promotes separatism in Taiwan, supports freedom of navigation in the South China Sea while viewing US intervention as a challenge to China's territorial sovereignty, and has made continuous contributions to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. He also emphasized that China has maintained and will continue to maintain cooperation with the US in practical aspects of military relations.

On June 2, the Chinese State Council released the white paper "China's Position on Sino-US Economic and Trade Consultations" to coincide with Minister Wei's speech. It asserts that the responsibility for the trade war lies entirely with the US and that the tariff war will harm the US economy. The white paper argues that Sino-US economic relations are the cornerstone of bilateral relations and that the tariff war affects the stability and prosperity of both countries and the world. It criticizes the Trump administration for threatening with tariff increases and creating tensions with partners. Predicting that the trade war will not make America great again, China asserts that it will not yield while protecting its legitimate rights and interests in response to the US.

Direction of US-China Strategic Maneuvering

The strategic maneuvering by the US and China for the construction of the new 21st-century Asia-Pacific order is in full swing. First, it is becoming increasingly clear that the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiative are not abstract regional strategies but possess characteristics of strategic competition. Speeches by Acting Secretary Shanahan and the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report explicitly label China as a disruptor of the rules-based order and a revisionist power, treating it more concretely than the "strategic competitor" defined in the 2017 "National Security Strategy Report." The US has also made it clear that it will not avoid competition with China.

China, in turn, has highlighted that the US is a force that threatens President Xi Jinping's vision of a community of shared future. It portrays the US as a hegemon that infringes upon the sovereignty of other nations, engages in unilateral trade retaliation, and prioritizes its own interests. It criticizes the US as a force that withdraws from the existing international order and disregards international norms, arguing that it is the US, not China, that undermines the rules-based order. As Defense Minister Wei argued, China has emphasized that it will strongly resist the US when it undermines China's crucial interests in areas such as trade competition, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

Second, the competition between the US and China is expanding beyond trade into all areas, as long as it does not lead to direct military conflict. In a speech at the Hudson Institute on October 4, 2018, Vice President Pence pointed out China's multi-faceted offensive. Pence argued that despite US efforts to integrate China into the liberal international order through WTO accession and opening its markets, China continues to maintain authoritarianism, engaging in public surveillance and human rights abuses. He criticized China for its persistent non-liberal policies, including maintaining high tariffs and quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and providing industrial subsidies to attract foreign investment. Furthermore, he argued that China is implementing a comprehensive strategy that includes threatening neighboring countries through military buildup, intervening in US political processes through debt diplomacy, and strengthening pro-China influence in cultural and academic spheres. Over the past year, the US has announced and launched a government-wide economic assistance strategy for Asian countries, encompassing economic, infrastructure, development cooperation, and energy support. At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, the acting Secretary of Defense presented the defense and security framework of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

On the economic front, China is responding to US demands for unilateral protectionism while also demonstrating its resolve to fight to the end if the US desires confrontation. It has published a white paper on Sino-US trade negotiations, criticizing US tariff pressure and foreshadowing long-term countermeasures. As evidenced by the second BRI Forum, China is simultaneously seeking to increase the number of participating countries and implement more projects by accepting international criticism. In addition to existing participants, Italy has newly expressed its intention to join the BRI, currency swap agreements have been signed with about 20 neighboring countries, payment in RMB has been agreed upon with seven countries, and achievements have been reported in science and technology, education, and foreign aid. On the military front, where it is relatively weaker, China is accelerating defense modernization, pursuing the long-term dream of a strong military, and vigorously developing advanced weapons such as aircraft carriers, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and hypersonic vehicles to project its military power in regional conflict zones like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. It has also begun to emphasize the long-term diplomatic narrative of a community of shared future for mankind.

However, US-China competition will not proceed at the same pace across all domains. The intensity of competition between the US and China is expected to differ significantly across three areas. Firstly, trade disputes, where both the US and China can experience mutual gains or losses, cannot end with a unilateral victory for either country. However, in the military domain, where the US holds an asymmetric advantage, China will likely adhere to the principle of peaceful development, avoiding direct military conflict or confrontation for a considerable period. Nevertheless, the risk of regional military tension remains significant as long as it does not escalate into direct US-China military confrontation. Furthermore, the US and China will adopt a more assertive stance in areas where they hold a relative advantage over each other. The US places particular emphasis on energy and advanced technology domains, while China emphasizes the importance of natural resources such as rare earths and agricultural products.

Third, as US-China competition intensifies, Asian countries are facing difficult choices. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, diagnosed the situation as the beginning of a full-blown confrontation between the US and China, attributing the exacerbation of the problem to a fundamental lack of trust between the two nations. Recognizing the dilemma faced by Asian countries, he stressed that even small nations like Singapore must unite to deepen economic cooperation, strengthen regional integration, and build multilateral institutions. This dilemma is acutely felt by all Asian countries. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasizes alliances and strategic partnerships, aiming to forge close ties with these countries based on America's formidable military power and technological innovation. The report, mentioning South Korea after Japan, explicitly lists trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, the US, Japan, and Australia, and the US, Japan, and India.

China also emphasizes its cooperation with ASEAN countries and close collaboration with South Korea on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, highlighting its coordination with Asian nations. Although China has no formal allies other than North Korea, it has presented a vision of providing opportunities and achieving peaceful economic development together with its neighbors based on the spirit of "sincerity, friendship, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness," without posing a threat to them.

Fourth, as US-China competition intensifies, both countries emphasize respecting the sovereignty of other nations, adhering to the various rules established with the international community, and upholding an open and fair international economic order. Acting Secretary Shanahan, while stating that he will not avoid competition with China, indicated that the US will pursue rule-based competition and prioritize avoiding confrontation. China has also repeatedly emphasized its role as a great power upholding the liberal international order when the US deviates from multilateralism. While these statements may be mere rationalizations for naked power competition, there is no doubt that in building economic and security architectures, the support and agreement of other countries are now crucial.

When criticizing each other, both the US and China use the liberal international order as a common standard for their critiques, recognizing the possibility of cooperation and the need to build future trust. While competing in military power and alliances, economic areas such as trade disputes and exchange rates, and technological innovation, as well as in philosophy and ideology, such as America's liberal democracy and China's community of shared future, they emphasize competition based on existing rules. Although the US and China may not share identical views on the elements and content of the liberal international order, their awareness of the international community based on rules, rather than naked confrontation, indicates a different pattern from previous power transitions.

Korea's Four Future Tasks

Amidst the intensifying competition between the United States and China, South Korea is rapidly entering a difficult phase. While attempting to secure individual Korean interests in the short term and find a clever strategy for cooperation with both the U.S. and China in the long term, this is proving to be realistically challenging. South Korea already faces situations where it can no longer postpone taking a stance in areas of competition between the two powers, such as the use of Huawei's 5G technology, its position on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and policies regarding the actual deployment of THAAD. In such circumstances, the naive expectation that South Korea can secure a more advantageous role on the stage of the 21st-century Asia-Pacific new order by focusing on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula peace process must be abandoned. South Korea must address the four major future challenges it faces promptly and effectively to play a proper role in the 21st-century Asia-Pacific new order.

First, Korea must properly address the issues of the new 21st-century Asia-Pacific order, which are far more urgent than the Korean Peninsula issue. Korea has already suffered two painful historical blows due to its failure to accurately read the rapidly changing dynamics of the new order's chessboard and its internal discord. In the late 19th century, amidst the civilizational shift of Western expansion into the East, Korea faced the tragedy of national ruin in the early 20th century under the imperialist new order. In the mid-20th century, as a new Cold War order settled in Northeast Asia, the US established the Acheson Line, with Japan as its base, excluding Korea. While the Soviet Union was relatively weaker than the US, changes in the international environment, such as Mao Zedong's unification of China and the Soviet Union's successful atomic bomb test, led to cautious support for North Korean leader Kim Il-sung's theory of unification through war, resulting in the tragedy of the Korean War for the peninsula. To avoid repeating a third tragedy in the 21st century, Korea must accurately interpret the significance of the rapidly unfolding US-China strategic maneuvering for the construction of the new 21st-century Asia-Pacific order and formulate a strategy for Korea's survival and prosperity within it.

Second, Korea must not narrow its position by rushing into strategic choices between the US and China on individual issues. As a middle power with a history of pursuing diplomacy based on universal norms, Korea must continue to strive to secure space for pursuing 21st-century normative diplomacy that transcends interest-based diplomacy favoring one side. As discussed earlier, given that both the US and China value rule-based competition and an inclusive international order and norms, even amidst their competitive dynamic, there is room for Korea's normative diplomacy. As a nation whose prosperity depends on exports, Korea must adhere to norms that support and pursue a free and open liberal international economic order. Beyond the self-interest of both the US and China, Korea must develop diplomatic issues that align with its own interests and are normatively sound.

Specifically, Korea must identify areas where it can be a significant stakeholder among the norms and rules that the US and China can agree upon. For example, the North Korean nuclear issue and peace on the Korean Peninsula are important issues for both the US and China, and areas where Korea can participate and propose norms for resolution. While Korea could pursue a short-term resolution solely for its own benefit, it can serve as a good example of drawing out partial cooperation norms between the US and China during the resolution process. Based on the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, the US and China continue to cooperate even as their competition and confrontation intensify. As progress is made in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, the issue of peace on the Korean Peninsula will be addressed jointly. This will include core tasks such as the diplomatic orientation of a denuclearized North Korea, a US-China cooperation framework guaranteeing peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the future of the ROK-US alliance. At this juncture, Korea's diplomatic capabilities must be exercised to enable the US and China to create common norms for the Northeast Asian regional order, transcending their short-term national interests.

Third, cooperation with countries in similar positions within the US-China confrontation is crucial. Acting Secretary Shanahan speaks of ASEAN centrality, and China also makes positive remarks about the leadership of neighboring countries. While these statements are efforts to secure their respective support bases, Asian countries within the US-China competitive framework can also play a role as forces that broaden the space for cooperation between the US and China through cooperation. Korea must contribute to establishing norms of cooperation and rules of agreement that enable the US and China to cooperate and reach consensus on mutually beneficial issues. A new Asia-Pacific order, jointly led by the US, China, and other stakeholders, rather than unilaterally led by either the US or China, must be constructed to ensure the comprehensive interests of all members.

Fourth, to pursue universal norms and develop logical frameworks on an issue-by-issue basis, Korea must fully mobilize its 21st-century capabilities domestically. The US and China are actively engaged in strategic maneuvering to redefine various issues and set standards for dispute resolution in order to maximize their national interests. Within this context, for Korea to propose new norms, gain the agreement of not only the US and China but also other middle powers, and achieve the successful reverse diffusion of these norms, global-level knowledge tracking and logical development are absolutely essential. To this end, a future-oriented generational transition is urgently needed to move beyond the dichotomous camp logic of the 20th-century older generation and promote the complex co-evolutionary logic of the 21st-century younger generation. ■

■ Authored by: Ha Young-sun EAI Chairman, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and has served as Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. His major works include "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and the New Order," "Korea-Japan New Era and Symbiotic Complex Networks," "World Politics in Transition," and "US-China Competition for the Asia-Pacific Order."

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung Director of the EAI National Security Research Center, Professor at Seoul National University. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "North-South Korean War Threats and Peace" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-ee, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series planned to provide a forum for experts from various fields to offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The views and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not related to EAI and solely represent the author's personal views.