On the Path to a Third North Korea-U.S. Summit: South Korea's Foreign Policy Challenges in 2019

Editor's Note

Amidst the stalemate in North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations following the collapse of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has hinted at the possibility of strengthening its nuclear arsenal by launching short-range ballistic missiles. Given the U.S. presidential election schedule next year, if a foundation for a third North Korea-U.S. summit is not laid this year, the stalemate is likely to persist long-term. Therefore, Director of EAI's Center for National Security and Professor at Seoul National University, Jeon Jae-sung, emphasizes that it is crucial to determine what efforts are made this year to achieve meaningful progress in North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations in the first half of next year. Although tangible results may not be expected in the immediate future, the South Korean government must recognize that the denuclearization issue is closely linked to inter-Korean relations, as well as diplomacy with neighboring countries and major powers. The author suggests that South Korea should "systematically strengthen its diplomacy with neighboring countries, build a foundation of trust with North Korea, and simultaneously lead international and multi-layered dialogues for the guarantee of North Korea's regime stability."

With North Korea setting a one-year deadline for negotiations after the collapse of the Hanoi talks, this year has emerged as a critical period. If the conditions for a smooth third North Korea-U.S. summit are not created by early next year, 2020 will be a difficult year in the denuclearization process. North Korea is already signaling its intent to explore alternatives for nuclear armament if denuclearization talks do not proceed smoothly, by launching short-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, it will strengthen its internal resilience and endurance through active engagement with China and Russia and its economic development strategies. In the context of U.S. politics, with the presidential election fervor already heating up, it will be difficult to expect bold and preemptive measures toward North Korea from President Trump. Experience shows that stalled negotiations with North Korea often become a significant detriment to presidential approval ratings, while even considerable success does not necessarily yield decisive domestic political gains. If next year passes amidst confrontation between North Korea and the U.S., the long-term situation will be determined by the extent of North Korea's nuclear armament and the next president's North Korea policy after the U.S. elections.

Ultimately, the success of a third North Korea-U.S. summit hinges on how this year is managed. At the 14th Supreme People's Assembly, Chairman Kim Jong Un demonstrated a generational shift to stabilize his regime, while relatively reducing the military's influence and emphasizing the economy, science, and education. Although the regime is politically stable, this calculation is based on the premise that long-term stable rule is only possible with remarkable economic achievements following the declaration of nuclear armament completion. North Korea's denuclearization is a process of securing external guarantees for regime and system stability, and a process through which Kim Jong Un's leadership becomes established based on tangible achievements in economic development.

The United States maintains pressure and sanctions on North Korea in the current state where a complete freeze of North Korea's nuclear capabilities is not guaranteed. Although the Hanoi talks collapsed with the proposition of a "big deal," future negotiations are inevitable given the certainty that North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities will advance. If both North Korea and the U.S. present agreed-upon objectives for denuclearization and proceed with the complete declaration of nuclear facilities for a freeze and appropriate verification procedures, complete and verifiable denuclearization will progress. Many U.S. strategists also advocate for a denuclearization process that is maximally compressed under the concept of agreed-upon denuclearization.

The issue is that this process must go through certain stages, including trust-building and the pursuit of each party's rational alternatives. While clear agreements and progress have not been achieved through the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit, the inter-Korean summit, and the North Korea-Russia summit, it does not mean there have been no achievements. We can see that North Korea's denuclearization process involves various summit-level dialogues, a process of verifying the realism of each party's alternatives, and a continuous exploration of the level of negotiations that can be internationally agreed upon. Off-the-table negotiations are also a meaningful part of the effort process. If managed well, it could become a process of trust-building.

What efforts are currently needed for this year's efforts, which appear to lack clear progress, to lead to trust-building and the exploration of rational alternatives? First, the basic principles of the denuclearization roadmap must be reaffirmed. Denuclearization and a peace regime must proceed in parallel, as a peace regime is a crucial process for guaranteeing North Korea's system, and through this, North Korea can achieve denuclearization. A peace regime centers on the signing of a peace treaty but is a much longer process. Trust must be built among key actors such as North and South Korea, the U.S., and China, which can only be based on long-term mutual negotiations and achievements. Various elements necessary for building a peace regime, such as non-aggression, arms reduction, and peace guarantees, proceed differently depending on trust-building.

Second, substantive discussions and negotiations on guaranteeing North Korea's regime are necessary. While North Korea's denuclearization will involve intermediate steps of complete declaration, verification, and easing of sanctions, political and military security guarantees for North Korea will ultimately emerge as the most critical agenda item. Last year, North Korea demanded military security guarantees for its preemptive denuclearization process, framed as security for security, such as a declaration of the end of war and a complete halt to ROK-U.S. military exercises. However, with the difficulty of a declaration of the end of war, the focus shifted to a security-for-economy framework, such as the lifting of economic sanctions. The lifting of sanctions is intended to yield economic benefits, but it is also a way for North Korea to confirm the sincerity of the ROK-U.S. response and gain a sense of regime security. After this period, it will eventually demand security for security, meaning military security guarantees. Even if a small deal were reached in Hanoi, involving the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities and partial sanctions relief, after a certain period, it would again demand military regime security, i.e., physical assurances guaranteeing the cessation of hostile policy toward North Korea. Without satisfactory regime guarantees, North Korea would receive economic compensation after sanctions relief and suspend negotiations again, which would be perceived as a violation of negotiation terms by the U.S. and an unavoidable consequence of incomplete regime guarantees by North Korea. Therefore, the conditions for political, military, and security regime guarantees must be discussed in parallel throughout the long process of establishing a peace regime.

To dismantle all existing nuclear weapons and ensure security, inter-Korean military agreements alone are insufficient; a security system in Northeast Asia, including China and the U.S., is essential. Furthermore, amidst accelerating geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China, we must consider how to provide military security guarantees to North Korea internationally. South Korea must activate multi-layered and multi-dimensional strategic dialogues with both the U.S. and China, as well as Northeast Asian countries, to discuss a peace regime. Currently, within the U.S., the priority of the North Korean nuclear issue is rapidly declining due to the complex domestic political issues related to Venezuela and next year's presidential election, and skepticism about Kim Jong Un's willingness to denuclearize is spreading due to North Korea's missile launches. As calls for strengthening sanctions are expected to rise, South Korea's efforts to develop a comprehensive denuclearization roadmap are urgently needed. In particular, strategic dialogues are necessary to broaden the base among U.S. strategists who advocate for realistic negotiations with North Korea.

Third, even at this stage of stalled denuclearization, measures to build trust are necessary. Maintaining economic sanctions against North Korea and providing humanitarian aid and socio-cultural exchanges are not necessarily contradictory. North Korea, due to the lack of sanctions relief, is showing strong distrust toward the international community and is resorting to military means. To alleviate this, measures that do not conflict with sanctions must be identified and implemented.

Presenting a vision of North Korea's future after denuclearization serves as an incentive for North Korea. It is difficult to move North Korea with rhetoric about a bright future and the realization of economic potential. A package of tangible and concrete strategic engagement must be prepared. Alternatives such as the North Korea Fund, proposed by former U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks, could be helpful. This proposal suggests that by raising substantial funds internationally and demonstrating this process and effort to North Korea, trust can be strengthened. Even without providing funds to North Korea, having tangible rewards readily available would be beneficial.

Fourth, it must be recognized that denuclearization and inter-Korean relations improvement are closely linked to South Korea's major power diplomacy. South Korean diplomacy is currently facing criticism for being solely focused on the North Korean nuclear issue. While the South Korean government has been engaging in diplomacy with neighboring countries, the issue is how proactively South Korean diplomacy perceives and responds to the rapidly reorganizing diplomatic landscape in Northeast Asia and Asia, centered on U.S.-China competition. In other words, the relative speed of response is crucial here. If not addressed quickly enough, even efforts made will not be properly evaluated.

One might think that achieving denuclearization alone would yield significant diplomatic assets in major power diplomacy. However, in a changing Asian landscape, these assets may not be decisive. Rather, amidst the changes in alliances and coalition structures, exemplified by the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific strategy, and the confrontation between neighboring countries' strategies centered on China's Belt and Road Initiative, the denuclearization issue is easily detached and loses its regional implications. It must be recognized that if diplomacy with neighboring countries does not proceed smoothly, the denuclearization process itself will eventually drift. When Asian regional diplomacy and major power diplomacy are conducted wisely, denuclearization can overcome challenges and make progress. Since the two are not zero-sum relationships, both the scope and means of diplomacy must be broadened and strengthened.

Ultimately, the core issue is what preparations must be made now to reach an agreement that goes beyond the intermediate stages of denuclearization by the first half of next year. This is a time when tangible results cannot be achieved immediately. We must systematically strengthen diplomacy with neighboring countries, build a foundation of trust with North Korea, and simultaneously lead international and multi-layered dialogues for the guarantee of North Korea's regime. This year must be spent productively to ensure that the path to complete denuclearization combines North Korea's declaration, agreement on a roadmap including nuclear freeze and verification, and the ROK-U.S.'s provision of a roadmap for appropriate levels of sanctions relief and regime guarantees for North Korea. ■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of EAI's Center for National Security and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Editor: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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