[EAI Commentary] China's Role and Strategy in the Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process Following the Hanoi Summit

Editor's Note

Following the collapse of the second North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi at the end of February, China's role in the denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula has once again drawn attention. However, China is surprisingly adopting a more cautious approach than in the past. Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI China Research Center (Professor at Dongduk Women's University), analyzes that China's cautious stance stems from two factors: first, China views the North Korean nuclear issue as an issue to be managed within a long-term context; and second, China prioritizes 'stabilization through maintaining the status quo' over altering the existing situation, as a stable international environment is essential for its continued economic growth and regime stability. Therefore, while China's role in denuclearization negotiations is expected to gradually become more prominent in the long run, for the time being, China is likely to focus on managing its relationship with North Korea while closely observing the progress of negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. Consequently, it will be difficult to expect China to play an active mediating role in realizing denuclearization and peace as South Korea hopes, the author adds.

China's 'Quiet' Response to the Hanoi Summit's 'No Deal'

The unexpected breakdown of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit has once again brought China's role in the denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula into sharp focus. China, highly sensitive to the 'China passing' narrative in the denuclearization and peace process on the Korean Peninsula, has been consistently emphasizing its willingness to play a 'constructive role' more clearly than ever before. Nevertheless, various interpretations and speculations continue to be raised about China's specific role and actions.

Expectations and demands for China's role escalated during the sanctions against North Korea, even leading to discussions of China's responsibility and pressure. As inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits were successively held in 2018, and the possibility of a joint declaration of the end of the Korean War by the three parties was discussed, the so-called 'China passing' theory emerged. Following a series of North Korea-China summits, the 'China behind the scenes' theory was raised, particularly within the U.S. political sphere.

Despite China's own emphasis on playing a 'constructive role,' its specific actions have not been discernible compared to the period following the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, amplifying the debate surrounding its role. Particularly, despite the dynamic developments in denuclearization negotiations since 2018, China's most notable diplomatic move has been the four consecutive summits with North Korea. However, as all four meetings were held at North Korea's request, with Chairman Kim Jong-un visiting China, it is difficult to consider China as having played a leading role.

It is also surprising that China has maintained a principled and calm official response to the unexpected 'no deal' outcome of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit, without taking any concrete actions. China has consistently argued that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved through bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the U.S., and has expressed strong welcome and support for the North Korea-U.S. summits. Therefore, its bewilderment at the 'no deal' outcome should have been considerable. Although it was at North Korea's request, China, which had garnered attention for its role through successive North Korea-China summits immediately before and after the Singapore summit, and just before the Hanoi summit, while being suspected by the U.S. of being 'behind the scenes,' is now surprisingly quiet following the collapse of the Hanoi summit.

China's unexpectedly cautious approach may reflect its complex intentions while observing the North Korea-U.S. summit amidst ongoing conflicts such as the U.S.-China trade dispute. A glimpse into these complex intentions can be seen in the remarks made by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Premier Li Keqiang at the press conferences during the 2019 Two Sessions. Both expressed a positive assessment of the Hanoi summit's outcome, despite its failure, and actively advocated for the resumption of dialogue. They also noted that denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime are difficult to achieve at once and will take a long time, urging relevant parties to proceed patiently and incrementally with easier steps. While controversies persist internationally regarding the reasons and background of the Hanoi summit's failure, China has remained reticent, even appearing indifferent. Furthermore, despite expressing strong hope and anticipation for the resumption of dialogue, China is not actively seeking to play a substantial mediating role to facilitate dialogue, unlike in the past.

China may be actively expressing hope for the resumption of negotiations, fearing that the breakdown of North Korea-U.S. talks could potentially lead to renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Simultaneously, it appears to have low expectations for a rapid progression of negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. In essence, China does not wish for the North Korea-U.S. negotiations to lead to a catastrophic outcome and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but it is also wary of a rapid progression of negotiations that could lead to swift changes on the Korean Peninsula, such as the establishment of a peace regime.

While supporting the North Korea-U.S. summit, China harbored considerable reservations about the possibility of its success. Doubts existed particularly regarding the intentions and commitment of the Trump administration. Considering the reality that the denuclearization process is unlikely to be completed in a short period, concerns were raised about the continuity of policies beyond the Trump administration's term. China continues to view the North Korean nuclear issue as an issue to be managed within a long-term context.

North Korean nuclear issue's role changes and patterns

China has exhibited a consistent pattern in its response and role regarding the North Korean nuclear issue over the past 26 years, and its reaction following the Hanoi summit also shows a certain connection to this pattern. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, China has consistently maintained its principled stance of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, peace and stability on the peninsula, and peaceful resolution through negotiations and dialogue, while gradually expanding its role and strategic position. Specifically, while China played a limited role as a 'quiet observer' or 'behind-the-scenes mediator' during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, after the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, China facilitated trilateral talks among North Korea, the U.S., and China, and subsequently played a substantial mediating role as the host of the Six-Party Talks, thereby expanding its influence. Following North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, China unusually and swiftly participated in high-intensity sanctions against North Korea, consequently strengthening its cooperation with the U.S.

Although China played a role through different actions in 2003 (mediating dialogue) and 2017 (strengthening sanctions), both periods shared the commonality of heightened risk of U.S. military action and escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, China determined that since denuclearization is ultimately an issue between North Korea and the U.S., its role is limited, and there is no need to unnecessarily deplete its 'leverage.' Conversely, in situations with a high potential for escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula, China has played a role in easing tensions by applying pressure and persuasion to North Korea to guide it towards dialogue.

The past 26 years of China's gradually expanding role in the North Korean nuclear issue are closely aligned with its own rise, which is why China has prioritized the 'U.S. variable' in the North Korean nuclear issue. While aligning with North Korea's position by insisting that the North Korean nuclear issue is an issue to be resolved through North Korea-U.S. negotiations, China has also sought to avoid intensifying conflict with the U.S. due to the North Korean nuclear issue. Instead, China has sought to maintain a cooperative stance with the U.S. on the North Korean nuclear issue whenever possible. China has consistently agreed on the 'principle of denuclearization' in summits with the U.S. and cooperated with the U.S. in the adoption of nine UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea up to September 2017. In summary, although China has gradually expanded its role in the North Korean nuclear issue in the past, its actions have been reactive rather than proactive, taking into account its relationships with both the U.S. and North Korea. In essence, the relationship with the U.S., the stability of the North Korean regime, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula have been key variables influencing China's response and strategy towards the North Korean nuclear issue, while its policy of managing North Korea as a geopolitical buffer zone has been maintained.

Xi Jinping government's strategy and role in the

The Xi Jinping government is expected to maintain the existing policy stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. Given the complex domestic and international circumstances facing the Xi Jinping government, its Korean Peninsula policy is likely to be based on the principle of 'stabilization through maintaining the status quo' and 'balanced diplomacy towards both Koreas.' A low-cost, stable international environment remains crucial for China to secure new economic growth drivers and maintain the stability of the Xi Jinping regime. Especially in the current uncertain and unpredictable complex situation with the U.S., any change in the power dynamics on the Korean Peninsula could be perceived by China as an increase in instability.

However, the reality facing the Xi Jinping government is not straightforward. Since 2018, as the denuclearization and peace process on the Korean Peninsula has centered on North Korea-U.S. negotiations, the role of 'mediator' that China has played, and the necessity of 'pressure and persuasion' towards North Korea, have been relatively diminished. South Korea has taken on some of the mediator role, and the need for pressure and persuasion towards North Korea has decreased with the direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. As denuclearization negotiations have progressed rapidly and erratically, China's status and position as a driver and mediator of negotiations have temporarily weakened.

The developments since 2018 present a new challenge for China, requiring a different approach than before. While U.S. containment of China is intensifying, dialogue and negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. are ongoing. China's room for maneuver is more limited than ever. Moreover, China's policy towards the Korean Peninsula has not been entirely successful. Its policy has been challenged by the THAAD deployment issue with South Korea and North Korea's nuclear weapons development, undermining the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula and the 'two Koreas' policy. Its strategic position as the only major power among the four surrounding powers that maintains cooperative relations with both Koreas is being challenged.

Therefore, while China aims for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it may prioritize stabilizing the situation and restoring its strategic position on the peninsula over altering the status quo. Although the North Korean nuclear issue is an important security concern for China, it is unlikely to be considered a top priority issue demanding immediate policy focus. China continues to view the North Korean nuclear issue as one to be managed in a long-term perspective, and in the process, it may need to restore relations with North Korea to minimize instability on the peninsula and prevent the weakening of China's strategic position.

Particularly, China's complex calculations are inevitably linked to the issue of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, which is intertwined with denuclearization negotiations. China is wary of the fact that establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula could bring up sensitive issues such as the presence of U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance. Given the current conflict between the U.S. and China, if this issue were to be seriously placed on the negotiation table, the Korean Peninsula could enter a new phase of uncertainty. Therefore, China needs to delay such a situation as much as possible. Consequently, China is likely to prioritize managing its relationship with North Korea and securing its own position while closely observing the progress of future North Korea-U.S. negotiations, rather than playing a leading role in the denuclearization and peace process on the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, in the long run, China's role is likely to become increasingly prominent in any denuclearization negotiation scenario. China's objections to the discussion of a trilateral or quadrilateral declaration of the end of the war, the unprecedented four North Korea-China summits in ten months, and President Trump's 'China behind the scenes' theory all strongly suggest that China's role cannot be overlooked. For denuclearization to reach a 'complete and irreversible' stage, it will eventually lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the U.S., the creation of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and a smooth transition to North Korea's reform and opening-up, and at each critical juncture, China's role will inevitably be significant.

In the current phase of U.S.-China competition, which is unfolding under U.S. strategic superiority, if President Trump remains firm in his intention to achieve denuclearization negotiations, the U.S.-China conflict will not directly negatively impact the denuclearization negotiation phase between North Korea and the U.S. However, if the denuclearization process rapidly advances to issues related to the transformation of the Korean Peninsula's order, such as the establishment of a peace regime, the element of U.S.-China competition is likely to act as an obstacle, and it could even potentially reverse the progress of the denuclearization process.

In conclusion, given the complex and uncertain domestic and international circumstances facing China, it is unrealistic to expect China to act as a 'promoter' or 'active mediator' that actively supports and cooperates with South Korea's denuclearization and peace initiatives. Therefore, South Korea needs to recognize the stark reality that, in addition to the task of mediating North Korea-U.S. negotiations, it faces the significant challenge of persuading China to play a 'positive role.' ■

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_ Professor at Dongduk Women's University and Director of the EAI China Research Center. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies. He has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification and as president of the Association for Contemporary Chinese Studies, and currently serves as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, ethnic minorities in China, and Chinese nationalism. Recent publications include 'Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas in Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative,' 'Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea,' 'Speaking of China's Future' (co-editor), and 'China's Territorial Disputes' (co-author).

■ Editor: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

■ EAI Commentary is a commentary series designed to provide a platform for experts from various fields to offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institute independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not attributable to EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.