[EAI Commentary] The Drama of Brexit and the European 'Community Spirit'

[Editor's Note]

The European Union and the United Kingdom have agreed to extend the Brexit deadline to October 31, after initially postponing it from March 29 to April 12. While this averts the worst-case scenario of a 'no-deal Brexit,' the future outlook remains uncertain. Interestingly, although Brexit was decided by a UK referendum in 2016, it has been in limbo because it failed to gain parliamentary ratification, not due to divisions within the EU, but within the UK itself. In contrast, the 27-member European Union has maintained a united front with a consistent negotiation strategy, even extending the deadline out of magnanimity in response to the UK's irresponsible stance. Cho Hong-sik, a professor at Soongsil University, analyzes that the contrasting postures of both sides stem from the historical context of the UK's passive and selective engagement with European integration and the 'community spirit' of the European Union, which has been forged over 70 years.

'Halloween Brexit'

At the European Council meeting that began on the evening of April 10 and continued into the early hours of the next day, the EU-27, excluding the UK, decided to extend the Brexit deadline to October 31. This plan, dubbed 'Halloween Brexit,' was a decision to rescue the UK from crisis. Had the European leaders failed to reach an agreement, the UK would have automatically been expelled from Europe on April 12. The 'no-deal Brexit' scenario refers to the situation where a member state instantly becomes a non-member state without an agreement on withdrawal terms or a transition period.

To understand the drama of Brexit, one must grasp the process. First, Brexit is a neologism meaning the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, a decision made by the British public in a referendum on June 23, 2016. At that time, 52% of the public voted to leave, while the remaining 48% supported remaining in the European Union. To implement the public's decision, the UK government began negotiations related to its withdrawal from the European Union in 2017. With the activation of Article 50 of the EU's Lisbon Treaty, a two-year period was set for negotiation, agreement, and ratification.

The referendum only decided the fact that the UK must leave the European Union; the specifics of how to withdraw and what future relationship to establish were to be determined through negotiations between the UK government and the European Union. The UK joined the European Union in 1973, so the process of disentangling nearly half a century of shared life was complex and arduous. After a difficult process, both the European Union and the UK finally reached an agreement on the terms and process of withdrawal in November 2018. Like most major international treaties, this intergovernmental agreement had to undergo a ratification process through the parliaments of both sides.

From the perspective of the two-level game theory, the international negotiations had concluded, and the process had moved to the domestic negotiation stage. While the EU's ratification was expected to proceed smoothly, the UK demonstrated that domestic parliamentary ratification could be more challenging than international negotiations. The original deadline for the UK's ratification was March 29 of this year, after which a no-deal Brexit would take effect. In reality, the UK attempted to ratify the withdrawal agreement twice, on January 15 and March 12, but failed both times due to divisions within the ruling Conservative Party and opposition from the Labour Party. Consequently, Prime Minister Theresa May had no choice but to ask the European Union for an extension. The European Union had already granted an extension to April 12, but the UK again failed to secure a majority for parliamentary ratification, leading to another request for an extension.

The divided stance of the UK Parliament during this process attracted global attention. Notably, the UK Parliament even conducted a vote to survey MPs' preferences on eight different Brexit proposals, but none secured a majority. In simple terms, Parliament was incapable of reaching any agreement to implement the public's mandate to leave Europe. The only proposal that managed to secure a majority in the UK Parliament was not a specific Brexit plan, but a motion to avoid a no-deal Brexit. It was akin to saying, 'We don't know how to live, but let's not commit suicide.'

While one country's parliament displayed such irresponsible behavior by failing to ratify an agreement its own government had made, the 27-member European Union pursued a consistent negotiation strategy, maintained a united front, and showed magnanimity towards the other party's irresponsible attitude by repeatedly extending the deadline. For instance, if even a single country among the 27 had exercised its veto power at the recent summit, insisting that the UK should not be given more time, the UK would have faced a no-deal Brexit on April 12. It is an interesting thought experiment, but if a small nation like Malta or Cyprus had acted obstinately, the UK might have suffered the indignity of an automatic withdrawal. To understand this irony, one must look for the root causes in history.

The UK's Historical Background and Tactical Mistakes

The UK's consistently passive stance towards European integration is a fundamental condition of Brexit. The tradition of the UK charting its own course has deep roots. Since its rise as a global power in the 18th century, Britain developed a sense of pride in its status as an equal to continental Europe. Even when continental Europe began to integrate in the 20th century, Britain remained an observer rather than a participant. The reason Britain did not join European integration in the 1950s and 1960s, only joining belatedly in the 1970s, can be attributed to this fundamental 'distancing'.

Although the UK participated as a member of Europe for nearly half a century since 1973, its internal history has been tumultuous. A referendum on remaining or leaving was already held in 1975, and in the 1980s, Prime Minister Thatcher famously demanded, 'I want my money back' from Europe. When Europe unified its currency with the Euro in 1999, the UK opted out, and it was also an exception to the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees the free movement of citizens. Unlike major powers like France, Germany, and Italy, which have taken a leading role in European integration, the UK has always been at the periphery, making selective integration choices based on careful calculations.

This historical background placed a significant burden on British politics. While joining European integration was beneficial for national interests, the conflict between pro-European and anti-European factions existed within both the Conservative and Labour parties. For example, the direct reason for the downfall of former Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major was the backlash from pro-European factions within their own parties. Although the Third Way governments under Prime Ministers Blair and Brown held a pro-European stance, anti-European elements like Corbyn remained strong within the Labour Party.

In addition to these historical divisions within parties, the tactical mistakes of Prime Ministers Cameron and May exacerbated the situation. In the 2015 general election, Prime Minister Cameron included a referendum on remaining in or leaving the European Union in his manifesto, believing that the Liberal Democrats or Labour Party, likely coalition partners, would oppose it. However, the Conservative Party won a landslide victory, making it imperative to fulfill the referendum pledge. While Cameron could have wisely chosen to cautiously withdraw the risky pledge, he opted for a dangerous gamble. At this point, Cameron and Corbyn from the government and opposition, respectively, formed the 'Remain' camp, while London Mayor Johnson and UKIP leader Farage led the 'Leave' campaign, creating a peculiar spectacle. Contrary to expectations, when the public decided to leave, Cameron irresponsibly resigned as Prime Minister, and Johnson subsequently refused to take the position.

Prime Minister May, who took office, also made a series of mistakes. In 2017, she dissolved a Conservative majority Parliament and called for new elections, resulting in a disastrous outcome. Although the government managed to stay in power with a coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland, it lost its absolute majority in Parliament. In this situation, to proceed smoothly with Brexit, she should have adopted a strategy that considered the opposition Labour Party. Instead, she consistently pursued a 'hard Brexit' strategy aimed at uniting the hardliners within the Conservative Party. Unlike 'soft Brexit,' which aimed to maintain membership in the single market or customs union even after leaving the EU, 'hard Brexit' was a choice that would completely sever the UK from the continent.

As of April 2019, the May government finds itself in a dire situation. Public opinion within the country shows severe signs of division and confrontation, and Parliament is unable to formulate a plan for the future. May's Conservative Party is fragmented into various factions, and the government is repeatedly experiencing the tragedy of ministers not being controlled by the Prime Minister. May had to go to Brussels to beg for more time and was left to console her anxiety with a solitary meal while the 27 heads of state dined and deliberated.

The European Union's 'Community Spirit'

In the days leading up to the recent summit, many media outlets and experts predicted that the European Union would avoid a no-deal Brexit and grant the UK more time. This outcome would have been impossible if even one of the 27 countries insisted on a no-deal scenario, but those familiar with the EU's operational methods were not overly concerned. This is because the European Union has shared the value of 'Community spirit' through nearly 70 years of cooperative history. Community spirit can be observed in various aspects of the Brexit process.

Community spirit signifies basic respect for the other party. When the UK unilaterally announces its intention to leave the Union through a referendum, the offended European side could adopt a retaliatory stance. However, the European Union, while expressing deep regret over Brexit, respected the UK's choice and hoped that even a departing partner would remain in institutions like the single market or customs union. It has even shown a magnanimous attitude, indicating that it would accept the UK's withdrawal application even if it were to be rescinded.

German Chancellor Merkel, a central figure in the European Union, stated that while the UK could leave Europe, Europe would not push the UK towards a no-deal scenario, vowing to prevent a complete breakdown until the end. In response, European Council President Donald Tusk proposed granting the UK an additional year until it resolves its domestic political divisions and properly ratifies the agreement. However, French President Macron opposed this, arguing that only a minimal extension should be granted to pressure the UK Parliament into ratifying the agreement. Macron indicated a willingness to accept a no-deal Brexit, stating that this was necessary to resolve the Brexit issue within the European Union. When opinions diverge like this, the EU's community spirit leads to compromise. As a result, a compromise was reached: not a no-deal, not a full year, but precisely six months.

Thus, community spirit embodies the principle of respecting the other party and avoiding public humiliation. It also entails a shared belief that while differences of opinion may exist, compromises can be reached through gradual concessions. The history of European integration shows that these habits, traditions, and spirit were not formed rapidly but were gradually cultivated through long-term experience.

Where will Brexit go from here? The European Union has granted the UK more time. However, it is also well aware that the agreement reached with the May government has a very low probability of being ratified by the UK Parliament. The May government only began consultations with the Labour Party at the moment of ratification, but the negotiations are stalled due to differences in their positions, and it is uncertain whether a new compromise will be reached between the two parties. Even if Prime Minister May resigns, the successor is likely to hold a position closer to hard Brexit, making it difficult to reach an agreement with the European Union.

Ultimately, the only path available for Europe and the UK appears to be 'kicking the can down the road,' or 'pushing the dust under the carpet' – that is, postponing decisions under various pretexts. Even if new general elections or a referendum are held in the UK, it is difficult to predict their outcome or impact on Brexit. Nearly three years have passed since the referendum, yet the direction of Brexit remains as obscure as ever. ■

■ Author: Cho Hong-sik_ Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Soongsil University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Sciences Po (Paris Institute of Political Studies). His main research areas include international political economy, European regional studies, and the politics of identity. His representative works include 'The Web of Civilizations: A Panorama of European Culture,' 'One Europe: The History and Policies of the European Union,' and 'European Integration and the Future of the 'Nation'.

■ Editor: Choi Soo-ee, Senior Researcher at EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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