[EAI Commentary] Political Interpretation of the 2nd Session of the 13th National People's Congress

[Note from the editor]

The 2nd Session of the 13th National People's Congress, which concluded on March 15th, did not address any particularly significant agenda items. However, unlike last year, Premier Li Keqiang's voice was more prominent compared to President Xi Jinping's, leading to cautious speculation about the potential revival of consensus politics, according to Dr. Yang Gap-yong. The author particularly points to the US-China trade dispute as a background for these changes. As the US-China trade dispute dragged on longer than expected, it placed a burden on President Xi, who responded by emphasizing 'the Party and the people' while 'lowering his profile.' In contrast, in response to these external variables, Premier Li Keqiang emphasized 'marketization' and 'privatization,' raising his own voice. This can be seen as a subtle sign of change in the one-man rule system that emerged with President Xi Jinping's acquisition of 'core status,' the author emphasizes. However, this change does not signify a weakening of President Xi's power; rather, it suggests that existing efforts to consolidate power may shift towards a 'consensus-based' approach due to unforeseen external variables, the author adds.

Introduction to the Discussion

The National People's Congress (NPC) is a crucial state organ of the People's Republic of China, its status and role being defined in the first section of Chapter 3 of the Constitution concerning state organs. According to Article 57 of the Constitution, the NPC is the highest organ of state power in China and a constitutional body that exercises legislative power. This means it is a vital mechanism for transforming the Party's decisions into state decisions. In accordance with Article 61 of the Constitution, the NPC convenes a plenary session once a year. Of course, an extraordinary plenary session can be convened at the request of the NPC Standing Committee or if more than one-fifth of all representatives request it. However, this is a very exceptional case. The 2nd Session of the 13th NPC was also held in accordance with the established practice of convening plenary sessions. However, the implicit meanings contained within it showed a slightly different aspect compared to the nature of previous 2nd Sessions.

Continuation and Change of Practice

Compared to the 1st Session held last year, this year's NPC plenary session did not have any particularly significant agenda items. There was the Premier's <Government Work Report>, a new law on foreign investment was enacted, and the resignation of Zhang Rongshun from the NPC Standing Committee was handled. Article 62 of the Constitution lists 16 powers of the NPC, including amending the Constitution, supervising the enforcement of the Constitution, and enacting basic laws. Among these 16 tasks, the enactment of the law (Foreign Investment Law) and the handling of personnel matters (resignation of Zhang Rongshun) attracted attention at this plenary session. The 2nd Session of the NPC, by its structure, is not a session that can attract attention, a fact clearly demonstrated in this session. If the 3rd Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee had been held in the latter half of last year as per usual practice, presenting a blueprint for the second term of leadership, the nature of the session would have been different, with policy debates unfolding. However, with the 3rd Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee being brought forward and its content altered, specific policy agendas for the five-year term did not come to the fore. Politics in China continues to be based on the <Report> delivered at the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017.

While the Party's political schedule changed, the NPC proceeded with its scheduled agenda. This shows that predictable politics are still at play in China. Last year, there were various debates surrounding the constitutional amendment. This year's NPC plenary session passed relatively quietly. This signifies that the political schedule was smoothly managed. The fact that predictable politics are functioning and the NPC plenary session was held without deviation is sufficiently positive in terms of institutional continuity. It clearly demonstrated an aspect of predictable, institutionalized politics. It may also reflect that the NPC is not a political event significant enough to warrant deviating from its constitutional schedule, even to the extent of rushing matters, to be compared with a Party Congress.

Compared to the 1st Session last year, Premier Li Keqiang's prominence has increased, and President Xi Jinping's activities have noticeably decreased. This is unusual and represents a kind of quiet change. It is markedly different from the critical assessment that last year's NPC plenary session was a meeting by, for, and about President Xi Jinping. China's official media also offered positive evaluations of Premier Li Keqiang's <Government Work Report>. The positive attention given to the <Government Work Report> relatively reduced the focus on President Xi Jinping. Last year, the NPC amended the Constitution to include the so-called 'Xi Jinping Thought' in the preamble. The term limits for the state president were also abolished. However, the term limits for the premier remained unchanged. Consequently, it can be assessed as a meeting to strengthen President Xi Jinping's personal power. At that time, China's major media outlets also focused on propagandizing the justification for the strengthening and concentration of power. However, this session showed relatively more interest in other voices, symbolized by Premier Li Keqiang. This shift in trend will not immediately lead to a relaxation or weakening of President Xi Jinping's personal power concentration. However, it has refocused attention on the possibility of collective power, which was relatively less emphasized, coming into play. This can be considered the new change in this session.

The Party and the People, Marketization and Privatization

The NPC plenary session is a meeting attended by people's representatives at all levels. Formally, it can be seen as a political arena where representatives, embodying the people's representativeness, contend to realize the people's needs and demands. It is a place where two-way communication occurs among key actors. For central leaders, it is an opportunity to respond to the diverse demands from the grassroots with policies. For people's representatives, it is a useful venue to express and convey their demands to the center. During the NPC sessions, central leaders, especially members of the Politburo Standing Committee, attend plenary meetings of various delegations. This is a long-standing practice of listening to grassroots demands and situations and conveying the central message. President Xi Jinping also attended meetings of six delegations, including the Inner Mongolia delegation, during this session. Premier Li Keqiang also attended the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region delegation's plenary meeting, among others. Notably, Premier Li Keqiang actively expressed his views through the <Government Work Report> and a press conference for domestic and foreign media after the closing ceremony. The emphasis of the two top leaders differed slightly during the session. This can be interpreted as one of the characteristics of this session.

During the session, President Xi Jinping emphasized the Party and the people. Premier Li Keqiang emphasized marketization and privatization. The two showed slight differences in their perspectives on responding to the external variable of the US-China trade dispute. Of course, these two are not expressing different voices based on factional political strategies. Nor is there a need to view them as such. Both understand that mutual cooperation maximizes political interests. Therefore, in a situation where external variables are deeply and significantly affecting China's domestic politics, there is no possibility of their discord being expressed externally to China. This is because the Party's and the state's views, perspectives, and positions are expressed through consensus within the Party. Therefore, the two will not act driven by factional interests that involve extreme confrontation. However, they do differ slightly in policy priorities and emphasis. In conclusion, President Xi Jinping is highly interested in overcoming difficulties through a mass line approach, while Premier Li Keqiang appears to be responding to external variables by creating domestic demand and revitalizing the domestic market.

President Xi Jinping expounded his views by attending delegation meetings, and Premier Li Keqiang expressed his views through the <Government Work Report> and the closing press conference. During this session, President Xi Jinping's keywords were the Party and the people. In the meeting with representatives from the cultural and artistic circles and social science circles on March 4th, he urged them to represent 'the people.' In the meeting with the Inner Mongolia delegation on March 5th, he mentioned 'ecological environment.' In the meeting with the Gansu provincial delegation on March 7th, he discussed the 'issue of poverty.' In the meeting with the Henan provincial delegation on March 8th, he emphasized the 'Rural Revitalization Strategy and the Three Rural Issues (Sannong).' In the meeting with the Fujian provincial delegation on March 10th, he mentioned the 'cross-strait' issue and urged that Taiwanese people be treated equally to mainland compatriots. In the meeting with the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police Force delegations on March 12th, he ordered the military to participate in poverty alleviation efforts. He reiterated the mass line approach centered on 'the people.' This can be interpreted as a will to overcome external variables through the unity of the Party and the people. On the other hand, Premier Li Keqiang sought to respond to external variables by promoting domestic market and domestic demand. He advocated for state-owned enterprise reform, expansion of the capital market, and making employment a macro-level strategy. As a method, he emphasized marketization and privatization.

From One-Man Rule Back to Consensus Politics

The second term of Xi Jinping's leadership, which began with the proclamation of the 'New Era,' has encountered the 'reef' of the US-China trade dispute, which intensified in April 2018, and is struggling to find its direction. The US-China conflict, initially expected to be short-lived, has now lasted for over a year, extending beyond the initial year. The 2nd Session of the NPC this year has indeed presented China with deep considerations on how to respond domestically to the external variable known as the US-China conflict. Added to this is the gloomy prospect that this situation may persist for a considerable time. In this process, President Xi Jinping has been forced to rethink his previously advocated concepts of new type of international relations, community of shared future for mankind, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The economic contraction or downward pressure triggered by the trade dispute directly threatens the legitimacy of the Party's rule and casts doubt on the smooth landing of Xi Jinping's regime. President Xi Jinping is responding by lowering his profile. His actions during the 2nd Session of the NPC this year were very cautious. He rarely revealed himself. Instead, Premier Li Keqiang is raising his voice, reviving the possibility of consensus politics.

Looking at the <Government Work Report> and the press conference, Premier Li Keqiang, compared to before, gave more weight to his favored terms such as marketization, privatization, and people's livelihood, rather than the terms emphasized by President Xi Jinping, such as supply-side structural reform and the Chinese Dream. He also revealed his presence by meticulously attending to people's livelihood issues. For example, he declared that employment-first policies would be handled at the macro-policy level, proposed increasing state investment, such as large-scale infrastructure construction, to stimulate the economy, advocated for increasing private investment to create domestic demand and revitalize the domestic market, and announced that urban residents without urban household registration would receive the same benefits as urban residents. This can be called Li Keqiang-style governance, which focuses on people's livelihood as concrete policy rather than as an ideology. Of course, this is partly a result of Premier Li Keqiang's personal convictions, but it is an agenda that can only be expressed with the prerequisite of consensus within the Party. In other words, the various measures to revitalize the domestic market advocated by Premier Li Keqiang are, in fact, the result of consensus within the Party.

In other words, the 2nd Session of the 13th NPC can be assessed as a meeting where the politics of 'core' leadership, previously concentrated on President Xi Jinping, is shifting back towards politics of 'consensus.' This can be seen as a facet of the outcome where external variables significantly impact domestic politics. Of course, this subtle change cannot be interpreted as a weakening of President Xi Jinping's authority as the 'core.' However, it can be reasonably inferred that the series of efforts to strengthen individual power is leading to a revival of consensus politics due to external variables. The NPC, especially the second session, is perceived as bland and lacking in significant events. However, the impact of external variables on domestic politics in this session has led to subtle changes in the actions of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. It is urged that we observe whether this will trigger a political change that leads back from 'core' to 'consensus.'

Conclusion

The 2nd Session of the NPC lacks the tension of the 1st Session. It primarily involves an evaluation of the first year spent according to the plans laid out in the 1st Session, and it mostly follows a ritualistic procedure of highly praising the achievements. The timing of the session and the content it addresses do not undergo significant changes due to the continuity of practice. This session was no different. The practice continued. However, the fact that President Xi Jinping received less attention and Premier Li Keqiang received more attention compared to the 1st Session is a subtle change. While Xi Jinping dominated the 1st Session, Premier Li Keqiang's activities also garnered attention in this session.

President Xi Jinping still revealed his presence by emphasizing the mass line through his 'core' status. The emphasis on 'the Party' and 'the people' confirmed that these remain important and crucial agendas in China. Premier Li Keqiang, unlike in the past, also voiced his distinct perspective on 'marketization' and 'privatization,' attracting attention. This differs slightly from the Xi Jinping-style governance that has consistently strengthened individual dictatorial power through securing 'core' status, constitutional amendments, and the abolition of term limits for leadership. The 2nd Session of the 13th NPC prompts us to seek new interpretations as to whether Chinese politics is shifting from individual rule back to consensus politics under the influence of external variables. ■

■ Author: Yang Gap-yong_ Senior Researcher, Department of Foreign Strategy, Institute for National Security Strategy. Obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University. His main research areas include the durability of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, cadre and elite politics, and the internal dynamics and mechanisms of rule.