[EAI Commentary] Political Interpretations of the Second Session of the 13th National People's Congress

[Editor's Note]

The Second Session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC), which concluded on March 15, did not address any particularly significant agenda items. However, Dr. Yang Gap-yong analyzes that a cautious optimism regarding the potential revival of consensus politics is emerging, noting a notable increase in Premier Li Keqiang's prominence compared to President Xi Jinping, a departure from the previous year. The author points to the US-China trade dispute as a background for this shift. The prolonged trade conflict has placed a burden on President Xi, prompting him to respond by emphasizing 'the Party and the people' while adopting a more reserved personal stance. Conversely, in response to these external factors, Premier Li Keqiang has amplified his voice by advocating for 'marketization' and 'privatization.' This development can be seen as a subtle indication of change within the one-man rule system that was highlighted by President Xi's attainment of 'core leader' status. The author emphasizes that this shift does not signify a weakening of President Xi's power but rather suggests a potential transition towards a consensus-based approach in response to unforeseen external variables.

Introduction

The National People's Congress (NPC) is a crucial state organ of the People's Republic of China, as stipulated in Chapter III, Section 1 of the Constitution concerning state organs. According to Article 57 of the Constitution, the NPC is the highest organ of state power and a constitutional body that exercises the state's legislative power. This signifies its critical role in transforming Party decisions into state decisions. In accordance with Article 61 of the Constitution, the NPC convenes its plenary session once a year. Extraordinary plenary sessions may be convened upon the request of the NPC Standing Committee or if more than one-fifth of all representatives call for a session. However, these are exceptional circumstances. The Second Session of the 13th NPC was convened in line with the established practice of annual plenary sessions. Nevertheless, the implicit meanings contained within this session presented a slightly different character compared to previous second sessions.

Continuity and Change in Practice

Compared to the first session held last year, the current NPC plenary session did not address any particularly significant agenda items. It included the Premier's 'Government Work Report,' the enactment of the new Foreign Investment Law, and the resignation of Zhang Rongshun from his position as a member of the NPC Standing Committee. Article 62 of the Constitution outlines sixteen duties and powers of the NPC, including constitutional amendments, supervision of the enforcement of the Constitution, and the enactment of basic laws. Among these sixteen tasks, the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law and personnel matters (the resignation of Zhang Rongshun) garnered attention during this plenary session. The Second Session of the NPC, by its structure, is not typically a forum for significant attention, a fact well-demonstrated by this year's meeting. Had the Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee been held in the latter half of last year as per convention, presenting a blueprint for the second term of leadership, the session's character might have differed, potentially involving policy debates. However, with the Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee being advanced and its content altered, specific policy agendas for the five-year term did not come to the forefront. Politics in China continues to be based on the 'Report' delivered at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017.

While the Party's political schedule underwent changes, the NPC proceeded with its scheduled agenda. This demonstrates that predictable politics still operates in China. Last year saw various debates surrounding constitutional amendments. This year's NPC plenary session passed relatively quietly, signifying the smooth execution of the political schedule. The operation of predictable politics and the undisturbed convening of the NPC plenary session are fully commendable from the perspective of institutional continuity. It effectively showcased an aspect of predictable, institutionalized politics. It might also reflect the fact that the NPC is not a political event of such significance as to warrant altering its constitutional schedule, even to the extent of a Party Congress.

In comparison to the first session last year, Premier Li Keqiang's prominence has increased, while President Xi Jinping's activities have noticeably decreased. This is an unusual and subtle change. It stands in stark contrast to the critical assessment of last year's NPC plenary session as a meeting 'by Xi Jinping, for Xi Jinping.' Even official Chinese media have offered positive evaluations of Premier Li Keqiang's 'Government Work Report.' The positive attention directed at the 'Government Work Report' has relatively reduced the focus on President Xi Jinping. Last year, the NPC amended the Constitution to include the so-called 'Xi Jinping Thought' in its preamble and abolished the term limits for the state president. However, the term limits for the premier remained unchanged. Consequently, last year's session can be assessed as one aimed at strengthening President Xi Jinping's personal power. At that time, major Chinese media outlets concentrated on propagandizing the justification for the concentration of power. This year, however, there was comparatively more attention given to alternative voices, symbolized by Premier Li Keqiang. While this shift in focus will not immediately lead to a relaxation or weakening of President Xi Jinping's concentrated personal power, it has refocused attention on the possibility of collective power, which had been relatively less emphasized. This can be considered the new change of this session.

The Party and the People, Marketization and Privatization

The NPC plenary session involves representatives from various levels. Formally, it can be seen as a political arena where representatives of the people compete to advance the needs and demands of the populace. It is a venue for interactive communication among key actors. For central leaders, it is an opportunity to respond to diverse grassroots demands with policies. For the people's representatives, it is a valuable platform to express and convey their demands to the central government. During the NPC sessions, central leaders, particularly members of the Politburo Standing Committee, attend plenary meetings of various delegations. This is a long-standing practice of listening to grassroots demands and situations and conveying the central government's messages. President Xi Jinping also attended meetings of six delegations, including the Inner Mongolia delegation, during this session. Premier Li Keqiang attended the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region delegation's plenary meeting, among others. Notably, Premier Li Keqiang actively articulated his views through the 'Government Work Report' and a press conference for domestic and foreign media following the closing ceremony. The emphasis of the two top leaders differed slightly during the session. This can be interpreted as one of the characteristics of this session.

During the session, President Xi Jinping emphasized the Party and the people, while Premier Li Keqiang stressed marketization and privatization. They showed slight differences in their perspectives on responding to the external variable of the US-China trade conflict. It is not, nor should it be interpreted as, that these two leaders are expressing different views due to factional political strategies. Both understand that mutual cooperation maximizes political benefits. Therefore, given the profound and significant impact of external variables on China's domestic politics, there is no possibility of these two leaders' discordant views being expressed externally. The Party's consensus ensures that the Party and the state's views, perspectives, and positions are articulated. Thus, the two leaders will not act based on factional interests leading to extreme confrontation. However, they do differ slightly in policy priorities and emphasis. In conclusion, President Xi Jinping appears highly interested in overcoming difficulties through a mass line approach, while Premier Li Keqiang seems inclined to respond to external variables by stimulating domestic demand and revitalizing the domestic market.

President Xi Jinping expounded his views at delegation meetings, while Premier Li Keqiang presented his through the 'Government Work Report' and the closing press conference. President Xi Jinping's keywords during this session were the Party and the people. In a meeting with representatives from the cultural and artistic sectors and the social sciences on March 4, he urged them to represent 'the people.' At the Inner Mongolia delegation meeting on March 5, he discussed 'ecological environment.' On March 7, at the Gansu Province delegation meeting, he addressed the 'issue of poverty.' On March 8, at the Henan Province delegation meeting, he emphasized the 'Rural Revitalization Strategy and the Three Rural Issues (Sannong).' On March 10, at the Fujian Province delegation meeting, he mentioned the 'cross-strait' issue and called for treating Taiwanese people equally to mainland compatriots. On March 12, at the meeting with representatives from the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police Force, he ordered the military to participate in poverty alleviation efforts. He reiterated a mass-line approach centered on 'the people,' which can be interpreted as a will to overcome external influences through the solidarity of the Party and the people. In contrast, Premier Li Keqiang sought to counter external variables by boosting the domestic market and domestic demand. He advocated for state-owned enterprise reform, expansion of the capital market, and the macro-strategic approach to employment. As a means to achieve this, he emphasized marketization and privatization.

From One-Man Rule Back to Consensus Politics

The second term of Xi Jinping's leadership, launched under the banner of the 'New Era,' has encountered the obstacle of the US-China trade conflict, which escalated in April 2018, causing it to lose direction. The conflict, initially expected to be short-lived, has now dragged on for over a year. The Second Session of the NPC presented China with profound considerations on how to respond domestically to the external variable known as the US-China conflict. This is compounded by the grim outlook that this situation is likely to persist for a considerable period. In this process, President Xi Jinping has been compelled to re-evaluate his initiatives such as the new type of international relations, the community of shared future for mankind, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The economic slowdown or downward pressure triggered by the trade conflict threatens the Party's legitimacy and casts doubt on the smooth landing of the Xi Jinping administration. President Xi Jinping is responding by adopting a low profile. His actions during the Second Session of the NPC were notably cautious, avoiding self-exposure. In contrast, Premier Li Keqiang has raised his voice, thereby reviving the possibility of consensus politics.

Judging from the 'Government Work Report' and the press conference, Premier Li Keqiang, compared to the past, gave more prominence to his favored terms such as marketization, privatization, and people's livelihood, rather than the keywords emphasized by President Xi Jinping, such as supply-side structural reform and the Chinese Dream. He meticulously addressed people's livelihood issues, thereby asserting his presence. For instance, he declared that employment would be treated as a macro-policy priority, advocated for increased national investment, including large-scale infrastructure construction, to stimulate the economy, and proposed boosting private investment to foster domestic demand and revitalize the domestic market. He also announced that urban residents without urban household registration would receive benefits equivalent to those of urban residents. This can be characterized as Li Keqiang-style governance, focusing on people's livelihood as concrete policy rather than an ideology. While this is partly a result of Premier Li Keqiang's personal convictions, it is an agenda that could only be expressed with the prerequisite of intra-Party consensus. In other words, the various measures for domestic market revitalization advocated by Premier Li Keqiang are, in fact, the result of intra-Party consensus.

In other words, the Second Session of the 13th NPC can be assessed as a meeting where the politics of 'consensus,' which had previously been overshadowed by the concentration of power around President Xi Jinping, is shifting back. This can be seen as a facet of the impact of external variables significantly influencing domestic politics. Of course, this subtle change cannot be interpreted as a weakening of President Xi Jinping's authority as the 'core' leader. However, it can be reasonably inferred that the series of efforts to strengthen individual power is leading to a revival of consensus politics due to external variables. The NPC, particularly its second session, is generally perceived as a rather uneventful meeting with little of note. However, the influence of external variables on domestic politics during this session has led to subtle shifts in the actions of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. We are urged to observe whether this will trigger a political change, a return from 'core' leadership to 'consensus.'

Conclusion

The Second Session of the NPC lacks the tension of the first session. It primarily involves an evaluation of the first year's performance according to the plans laid out in the first session, and generally follows a ritualistic procedure of highly praising the achievements. The timing of the meeting and the content discussed do not typically undergo significant changes due to the continuity of practice. This session was no different. The practice continued. However, the subtle change lies in President Xi Jinping receiving less attention compared to the first session, while Premier Li Keqiang garnered more. While Xi Jinping dominated the first session, Premier Li Keqiang's activities also drew attention this time.

President Xi Jinping still asserted his presence by emphasizing the mass line through his 'core' status. The emphasis on 'the Party' and 'the people' confirmed that these remain crucial and pivotal agendas in China. Premier Li Keqiang, unlike in the past, also voiced his distinct perspective on 'marketization' and 'privatization,' drawing attention. This differs somewhat from Xi Jinping's governance style, which has consistently strengthened individual power through securing 'core' status, constitutional amendments, and the abolition of term limits for leadership. The Second Session of the 13th NPC compels us to seek new interpretations regarding whether Chinese politics, influenced by external variables, is shifting from individual rule back to consensus politics. ■

■ Author: Yang Gap-yong_ Senior Researcher, Department of External Strategy, Institute for National Security Strategy. Dr. Yang holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International and Public Affairs, Fudan University. His primary research areas include the internal durability of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, cadre and elite politics, and the internal dynamics and mechanisms of rule.