EAI Commentary: Reflecting on Korea-Japan Relations on the 100th Anniversary of the March 1st Movement: From Resistance to Construction

[Editor's Note]

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the March 1st Movement. A century has passed since independence was declared, yet Korea-Japan relations remain trapped in the past. The result is a deepening distrust between the two nations, stemming from Korea's resistance nationalism during the Japanese colonial period and Japan's imperialistic sense of superiority. The problem is that this distrust is not merely a matter of 'public opinion' but is also translating into policy. This is likely to become an obstacle not only for both countries but also for regional development. Therefore, Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute (EAI), argues that cooperation between Korea and Japan is necessary for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and, more broadly, for establishing a new regional order, and that various efforts to restore trust between the two nations must precede this. On March 1, 1919, our ancestors stated in the Declaration of Independence, "We are too busy whipping ourselves to have time to resent others. What we must do now is to set ourselves right, not to destroy others." Recalling the wisdom of our ancestors, President Son emphasizes that it is time for us to focus on self-development with an eye toward the next 100 years.

In his congratulatory speech for the 100th anniversary of the March 1st Movement, President Moon Jae-in stated, "The elimination of pro-Japanese collaborators' remnants and diplomacy should also be conducted in a future-oriented manner," and "We will strengthen cooperation with Japan for peace on the Korean Peninsula."

The Moon Jae-in administration, which seeks to establish a 'New Korean Peninsula Regime,' faces considerable burden from the conflict-ridden Korea-Japan relationship. The current bilateral relationship is arguably at its worst since the normalization of diplomatic ties. Over the past several years, through controversies surrounding the compliance with the comfort women agreement, the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, and disputes over the alleged targeting of a Japanese patrol aircraft's fire-control radar in the East Sea, the two countries have fallen into a crisis of trust. As mutual distrust deepens, a state of equilibrium has been reached where the strategic importance of the other country is downgraded in terms of foreign policy strategy, and cooperation is hesitant. To break through the current difficult situation and move towards future-oriented cooperation, it is necessary to re-examine the declaration of independence from 100 years ago. It is quite progressive and constructive for a declaration of resolve, resistance, and struggle for independence.

We shall not be content with blaming Japan for its faithlessness. We shall not be content with reproaching Japan for its lack of righteousness.

We, who are too busy spurring ourselves on, have no leisure to resent others.

We, who are too busy mending the present, have no leisure to dwell on past grievances.

There is only self-construction, and absolutely no destruction of others.

We shall only pioneer our new destiny, and shall never envy or expel others out of temporary emotions or old grudges.

The legacy of the 33 national representatives is to control long-standing resentment and deep-seated emotions toward Japan, to prevent the nation's interests from being undermined by envy and exclusion, and to manage Japan so that it does not become an obstacle to peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. The declaration from 100 years ago appears to remain valid at the present time, when we must design the next 100 years.

New Normal: A Japan-Korea Relationship of Identity Conflict

The incident symbolizing the current state of Japan-Korea relations is President Moon Jae-in's criticism at his New Year's press conference in January that Japanese leaders were politicizing the bilateral relationship and creating controversy. This, in turn, implies that an atmosphere has formed in Japan where criticism of Korea can lead to political support. This is the exact opposite of the situation in the past, when Japan criticized Korean leaders for politically exploiting public anti-Japanese sentiment.

According to the survey results (<Figure 1>) from EAI and Japan's Genron NPO, which have conducted public opinion polls in both countries for the past seven years, South Korea's favorability rating towards Japan has steadily increased from 12.2% in 2013 to 28.3% in 2018, while Japan's favorability rating towards South Korea has declined from 31.1% to 22.9%. Since 2017, a reversal in favorability ratings between the two countries has occurred, a situation unprecedented since the normalization of diplomatic relations.

<Figure 1> Impressions of the Other Country (2013-2018)

Source: East Asia Institute - Genron NPO Joint Public Opinion Survey (2018)

While Japan, as the former colonial power, once showed both a sense of debt and, conversely, indifference and disregard towards Korea, its subordinate, it is now questioning Korea's identity based on fatigue from Korea's strong resistance. The perception that Korea is a country that does not share values with Japan, does not keep international promises, and is untrustworthy is spreading throughout society. This is why hardline arguments against South Korea from Japan's leadership are gaining public support. The fact that Japan's worsening public opinion is not a rejection of policy but a questioning of identity is a structural phenomenon that cannot but cause concern.

Structural factors, accelerating since the 2010s, are at play in the shift of Japan-Korea relations to a new normal. The backlash against neoliberal globalization, which spread following the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, has brought anti-globalization and anti-liberal tendencies to the fore. The widening income inequality resulting from globalization and the financial crisis has weakened social cohesion and led to political polarization, resulting in frequent political paralysis and the rampant spread of populist politics. Populism is spreading beyond advanced industrial nations, as seen in Brexit in the UK and the rise of the Trump administration in the US, to South America and East Asia. In particular, advanced industrial nations are increasingly emphasizing their own cultural identities and pursuing foreign policies with nationalist undertones, based on a sense of crisis that their countries are relatively declining and their lives are under threat. The political efforts to establish national identity in our vicinity are being re-enacted as 'Japan is Back' and 'Make America Great Again'.

Japan's Abe administration has repeatedly engaged in regressive identity politics through its right-wing agenda, leading to various conflicts with South Korea since the Park Geun-hye administration. Japan's leadership skillfully framed Korea's reactions using concepts like 'goalpost theory' to spread the 'apology fatigue theory' among its public. It projected onto the sentiments of Japanese people who hold a sense of superiority over Korea the impression that 'Korea is ignoring Japan' and 'Korea is hindering Japan's prosperity,' thereby eliciting public sentiment that 'Korea cannot be trusted' and 'we should distance ourselves from Korea.'

Improving Relations Amidst Unfavorable Circumstances

The policy of 'distancing' from South Korea, or 'Korea Passing,' is also evident in policy. On January 28, in his 2019 foreign policy address to the Diet, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono outlined the goals of Japanese diplomacy: first, strengthening the Japan-US alliance and enhancing deterrence; second, strengthening the network of friendly countries, specifically by reinforcing solidarity with countries sharing fundamental values (freedom, democracy, rule of law, basic human rights, respect for international law, etc.) and strategic interests, such as India, Australia, and the EU; third, strengthening relations with neighboring countries (Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea); and fourth, promoting the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Compared to the speech in January 2013 when the Abe cabinet was inaugurated, South Korea's strategic value has been downgraded from the second category (friendly countries) to the third category, alongside neighboring countries like Russia and China.

Japan's policy of 'distancing' is difficult to reverse easily because it is related to South Korea's perception of its identity. On the other hand, our situation is not so comfortable as to allow this to continue unchecked. Discord with Japan during the process of denuclearization negotiations with North Korea, the most pressing diplomatic task, and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, will burden both South Korea and the United States.

In the region, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy actively pursued by Japan is gaining the support of the US, Australia, and India, with movements by the UK and France to join. Furthermore, Japan played a central role in concluding the TPP, which was facing a crisis of shipwreck after the US withdrawal, as TPP-11 or CPTPP, thereby demonstrating its international leadership. The Japanese government, greatly encouraged, has expressed confidence that it has transformed from a recipient to a maker of international rules, norms, and order.

While we were dedicating all our efforts to overcoming the domestic crisis of impeachment and to laying the groundwork for peace amidst the threat of war, Japan's international standing has grown immeasurably. In the future, the importance of diplomacy with Japan will increase accordingly in the process of seeking new regional security and economic orders. The reports in some of our media outlets claiming that Japan is being isolated in the North Korean nuclear negotiations and is surrounded by neighboring countries are, in fact, a self-serving interpretation of the situation.

The immediate task for South Korean diplomacy is to improve relations with a distrustful counterpart under unfavorable circumstances and to pursue future-oriented cooperation. However, it will not be easy for the two countries, caught in a crisis of trust, to recover from the worst situation. Regarding thorny issues such as the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor and subsequent lawsuits and judgments, a strategy is needed that involves taking time to make efforts towards rebuilding trust, focusing on 'self-encouragement' and 'present-day preparedness' rather than 'blaming' Japan for its 'lack of trust' and 'lack of righteousness.'

Efforts to Bridge the Perception Gap

South Korea should engage in strategic dialogues through various channels between the two countries as a form of trust-building measure. The new normal does not reflect structural differences, so a multi-layered dialogue platform should be established to confirm intentions, resolve misunderstandings, and broaden the scope for cooperation through dialogue. Since the launch of the current government, the core pipeline between the two countries appears to be inactive, and dialogues at the level of government ministries, the National Assembly, academia, and civil society have also shrunk. In the future, rather than aiming for agreement/resolution through multi-layered strategic dialogues, South Korea should focus on confirming geopolitical and economic positions surrounding the Asia-Pacific and Korean Peninsula situations, sharing mutual differences, and communicating.

The topics of strategic dialogue should focus on discussions regarding the convergence of interests between the two countries. Under the recognition that the current new normal does not reflect a structural decoupling of interests between the two countries, South Korea needs to objectively and accurately understand Japan's security interests, define common interests, and then engage in sincere dialogue to confirm convergence in the broader framework and differences on specific issues.

While interests converge between the two countries on the goal of North Korean denuclearization, it is also true that there has been a lack of communication and dialogue regarding strategies. Considering that Japan is an important stakeholder in the process of North Korean denuclearization, the South Korean government should make efforts to narrow the differences in perception between the two countries regarding denuclearization strategies.

In-depth discussions are also needed on the extent to which security interests are shared between the two countries regarding the rise of China. As the US government fully embraces the Indo-Pacific cooperation concept actively promoted by Japan and concretizes security cooperation with India, Australia, and the UK, US-Japan regional cooperation is becoming increasingly close. Although South Korea has already presented a cautious stance on its regional strategy for the Indo-Pacific, it needs to quickly finalize its position on this emerging concept and, based on that, pursue substantive dialogue with Japan.

Similarly, South Korea needs to finalize its position on the CPTPP, which is emerging in the context of building the Asia-Pacific trade order. The CPTPP, even without the US, is a mechanism that faithfully reflects US strategic interests and serves as an effective safeguard for Asian countries against the US's unilateral and bilateral approaches. While South Korea agrees on the necessity of bilateral cooperation to defend liberal, rule-based order in the international community, it maintains a reserved stance on joining the CPTPP, with the key factor being bilateral negotiations with Japan. Without communication and dialogue to reduce commercial and geo-economic interests between the two countries, South Korea risks being marginalized in the process of building the regional order.

Finally, both countries can pursue dialogue to establish a common model that other Asian countries can refer to, proactively responding to future crises of democracy as thought leaders who have first experienced and resolved various challenges that could undermine democracy, such as demographic changes, increasing inequality, and rising welfare demands.

Actively Pursuing Public Diplomacy Towards Japan

The core of the current new normal in Japan-Korea relations is the deepening anti-Korean sentiment and distrust in Japan, so public diplomacy should focus on alleviating these issues. Past public diplomacy towards Japan, particularly during the Park Geun-hye administration, was heavily inclined towards a strategy of spreading anti-Japanese public opinion among third-country nationals, primarily in the US, within the framework of confrontation with Japan over the comfort women issue, leading to a war of attrition between the two countries. Recently, Japan has resumed public diplomacy targeting Washington to foster critical public opinion towards South Korea. If South Korea retaliates, it would be repeating the folly of the Park Geun-hye administration.

Public diplomacy must now shift to systematic efforts to foster favorable public opinion among the Japanese people, and differentiated strategies for each generation are needed. For example, for the younger generation in Japan, who generally have a more positive impression of South Korea, opportunities for cultural and visit exchanges should be actively provided to enhance their understanding of Korea, and efforts should be made to improve perceptions of Korea centered around them. Meanwhile, for the middle-aged and elderly generations, who already possess considerable accumulated knowledge and information about Korea, the focus can be placed on knowledge diplomacy and policy diplomacy to correct their prejudices.

Ultimately, We Must Resolve to Build Ourselves Up

For these trust-building measures to be effective, efforts to overcome our own exclusive and resistant nationalism must proceed concurrently. South Korea still talks about eradicating Japanese colonial remnants and cannot alleviate anti-Japanese sentiment in its pursuit of national independence, permanence, and homogeneity. Japan, too, cannot shake off the deep-seated feelings of superiority and disregard towards Korea formed during the imperialist era.

The March 1st Movement's legacy from 100 years ago calls not for resentment towards Japan or for emotionally rejecting it based on fault-finding, but for self-discipline, correction, and construction. When South Korea achieves critical discussion and social consensus for overcoming 100 years of anti-Japanese and resistant nationalism, and based on this, approaches the construction of a nation fitting 21st-century standards, Japan will set aside its faded sense of superiority and join the path of joint evolution between Korea and Japan, leading 21st-century peace in the East and world peace, and human happiness. ■

■ Author: Son Yeol_ President of EAI and Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, Dean of Underwood International College, and President of the Association for Japanese Studies in Korea, and currently serves as President of the Korean Political Science Association. His main research areas include international political economy, Japanese foreign policy, and East Asian international relations. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2018, with T.J. Pempel), Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy(2017, co-edited with Kim Sang-bae and Lee Seung-ju), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen).

■ Responsible Editor: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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