[EAI Commentary No. 22] Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project and Russia-North Korea and South Korea-Russia Summits

Professor Shin Beom-sik received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

On August 24, 2011, a summit between Russia and North Korea was held for the first time in nine years since the meeting between then-Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chairman Kim Jong-il in Vladivostok in 2002. Following this, there are assessments that the possibility of changes in the Korean Peninsula situation has increased. While some view the recent Russia-North Korea summit as merely Kim Jong-il's begging diplomacy, this perspective overlooks the significance embedded in Russia's active engagement. Examining the agreement details and strategic implications of the summit between the two leaders, it is judged that this meeting holds the potential to be a crucial catalyst for future changes in the geopolitical landscape surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline project, depending on its success, could significantly influence the transformation of Northeast Asian regional politics. The direction of this project is expected to become clearer at the South Korea-Russia summit anticipated in early November. How can South Korea, in preparation for the upcoming South Korea-Russia summit, capture and leverage the potential for changes in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian situation?

Russia-North Korea Summit and Bilateral Relations

To understand the agreements of the Russia-North Korea summit, it is necessary to comprehend the background against which this meeting was pursued.

Firstly, from Russia's perspective, this summit can be interpreted as a signal that Russia's strategy to strengthen its position in Asia and enhance its influence, in line with its identity as a "Euro-Pacific State," is being actively pursued. Historically, such Russian efforts have been constrained by various factors, including economic weakness, flawed foreign policy orientation, loss of channels for Russian influence in Asia, the North Korean nuclear issue and US-North Korea confrontation, Russia's opportunistic diplomacy in Northeast Asia, and US containment of Russia's attempts to re-establish its position as a strategic actor in Asia. However, with the increasing possibility of exerting influence through energy resources, Russia has recently shown a tendency to strengthen its practical influence on the Korean Peninsula issue, even at a certain cost. Russia has recently initiated various forms of aid, such as providing 50,000 tons of food in response to North Korea's flood damage and considering further aid of 50,000 tons, and is revitalizing various cooperation agendas. This suggests that Russia is attempting to elevate its relationship with North Korea to a level of strategic cooperation as a key channel for strengthening its position in Northeast Asia. Russia has not forgotten the diplomatic defeat of being excluded from the Four-Party Talks process during the first North Korean nuclear crisis and is seeking to rekindle the embers of strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea, which have not been recovered since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in order to secure a channel for influence on the Korean Peninsula issue, which is central to Northeast Asian affairs.

In this context, the recent reactivation of the Russia-North Korea Economic Cooperation Committee and the resumption of discussions on the debt issue, the largest hurdle to economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea, are reminiscent of the discussions between Russia and North Korea in 2006-2007, when the North Korean nuclear crisis seemed to be heading towards a resolution. Russia's opportunistic approach, which sought to maximize its economic interests through railway and energy cooperation on the Korean Peninsula after playing a decisive role in resolving the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue, was rendered futile by the breakdown of the North Korean nuclear negotiations. However, the fact that the Economic Cooperation Committee, suspended since 2007, has been reactivated amidst the current tense and confrontational situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, and that discussions to resolve the debt issue have begun, suggests that Russia is willing to bear certain costs. In reality, North Korea's debt to Russia, estimated to be around $10 billion, is not a significant sum for Russia. However, resolving this debt is a prerequisite for full-fledged economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea, making its resolution a matter of strategic choice for Russia. In other words, resolving this issue signals Russia's intention to restore a strategic cooperative relationship with North Korea. The recent Russia-North Korea summit has increased the likelihood of this.

This Russian move aligns well with North Korea's needs. Since the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration, North Korea has experienced a decrease in hard currency income, which it had secured through Mount Kumgang and Kaesong Industrial Complex, and has faced difficulties in dialogue with the United States. Amidst the heightened tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula following the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, North Korea has become more dependent on China than ever before, both economically and in terms of security. However, with the approach of 2012, the year of "Great Power" as declared by North Korea, alleviating its excessive dependence on China is a critical issue for the self-reliant nation of North Korea. Therefore, many North Korea experts interpret North Korea's approach to Russia from the perspective of "balance of dependence," as North Korea seeks to mitigate its excessive reliance on China.

Observing Kim Jong-il's travel route and itinerary during his visit to Russia, as reported by the media, it is noteworthy that, unlike his previous behavior of touring China's economic reform achievements to hint at or promote North Korea's future reform orientation, he visited the Bureya hydroelectric power station, which could help solve North Korea's urgent electricity problem, and the "East Siberia-Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline" (ESPO) branch point in Skovorodino. It is also reported that during his return journey through Northeast China, Chairman Kim visited the Daqing oilfield area, where an oil pipeline connects Russia and China. This highlights North Korea's thirst for energy and electricity.

Indeed, an analysis of media reports on the agreements between Russia and North Korea announced by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and their subsequent outcomes lends considerable validity to the analysis that the needs of both countries are aligning. Russia's objective in highlighting the summit to the global media was not to strengthen its relationship with North Korea. It prominently featured North Korea's agreement to the construction of a gas pipeline passing through North Korea to South Korea. The agreement to establish a "Russia-North Korea-South Korea Trilateral Special Committee" for the gas pipeline construction was also announced. What is the reason for Russia's active pursuit of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline connection project?

First, it is driven by Russia's need to develop new natural gas markets. Russia has high expectations for natural gas sales. As China imports natural gas from Central Asia via pipelines and US demand for Russian natural gas decreases due to domestic shale gas development, Russia is focusing on Japan and South Korea as new natural gas markets.

However, considering the nature of energy as a "strategic commodity," it is difficult to assume that Russia is solely pursuing economic benefits through natural gas sales. Energy foreign policy decisions are made considering not only economic logic but also geopolitical and security logic. Russia's position as a gas exporter to Europe holds significant meaning for Europe's energy security. The pipeline network, which supplies Russian oil and gas and extends to every corner of Europe, is the core channel of Russian influence over Europe. Russia's substantial investment in building energy supply pipelines to Asia can be understood in the same context. The construction of the "East Siberia-Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline" (ESPO) and the "Eastern Gas Program" directed towards Asia will become important channels of Russian influence over Asian countries. While Russia is building crucial energy transport networks towards Asia, it is simultaneously pursuing pipeline connections with neighboring countries. The connection of the ESPO line, which reached Skovorodino in 2009, to Daqing, China, for the supply of Russian oil, has already drawn attention to the conclusion of an energy alliance between China and Russia.

Russia has now embarked on a determined course to solidify its channel of influence over the Korean Peninsula through the connection of a gas pipeline. Based on the strengthened influence derived from the gas pipeline connection, Russia can more actively play a mediating role in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue and enhance its standing in Northeast Asian regional politics. This is a project worth the cost for Russia.

There is another interest for Russia to consider in this regard. This gas pipeline project lays the groundwork for Russia to pursue other projects that strengthen its network with Asia, such as future electric power grid connections and railway connections. The pursuit of these projects, in turn, will facilitate the expansion of human and material resources crucial for the development of Russia's Far East and Siberian regions. On October 13, Russia completed the renovation of the railway from Hassan, Russia, to Rajin, North Korea, at its own expense and held a large-scale ceremony to mark the operation of a test train. If the inter-Korean railways are fully operational, it will enable the transport of 200,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) annually. This process will naturally integrate Russia's Far East and Eastern Siberia into the Northeast Asian economic sphere, not only resolving internal regional development imbalances but also, externally, refreshing Russia's image as an Asia-Pacific nation, thereby strengthening its identity as a "Euro-Pacific State" and securing its status as a genuine global power.

For North Korea, restoring the strategic cooperation link with Russia is not unfavorable. During the recent contact between Russia and North Korea, North Korea requested the provision of military equipment such as new fighter jets and explored the possibility of military cooperation. While providing strategic weapons that could alter the strategic balance in Northeast Asia and fuel an arms race would be burdensome for Russia, it appears that North Korea's military delegation discussed military cooperation during Kim Jong-il's visit to Russia, and media reports announced that the two countries would soon conduct joint military exercises. Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is expected to contribute, above all, to alleviating North Korea's security anxieties. From Russia's perspective, this appears to be a response to North Korea's balancing diplomacy, aimed at countering the growing Chinese influence in the region, particularly after China's naval vessels began appearing in Rajin Port following Russia's lease of the port.

Ultimately, the Russia-North Korea summit represented a convergence point where North Korea's need to diversify its excessive dependence on China and secure economic support through practical cooperation met Russia's policy to practically restore the Russia-North Korea relationship, a lost channel of influence, and strengthen Russia's position on the Korean Peninsula.

Russia's Expanding Role and the Korean Peninsula Issue

If strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea is restored, what impact will it have on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia? Several perspectives appear to be in conflict regarding this matter.

First, there is the prospect that the restoration of strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea will intensify the confrontational dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula. This is because North Korea's balancing diplomacy strategy, through Russia, can counter not only China but also South Korea, the United States, and Japan, which are demanding preconditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. If North Korea pursues a balancing diplomacy strategy and Russia supports North Korea's position for the sake of developing its Far East and expanding its influence in Northeast Asia, it could negatively impact the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

However, judging by the summit's outcomes, Russia does not appear to be abandoning its role as a "mediator" that it has maintained amidst the confrontational dynamics between the US-South Korea-Japan bloc and the North Korea-China bloc. While Russia has consistently advocated for the "early resumption of Six-Party Talks without preconditions," in line with North Korea and China, it has also shown a ambiguous stance, siding with the US-South Korea-Japan position and urging North Korea to take "denuclearization preconditions." The outcomes of the Russia-North Korea summit also reveal Russia's efforts to attempt such a compromise. The Kremlin spokesperson stated that "North Korea expressed its readiness to return to the Six-Party Talks without any preconditions," adding that "then, within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea could be prepared to implement a moratorium on the production of nuclear materials and nuclear tests." On the surface, it appears that Russia has supported the resumption of the Six-Party Talks without preconditions, as advocated by North Korea and China. However, North Korea's statement about being prepared to implement a moratorium on nuclear material testing, albeit with the precondition of the talks being held, seems to reflect Russia's efforts to encourage North Korea to express its willingness for denuclearization. This indicates that Russia maintains a compromising position, simultaneously supporting the positions of China and North Korea by emphasizing "early resumption of dialogue" and the "principle of resolving the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue," while not abandoning the goal of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Therefore, the prospect that the strengthening of strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea will intensify the confrontational nature of the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula does not appear to hold significant validity.

Secondly, a similar but distinct perspective suggests that Russia, which has maintained a stance of strategic ambiguity or opportunistic equidistant diplomacy, will now side with North Korea, joining the North Korea-China bloc, and that the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula will evolve into a confrontation between a new Northern Triangle (Russia-North Korea-China) and a new Southern Triangle (US-South Korea-Japan).

However, the prospect of a confrontation between the Southern Triangle and the Northern Triangle appears even less plausible. China would likely be the most uncomfortable nation with the recent Russia-North Korea summit. This discomfort would likely exceed what Russia felt when China leased the port of Rajin for a long term. The sea route between the East Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk is primarily used by North Korean, Russian, and Japanese vessels. Chinese vessels have no reason to traverse this route. Yet, China has long-term leased the port of Rajin as a hinterland port for its Northeast provinces, which could serve as a base for China to check Russian southward advance in the event of a North Korean contingency. The docking of Chinese warships in Rajin Port last spring demonstrated the possibility of Chinese warships navigating from off the coast of Busan and through the East Sea to the Russia-North Korea border, under the pretext of protecting its merchant ships and ports. In this context, it can be inferred that Russia, through the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline project discussed at the recent summit, sought to establish a basis for countering China's maritime geopolitical advantage with a land-based blockade.

This does not mean that strategic cooperation between Russia and China will collapse. The strategic cooperative relationship between Russia and China will continue to involve strategic communication and coordination at the global and Eurasian regional levels. A considerable level of cooperation will also be maintained in Northeast Asia. However, it is reasonable to view Russia, which has experienced a significant decline in influence, as having begun efforts to find a new balance of power through the gradual, albeit not rapid, recovery of its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, Russia's policy towards the Korean Peninsula, in its pursuit of a new balance, is likely to provide a direction for North Korea, which is seeking a more balanced position, moving away from its previous policy of aligning with China in the context of Northeast Asian affairs.

Third, there is the prospect that if Russia-North Korea economic cooperation progresses, it will also benefit the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline connection has aspects that are beneficial to all three countries, making the recent summit a potential opportunity to build trilateral cooperation. The development of this trilateral cooperation could stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula by altering the diplomatic landscape surrounding it.

Of course, this could provide an opportunity for North Korea to adjust its excessive "tilt towards China" and restore a balance in its relations with both Russia and China. Depending on the future outcomes of strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea, China's dominant influence, which it has sought to exert in the unfolding of the Korean Peninsula situation, could be checked. Moreover, the possibility of Russia emerging as a variable in the Six-Party Talks and the Northeast Asian security framework, which have been primarily driven by the US and China, could increase.

However, for the strengthening of Russia's active role to bring about such changes in Northeast Asia, two conditions must be met. In this regard, the most crucial point to observe in the Northeast Asian power network structure is the "structural hole" forming around North Korea. The North Korea-US, North Korea-Japan, and North Korea-South Korea relations are undoubtedly the most clearly visible structural holes in the Northeast Asian power network structure. However, beyond these structural holes, the relationships that have hitherto escaped our attention are those between Russia-North Korea and US-Russia. Therefore, we need to pay attention to these structural holes, which have been overlooked by the Six-Party Talks framework, built around the US-China axis as a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.

First, strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea must be restored to a complete level. By severing strategic cooperation with North Korea in the 1990s, Russia lost not only its influence over North Korea but also its influence throughout the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Now, through projects such as resolving the debt issue and constructing gas pipelines, railways, and power grids with strategic significance, Russia must firmly restore the link of strategic cooperation with North Korea.

In that sense, the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline connection project offers even more intriguing inferences from the perspective of Social Network Theory. Existing studies on security and alliances emphasize that the connection of energy transport networks can serve as an important condition for strategic cooperation between countries. Considering this, if Russia secures a channel of influence for close strategic cooperation with North Korea through the gas pipeline connection, a link of strategic cooperation can be established between Russia and North Korea. This signifies the establishment of a new link that fills a "structural hole" in the network formed by the correlation of power among Northeast Asian countries. Consequently, it can serve as an opportunity to change the structure of the Northeast Asian "network of geopolitical powers," which is composed of strategic cooperation and competition.

Of course, it is important for South Korea to determine whether the new strategic cooperation link formed between Russia and North Korea will pursue a different direction from the existing strategic cooperation link between China and North Korea, or whether it will be differentiated. If not, the newly established strategic cooperation link between Russia and North Korea may cause slight fluctuations in the interests of China and Russia, but it is unlikely to significantly alter the existing regional political structure. However, if the link of Russia-North Korea strategic cooperation fills part of the structural hole in the Northeast Asian power network structure, and Russia pursues a strategy of cooperation with South Korea and the United States, this link could provide an opportunity for changes in the Northeast Asian regional order and, furthermore, lay the foundation for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

A positive signal from South Korea's perspective is that Russia requires South Korea's participation as a key partner in this project. Therefore, the South Korean government needs to consider this Russia-North Korea-South Korea energy transport network construction project not only from the perspective of South Korea's energy security but also from a broader, macro perspective, and meticulously refine its policy towards Russia. The Russian government will also be carefully considering which cooperative orientation will guarantee Russia's long-term and strategic interests in Northeast Asia. For this reason, both South Korea and Russia must recognize this issue as a task for strategic cooperation and advance sincere strategic communication between the two countries.

Second, strategic cooperation between the United States and Russia must be established at the regional level in Northeast Asia. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has clearly lost the superpower status it enjoyed during the Cold War. However, while managing the difficult task of multi-layered systemic transformation, it has, since the 2000s, regained its status as a military, energy, and geopolitical power on the world stage and its role as a central axis of Eurasian regional politics. Despite this, why has Russia not been able to fully recover its influence at the level of Northeast Asian regional politics? In addition to the loss of its channel of influence over the Korean Peninsula due to the breakdown of strategic cooperation between Russia and North Korea, as previously pointed out, US policy in Northeast Asia has also deterred Russia from regaining its status as a strategic actor in the region. In the post-Cold War era, while discussing global-level cooperation, the US and Russia failed to establish strategic cooperation links at the regional level in Northeast Asia. For the past 20 years, the US has neglected Russia's national interests in this region, failing to develop a strategy for dealing with Russia in Northeast Asia. During this time, the US focused on resolving the first North Korean nuclear issue by activating a temporary US-North Korea link in Northeast Asia, but failed. Subsequently, it attempted to resolve this issue by involving China, but this also reached an impasse. The US needs to attempt a more comprehensive and networked approach by establishing a strategic cooperative relationship with Russia at the regional level in Northeast Asia.

The structural hole that has emerged as a result of the delinking process, which has rendered strategic interactions between Russia-North Korea and Russia-US impossible, continues to be a decisive factor hindering the emergence of a cooperative order in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the US needs to indirectly support the trilateral cooperation projects, such as the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline connection project, and strive to establish strategic cooperation links with Russia. From this perspective, the South Korean government could consider and promote the proposal of a trilateral dialogue framework involving Russia, the US, and South Korea.

Tasks for the South Korea-Russia Summit for Strategic Cooperation

How will South Korea leverage the potential for changes in the surrounding situation of the Korean Peninsula at the South Korea-Russia summit anticipated sometime at the end of this year? What strategic orientation should South Korea's response adopt towards trilateral cooperation projects, such as the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline connection, in order to realize the "strategic partnership" established between South Korea and Russia in 2008? The South Korean government must meticulously examine feasible options at three levels.

First, the policy of limited intervention. This is an option that pursues limited objectives, such as guiding North Korea's economy towards a soft landing and promoting reform and opening by not over-interpreting the gas pipeline project and providing North Korea with a way out. Second, the policy of comprehensive intervention. This involves pursuing the incorporation of Russia's Far East into Northeast Asia as a goal of strategic cooperation between South Korea and Russia, thereby naturally inducing North Korea's involvement. To achieve this, a blueprint for sub-regional cooperation encompassing Russia's Far East and the border areas with North Korea must be developed. Furthermore, the focus of policy objectives should not be solely on North Korea but should be on cooperating to help Russia establish itself as a full-fledged Asian nation. However, the project to realize this must possess sufficient momentum to attract North Korea. Third, the option of pursuing changes in the Northeast Asian regional political structure through region formation policy. This involves exploring the possibility of South Korea, as a middle power, forming a semi-balancing alliance with Russia and mitigating the competition between the US and China to transform Northeast Asian regional politics. Such an attempt is likely to stabilize the Northeast Asian regional politics, which is dominated by the competitive dynamics between the US and China. Ultimately, South Korea must prepare a comprehensive strategy that takes into account all three strategic orientations.

However, equally important as these external strategies is the fact that strategies related to these regional political structures must be bipartisan diplomacy, not the diplomacy of a specific administration. In this context, it is necessary to solidify the background and implementation framework of external strategies and simultaneously prepare an action plan that can be sustained by the next administration. Therefore, thorough preparation at the working-level group level is necessary in preparation for the upcoming South Korea-Russia summit. Furthermore, rather than rushing into trilateral consultations, efforts should be focused on bilateral strategic communication and coordination with Russia. Additionally, consultations with neighboring countries must also be considered. Through various trilateral dialogues such as South Korea-US-Russia, South Korea-Russia-China, and South Korea-Japan-Russia, it is necessary to proceed step-by-step in developing mid- to long-term cooperation plans by closely discussing the impact of this project on Northeast Asia and the goals of multi-layered cooperation. Following that, agreements on more concrete goals and implementation strategies should be reached with Russia, and then the trilateral consultation system should be fully activated. If possible, the possibility of expanding this project into a regional cooperation agenda at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok in 2012 should be considered.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's approach to issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem and the Northeast Asian security and peace regime has been opportunistic, intervening in economic matters after the US and China took the lead in resolving security-sensitive issues. However, Russia is now demonstrating its willingness to play an active role, even at a cost. It is necessary to position Russia as a strategic actor with a certain stake in Northeast Asia. At this juncture, it is necessary to re-examine the US-China relationship within this new framework and ensure that North Korea is naturally integrated into the regional political process. Therefore, the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline project, which has recently garnered attention, should not be viewed solely as an energy issue but should be approached in conjunction with broader regional political issues.■

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