[EAI Commentary No. 20] The Korean Peninsula Situation After the North Korea-China Summit

Professor Lee Dong-ryul holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies. He is currently a professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University and serves as the Chairman of the EAI China Research Panel.

The Significance of Kim Jong-il's Consecutive Visits to China

North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il made his third unofficial visit to China on May 20th, nine months after his visits in May and August 2010. While consecutive summit meetings through three visits within a year are uncommon in North Korea-China relations, they are not unprecedented. Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively around the Korean War in the 1950s. It is reported that five summit meetings took place between Pyongyang and Beijing during the height of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1964. Both periods can be considered strategically critical times in the history of North Korea-China relations.

Kim Jong-il's hurried itinerary, marked by successive visits to China, must have been driven by important and urgent issues. Currently, North Korea and China face three main issues: economic aid and cooperation, the succession of power, and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. In fact, these issues are not significantly different from those raised during the previous two visits to China. Economic aid and the Six-Party Talks, in particular, have been regular agenda items for North Korea-China summits since the North Korean nuclear crisis began in 2003. However, the analysis that Kim Jong-il's consecutive three visits were aimed at securing China's support for his succession is not balanced. Due to the Taiwan issue, China is in a position where it cannot easily abandon its principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Nor is it likely that North Korea would risk damaging its Juche ideology by seeking China's 'official support'.

Instead, it is noteworthy that these three individual issues converge into one core issue: the maintenance and stability of the North Korean regime. If there is a significant difference in Kim Jong-il's visit this time compared to previous ones, it is the unusual emphasis placed on showcasing 'North Korea-China friendship and traditional amity' both domestically and internationally. Notably, upon his return to Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an exceptionally large welcome rally, emphasizing the achievements of his visit and 'North Korea-China friendship' as a 'great immortal march'.

However, it is important to note a subtle difference in the emphasis on strengthening North Korea-China relations between the two countries. Kim Jong-il appeared determined to clearly express his intention to resolve issues through China, his only current option, as anxieties about regime stability heightened ahead of the 'Year of the Strong and Prosperous Nation' in 2012. That is, through this visit, he intended to mutually reaffirm the strengthening of North Korea-China relations and actively showcase it. On the other hand, China seemed to be cautious about the possibility of overestimating the relationship with North Korea among relevant parties. For instance, immediately after the visit, the Chinese government briefed South Korea and other relevant countries on the summit talks. Furthermore, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie stated at the 10th Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore, 'We advised them not to take risks,' emphasizing that China had urged North Korea to exercise restraint. While both North Korea and China were considerably mindful of other countries during the summit, there appears to be a subtle yet significant difference in the messages they intended to convey. This difference reflects the complex and delicate reality of North Korea-China relations.

The Meaning of Summit Meetings in North Korea-China Relations

Summit meetings through mutual visits between North Korea and China are undoubtedly one of the most representative indicators of the special nature of their relationship. However, there is a paradox: the background of this special tradition in their bilateral relations is actually a product of inherent distrust between the two countries. After the 'August Factional Incident' in 1956, when the 'Yan'an faction' was purged from the North Korean power center, China lost its human channels to North Korea. As a result, it proposed regular summit meetings through mutual visits as an alternative. China sought to secure a channel for exercising influence over North Korea through this. Consequently, mutual visits for summit meetings are now interpreted as a key indicator of the closeness of their bilateral relations.

Indeed, since Kim Il-sung's unofficial visit to China in May 1950, mutual visits between the leaders of the two countries have been held almost annually, with the exception of three periods before the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. During the period around the August Factional Incident in 1956 (1954-58), the Cultural Revolution in China in the mid-1960s (1964-1969), and the period around Mao Zedong's death (1976-77), leader visits were suspended, and during these times, North Korea-China relations were actually distant or in a state of conflict. In particular, the tradition of annual summit meetings between North Korea and China was significantly undermined by the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992. After the establishment of ROK-China diplomatic ties, summit meetings between North Korea and China were effectively suspended until June 1999, when Kim Yong-nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, visited China. Although summit meetings resumed with Kim Jong-il's visits to China in 2000 and 2001 and Jiang Zemin's reciprocal visit in 2001, the regularity of the past was not restored.

Although North Korea-China relations have recovered since the 2000s, the fact that regular mutual visits between leaders are not taking place indicates that the bilateral relationship has clearly changed from the special relationship of the past. The content of summit meetings, rather than being based on firm trust as suggested by the diplomatic rhetoric of 'invincible friendship,' has shown aspects of a tug-of-war over interests. In fact, since the North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, North Korea has used summit meetings with China as a channel to obtain economic aid. Conversely, China has provided economic aid as a means to persuade North Korea to participate in the Six-Party Talks. In particular, since Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in 2009, China has reactivated summit meetings with North Korea and has been trying to manage North Korea by emphasizing more active communication. That is, China, judging that North Korea is in an unstable situation, has been managing North Korea and expanding its influence over it through more active engagement. For example, since the summit meeting in May 2010, President Hu Jintao has consistently proposed five points for bilateral cooperation, suggesting 'communication on important internal and foreign policy issues, international and regional situations, and experiences in governing the party and the country'.

In summary, behind the North Korea-China relations that emphasize friendship, a subtle tug-of-war between the two countries continues based on different calculations. The underlying reason for Kim Jong-il's overt tilt towards China is undoubtedly that he has significant expectations from China. North Korea expects support for its regime and, as a concrete means, economic aid from China. On the other hand, China appears to expect a soft landing for the North Korean regime through its Sinicization in the long term, while managing it to prevent instability originating from North Korea. Therefore, China is seeking structural Sinicization by transplanting the Chinese model of reform and opening up to North Korea, rather than through consumptive aid.

Prospects for Change in North Korea-China Relations

To forecast the future of North Korea-China relations after the summit meetings, it is necessary to review the recent flow of North Korea-China relations over the past few years. After North Korea's two nuclear tests, relations between North Korea and China, which had been distant for a considerable period, began to recover rapidly starting with Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to North Korea in October 2009 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. The heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to the Cheonan incident and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the strengthening of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and North Korea's deepening diplomatic isolation paradoxically spurred the strengthening of North Korea-China relations. The two countries emphasized their traditional amity to such an extent that some even suggested the restoration of their 'blood alliance.' Kim Jong-il's visit to China this time also occurred within this overall trend of recovering North Korea-China relations.

In essence, North Korea faces a dilemma: after two nuclear tests, amidst international sanctions and severe economic hardship, it must proceed with the succession of power and open the 'door to a strong and prosperous nation' in 2012 as proclaimed. To overcome this predicament, Kim Jong-il, through his visit to China, clearly expressed his intention to secure economic and political support from China, his only current option, and to showcase the strong relationship with China both domestically and internationally. China, despite strategic burdens, accepts this because it deems the stability of the North Korean regime necessary for stabilizing the surrounding security environment, especially with the impending leadership transition and China's continuous rise. These strategic interests of North Korea and China have led to consecutive summit meetings, enabling North Korea to secure China as leverage for maintaining a tougher stance towards South Korea.

Recently, China and North Korea have formed a clear consensus on the principle of stabilizing the North Korean regime, and on this basis, they are emphasizing 'China-North Korea friendship' more actively than ever before. However, behind the scenes, differences in interests that are still difficult to coordinate remain, and new trends are unfolding that could influence the future changes in the nature of China-North Korea relations.

First, the asymmetric dependency relationship in North Korea-China relations is likely to deepen further. Just as the summit meetings have been conducted through Kim Jong-il's unilateral and consecutive visits rather than mutual visits as in the past, the unbalanced relationship where North Korea requests and depends on China may intensify. North Korea's overt dependence on China will be seized by the rising China as a good opportunity to expand its influence on Korean Peninsula issues, while South Korea's position in resolving North Korean issues through China will inevitably become more vulnerable. Consequently, there is a possibility of a significant change in China's approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. If China determines that it can manage security instability originating from North Korea, including the nuclear issue, through direct communication and management with North Korea, its existing stance on the Six-Party Talks may also change.

Furthermore, China is likely to play an increasingly leading role in future North Korea-China relations. While Kim Jong-il has shown a tendency to regress to the past during his visits to China, including the one in August 2010, China is proposing a future-oriented new relationship and leading the North Korea-China relations. Since his visit in May, President Hu has been proposing new norms for bilateral relations, such as 'sharing experiences in governing the party and the country' and 'strengthening strategic communication,' thereby guiding the direction of development in bilateral relations. Premier Wen has gone a step further, publicly encouraging reform and opening up and calling for regime change in North Korea. This is manifesting as a difference where North Korea realistically focuses mainly on economic aid, while China shifts its focus to economic cooperation. China has been seeking a change in the method of economic aid to North Korea since 2005 by proposing the so-called three principles for economic cooperation. The rapid progress of the North Korea-China economic cooperation projects, such as the development of Golden Pond Island Economic Zone and the Rason Special Economic Zone, seems to be part of this change.

Changes in the Northeast Asian Situation After the Summit and South Korea's Response

Following the North Korea-China summit, remarkable new developments are rapidly unfolding in Northeast Asia. On May 30th, North Korea issued a statement through its National Defense Commission spokesperson, declaring an end to relations with the Lee Myung-bak administration and an entry into a full-scale offensive. It subsequently revealed the details of secret contacts for a South-North summit. North Korea claims that despite its best efforts to improve inter-Korean dialogue, it was forced to launch a full-scale offensive due to South Korea's 'anti-national and anti-unification' policies. In other words, North Korea emphasizes its active pursuit of improving inter-Korean relations and shifts the blame for the failure of the Six-Party Talks onto South Korea. North Korea's consistent criticism of South Korea, while refraining from any criticism of the United States, also hints at its future tactics.

Meanwhile, China is sending a dual message: it will not tolerate North Korea's adventurous actions, which could jeopardize its own economic development, and it will maintain economic cooperation with North Korea at a certain level. As mentioned earlier, China, through Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the Shangri-La Dialogue, claims to be restraining North Korea's provocations, while actively pursuing economic cooperation, such as the groundbreaking ceremonies for the Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones and the Rason Economic and Trade Zone. Furthermore, the first strategic dialogue between the North Korean Workers' Party and the Chinese Communist Party was held.

The United States is showing some changes, such as the visit of Robert King, the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, to North Korea, but whether this can be interpreted politically is a separate issue. For a fundamental change in U.S.-North Korea relations, a breakthrough in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue must be achieved. The Obama administration will pursue substantial improvements in economic and diplomatic relations only if North Korea shows tangible willingness to follow the three-stage process of 'disabling, declaration, verification, and denuclearization' agreed upon in the Six-Party Talks in February 2007 and makes efforts to improve inter-Korean relations. For North Korea to comply with the U.S. conditions, it would essentially require a decision to abandon its 'military-first' policy, making such a change difficult unless a new type of leadership emerges within North Korea. North Korea will continue to advocate for the necessity of a peace treaty and nuclear disarmament talks with the U.S. under the premise that the U.S. pursues a hostile policy towards North Korea and poses a nuclear threat. Recently, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, during his visit to South Korea on June 10th, emphasized the need for improved inter-Korean relations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and reaffirmed the U.S. government's position by urging transparency and caution in economic cooperation with North Korea, thereby calling attention to North Korea-China economic relations.

In this rapidly and complexly changing situation, South Korea needs to recognize the reality that by remaining confined to its own principles, it risks its position in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue becoming increasingly marginalized. With China's influence over North Korea growing, the U.S. also cannot indefinitely stand by while North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities strengthen without a breakthrough through dialogue. Therefore, before it is too late, South Korea must accurately read the trends of change in North Korea-China relations and seize opportunities to actively play its role. First, while thoroughly preparing for the possibility of North Korean provocations against the South, it must find a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations by presenting a long-term engagement strategy towards North Korea. It should also continuously persuade the U.S. and China of the importance of improving inter-Korean relations and establish a long-term North Korea policy to induce strategic changes in North Korea. In particular, since China also recognizes the limitation that it cannot achieve both stability on the Korean Peninsula and increased influence in China solely through the North Korean card, practical and proactive diplomacy towards China is needed to provide China with the judgment and trust that strengthening relations with South Korea, rather than North Korea, would be more beneficial for realizing China's policy objectives on the Korean Peninsula. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's 'Asia Security Initiative' program and receives financial support. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When quoting [EAI Commentary], please be sure to cite the source. This manuscript represents the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute. We express our gratitude to Professor Ha Young-sun and Professor Chun Jae-sung of Seoul National University for their valuable comments and insights on this manuscript.