[EAI Commentary No. 16] Japan's 'Defense Program Outline 2010' and Implications for South Korean Security Policy

Park Young-jun is a professor at the National Defense University's Graduate School of Security Studies and is currently a visiting scholar at Harvard University. His publications include 'The Third Japan' (2008) and 'International Politics of Security' (2010, co-authored).

Significance of the 'Defense Program Outline 2010'

On December 17th, the Japanese government decided and announced the 'Regarding the Defense Program Outline from 2011 onwards' (hereinafter referred to as 'Defense Program Outline 2010') and its supplementary document, the 'Mid-Term Defense Program (2011-2015),' through the Security Council and the Cabinet. The Defense Program Outline is the highest-level military strategy, and by extension, an official document expressing Japan's security strategy, stipulating the objectives and operational methods for the Japan Self-Defense Forces. In the United States, it has become customary for each new administration to announce a National Security Strategy from the White House, followed by the Pentagon's National Defense Strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy, or Joint Vision, to present the goals and direction of national security strategy domestically and internationally. Japan does not have a separate document system equivalent to a National Security Strategy; therefore, the Defense Program Outline, confirmed through decisions by the Security Council and the Cabinet, essentially serves as a strategic document encompassing both the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Since its first announcement in 1976, the Defense Program Outline has been revised and announced in 1995 and 2004. If the 'Defense Program Outline 1976' articulated Japan's security and military strategy during the Cold War, the 'Defense Program Outline 1995' represented Japan's security and defense strategy in the post-Cold War era, and the 'Defense Program Outline 2004' represented Japan's security and defense strategy in the early 21st century, following 9/11. Therefore, in what aspects should the 'Defense Program Outline 2010,' recently finalized, draw our attention?

Firstly, it can be pointed out that the East Asian security environment surrounding Japan has undergone structural changes since the last Defense Program Outline was formulated in 2004. North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, and particularly in 2010, it emerged as a significant threat not only to the Korean Peninsula but to all of East Asia by causing the Cheonan incident and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. Furthermore, China, through its sustained economic growth, is certain to surpass Japan to become the world's second-largest economy by GDP. The projection of these military and economic landscape changes in East Asia onto Japan's new security strategy is the first point worthy of attention.

Moreover, while previous Defense Program Outlines were formulated during the long-term rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 'Defense Program Outline 2010' is the first strategic document reflecting the perceptions and security strategy of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which came to power in September 2009. Since taking power, the DPJ has sought to differentiate itself from the LDP in policy formulation and actual policy content, a tendency that has also been evident in foreign and security policy. Therefore, how does the 'Defense Program Outline 2010,' which holds the status of a top-level security and defense strategy document, exhibit differences or continuities with the outlines previously determined by the LDP?

In essence, the 'Defense Program Outline 2010' is the most appropriate document for examining how post-DPJ Japan perceives the changed security environment and how it intends to respond to perceived security threats with what strategic concepts and military capabilities.

Process of Determining the 'Defense Program Outline 2010'

The process of determining previous Defense Program Outlines followed a certain pattern. First, an expert committee composed of individuals from academia, industry, and the economy was established directly under the Prime Minister. After internal deliberations, a final report was drafted, which was then reviewed within the Japanese government and the ruling party before the Defense Program Outline was announced through a Cabinet decision.

The 'Defense Program Outline 2010,' led by the DPJ administration, was fundamentally determined through a process similar to the previous methods. In September 2009, following the DPJ's assumption of power, the party showed an eagerness to present a security policy direction distinct from the LDP's. Accordingly, on February 18th of this year, Prime Minister Hatoyama at the time commissioned the formation of the 'Forum on Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era,' comprising individuals from academia, the economy, and former bureaucracy, to draft a new Defense Program Outline. Among those commissioned were Takashi Shiraishi, Director of the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), who has consistently emphasized cooperation in the East Asian region, and Yoshihide Soeya, Director of the Faculty of Policy Management at Keio University, and Hiroshi Nakanishi, Professor at Kyoto University. This fueled expectations that a security strategy aligned with the DPJ's proclaimed East Asian Community initiative would be proposed. After more than six months of internal discussions, this forum released its final report in August, titled 'Future Vision for Japan's Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era.' This final report proposed the construction of military capabilities based on the new concept of 'dynamic deterrence,' replacing the previous concept of 'basic defense capability' which had been the foundation of Japanese defense policy. It also presented new policy directions, emphasizing the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the necessity of security cooperation with countries like South Korea and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, during the preparation of the forum's final report, and even afterward, various actors within Japan, including economic organizations and political parties, put forward diverse opinions on what should be included in the new Defense Program Outline regarding Japan's future security policy. Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), a representative economic organization, announced 'Proposals for Promoting the Development and Utilization of Space as a National Strategy' on April 12th of this year, followed by 'Proposals Towards a New Defense Program Outline' on July 20th. In these documents, Keidanren argued that the new Defense Program Outline should include the utilization of space for defense purposes and the relaxation of the existing strict three principles on arms exports, thereby creating an environment where Japanese defense industry companies can actively enter the space industry and freely participate in joint research and development projects for advanced weapons with Western countries.

The DPJ's Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and National Security announced its 'Basic Stance on the Defense Program Outline' on November 29th, proposing that the new Defense Program Outline should include revisions to the five principles for Participation in International Peace Cooperation Activities (PKO) to promote participation, the establishment of new criteria for the three principles on arms exports, and the creation of a Prime Minister's Office for National Security to strengthen crisis management functions. Even up to the final announcement, the Japanese government demonstrated efforts to formulate a Defense Program Outline that could gain broad consensus through discussions with other political parties, social organizations, and within the government itself. On November 30th, Defense Minister Kitazawa met with representatives from Japanese defense industry companies, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, to listen to their opinions on revising the three principles on arms exports. In early December, opinions on this issue were also gathered from the Social Democratic Party, a potential coalition partner. In the final moments, adjustments were made between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance regarding the appropriate level of defense spending, including personnel and equipment procurement costs, and the resulting strength of the Ground Self-Defense Force. Through this process, the 'Defense Program Outline 2010,' announced on December 17th, was effectively finalized through the convergence of opinions from academia, the economy, politics, and various government ministries related to security, led by the DPJ administration. It is no exaggeration to say that this document represents Japan's national will concerning security.

Key Discussion Points of the 'Defense Program Outline 2010'

The 'Defense Program Outline 2010' is structured as follows: Chapter 1 outlines the purpose of its formulation, Chapter 2 clarifies the basic philosophy of Japan's security, Chapter 3 analyzes the security environment surrounding Japan, Chapter 4 presents the basic policy for security, Chapter 5 describes the desired form of defense capabilities, Chapter 6 identifies tasks for building the foundation for exercising defense capabilities, and an appendix provides the force enhancement goals for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. Compared to previous Defense Program Outlines, the following are noteworthy discussion points:

First, regarding the assessment of the security environment surrounding Japan, at the global level, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and piracy are identified as security challenges. In relation to the Asia-Pacific region, a sense of vigilance persists regarding North Korea's military activities and China's military opacity. Specifically concerning North Korea, its development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, its large-scale special forces, and its recent military provocations are mentioned, pointing to North Korea's military movements as a significant destabilizing factor for the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.

China presents a somewhat complex perception. Chapter 2 expresses concern over China's rapid military modernization, enhancement of its long-range power projection capabilities, and military opacity. However, Chapter 4 emphasizes the need to build trust through security dialogues and defense exchanges with China and to foster cooperative relationships in non-traditional security areas. This is a significant change compared to the 2004 Defense Program Outline, which only highlighted the potential threat of China's military power. This reflects the influence of Prime Minister Hatoyama's advocacy for an East Asian Community and the cooperative approach towards China held by the individuals commissioned for the forum.

Second, as a countermeasure to these potential threats, the new Defense Program Outline comprehensively presents a three-tiered strengthening: Japan's own efforts, cooperation with its ally the United States, and multi-layered security cooperation within the international community. Since assuming power, the DPJ has emphasized the establishment of an equal Japan-U.S. alliance relationship and, in fact, temporarily exposed friction between Japan and the U.S. over the relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa. However, the 'Defense Program Outline 2010' expresses the perception that the United States plays the 'most significant role in global peace and stability' and demonstrates a commitment to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance from the perspective of stabilizing regional order and providing global public goods. It appears that the DPJ's initial idealistic stance on the Japan-U.S. alliance is shifting towards a more realistic direction with the announcement of the 'Defense Program Outline 2010.'

Regarding multi-layered security cooperation within the international community, the explicit emphasis on security cooperation with South Korea and Australia is noteworthy. The new Defense Program Outline highlights these countries as sharing 'fundamental values and security interests' with Japan and emphasizes their role as partners in jointly building a multi-layered security cooperation posture in the Asia-Pacific region. This perception is a departure from previous Defense Program Outlines. It also reflects the recommendations presented in the report of the 'Forum on Security and Defense Capabilities.'

Third, in terms of Japan's own efforts to counter threats, the new concept of 'dynamic defense capability' has been introduced, replacing the concept of 'basic defense capability' that had served as the guideline for building Japan's defense capabilities. The previous 'basic defense capability' referred to the minimum necessary defense capabilities to prevent Japan from becoming a power vacuum that could endanger the surrounding region. The new Defense Program Outline discards this concept and proposes 'dynamic defense capability'—characterized by responsiveness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and multi-utility—as a replacement concept for effective deterrence and response to various contingencies. The 'dynamic defense capability' concept in the new Defense Program Outline appears to be an active adoption of the 'dynamic deterrence' concept presented in the 'Forum on Security and Defense Capabilities.'

This raises the question of what 'dynamic defense capability' specifically entails. To address this, it is necessary to examine the force enhancement directions and goals for each Self-Defense Force unit presented in Chapter 5 and the appendix of the Defense Program Outline, as well as in the 'Mid-Term Defense Program (2011-2015).' Compared to the 'Defense Program Outline 2004,' the new Defense Program Outline reduces the total personnel of the Ground Self-Defense Force by 1,000 and cuts tanks and artillery by 200 units each. Conversely, the Maritime Self-Defense Force's submarine fleet is to be increased from 16 to 22 vessels, and the five fixed escort flotillas deployed regionally will be reduced to four and made mobile. The Aegis destroyers for ballistic missile defense will be increased from four to six, and the acquisition of additional helicopter-carrying destroyers, nearly 20,000 tons, is also a stated goal. For the Air Self-Defense Force, the plan includes relocating one squadron to Okinawa and acquiring successors for the aging F-4 fighter jets and C-1 transport aircraft. The strengthening of jointness centered on the Joint Staff Office, established in 2006, is also emphasized. Therefore, the 'dynamic defense capability' concept can be understood as involving the significant reduction of the Ground Self-Defense Force's conventional forces, which tended towards regional defense, while enhancing the rapid response capabilities of the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, which possess mobile defense capabilities, continuously reinforcing ballistic missile defense and special forces capabilities, and strengthening the intelligence gathering and joint operational capabilities of the Joint Staff Office, which commands the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces. While the trend of continuously reducing the personnel and conventional equipment of the Self-Defense Forces, in line with the Japanese government's trend of fiscal contraction, continues from the 'Defense Program Outline 2004,' the 'dynamic defense capability' concept reflects the intention to respond to various security threats by compensating for this through qualitative force enhancement, such as strengthening mobility and jointness.

Implications for South Korean Security Policy

South Korea faces not only potential security threats in the global and regional order but also immediate threats from North Korea, as evidenced by the repeated Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong Island shelling. In this regard, Japan's 'Defense Program Outline 2010' offers several implications for the formulation of South Korean security policy.

Firstly, there is the question of whether there are issues with the formulation process of South Korea's security strategy or military strategy. In Japan's case, the Defense Program Outline is finalized and announced domestically and internationally every five to ten years, drawing on the collective wisdom of society. South Korea has also formulated National Security Strategy documents such as 'Peace, Prosperity, and National Security' during the Roh Moo-hyun administration and 'A Mature Global State' during the Lee Myung-bak administration. However, it is difficult to consider the process of formulating these National Security Strategy documents as having involved public discourse by gathering the collective wisdom of not only the government but also academia, politics, the economy, and social organizations. Consequently, the majority of the public is unaware of the existence of such documents, leading to a lack of shared understanding regarding our national goals or security threats. Even on the crucial issue of whether North Korea should be considered a primary adversary or merely one of several threat factors, discussions are limited to the level of the 'Defense White Paper' published by the Ministry of National Defense, and the formation of public consensus at the national level has been neglected. A review is also needed at the national security strategy level regarding how to perceive the rising China. Strengthening defense capabilities, reinforcing the ROK-U.S. alliance, multilateral security efforts, and even North Korea policy should be discussed within the framework of the overall national security strategy, and the basic direction should be contained in national strategy documents. However, we feel that only specific, tactical discussions are active throughout society. In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to how Japan's Defense Program Outline is determined by gathering opinions from various sectors and is utilized as a guiding principle for the actual implementation of security policy.

In terms of content, the 'Defense Program Outline 2010' strongly expresses vigilance towards North Korea, while presenting a need for cooperation to build trust with the rising China, alongside vigilance. It also specifically emphasizes the strengthening of security cooperation with South Korea. The Japanese government's proposal for security cooperation with South Korea in an official document is worthy of positive evaluation. At a time when the immediate threat from North Korea is increasing, securing deterrence against North Korea requires not only strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance but also cooperation with neighboring friendly nations. However, it would be a burden and unacceptable for us if the promotion of ROK-Japan security cooperation were to create a dynamic of excluding or confronting China, and further hinder the possibility of multilateral security cooperation in the Northeast Asian region. South Korea's national strategic goal is to deter North Korea's military threat and build peace on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, we must secure bilateral cooperation with each country participating in the Six-Party Talks and, furthermore, it is advantageous for our national policy implementation that regional multilateral security mechanisms function more effectively. Security cooperation with Japan should be pursued within the limits that do not hinder such frameworks and within the scope of Japanese domestic law and the principle of exclusively defensive defense. In any case, a new challenge has arisen: how to utilize Japan's expressed intention for ROK-Japan security cooperation in a beneficial direction for achieving our national strategic goals.

Japan has introduced the concept of 'dynamic defense capability,' replacing the previous 'basic defense capability,' as the fundamental guideline for building its defense capabilities. This concept embodies Japan's own considerations and strategies for efficiently allocating budget and forces to counter potential threats it may face amidst a declining defense budget. Therefore, under what concept should we build defense capabilities to counter the current and potential threats we face? We must simultaneously respond to North Korea's conventional military power, nuclear weapons, and other asymmetric capabilities, as well as non-traditional security threats in the East Asian and global orders. The Ministry of National Defense requests an increase in the defense budget to achieve these goals, but like Japan, we face limitations on increasing the defense budget due to the overall national fiscal scale and other necessities. How should we efficiently allocate defense budgets and forces, and structure our organizations and personnel to respond to the complex security crises we face within a limited budget? While efforts have undoubtedly been made, the Cheonan incident and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling demonstrated that our various efforts under the guise of 'defense reform' have been ineffective in deterring or retaliating against North Korea's military threats that exploit our vulnerabilities. More fundamentally, accurate identification of the multi-layered elements of the security threats we face must precede the formulation of a concept for building defense and diplomatic capabilities that can neutralize such threats. The concept of 'dynamic defense capability' newly presented in Japan's 'Defense Program Outline 2010,' although a foreign concept derived from a different security environment than ours, prompts us to re-examine the direction and tasks for our security policy and defense reform in the face of more layered security threats.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is receiving financial support as a core research institution selected for the MacArthur Foundation's 'Asia Security Initiative' program. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary]. This manuscript represents the author's personal views and does not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute.