[EAI Commentary No. 15] A Complex Strategy for Overcoming the Yeonpyeong Island Crisis

Professor Ha Young-sun holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, where he also serves as the Chairman of the East Asia Institute's Global Network 21.

A Complex Strategy Toward North Korea

Following the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident, South Korea is strengthening its military response posture toward North Korea and endeavoring to solidify the framework of international cooperation. It has decided to augment its military presence in the West Sea, enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities against North Korean provocations, and significantly increase next year's defense budget. Efforts are being multifaceted and belatedly undertaken to re-examine the ROK-US military strategy toward North Korea, maintain close ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation, and simultaneously urge cooperation from China and Russia. While analyzing the causes of the failed response to the Yeonpyeong Island shelling and preparing military countermeasures to prevent recurrence are undoubtedly important, it is more crucial to accurately discern the overall situation of the chessboard and devise a masterful strategy for survival. On the chessboard of life and death, the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un succession system has recently made two consecutive opening moves: the revelation of its uranium enrichment facility and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Future South Korean policy toward North Korea must be pursued from a perspective that encompasses the entire changing landscape of East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula, while also anticipating and preemptively responding to North Korea's strategies.

First, we must accurately recognize the scope of North Korea's "violent diplomacy" and "peace diplomacy." The Korean Peninsula experienced a "hot war" on the scale of a world war on June 25, 1950, triggered by the convergence of inter-Korean conflict and US-Soviet confrontation. Since the armistice, North and South Korea have remained in a state between a hot war and a cold war. While the world is moving from the post-Cold War era of the 1990s through "cold peace" toward "hot peace," North Korea has maximally utilized the chessboard of hot war, cold war, cold peace, and hot peace. During the Cold War, it engaged in terrorism such as the Rangoon bombing (1983) and the KAL bombing (1987), as well as irregular warfare like the January 21 incident (1968) and the Uljin-Samcheok incident (1968). Even in the post-Cold War era, it has conducted nuclear tests, followed by the Battle of Yeonpyeong, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Simultaneously, North Korea has continuously pursued the agenda of concluding a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula since the armistice to this day.

The recent sinking of the Cheonan and the subsequent shelling of Yeonpyeong Island carry inherent risks of a higher-level localized conflict. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swings from cold war toward hot war, great confusion is ensuing. Consequently, the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime is making efforts to maximally leverage the pendulum of war and peace to establish a new supreme leader system with relatively limited national strength.

In this situation, rather than simply worrying about the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula, we must accurately understand why North Korea has escalated its offensive from the existing level of terrorist warfare. North Korea will actively pursue a "cold peace offensive" following the Yeonpyeong Island incident to maximize the amplitude of the pendulum's swing. Based on the recent statements and actions of North Korean, US, and Chinese officials, we can reconstruct the situation: for North Korea, which is in the process of building its successor leadership, the US and South Korea have set active denuclearization measures and re-engagement with South Korea as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. However, North Korea, seemingly to catch them off guard, has chosen the exact opposite course. To properly interpret this move, it must be understood not as a static snapshot but as a continuous movement, like a video. While responding to the incident itself is important, South Korea must also find strategic opening moves rather than merely following North Korea's lead. To achieve this, we must examine why North Korea has widened the pendulum's amplitude and how a nuclear-free survival strategy for North Korea is possible.

As revealed by the Yeonpyeong Island crisis, in North Korea today, father Kim Jong-il is passing down the traditional North Korean playbook, inherited since grandfather Kim Il-sung, to his son Kim Jong-un. Following the "brinkmanship diplomacy" playbook, they have clearly demonstrated a commitment to "nuclearization" instead of "denuclearization" and presented a higher probability of "worsening relations" instead of "improving relations." The next step will likely involve widening the pendulum's amplitude with a "hugging" peace offensive, followed by persistent "onion-peeling" tactics to safely establish the new supreme leader system. However, complete all-out war or nuclear-free reform and opening are not within the current range of the North Korean pendulum's amplitude.

Conversely, the amplitude of South Korea's pendulum is too narrow compared to North Korea's, which is a significant problem. While North Korea's pendulum swings broadly from cold war to hot war, South Korea has operated within the narrow range of the Sunshine Policy and sanctions. The overall framework of North Korea strategy must be designed with a more complex perspective encompassing military, diplomatic, and unification aspects. First and foremost, to prevent North Korea from escalating the use of violence to the brink of all-out war on the Korean Peninsula, it is crucial to develop military capabilities for deterrence, "defensive defense," and "offensive defense" in close coordination with the United States, thereby making North Korea cease considering the mobilization of organized violent means as a policy tool.

In this context, a crucial issue arises: whether Kim Jong-un, upon fully assuming leadership of the new supreme leader system, will inherit his father's "military-first" policy as his final instruction. The outcome of Kim Jong-il's "military-first" policy since 1994 has been, in North Korea's own words, a "arduous march" more difficult than any in human history. If Kim Jong-un inherits the "military-first" policy as is, he will face a second "arduous march" several times more difficult than the first. Therefore, it is important to consider how to encourage the North Korean supreme leader system to re-examine his father's "military-first" policy and how to prevent the repetition of his father's playbook. In such times, it is essential to devise complex strategies. First, we must make the North Korean supreme leader system realize that its "nuclear military-first" policy is inherently a self-defeating move. If past Sunshine Policies or sanctions have failed to achieve this, a third policy is needed. While developing strategies to neutralize North Korea's violent diplomacy, we must simultaneously formulate a complex vision for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula that can be pursued with the US and China, in order to more actively respond to North Korea's "peace offensive." While the Sunshine Policy may increase limited exchanges and cooperation, it cannot bring about a change in the "nuclear military-first" policy, as it requires a change in DNA, not just shedding an outer layer.

Therefore, North Korea's denuclearization is only possible if the current Kim Jong-il "nuclear military-first" regime pursues a new nuclear-free survival strategy, taking advantage of the emergence of a new successor regime. North Korea's new survival strategy can realistically be achieved only when the "de-militarization" of North Korea's political power occurs. Simultaneously, with this change, complex efforts by South Korea, the United States, China, and others must be undertaken to reliably guarantee the security of North Korea's non-military political system. To this end, it is particularly important to devise highly complex and reliable security guarantees for North Korea. Along with finding a way to denuclearize North Korea, a regional and global economic support system must be established to resolve North Korea's economic difficulties. In the longer term, a policy of co-evolution, involving North Korea itself and relevant parties, should be pursued for North Korea's advancement in the 21st century.

Pursuing Complex Diplomacy with China

The most crucial and challenging aspect of pursuing South Korea's complex strategy toward North Korea is its policy toward China. China's role in North Korean policy is particularly important due to its influence over North Korea. While China expresses dissatisfaction with North Korea's hereditary supreme leader system, which aggressively pursues a "nuclear military-first" policy, it has realistically always accommodated North Korea to a certain extent. China, prioritizing economic development, chooses the lesser evil of maintaining the supreme leader system over the collapse of the North Korean regime, which would have the worst impact on its northeastern provinces. Therefore, diplomacy aimed at resolving the North Korean issue must be pursued in a complex manner, emphasizing cooperation with China as much as cooperation with the US and Japan.

Over the long term, through economic crises, and in the short term, through various events in 2010, China has been speaking out more forcefully against the US than expected, amidst its relative rise and America's relative decline. Previously, there was an atmosphere of frankly acknowledging the power gap between the US and China, prioritizing economic development, and being cautious in international politics. However, recently, while maintaining the principles of "hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time" (韜光養晦) and "acting when appropriate" (有所作爲), the level of its rhetoric has increased. While it is true that China's confidence has grown with the relative assessment of its national strength since the global financial crisis, we must also pay attention to the influence of domestic politics on international politics. As China approaches its power transition in 2012, it is engaged in cautious yet clear competition in its foreign policy. Demonstrating the confidence that comes with China's growth more clearly is important for securing dominance during the power transition period, and its strategy toward the US is the most effective way to showcase that clarity. Therefore, domestic political demands are amplifying its clear rhetoric toward the US internationally.

The question is whether it is appropriate for China to raise its level of rhetoric toward the US at this juncture. In his speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of reform and opening in 2008, President Hu Jintao set a goal of building a "moderately prosperous society" (小康社會) by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. Currently, per capita income is around $4,000, and by 2021, it is expected to approach $10,000. However, President Hu Jintao has expressed hope that 2049 is the year China is truly aiming for. This is not merely an economic goal but a vision to present a new civilizational standard to the world, commensurate with the 100th anniversary.

In this context, both the US and China are cautiously anticipating the outcome of the US-China summit scheduled for next January. While the summit will not completely collapse, it is expected that conflicts will be resolved in a very rough manner. Since 2008, the US has experienced significant economic difficulties, and China has continued to rise relatively. However, overall, the pace of America's relative decline and China's relative rise will be slower than anticipated. When the great currents of history change course, the resulting national status depends on how appropriately self-regulation is exercised. The US, belatedly realizing the crisis of relative decline, has begun to pursue an "American complex strategy" to adapt to the epochal changes of complexity.

The future changes in the East Asian order will be far more complex than China anticipates. However, China has yet to present a clear blueprint for constructing a new East Asian order. This is particularly evident when comparing the "chessboard" strategies of the US and China in building a new East Asian order in the 21st century. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech in late October titled "America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region." In essence, it was about America's "complex policy" toward East Asia. The engagement strategy being formulated by the US includes military aspects but is far more complex. It involves maintaining close relationships with existing key allies in East Asia, including South Korea and Japan, while simultaneously fostering friendly relations with emerging central powers such as ASEAN and India, and China, and not viewing them as hostile zero-sum relationships like war or cold war. It also includes active participation in regional international organizations. Expanding the scope of activities, Secretary Clinton emphasized the use of "smart power," which appropriately blends hard and soft power across "3Ds": Diplomacy, Development, and Defense.

In contrast, China has not yet fully moved beyond the dichotomous thinking of the Cold War era. China views the world through the narrow lens of power struggles and balance of power for national interest, which are fundamental principles of the modern international order. With this perspective alone, it cannot catch up to the US. While the Cold War order was divided between the US and the Soviet Union, the new order being constructed in 21st-century East Asia is far more complex than the Cold War order. China's construction of a new East Asian order, characterized by a strong dichotomous atmosphere, will find it more difficult to consolidate power relative to America's more complex construction of a new Asia-Pacific order.

As a specific example, Chinese political circles, media, and scholars often categorize South Korea's past government as "pro-China" and the current government as "pro-US" in an overly dichotomous manner. However, there are far more diverse views and perspectives within South Korea than China imagines. The prevailing trend is to strengthen the existing network of ROK-US and ROK-Japan relations while simultaneously expanding the new network of ROK-China relations. Failing to properly understand these efforts to be "pro-US and pro-China" and misunderstanding 21st-century South Korea through the dichotomous lens of the Cold War era as "pro-US and anti-China" signifies China's failure to read the currents of the times correctly.

For South Korea, the most important task is to foster a cooperative relationship between the US and China rather than conflict. If the US and China engage in Cold War-like conflict, South Korea will be forced into a dichotomous choice. While the Korean Peninsula has not yet escaped the Cold War, the current US-China relationship on a global scale is not a Cold War relationship. Despite various elements of conflict, cooperation is inevitable, as seen in the economic relations between the two countries. South Korea and China also have too close a relationship to be separated. In terms of economy and investment, China has become South Korea's largest trading partner. South Korea must pursue both traditional alliance with the US and new engagement with China, which requires a friendly, not adversarial, relationship between the US and China. If China were to force South Korea to choose between its traditional alliance and new engagement, such a perspective itself would not significantly contribute to China's rise. The US is currently trying to engage everyone except a few outliers like Iran and North Korea, whereas China is still structuring its approach more simplistically.

In this situation, our diplomatic efforts should focus on expanding and deepening our network with China within the context of a close relationship with the US. It is difficult for a relatively weaker South Korea to make China act against its subjective national interests as South Korea desires. In the 18th century, Park Ji-won, in his famous "Heo Saeng-jeon," pointed out the practical limitations of the "Northern Expedition Theory" and emphasized a "diplomacy of network with Qing" that maximally utilizes marital, academic, and commercial networks. South Korea must fully pursue a "21st Century Park Ji-won Project." By properly implementing a three-stage approach to building a China network—expansion, deepening, and trust-building—it is important to make China itself complexify its current perspective of prioritizing its own national interests and actively embrace the interests of South Korea, the Korean Peninsula, East Asia, and the globe.

Overcoming Division in National Opinion

For the strategic choice of a complex policy toward North Korea, the most crucial issue moving forward is how to overcome the division in national opinion regarding the North Korean issue. From the Cheonan incident to the Yeonpyeong crisis, the level of intra-South Korean conflict, occurring in both physical and cyber spaces, is comparable to the level of inter-Korean conflict. It is difficult to pursue an efficient and sophisticated complex strategy toward North Korea in the current state of divided national opinion. To escape this difficulty, it is imperative to seize the Yeonpyeong crisis as an opportunity for turning crisis into fortune, and to develop and properly publicize a future-oriented yet realistic North Korean policy that can gain national consensus beyond the outdated distinctions between conservatives and progressives, in both physical and cyber spaces.

To this end, South Korea must prepare and efficiently implement a complex strategy for the amplitude of war and peace, which is broader than the amplitude of North Korea's pendulum. The current "grand bargaining" policy is unlikely to gain sufficient persuasive power in the discourse war of deeply rooted national division. Once the shock of the current situation subsides and North Korea's "cold peace offensive" begins, South Korean national opinion will once again be divided. Therefore, for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia, in addition to strengthening our response posture to cold war and hot war, active preparation is needed for "cold peace" and "hot peace," which are also included in the other amplitudes of the pendulum. While preventing North Korea's violent diplomacy, South Korea must actively formulate and proactively lead 21st-century style peaceful unification diplomacy. Simultaneously, novel ideas are needed to properly understand how South Korean national opinion is being newly formed in the cyber age and to publicize persuasive discourse in both physical and cyber spaces.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's "Asia Security Initiative" program and is receiving financial support. "EAI Commentary" aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When quoting "EAI Commentary," please be sure to cite the source. This commentary is a revised and supplemented version of "Ha Young-sun Column (Chosun Ilbo, November 29, 2010)" and "Power Interview No. 93 of the Seoul National University Department of Political Science and International Relations Alumni Association Newsletter (December 16, 2010)."