EAI Commentary No. 11: The ROK-Japan Relationship Through the Dokdo Dispute

Professor Bong Young-shik is currently an Assistant Professor at the School of International Service at American University.

In the history of post-war ROK-Japan relations, no issue has destabilized bilateral relations as persistently as the dispute over the sovereignty of two small islands known as “Dokdo.” This paper will briefly review the history of the Dokdo dispute and argue that the starting point for resolving the issue lies not in assertive diplomacy based on nationalistic sentiment, but in a pragmatic and calm approach.

Immediately after the end of World War II in 1945, Dokdo was incorporated into the administrative jurisdiction of the Korean government and placed under effective Korean control. The Japanese government, based on historical evidence and international law, has consistently raised the issue at an official level, asserting that Dokdo, which Japan refers to as Takeshima (竹島), is Japanese territory.

The territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo was not significantly expressed during the Cold War. Both countries prioritized enhancing security cooperation to counter the threat of communist forces in Northeast Asia. However, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of external variables concerning the regional security environment, Japan began to assert its sovereignty over Dokdo more aggressively and in a more multifaceted manner. In the early post-Cold War period, South Korea pursued a policy of “quiet diplomacy” rather than an assertive response to these policy changes by Japan. This was because South Korea judged that it was in its strategic interest not to respond emotionally and aggressively to Japan’s provocative territorial policy, given that there was no room for debate regarding South Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo and that its effective control was fully established. South Korea reasoned that a sensitive reaction to Japan’s claims would only strengthen Japan’s assertion that the Dokdo sovereignty issue remains an unresolved territorial dispute between the two countries.

In fact, in the early post-Cold War period, there were many optimistic expectations that the dispute over Dokdo sovereignty between the two countries would gradually be resolved by the 21st century due to increasing economic interdependence, globalization, and the fading memory of the colonial period. However, contrary to these expectations, the conflict between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo worsened following two incidents. The first incident was the negotiation to revise the ROK-Japan Fisheries Agreement between 1996 and 1997. The ROK and Japanese governments, which were negotiating to revise the ROK-Japan Fisheries Agreement signed in 1965, did not yield on their respective claims to Dokdo, and the negotiations ultimately failed. Although the Kim Dae-jung administration in South Korea and the Obuchi Keizo (小淵惠三) cabinet in Japan succeeded in concluding a new ROK-Japan Fisheries Agreement in 1998, the Dokdo sovereignty issue was not explicitly addressed in the agreement, and the dispute over Dokdo continued. The second incident was the announcement of the “Takeshima Day” ordinance by Shimane Prefecture in Japan. In March 2005, Shimane Prefecture announced an ordinance establishing February 22nd as “Takeshima Day,” which significantly escalated the conflict between the two countries over the Dokdo issue. At that time, the Roh Moo-hyun administration in South Korea announced a “New Doctrine towards Japan” through a joint statement by the Blue House and the Standing Committee of the National Security Council.

The repercussions of the sharp confrontation between South Korea and Japan, which occurred from the “Government of the People” to the “Participatory Government,” have had a considerable impact on the leadership of both governments today. The difficulties faced by the Lee Myung-bak administration, which had pledged to develop ROK-Japan relations to a “mature” stage, are particularly significant. Despite the active efforts made by the Lee Myung-bak administration over the past two and a half years to restore and develop ROK-Japan relations, these efforts have been underestimated and have not received sufficient attention. Immediately after his election victory in the 2007 presidential election, President Lee Myung-bak pursued several important policies to improve ROK-Japan relations, which had become strained due to the anti-imperialist historical perception of the previous administration. Under the banner of “seeking common ground while reserving differences” (求同存異), which emphasizes pursuing common interests while leaving areas of disagreement aside, President Lee emphasized the pragmatic pursuit of mutual interests. In other words, he departed from the previous government’s stance of making the Japanese government’s official apology and remorse for its colonial past a prerequisite for improving ROK-Japan relations. In this context, President Lee Myung-bak made it clear that he would strive to enhance cooperation with Japan, an indispensable regional partner. This was concretely demonstrated by his invitation not only to then-Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (福田康夫) but also to former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori (森喜朗) and former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (中曽根康弘) to his inauguration ceremony.

However, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s efforts to elevate the level of ROK-Japan cooperation faced a serious challenge. In July 2008, it became known through South Korean media that the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN) had decided to classify the sovereignty designation of Dokdo under the category “UU” (Undesignated Sovereignty). In response, the South Korean government mobilized various diplomatic channels, including direct contact with U.S. President George W. Bush, to request the withdrawal of the board’s decision. Three days after the decision became known, the government succeeded in restoring the sovereignty designation of Dokdo as Korean territory.

Following the U.S. Board on Geographic Names incident, in July 2008, the Fukuda administration’s authorization of detailed references to the Dokdo issue in the explanatory guidelines for Japanese junior high school social studies textbooks provoked anger among Koreans. Furthermore, this decision was made in disregard of the South Korean government’s request for Japan to refrain from any mention of the Dokdo issue. This explanatory guideline, which is to be reflected from 2012, mentions the dispute over Dokdo sovereignty between South Korea and Japan for the first time in history, including Japan’s position that “Takeshima is an inherent territory of Japan.”

The recent incidents involving the U.S. Board on Geographic Names and Japanese junior high school social studies textbooks might suggest that the Dokdo issue cannot be resolved through “pragmatic approaches” or “quiet diplomacy.” Many people believe that more assertive actions must be taken regarding the Dokdo issue to achieve decisive results, and it is difficult for a democratic government to ignore such public opinion.

However, it is unreasonable to evaluate the complex and intertwined Dokdo issue solely on absolute criteria of victory and defeat. We must remember that the assertive diplomacy of the previous South Korean government, stemming from the “fundamental ways” of defending its sovereignty over Dokdo, has often resulted in narrowing South Korea’s position in its relations with Japan.

For example, by adopting a publicly assertive stance in 2005, the Participatory Government weakened the credibility of its own claim that the Japanese government was “irrational” and “confrontational.” In its joint statement, the National Security Council’s Standing Committee accused Japan’s claim to Dokdo sovereignty of being “not merely a territorial dispute, but an act of denying the history of liberation and justifying past aggression,” and declared that it would “respond using all available means” and build ROK-Japan relations based on “universal human values and common sense in the future.” However, to those unfamiliar with the historical background of ROK-Japan relations, the statement appeared to acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, as the South Korean government itself defined the incident at the time as a “serious threat to national security.” Furthermore, while the South Korean government invoked universal human values and justice in handling the Dokdo sovereignty issue, its refusal to submit the issue to the International Court of Justice for objective resolution under international law led to misunderstandings among observers of the situation.

Another example of the counterproductive effects of assertive diplomacy is the U.S. Board on Geographic Names’ decision to change the sovereignty designation of Dokdo to “Undesignated Area.” While the Geographic Names Board left unchanged the designations for 58 other cases, including the Senkaku Islands and the Southern Kuril Islands, which are similar to the Dokdo issue, it uniquely altered the sovereignty designation for Dokdo. This decision by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names can be interpreted in two ways. First, it was merely a “technical” decision to update the world geographic names database, which had been significantly delayed. The South Korean government also pursued a diplomatic campaign to promote the parallel use of “Sea of Japan” and “East Sea” and proposed adherence to international standards and practices, in order not to escalate the issue into an overly political one. However, second, the U.S. Board on Geographic Names’ decision can be interpreted as being based on strategic considerations. This could be seen as a clearer indication of the U.S. official stance on disputes over island territories in East Asia. That is, the U.S. has no authority to take a position on the sovereignty claims of various stakeholders concerning island territories, and the U.S. military will not intervene in the event of conflict in the vicinity of these islands. As mentioned earlier, since the mid-1990s, South Korea and Japan have clashed during the process of revising the existing ROK-Japan Fisheries Agreement to comply with the new international maritime regime based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in 1982. Having witnessed Japan’s aggressive territorial policy and South Korea’s strong reaction to it, the U.S. government may have judged Dokdo to be the conflict zone with the highest risk of U.S. military involvement and determined that maintaining neutrality in this area was a more urgent measure than in other East Asian island dispute areas.

Ultimately, the evaluation of South Korea’s and Japan’s Dokdo policies depends not on “how assertively they are pursued,” but on “how persuasively they can present their claims to Dokdo.” If a country’s Dokdo policy can make more people sympathize with the logic presented by that country, then that policy can be considered effective. In this regard, it is highly likely that Japan will continue to mention the Dokdo issue more frequently in its public education and domestic political arena. Both the current Democratic Party-led coalition government and the conservative Liberal Democratic Party are in a position where they cannot ignore the nationalistic sentiments present within Japanese society or completely reject populism in order to secure a sufficient political standing for their top leadership.

A prime example of this is Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s (菅直人) statement released on August 10th. In his statement, Prime Minister Kan acknowledged Japan’s colonial rule over Korea as “conducted against the will of the Korean people” and expressed “deep remorse and heartfelt apology,” but he carefully avoided explicitly acknowledging legal responsibility for the atrocities committed by Japan during the colonial period. He also avoided mentioning North Korea in his statement, fearing a loss of bargaining power on the issue of Japanese abductions, and did not address compensation for Koreans who suffered due to forced labor and the comfort women issue. As a result, Prime Minister Kan’s statement can be seen as another gesture of goodwill, but it did not prove that Japan is ready to handle historical issues with a wise and sincere attitude.

Japan, which is in dispute with Russia and China over island sovereignty in addition to the Dokdo issue, finds it difficult to exercise flexibility in negotiations with South Korea. Any change in Japan’s position on the Dokdo issue, however minor, would directly affect Japan’s negotiating power in other ongoing disputes. Furthermore, Japan’s Dokdo policy cannot be separated from its obsession with the four northern Kuril Islands. The reason Japan uses the term “loss” in relation to the Dokdo sovereignty issue reflects a deep-seated sense of victimhood experienced by Japan since World War II. Until a breakthrough is achieved in the negotiations with Russia regarding the Kuril Islands, it will be difficult for Japan to deviate from its current Dokdo policy and adopt a new one.

It is certainly frustrating for everyone that ROK-Japan relations remain in a state of stalemate, with the Dokdo issue festering. However, considering the complexity of the issue, the status quo can be evaluated positively, and we believe that a solution can only be found through a pragmatic approach. In December 2008, the Hatoyama administration decided not to include any mention of Dokdo in the new explanatory guidelines for curriculum, including the high school Geography A and Geography B curricula to be implemented from the 2013 academic year. While this decision may seem trivial, it should be evaluated as a significant political move, considering that both countries are preparing to jointly mark the “100th anniversary of the Japan-Korea Annexation.” The resolution of the unstable Dokdo issue must begin with the condition that leaders of both countries can develop a relationship based on trust from a relationship based on interests by pursuing mutual pragmatic diplomacy.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is receiving financial support as a core research institution selected for the MacArthur Foundation’s “Asia Security Initiative” program. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When citing [EAI Commentary], please be sure to acknowledge the source. This manuscript represents the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute.