[EAI Commentary No. 10] After the Cheonan Warship UN Security Council Diplomacy: Towards a "Post-Kim Jong-il" Strategy Beyond "Post-Cheonan Warship"

A Chairman's Statement of the UN Security Council regarding the Cheonan Warship incident has been adopted. As expected, a compromise statement with some room for dual interpretation has been produced. Consequently, a second round of debate over the interpretation of the statement is underway among South Korea and the U.S., North Korea and China, and within domestic political factions.

However, the debate over the success or failure of the Cheonan Warship diplomacy, while perhaps politically significant, is extremely unproductive from the perspective of national interest. At this juncture, it is more important to accurately read the international politics surrounding the Cheonan Warship diplomacy and formulate a meticulous strategy than to debate the interpretation of the Chairman's Statement.

The Cheonan Warship diplomacy unfolded as a consistently multi-faceted and complex game. At the global level, it involved the great power game between the U.S. and China; at the Northeast Asian level, the triangular game among South Korea, North Korea, and China; and domestic political games were intertwined, creating a complex landscape. The significance of China's diplomatic strategy in East Asia and globally was once again confirmed, as was the U.S. position of having no choice but to resolve pending issues through compromise with China. We also learned the lesson that the strategic relationship between South Korea and China remains fragile, and that pending issues in inter-Korean relations cannot be smoothly resolved without deep discussion and agreement between the two countries regarding North Korea's future. The necessity of a government strategy that skillfully handles diplomatic issues intertwined with domestic politics is beyond question.

First, the power struggle between the U.S. and China, which unfolded at the beginning of the year concerning the four major pending issues, has once again manifested in the Cheonan Warship diplomacy. The outcome was not a decisive victory for either side, but a compromise. The confrontation surrounding the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in the West Sea, scheduled to be conducted in July, will likely also be resolved through adjustments in the location and scale of the exercises.

It is unlikely that the U.S. and China will spend further time on the Cheonan Warship issue, for which they have barely reached a compromise. The stage will rapidly shift to the issue of North Korea's denuclearization. China has already stated its position of concluding the Cheonan Warship incident for the time being with the adoption of the Chairman's Statement and resuming the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. also needs to inject momentum into the denuclearization issue to realize Obama's vision of a "world without nuclear weapons." Given that the U.S. has already achieved relative effects such as the consolidation of the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Japan alliances and containment of China through the Cheonan Warship incident, there is no reason for the U.S. to object to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks if North Korea shows some degree of sincerity. The U.S. and China will engage in concrete discussions on the conditions and modalities for resuming the Six-Party Talks.

Meanwhile, our government has adhered to the principle of "Six-Party Talks after the Cheonan Warship." This was unavoidable for our security and served as a strong warning to North Korea. North Korea, to escape the self-contradictory trap of the Cheonan Warship, made maximum efforts in North Korea-China relations through Kim Jong-il's visit to China, and immediately after the adoption of the July 9th Security Council Chairman's Statement, it brought up the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

However, even after the Security Council Chairman's Statement, a fundamentalist approach that links the Cheonan Warship issue to all other security issues is not advisable. As the U.S.-China global game has already shifted to the Six-Party Talks, remaining solely focused on Cheonan Warship diplomacy means ignoring the reality of international politics. Koizumi's diplomacy regarding the abduction issue in Japan serves as a good cautionary tale. At the very least, it is advisable for the government to pursue a two-track strategy that simultaneously addresses the resolution of the Cheonan Warship incident and the Six-Party Talks process. Efforts to resolve the Cheonan Warship incident should be continuously pursued, while simultaneously demanding North Korea's unconditional return to the Six-Party Talks and the resumption of denuclearization measures. Given that North Korea caused the sinking of the Cheonan Warship following its second nuclear test, it is unacceptable to accept the lifting of sanctions first.

The response at the inter-Korean relations level is more difficult. While inter-Korean relations must ultimately be normalized, the Cheonan Warship incident cannot be simply overlooked as if nothing happened. North Korea's apology, punishment of those responsible, and measures to prevent recurrence, as presented by President Lee Myung-bak in his May 24th statement, are the basic conditions for normalizing inter-Korean relations. However, it is unlikely that this will be achieved in the short term. Realistically, the resolution of the Cheonan Warship incident is likely to face a similar fate to past major incidents in inter-Korean relations history, such as the Korean War invasion, the KAL 007 bombing, and the Rangoon bombing. The complete and fundamental resolution of the Cheonan Warship incident will only be possible through a transformation of North Korea's military-first regime. It is essential to take this opportunity to correct North Korea's misguided military-first policy and re-establish the framework for inter-Korean relations. Approaching inter-Korean relations and North Korea policy from a "post-Cheonan Warship" perspective is fully understandable in a similar context to the Bush administration's establishment of security strategy from a "post-9/11" perspective after the 9/11 attacks.

However, preparing for the post-Kim Jong-il era is as urgent as resolving the Cheonan Warship incident. The formation of a post-Kim Jong-il regime will have a decisive impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and the fate of North Korea and the peninsula could change accordingly. With the official announcement of Kim Jong-il's succession expected around 2012, the so-called first year of a strong nation and the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth, the Party Delegates' Conference announced for this September is also significant. The issue of nuclear weapons and inter-Korean relations will stand at a crossroads depending on whether North Korea continues its military-first legacy rule after Kim Jong-il or moves towards reform and opening.

Henceforth, our North Korea strategy should focus on guiding the post-Kim Jong-il regime in a desirable direction. To this end, there are specific considerations. First, the issue of how to employ hard power. While securing defensive capabilities against all potential unstable situations, sanctions against North Korea should be maintained until a sincere response from North Korea is received, but measures that could provoke unnecessary conflict should be approached with caution. The operation of loudspeakers facing North Korea is a prime example. Unnecessary escalation of military tensions will only weaken domestic political support for government policies.

Second, the utilization of soft power. It is particularly necessary to more actively propose a new inter-Korean relations framework for new economic development policies so that North Korea's post-Kim Jong-il regime can persuasively pursue denuclearization and economic development domestically. In the current situation where all existing inter-Korean agreements have been effectively nullified, a more mature framework is needed to manage overall inter-Korean relations. In particular, the post-Kim denuclearization and economic development regime must co-evolve with South Korea's efforts to provide comprehensive regime guarantees and prosperity support for North Korea policy.

Finally, the utilization of network power. Even if direct inter-Korean channels are difficult to operate, civilian networks should be kept open, and various networks that can influence North Korea's policy decisions, such as North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations, should be established and utilized. In particular, if a new paradigm for South Korea's North Korea strategy that can lead future developments is presented at this juncture, and strategic support from neighboring countries is secured, we will be able to navigate the difficult situations that lie ahead.■

Chairman

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Member

Chun Jae-sung (Seoul National University)

Han Seok-hee (Yonsei University)

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