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[EAI Commentary No. 5] President Obama's Asia Trip and Visit to Korea: Achievements and Challenges

Category
Commentary and Issue Briefing
Published
June 4, 2020
EAI_Commentary_no5.pdf
EAI_Commentary_no5.pdf

President Obama inherited from the Bush administration a triple crisis of security, economy, and soft power that threatens America's global leadership. He has been making strenuous efforts to maintain U.S. leadership in the post-crisis era through visits to various regions of the world. Following Europe and the Middle East, the U.S. has completed its Asia trip, pursuing both a regional strategy for East Asia and individual country strategies, while simultaneously addressing various issues of global strategy. President Obama conveyed the message that the United States will remain an important power in Asia in the future, as it has been in the past, and will exert continuous influence on key issues such as security, economy, environment, and culture through various networks including bilateral alliances, great power relations, and multilateralism. This intention is well reflected in the itinerary and format of the trip. President Obama's Asia trip placed the two allies, Japan and Korea, at the beginning and end, with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) multilateral diplomacy and diplomacy with China, a major power, in the middle. In particular, by dedicating 3 to 4 days out of the 7-night, 8-day trip to China, he emphasized that diplomacy with China is important not only for East Asia but also on a global scale, and that cooperation with China is crucial across all issues.

In his speech at Suntory Hall in Tokyo, President Obama presented a vision of East Asia that transcends zero-sum games, an East Asia where the rise and development of one country does not harm the development of others—a positive-sum game. The United States sought to clarify its pursuit of diverse Asian partnerships through bilateral alliances, multilateral cooperation, and great power cooperation with China in East Asia. Currently, East Asian countries are each pursuing their own foreign policy strategies in the rapidly changing international environment of the 21st century. China is making every effort to create a favorable environment for its rise through 'harmonious diplomacy,' while Japan's newly emerged Democratic Party government is pursuing 'friendly diplomacy' that emphasizes an equal relationship with the United States and the concept of an Asian community, moving beyond its previous one-sided diplomacy towards the U.S. The Lee Myung-bak administration in Korea is striving to establish a new standing in East Asia under the banner of pragmatic diplomacy. In the context where the diplomatic strategies of the three Northeast Asian countries converge, the diplomatic principle that the United States has put forth so far is 'balanced' diplomacy. However, there is still a long way to go to fully reveal its specific content through this trip alone. While advocating for balanced partnerships as a leading power in Asia, it remains to be seen how the U.S. will manage East Asia with a rising China, a Japan that has begun to voice criticism, and North Korea challenging with nuclear weapons.

In the 20 hours spent in Korea, which concluded the 7-night, 8-day Asia trip, it is necessary to carefully examine the present and future of Korea-U.S. relations. While Korea is developing relations with the United States through various networks, the visit provided an opportunity to re-examine Korea-U.S. relations within the framework of President Obama's Asia trip, and to reflect on Korea's future strategy towards the U.S., as well as its regional and global strategies for East Asia.

Bilateral issues between Korea and the U.S. can be broadly categorized into the Korea-U.S. FTA, North Korea's nuclear program and related issues, and the Korea-U.S. alliance. During the short visit to Korea, the FTA was the issue that received substantial and concrete discussion. In his speech in Japan, President Obama pointed out that the essence of the economic crisis lies in global imbalances, particularly between Asian countries and the United States, and emphasized the establishment of new economic relations between the U.S. and Asian countries. To expand exports to Asia, which account for 25% of U.S. overseas exports, President Obama placed significant importance on improving trade relations with Asian countries. At the press conference immediately following the Korea-U.S. summit, President Obama expressed expectations for more balanced trade with Korea and showed a positive attitude towards the future progress of the Korea-U.S. FTA. On November 18, during his Asia trip, President Obama mentioned the importance of the Korea-U.S. FTA in an interview with Fox News, stating his commitment to working towards congressional ratification in the first or second half of the following year. During this visit, the two leaders discussed measures necessary for U.S. congressional ratification, and President Lee left room for further discussion, particularly in the automotive sector, after the summit press conference. It is noteworthy that, given the structural conditions requiring proactive U.S. economic policy towards Asia, President Obama's subsequent attention to the economic and strategic aspects for the advancement of the Korea-U.S. FTA is significant.

In the summit talks regarding North Korea's nuclear issue, the Korean side hoped to hear explicit approval from President Obama for Korea's 'Grand Bargain' proposal. It is understandable that a key objective for the South Korean government was to confirm the commonalities between the U.S.-proposed 'Comprehensive Package' and the Grand Bargain, and to reaffirm strong cooperation on North Korea policy. The question, however, is whether the Grand Bargain or the Comprehensive Package can truly resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. This is because North Korea, which views nuclear weapons as a matter of survival, finds a suitable level of 'bargaining' and negotiation difficult to accept. North Korea has repeatedly stated that verbal assurances of survival, economic assistance, and normalization of diplomatic relations are not sufficient conditions for denuclearization. North Korea's reaction to the proposals put forth by Korea and the United States remains negative, and even if North Korea participates in bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea with Special Envoy Bosworth, scheduled for early December, or multilateral talks including the Six-Party Talks, a strategic decision for denuclearization has not yet been made. As President Obama has emphasized, there is little likelihood that North Korea's policy pattern of repeatedly engaging in negotiations and provocations to gain concessions will change in the current situation.

In the absence of a comprehensive agreement that North Korea can genuinely accept, the current cooperation between Korea and the U.S. is unlikely to achieve significant progress beyond sustained pressure on North Korea and urging its strategic decision-making. This summit did not seem to establish a new breakthrough but rather confirmed the common ground currently shared by both countries and reached a consensus on the need for further discussion on future alternatives.

There remain many unresolved issues regarding the future direction of the strategic alliance in the 21st century. More thought must be given to how the Korea-U.S. alliance can contribute to peace in the region amidst changing power dynamics in Northeast Asia, in which areas global cooperation can be advanced, and how to persuade China, which views the Korea-U.S. alliance critically. The issue of dispatching a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan, in particular, should be addressed more profoundly not only in terms of concretizing the Korea-U.S. alliance but also from the perspective of considering Korea's future role as a middle power in the global security environment. More specifically, considerations should include the deployment area, the scale and armament level of non-combat troops, the possibility of cooperation with U.S. forces, the necessity of achieving domestic consensus, and communication issues between the government and the public.

The considerations regarding the future direction of the Korea-U.S. alliance naturally lead to the question of how Korea and the United States should shape the new order in East Asia. While discussions on cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan, and further, on an East Asian community, are indeed far from realization, existing in a dual reality of dreams and reality. The United States is in a difficult position where it must neither hinder new cooperation networks among Korea, China, and Japan, nor assist them in a way that favors one side. East Asia is currently undergoing a massive systemic transformation. At its core is the challenge of managing China's rise as a regional hegemon. A foundation must be laid for Korea and the United States to work together to prevent China from becoming an expansionist great power. It is important to note that there is significant room for productive cooperation between Korea and the U.S. within the framework of institutionalization that can prevent and manage the increasing conflict-oriented elements among major powers in the East Asian order.

In addition to bilateral issues, the two leaders discussed global issues. They mentioned strengthening Korea-U.S. cooperation through the G20 and the need for cooperation on human security issues such as terrorism, climate change, and environmental conventions. President Obama's Asia trip clearly demonstrates that while the United States remains important in the world order, it can no longer solve all problems alone. To successfully address pressing issues such as global imbalances, climate and environment, and terrorism, it has become a situation where mutual assistance is necessary. The United States is currently in the process of confronting these issues but has not yet reached the stage of actual problem-solving. Korea has set its greenhouse gas target for 2020 as a '30% reduction from the business-as-usual scenario,' which should lead to improving Korea's economic structure and strengthening global environmental protection. If these efforts are successful, they could provide a fresh impetus to the United States. In the future, the U.S. must become a smart power that actively plays the role of a leader while also fully understanding the sentiments of other nations and working together with them.

The current world order is not so much changing from G8 to G20 as it is embracing various forms of groups within the G20 framework, much like Russian Matryoshka dolls. A country is needed to serve as a bridge connecting these diverse groups. Korea, in cooperation with the U.S. and as the chair of the G20, should actively play this bridging role, which will also benefit U.S. national interests in the long term. In this process, Korea should strive to become a civilization-standard nation that sets global standards, drawing upon its historical experience of transforming from one of the world's poorest authoritarian states to an emerging economic democracy in just half a century.■


Chairperson

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Member

Lee Sook-jong (President, EAI, Sungkyunkwan University)

Jeon Jae-seong (Seoul National University)

[EAI Commentary] aims to present in-depth analysis and relevant policy alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When citing [EAI Commentary], please ensure proper attribution.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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