[EAI Issue Brief] The Crisis in Korea-Japan Relations Requires Political Change: Analysis of the Results of the `7th Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey` and Discussions from the `7th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue`

[Editor's Note]

This issue brief is a report primarily authored by Director Son Yeol, based on the results of the Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey jointly conducted by EAI and Genron NPO this year, and discussions from the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue. Relations between Korea and Japan are in a crisis of trust due to the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor compensation and the Japanese military's radar lock-on incident late last year. However, the public opinion survey revealed that the people of both countries perceive their respective governments and private sectors differently. The author analyzes this 'decoupling phenomenon between government and private sectors' as indicative of room for improvement in bilateral relations, primarily driven by the private sector.

※ The following is an excerpt from this issue brief.

Korea-Japan Relations Unable to Hold Summits

Current Korea-Japan relations are in a crisis of trust. As seen in the Japanese military's radar lock-on incident late last year, an issue that could have been resolved with a single phone call between the leaders of both countries escalated into an emotional dispute and an international debate over the facts. Both countries have lowered their strategic assessment of each other, avoided cooperation, and engaged in behavior and rhetoric that disregards the other, leading to a situation where bilateral summits could not be held at the G20 summit.

However, the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations is strictly speaking a deterioration of government-level relations. Private exchanges remain active, and South Korea's favorability towards Japan has actually increased. In South Korea, the decoupling trend between the government and the private sector is evident. In contrast, it is noteworthy that in Japan, public opinion shows a trend of synchronizing with the deterioration of government-level relations. While anti-Japan sentiment in Korea is weakening, anti-Korea sentiment in Japan is strengthening and tending to become the 'new normal'.

Despite this, both publics do not view the current situation as worse than the conflicts during the previous Park Geun-hye administration, and they emphasize the necessity of economic and security cooperation more than ever before. Consequently, their assessment of the governments of both countries, which are unable to resolve the current deadlock, is critical. Only one in five South Koreans positively assesses the Korean government's policy toward Japan, and one in four Japanese people positively assesses the Japanese government's policy toward Korea. The favorability and trust towards the leaders of the opposing government have hit rock bottom.

The problem lies with the government and politics. The deep emotional rift between political leaders exacerbates the situation, creating an environment where negative public opinion is amplified and leaders can politically exploit it, forming a vicious cycle. The private sector is suffering due to government disputes. The key to restoring Korea-Japan relations lies in how to block the negative spillover effects of government-level relations, that is, the negative impact from the government to the private sector.

If the established generation of politicians, bureaucrats, and media currently in power fail to shed their stereotypes about the other country, the future of Korea-Japan relations is bleak. On the other hand, the driving force behind increased favorability towards the other country in both nations is the younger generation (20s-30s). This generation, less exposed to traditional media and older generation politics that convey negative stereotypes about the other country, perceives the other country through direct experiences such as visiting the country and indirect experiences via new media like social media. Ultimately, only when a political force emerges that represents and develops the new way of thinking shown by the younger generation can the reconstruction of Korea-Japan relations become possible.

The New Normal in Korea-Japan Relations: Korea and Japan Moving in Opposite Directions

The assessment that Korea-Japan relations are at their worst since normalization is repeated almost every year. This implies that the worst situation is being renewed annually. In particular, the past year has seen numerous conflict situations, including the controversy over the Rising Sun Flag at the Jeju International Naval Ceremony, the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, the Supreme Court's ruling on compensation for forced labor, the dispute over the Japanese military's radar lock-on incident, the controversy over pro-Japanese collaborators, and the controversy over holding a Korea-Japan summit at the Osaka G20 Summit. These incidents have invariably led to emotional confrontation between the governments of both countries and fueled negative public opinion. The Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, in particular, has become a symbolic event in the deterioration of bilateral relations. The Japanese government, viewing this ruling as undermining the foundation of the 1965 Korea-Japan Treaty, responded with extreme language such as calling it a 'outrage and a challenge to the international order,' and urged the Korean government to take swift and strong action. In response, the Korean government proposed a plan to establish a fund led by private companies from both countries in mid-June, but for seven months, it effectively failed to present a response, leading to accusations of disregard from the Japanese side and the failure to hold a bilateral summit.

The results of the EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey over the past seven years indicate that the decline in Japanese favorability towards Korea reflects this long-term conflict trend (Figure 1). The percentage of Japanese respondents who responded 'good' or 'generally good' to their impression of Korea has steadily declined from 31.1% in 2013 to 20.0%. Conversely, the percentage of negative perceptions has also declined from 37.3% in 2013 to 49.9% in 2019.

Interestingly, the opposite phenomenon is occurring in Korea. The percentage of Korean respondents who responded 'good' or 'generally good' to their impression of Japan has shown an increasing trend year by year, reaching 31.7% this year, following 26.8% (2017) and 28.3% (2018). Negative perceptions of Japan among Koreans have also significantly decreased from 76.6% in 2013 to 49.9% in 2019.

[Figure 1] Impression of the Other Country (2013-2019)

Decoupling of Government and Private Sector

The case of the radar lock-on incident dispute between the two governments, which symbolized the confrontation, shows that government-level conflicts significantly impacted private perceptions. Judging the radar incident requires highly specialized knowledge of military technology, making it difficult for the general public to form their own opinions. Therefore, people tend to rely heavily on government announcements and the subsequent media coverage, and public opinion in both countries unilaterally supports their own government's position. 62.9% of Japanese respondents thought the Japanese government was right, and 61.9% of Korean respondents thought the Korean government was right. On the other hand, not a single Japanese respondent thought the Korean government was right, and only 3.1% of Korean respondents thought the Japanese government was right. The percentage of Korean and Japanese respondents who answered 'not interested in the radar incident' or 'don't know' was 26.7% and 31.7%, respectively. Given the nature of the issue, where truth can only be one, the stark difference in perception between the two publics can only be attributed to the influence of the government-level confrontation.

Despite the clear differences in preferences for specific policies between the two publics, the fact that decoupling is occurring in overall favorability towards the other country offers significant insights for finding a starting point for improving relations. Public opinion is calling for an improvement in the strained government-level relations. 70.8% of South Koreans and 40.2% of Japanese people responded that 'efforts are needed for improvement' in restoring Korea-Japan relations. Here, the fact that South Korea, compared to Japan, relatively recognizes the importance of Korea-Japan relations more and shows a greater willingness to improve and restore them is a point that confirms the difference in perception between the two countries once again.

Solid Public Support for Korea-Japan Cooperation

The reason why the publics of both Korea and Japan are calling for improved relations lies in their emphasis on the benefits of cooperation in practical terms. Both publics hold very positive views on Korea-Japan cooperation in terms of security and economy. Regarding the necessity of the ROK-US and Japan-US alliances for their respective countries' security, 58.6% of Koreans responded that 'the Japan-US alliance is necessary for Korea.' This is approximately three times higher than the respondents who answered 'the Japan-US alliance is not necessary for Korea' (20.7%). Among Japanese respondents, the proportion who answered that the ROK-US alliance is necessary for Japan was also the highest at 40.4%, which is about four times higher than the 11.5% who answered 'it is not necessary'.

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Viewed in this light, the Korean public desires improved relations with Japan and supports cooperation with Japan in both security and economic aspects. Therefore, they are critical of the current government's policy toward Japan, which appears to be experiencing difficulties in improving relations and seems hesitant in security and economic cooperation. Regarding the Moon Jae-in administration's response and attitude toward Japan, 21.5% of Koreans gave a positive assessment, while 35.4% gave a negative assessment. In Japan, regarding the 'Abe administration's response and attitude toward Korea,' 26.1% responded 'doing well,' 29.3% 'average,' and 26.0% 'not doing well.' Approximately one in four people in both countries are satisfied with their own government's response and attitude toward the other country.

Convergence of Perceptions on North Korean Denuclearization and China between Korea and Japan

In the 2018 opinion poll, perceptions of North Korean denuclearization were an area where the perceptions of Korea and Japan sharply diverged. The optimistic perception of North Korean denuclearization among Koreans last year has shifted back towards negativity this year. Only 31.4% of Koreans responded that 'denuclearization will be realized,' a significant decrease of 27.9 percentage points from 59.3% last year. Among these, 1.7% believed 'denuclearization will be realized in the short term,' and 29.7% believed 'denuclearization will be realized but will take a long time.' In contrast, the proportion of respondents who answered 'denuclearization will ultimately not be realized' increased from 8.9% last year to 25.0% in 2019. Japan also saw an increase in negative perceptions regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Similar to Korea, the response rate for 'denuclearization will be realized' decreased, and 'denuclearization will ultimately not be realized' increased by 11.1 percentage points from last year to 29.0%. Furthermore, the option added this year, 'I never thought denuclearization would be realized from the beginning,' was answered by a relatively high 18.4% of Japanese respondents.

Thus, regarding the long-term realization of denuclearization, Korea shows a slightly more positive response rate, 16.5 percentage points higher than Japan. However, in both countries, the proportion of respondents who think 'cannot judge at the moment' and 'denuclearization will ultimately not be realized' are the highest and show similar distributions. This contrasts with the significant difference in perceptions between the two countries in 2017.

Conclusion

The results of this opinion poll suggest that Korean society is undergoing changes. First, perceptions of Japan are steadily improving. Despite the worsening government-level relations, the trend of weakening anti-Japan sentiment continues. Second, the prevailing voice calls for security and economic cooperation with Japan. Third, South Korea's external outlook is gradually converging with that of Japan, as seen in perceptions of North Korea and China.

Japanese citizens hold a stereotype that Korea is dominated by anti-Japan sentiment, hesitates in security and economic cooperation with Japan, leans towards China rather than Japan, and prioritizes inter-Korean relations due to favorable feelings towards North Korea. The Japanese government tends to handle its policy toward Korea based on this, and sometimes amplifies it. The Korean government has also pursued its policy toward Japan by taking the public's anti-Japan sentiment as a constant.

Korean nationalism, which began as resistance to Japanese imperialism, has for a long time been expressed as anti-Japan sentiment, constraining the policy flexibility of the government. Despite democratization and globalization, the hegemonic status of this sentiment has not easily been shaken. The established generation's government leaders, political circles, and media/broadcasting industry, which form the mainstream of Korean society, are not free from anti-Japan sentiment themselves and are, in fact, perpetuating stereotypes.

Conversely, a quiet wave of change is gaining momentum, breaking down the stereotypes of the older generation, particularly among the youth. This is a new thinking paradigm that pursues economic and security interests and achieves cultural empathy beyond rigid anti-Japan sentiment.

The problem is politics. The existing political order struggles to accommodate the demands for change emerging from the younger generation. The generational monopoly of consciousness structure centered around the '586 generation' and the winner-take-all political system in Korean politics hinder the entry of the new generation and new thinking.

Regardless of emotional disputes, Korea and Japan share cultural commonalities, security and economic interests, and democratic values, giving their conflict a downward rigidity. Therefore, current Korea-Japan relations can enter a recovery phase through partial policy adjustments and a change in momentum. Nevertheless, even with the synergistic effects of shared interests, bilateral relations have limitations in their upward trajectory due to the structural constraint of identity conflict. For both societies to overcome the vicious cycle of alternating anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiment, institutional conditions must be created that allow for the entry of the new generation and new thinking. Only then will the full-scale reconstruction of Korea-Japan relations commence.

■ Lead Author: Son Yeol, Director of EAI and Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, Dean of Underwood International College, and President of the Association for Japanese Studies. He is currently the President of the Korean Political Science Association. His main research areas include international political economy, Japanese foreign policy, and East Asian international relations. His recent publications include:Japan and Asia's Contested Order(2018, with T.J. Pempel), Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy(2017, co-edited with Kim Sang-bae and Lee Seung-ju), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen).

■ Responsible Editor: Kim Seyoung, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) I sykim@eai.or.kr

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Attachment: IssueBrief_CrisisInKoreaJapanRelations.pdf