[EAI Briefing Issues] New Year’s Address of North Korea and Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Issue in 2019

[Note from the editor]

With high-level talks imminent to prepare for the second North Korea-U.S. summit, U.S. Vice President Pence has repeatedly urged North Korea to take concrete denuclearization measures. The U.S. appears to be employing a dual strategy of 'dialogue and pressure' towards North Korea. Nevertheless, EAI experts analyze that the likelihood of a second North Korea-U.S. summit is high, as both sides are pinning their hopes on a direct negotiation between the leaders. However, they predict that if the second North Korea-U.S. summit is held without South Korea and the U.S. having prepared concrete alternatives for North Korea, for whom denuclearization is not merely a bargaining chip but a fundamental issue concerning the security of its regime, the process will face further difficulties afterward. Furthermore, this briefing discusses the conflicting assessments of North Korea’s New Year's address and South Korea’s future response strategies to the North Korean nuclear issue. This briefing has been primarily authored by EAI Director of the Center for International Relations, Jeon Sung-bae (Professor at Seoul National University), based on discussions from the New Year’s roundtable organized by EAI at the beginning of the year.

Conflicting Assessments of North Korea's New Year's Address

Following the release of North Korea’s New Year’s address for 2019, the views of the South Korean government and various domestic and international experts on North Korea's strategy and intentions have been diverse and even contradictory. Even within the United States, a key player in North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, there are differing opinions between President Trump and U.S. expert groups. Optimistic views on North Korea's denuclearization suggest that Kim Jong-un has already made a strategic decision for complete denuclearization, is focusing on a line of all-out economic mobilization, and is genuinely pursuing phased denuclearization measures, while acknowledging that negotiations are facing difficulties due to mutual distrust between North Korea and the U.S. and the U.S.'s lukewarm compensation. Pessimistic views argue that North Korea's intention for complete denuclearization is inherently unclear, and that while its nuclear and missile capabilities are being enhanced in a situation falling short of a freeze, it is pursuing the weakening of the ROK-U.S. alliance, maximization of economic compensation, strengthening of relations with China and Russia, and ultimately, recognition as a nuclear-armed state. Such completely different interpretations of the same text can be attributed to the readers' wishful thinking and their pre-existing perceptions and belief systems regarding North Korea, but also because North Korea's New Year's address itself is intended to create strategic ambiguity and allow for diverse interpretations. The New Year's address presents North Korea's maximum expectations and thus contains its own wishful thinking and highly sophisticated strategies for achieving future objectives.

The first characteristic of this New Year's address is the emphasis on the economy and a strong desire for development. The word 'economy' is mentioned 38 times, a significant increase compared to 21 times in 2018 and 18 times in 2017. Content-wise, there is a notable emphasis on the self-reliant economy, qualitative improvement in people's living standards, and a desire to showcase achievements externally. In particular, there are many mentions of self-reliant economic elements such as indigenous technology, indigenous resources, revolutionary zeal, and creative innovation, reflecting North Korea's perspective on the economy, including the emphasis on the achievements of construction projects. Another characteristic of this year's New Year's address is the emphasis on the welfare of farmers and coal miners. However, the crucial point is that the decision for an all-out economic mobilization line does not lead to a strategic change in economic development methods. The economic development strategy remains within the framework of socialism, bound by the demands of socialist distribution principles and a party-centered economic development strategy, revealing limitations in the search for new systems. In other words, while mentioning various sectors such as electricity, coal, and tourism development under the banner of a socialist self-reliant economy, it does not present a vision that fundamentally transcends existing approaches. Therefore, the strategy presented in this New Year's address, which shows how North Korea's leadership perceives the economy and what range of strategic choices it is exploring for a qualitative leap in the North Korean economy, offers limited potential to revolutionarily transform North Korea's economic reality and the lives of its people. Furthermore, it is difficult to view this strategy as an economic development line that takes denuclearization into account, as it envisues continued economic sanctions while pursuing economic self-reliance, making the connection between economic development strategy and strategic decisions for denuclearization ambiguous.

Second, while the New Year's address clearly prohibits the production, use, deployment, and transfer of nuclear weapons, it is unclear whether this signifies a nuclear freeze as a step towards denuclearization demanded by the international community. Some emphasize the mention of the word 'denuclearization' and view the newly declared cessation of nuclear weapon production as a meaningful step towards denuclearization. However, others criticize it as a passive policy that does not include the continued production of fissile materials, ongoing development of nuclear technology, and advancement of ballistic missiles, and thus remains distant from a freeze. Notably, even within the U.S., while some express cautious optimism about North Korea's progressive policies, many still consider it an ambiguous policy falling short of a nuclear freeze. President Trump, immediately after the announcement of North Korea's New Year's address, expressed delight at North Korea's remarks on nuclear weapons, sent a message expressing confidence in North Korea's economic potential, and showed anticipation for Kim Jong-un's letter. The possibility of a second North Korea-U.S. summit continues to be mentioned.

North Korea views the phased and synchronized approach as agreed upon with the U.S. through the Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit and is pursuing a de facto arms reduction negotiation, aiming for complete denuclearization depending on the situation. President Trump assumes North Korea's willingness for complete denuclearization and has accepted a phased approach, but the difference in views between North Korea and the U.S. regarding the concept of complete denuclearization has not been resolved. North Korea presents various preconditions prior to North Korea's denuclearization, under the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, the U.S. finds it difficult to accept preconditions without complete denuclearization being established. With numerous challenges remaining, such as submitting a list of all nuclear and missile capabilities as demanded by the U.S., objective verification by the international community including the U.S., and the disposal of already produced nuclear weapons, easing economic sanctions and initiating peace regime negotiations are not easy.

Third, while North Korea's New Year's address assesses the progress in inter-Korean relations in 2018 as highly satisfactory, the tasks proposed for 2019 are formidable. After defining the inter-Korean military agreement as a de facto non-aggression treaty, North Korea proposes the resolution of military hostility across the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it demands the permanent suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the cessation of the import of strategic assets and equipment from external sources. It advocates for multilateral peace regime negotiations without discussing a declaration of the end of war, which is interpreted as being premised on China's participation. By demanding the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism, and stating that interference and intervention by external forces will never be tolerated, it also shows an intention to separate inter-Korean exchange and cooperation from the international sanctions regime.

The progress in inter-Korean relations, spanning military, economic, and peace regime negotiations, is essentially a complex issue involving the ROK-U.S. alliance, conventional arms reduction between North and South Korea, the international economic sanctions regime against North Korea, and the balance of power in Northeast Asia. The nature of the problem is international relations, and these are issues intrinsically linked to denuclearization negotiations. Furthermore, for South Korea, which must consider various factors, it is impossible to view this simply as a nationalistic issue, and North Korea's demands are premised on a clear strategic line that conflicts with this. The U.S. views North Korea's New Year's address demands as a strategic move considering the advancement of inter-Korean relations detached from denuclearization, the weakening of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the weakening of South Korea's conventional military posture, and the increased role of China, which will also affect North Korea-U.S. negotiations.

Possibility of the Second North Korea-U.S. Summit and Progress on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

The proposals presented in the New Year's address represent North Korea's maximum demands, and thus negotiations can progress if South Korea and the U.S. appropriately shape North Korea's options in response. On one hand, North Korea will engage in difficult negotiations with the U.S. regarding the conditions for denuclearization, and separately demand progress in inter-Korean relations, the early commencement of multilateral peace regime negotiations, and the easing of sanctions. If denuclearization negotiations do not proceed as desired, North Korea will seek 'a new path to defend the nation's sovereignty and the supreme interests of the state and achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,' as expressed in the New Year's address.

The key to North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula this year lies in the North Korea-U.S. summit. President Trump has stated that he expects a North Korea-U.S. summit to be held in the near future and commented that Chairman Kim Jong-un's letter was excellent. Given that both North Korea and the U.S. are anticipating a direct negotiation between their leaders, the possibility of a second summit is high. However, with existing differences in opinion between North Korea and the U.S. on the fundamental principles and concepts of denuclearization, it remains uncertain whether difficult issues not resolved in working-level talks can be resolved through leader-level dialogue. Even if a summit is held, the two leaders may fail to agree on clear principles for resolving fundamental issues and focus on short-term achievements, exchanging incentives that can be presented first. This could lead to another situation where significant issues remain unresolved in subsequent working-level talks, hindering progress.

North Korea's plan is to pursue de facto nuclear disarmament based on a phased and synchronized approach to problem-solving at the second North Korea-U.S. summit, and to decide on complete denuclearization in the final stage. As expressed in the New Year's address, if the U.S. does not move 'boldly from its chronic stance and make fair proposals based on mutual recognition and respect, with a proper negotiating attitude and willingness to resolve the issue,' North Korea will pursue a strategic path other than denuclearization. North Korea's concept of complete denuclearization refers to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including South Korea and the U.S., whereas the U.S.'s concept of complete denuclearization refers to the degree of North Korea's denuclearization. Since North Korea is pursuing denuclearization at the risk of its regime and political entity, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not merely a bargaining chip but a fundamental issue, making the security assurances provided by South Korea and the U.S. a critical topic. If the second North Korea-U.S. summit is held without concrete alternatives prepared for this, especially if President Trump is not adequately prepared with the core issues and future alternatives, further progress will face difficulties.

South Korea's Future Response Strategy to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Furthermore, the New Year's address outlines efforts to strengthen North Korea's capabilities in inter-Korean and foreign affairs, requiring an appropriate response from South Korea. First, it is crucial to recognize the significant gap between North Korea's goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the international community's goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. If North Korea's synchronized and phased approach signifies a process of nuclear disarmament negotiations, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to agree to this, as it will not accept phased nuclear disarmament without an overall framework for denuclearization negotiations. Conversely, if the U.S. pursues a policy of engagement without fundamentally considering the security of North Korea's regime and system and without offering fundamental engagement policies, North Korea will not be able to agree. The U.S.'s engagement policy must be prepared with a long-term vision for North Korea's denuclearization efforts.

Second, it must be recognized that it may take considerable time to reconcile the differences between North Korea and the U.S. The South Korean government emphasizes the holding of North Korea-U.S. talks to maintain the momentum of dialogue, but external coordination of views, power struggles, and even stalemates in negotiations can be necessary processes for successful future talks. Even if a second North Korea-U.S. summit is held, it is important to lay the groundwork for a third and fourth summit. Efforts must be made to converge views on objectives and processes through meticulous dialogue not only with North Korea and the U.S. but also with China and the international community. This process requires a long time, and therefore, South Korea must recognize that North Korea's denuclearization cannot be achieved in the short term.

Third, a complex strategy of pursuing engagement with North Korea and supporting its self-help efforts, while simultaneously maintaining military deterrence and sanctions, must be continuously pursued. While denuclearization negotiations, inter-Korean exchanges, cooperation, and peace regime negotiations are important, it is necessary to anticipate what military, diplomatic, and economic strategies North Korea will pursue after denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime, and what kind of competition and cooperation will characterize inter-Korean relations after the peace regime. Furthermore, a plan for desirable directions for North Korea's development, including North Korea's strategies and self-help efforts, must be presented. In this process, a comprehensive consideration is needed regarding the extent of military power South Korea will maintain for deterrence and the level at which economic sanctions will be used as a policy tool to induce North Korea's choices.

Fourth, in the midst of rapidly changing international dynamics, South Korea must plan for its regional strategy and the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In the context of U.S.-China competition, the issue of North Korea's denuclearization is proceeding in close connection with international dynamics, and South Korea's regional strategy and denuclearization strategy must be pursued simultaneously. In particular, the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance is bound to be a subject of deep consideration during the process of North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Short-term tasks such as combined military exercises and the transfer of wartime operational control, as well as long-term issues such as the role and scale of U.S. Forces Korea, will arise. Moreover, the Trump administration is re-evaluating its overall alliance strategy based on economic logic and a national interest-first approach, and in this process, strategic cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan also shows signs of weakening. As the ROK-U.S. alliance is not an issue confined to the Korean Peninsula, an opportunity must be created to consider South Korea's regional strategy alongside the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. ■

■ Lead Author: Jeon Sung-bae_ Director of the Center for International Relations at EAI and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His primary research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, and studies on the ROK-U.S. alliance and the Korean Peninsula. His major works and co-authored books include "Threats of War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Roundtable Participants (in alphabetical order by Korean surname): Kim Byung-yeon (Seoul National University), Son Yeol (EAI), Jeon Sung-bae (Seoul National University), Ha Young-sun (EAI)

■ In Charge and Edited by: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher at EAI

문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series planned to provide a forum for discourse where experts from various fields can offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please be sure to cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The arguments and opinions presented in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not related to EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.