[EAI Issue Brief] North Korea's New Year's Address and Prospects for North Korean Nuclear Issues in 2019

[Editor's Note]

With high-level talks to prepare for a second North Korea-U.S. summit imminent, U.S. Vice President Pence has repeatedly urged concrete denuclearization measures from North Korea. It appears the U.S. is still employing a dual strategy of "dialogue and pressure" towards North Korea. Nevertheless, EAI experts analyze that the possibility of a second North Korea-U.S. summit is high, as both sides are pinning their hopes on direct talks between the leaders. However, they predict that denuclearization is not merely a bargaining chip for North Korea but a fundamental issue concerning the regime's survival. If a second North Korea-U.S. summit is held without South Korea and the U.S. having prepared concrete alternatives for this, the issue will face further difficulties. This issue brief also discusses divergent assessments of North Korea's New Year's address and South Korea's future response strategies to the North Korean nuclear issue. This issue brief was primarily authored by EAI Director of the Center for International Relations, Jeon Sung-bae (Professor at Seoul National University), based on discussions from EAI's New Year's roundtable.

Divergent Assessments of North Korea's New Year's Address

Following North Korea's New Year's address in 2019, the South Korean government and various domestic and international experts have presented diverse and even conflicting views on North Korea's strategy and intentions. Even within the U.S., a key actor in North Korean denuclearization and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, President Trump and experts within the U.S. do not share the same perspective. Optimists regarding North Korean denuclearization diagnose that Kim Jong Un has already made a strategic decision for complete denuclearization, is focusing on a line of all-out economic mobilization, and is sincerely pursuing phased denuclearization steps, while the negotiations are facing difficulties due to mutual distrust between North Korea and the U.S. and the U.S.'s lukewarm compensation. Pessimists believe that North Korea's intention for complete denuclearization is unclear, and that while its nuclear and missile capabilities are still being enhanced beyond a freeze, it is pursuing the weakening of the ROK-U.S. alliance, maximization of economic compensation, strengthening of relations with China and Russia, and ultimately, recognition as a nuclear-armed state. Such vastly different interpretations of a single text can be attributed to the readers' wishful thinking and their pre-existing perceptions and belief systems about North Korea, but also because North Korea's New Year's address itself is intended to create strategic ambiguity and allow for diverse interpretations. The New Year's address presents North Korea's maximum expectations, thus containing its own wishful thinking and a sophisticated strategy for achieving future objectives.

The first characteristic of this New Year's address is the emphasis on the economy and a strong desire for development. The word "economy" is mentioned 38 times, a significant increase compared to 21 times in 2018 and 18 times in 2017. In terms of content, the emphasis on a self-reliant economy, qualitative improvement in people's living standards, and the desire to showcase achievements externally are prominent. In particular, there are many mentions of elements of a self-reliant economy such as indigenous technology, indigenous resources, and revolutionary zeal and creative innovation, reflecting North Korea's perspective on the economy, including the emphasis on construction project achievements. The emphasis on the welfare of farmers and miners is also a characteristic of this year's New Year's address. However, the crucial point is that the decision for an all-out economic mobilization line does not lead to a strategic change in economic development methods. The economic development strategy remains within the framework of socialism, adhering to the demands of socialist distribution principles and a party-centered economic development strategy, revealing limitations in the search for new systems. That is, while mentioning various sectors such as power, coal, and tourism development under the banner of a socialist self-reliant economy, it fails to present a vision that fundamentally transcends existing lines. Therefore, the strategy presented in this New Year's address, which shows how the North Korean leadership perceives the economy and what range of strategic choices they are exploring for qualitative leaps in the North Korean economy, has limited potential to revolutionarily transform North Korea's economic reality and the lives of its people. Furthermore, it is difficult to view this strategy as an economic development line that takes denuclearization into account, as it anticipates continued economic sanctions while pursuing economic self-reliance, making the connection between the economic development strategy and the strategic decision for denuclearization ambiguous.

Second, while the New Year's address clearly prohibits the production, use, deployment, and transfer of nuclear weapons, it is unclear whether this signifies a nuclear freeze as a step towards denuclearization, as demanded by the international community. Some emphasize the mention of the word "denuclearization" and view the new declaration of halting nuclear production as a meaningful step toward denuclearization. However, others criticize it as a passive policy that does not include the continued production of fissile materials, the ongoing development of nuclear technology, and the advancement of ballistic missiles, and thus remains far from a freeze. Notably, even within the U.S., while some express cautious optimism about North Korea's progressive policies, many still consider it an ambiguous policy that falls short of a nuclear freeze. President Trump, immediately after the announcement of North Korea's New Year's address, expressed delight at North Korea's remarks on nuclear weapons, sending a message expressing confidence in North Korea's economic potential and showing anticipation for Kim Jong Un's letter. The possibility of a second North Korea-U.S. summit is also continuously mentioned.

Through the Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit, North Korea believes that a phased and simultaneous approach was agreed upon with the U.S. and is pursuing a de facto nuclear disarmament negotiation, while exploring the possibility of complete denuclearization depending on the situation. President Trump has assumed North Korea's will for complete denuclearization and accepted a phased approach, but the difference in views between North Korea and the U.S. regarding the concept of complete denuclearization has not been resolved. North Korea presents various preconditions prior to North Korea's denuclearization under the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, the U.S. finds it increasingly difficult to accept preconditions without complete denuclearization. With numerous challenges remaining, such as submitting a list of all nuclear and missile capabilities as demanded by the U.S., objective verification by the international community including the U.S., and the disposal of already produced nuclear weapons, easing economic sanctions and initiating peace regime negotiations are not easy.

Third, North Korea's New Year's address evaluates the progress in inter-Korean relations in 2018 as highly satisfactory, but the tasks presented for 2019 are not insignificant. North Korea defines the inter-Korean military agreement as a de facto non-aggression treaty and proposes the resolution of military hostility across the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it demands the permanent suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the cessation of external strategic assets and equipment. It advocates for multilateral peace regime negotiations without discussing a declaration of the end of war, which is interpreted as being premised on China's participation. By demanding the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Geumgangsan tourism, and stating that external interference and intervention will never be permitted, it also shows an intention to separate inter-Korean exchange and cooperation from the international sanctions front.

The progress in inter-Korean relations, spanning military, economic, and peace regime negotiations, is in fact a complex issue involving the ROK-U.S. alliance, conventional arms reduction between North and South Korea, the international economic sanctions regime against North Korea, and the balance of power in Northeast Asia. The essence of the problem lies in international relations, and these issues are inseparably linked to denuclearization negotiations. For South Korea, which must consider these various factors, it is impossible to view this simply as a national issue, and North Korea's demands are premised on a clear strategic line that conflicts with this. The U.S. views North Korea's New Year's address demands as a ploy to advance inter-Korean relations separate from denuclearization, weaken the ROK-U.S. alliance, weaken South Korea's conventional military posture, and increase China's role, which will also affect North Korea-U.S. negotiations.

Possibility of a Second North Korea-U.S. Summit and Progress on North Korean Nuclear Issues

The proposals presented in the New Year's address represent North Korea's maximum demands, so negotiations can progress by appropriately shaping North Korea's options based on the future responses of South Korea and the U.S. On one hand, North Korea will engage in difficult negotiations with the U.S. regarding the conditions for denuclearization, while separately demanding progress in inter-Korean relations, the early commencement of multilateral peace regime negotiations, and the easing of sanctions. If denuclearization negotiations do not proceed as desired, North Korea will seek "a new path to defend the nation's sovereignty and the supreme interests of the state and achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula," as expressed in the New Year's address.

The key to North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula this year lies in the North Korea-U.S. summit. President Trump has expressed expectations that a North Korea-U.S. summit will be held in the near future, commenting that Chairman Kim Jong Un's letter was excellent. Given that both North Korea and the U.S. are pinning their hopes on direct talks between the leaders, the possibility of a second summit is high. However, it remains uncertain whether difficult issues not resolved in working-level talks can be resolved through leader-level dialogue, given the existing differences in fundamental principles and concepts of denuclearization between North Korea and the U.S. Even if a summit is held, the two leaders may fail to agree on clear principles for resolving fundamental issues and focus on short-term achievements, exchanging only readily available incentives. This could lead to a situation where significant issues remain unresolved in subsequent working-level talks, hindering progress.

North Korea's plan is to pursue de facto nuclear disarmament based on phased and simultaneous problem-solving at the second North Korea-U.S. summit, and to decide on denuclearization in the final stage. As expressed in the New Year's address, if the U.S. does not show "boldly departing from its chronic position, making fair proposals based on mutual recognition and respect, and demonstrating a proper negotiating posture and willingness to resolve problems," North Korea will pursue a strategic path other than denuclearization. North Korea's concept of complete denuclearization refers to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including South Korea and the U.S., whereas the U.S. and South Korea's concept of complete denuclearization refers to the degree of North Korea's denuclearization. Since North Korea pursues denuclearization at the risk of its regime and political entity, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not merely a bargaining chip but a fundamental issue, making the security assurances that South Korea and the U.S. provide a critical issue. If the second North Korea-U.S. summit is held without concrete alternatives prepared for this, especially if President Trump is not sufficiently prepared with the core issues and future alternatives, progress thereafter will face difficulties.

South Korea's Future Response Strategies to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Furthermore, the New Year's address outlines North Korea's efforts to strengthen its capabilities towards South Korea and externally, requiring an appropriate response from South Korea. First, it is crucial to recognize the significant gap between North Korea's goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the international community's goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. If North Korea's simultaneous and phased approach implies a process of nuclear disarmament negotiations, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to agree to this, as it will not accept phased nuclear disarmament without an overall framework for denuclearization. Conversely, if the U.S. pursues only denuclearization without fundamentally considering the security of North Korea's regime and system and without presenting fundamental engagement policies, North Korea will not be able to agree. The U.S. engagement policy must be formulated with a long-term vision for North Korea's denuclearization efforts.

Second, it must be recognized that it may take considerable time to reconcile the differences between North Korea and the U.S. The South Korean government prioritizes the holding of dialogue to maintain the momentum of talks, but opinion coordination outside the negotiation table, power struggles, and even negotiation stalemates can be necessary processes for successful future negotiations. Even if a second North Korea-U.S. summit is held, it is important to lay the groundwork for third and fourth summits. Efforts must be made to converge opinions on goals and processes through meticulous dialogue not only with North Korea and the U.S. but also with China and the international community. This process requires a long time, so South Korea must recognize that North Korea's denuclearization cannot be achieved in a short period.

Third, while pursuing engagement with North Korea and supporting its self-help efforts, a comprehensive strategy of combining military deterrence and sanctions must be continuously pursued. Although denuclearization negotiations, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, and peace regime negotiations are important, it is necessary to anticipate what military, diplomatic, and economic strategies North Korea will pursue after denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime, and what kind of competition and cooperation will be seen in inter-Korean relations after the peace regime. Furthermore, South Korea must present its own strategies and self-help efforts for desirable North Korean development. In this process, comprehensive consideration is needed regarding the extent of military power South Korea will maintain for deterrence and the level at which economic sanctions will be used as policy tools to guide North Korea's choices.

Fourth, in the midst of rapidly changing international dynamics, South Korea must plan for its regional strategy and the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In the context of U.S.-China competition, the issue of North Korean denuclearization is proceeding in close relation to international dynamics, and South Korea's regional strategy and denuclearization strategy must be pursued simultaneously. In particular, concerns about the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance are inevitable during the process of North Korean denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Short-term tasks such as combined military exercises and the transfer of wartime operational control, as well as long-term issues such as the role and scale of U.S. Forces Korea, will emerge. Moreover, the Trump administration is re-evaluating its overall alliance strategy based on economic logic and national interest prioritization, and signs of weakening ROK-U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation are also emerging. As the ROK-U.S. alliance is not an issue confined to the Korean Peninsula, an opportunity must be created to consider South Korea's regional strategy concurrently with the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. ■

■ Primary Author: Jeon Sung-bae_ Director of the Center for International Relations at EAI and Professor at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works and co-authored books include "War Threats and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Roundtable Participants (in alphabetical order): Kim Byung-yeon (Seoul National University), Son Yeol (EAI), Jeon Sung-bae (Seoul National University), Ha Young-sun (EAI)

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-i, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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