The Genesis and Significance of the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration

[Editor's Note]

On October 8, we mark the 20th anniversary of the announcement of the "Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration." The "Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration," officially titled the "Joint Declaration on a New Japan-Korea Partnership for the 21st Century," was a comprehensive agreement on bilateral relations announced in October 1998 by President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. It is regarded as the most significant declaration in the history of Korea-Japan relations since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1965. This issue brief features insights from Professor Cho Se-young of Dongseo University, who, as a director at the Northeast Asian Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and as President Kim Dae-jung's Japanese interpreter at the time, was directly involved in the planning and promotion of the Partnership Joint Declaration. Based on his experiences, Professor Cho discusses the process and significance of the declaration. The author posits that while various domestic and international factors contributed to the declaration's success, President Kim Dae-jung's role was paramount, given his firm philosophy and vision for Korea-Japan relations and diplomacy even before taking office.

Introduction

As the 20th anniversary of the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Partnership Joint Declaration approaches, there is a growing momentum to re-examine its significance. The Partnership Joint Declaration holds a monumental position in the history of Korea-Japan relations, aiming to consolidate 20th-century relations and present a new vision for the 21st century. It continues to be cited as a model case in discussions about desirable bilateral relations.

In 1998, the author served as a director in the Northeast Asian Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and was President Kim Dae-jung's Japanese interpreter, directly participating in the planning and promotion of the Partnership Joint Declaration. This article aims to introduce the process and significance of the declaration based on this personal involvement, hoping it will serve as a useful reference for future research. As relevant documents have not yet been declassified, the content presented here is based on facts within generally permissible limits.

Situation at the Launch of the Kim Dae-jung Administration

Upon the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration in February 1998, Korea-Japan relations were at their nadir. Following President Kim Young-sam's remarks in November 1995 about "disciplining Japan," friction persisted over issues such as Dokdo, comfort women, and fisheries. The situation escalated dramatically when, just one month before the end of President Kim Young-sam's term on January 23, 1998, the Japanese government unilaterally announced its withdrawal from the Korea-Japan fisheries agreement.

In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun on January 22, President-elect Kim Dae-jung expressed his displeasure, calling the termination of the fisheries agreement "a deeply insulting act so close to the birth of a new administration." He added, "While there may be political reasons on the Japanese side, this is an outrageous act. I intended to improve Korea-Japan relations after taking office, but this will have a negative impact."

The 1965 Korea-Japan fisheries agreement stipulated that its termination would take effect one year after one party notified the other. President-elect Kim Dae-jung's position was that the agreement should not be terminated and that the issue should be resolved amicably within a year of the new government's inauguration. However, the Japanese side decided it was better to notify the termination before the end of the Kim Young-sam administration, even if it created burdens for bilateral relations, and to negotiate under a new atmosphere with the incoming government in February. On January 26, Foreign Minister Yoo Jong-ha's statement in the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee that "the Japanese government's claim of no liability for reparations for comfort women is legally unfounded" reflected the heated domestic sentiment at the time.

Regardless of the deterioration of bilateral relations, South Korea, whose paramount task was to overcome the foreign exchange crisis that struck in late 1997, could not afford to neglect cooperation with Japan. President Kim Dae-jung emphasized to former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who attended his inauguration, the importance of Japan's leading contribution to overcoming the foreign exchange crisis, stating, "Witnessing the citizens gathered along the streets during my inauguration earnestly appealing to me to save the nation, stabilize prices, and resolve unemployment, I felt a heavy sense of responsibility. I am deeply concerned as over one million job losses are projected this year."

Another crucial area for cooperation with Japan was the North Korean issue. President Kim, who sought to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through his engagement policy and guide North Korea towards reform and openness, needed to establish a smooth cooperative relationship with Japan to realize his vision. His stance was that the three countries—South Korea, the U.S., and Japan—must cooperate closely and jointly respond to North Korea, and that smooth and sufficient consultations between South Korea and Japan were essential for the success of both countries' North Korea policies.

President Kim's statement to former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, who attended the presidential inauguration, that "strengthening relations with Japan is in South Korea's national interest regarding various issues such as inter-Korean relations and economic interests" clearly demonstrated his basic stance on diplomacy with Japan.

Preparation Process for the Joint Declaration

The Partnership Joint Declaration was the result of approximately eight months of preparation, beginning with practical conceptualization and review shortly after President Kim's inauguration in February 1998, and culminating in its announcement on October 8. Both governments naturally agreed on the necessity of restoring severely strained bilateral relations within President Kim's first year in office.

At President Kim's inauguration ceremony on February 25, Japan sent numerous political leaders, including two former prime ministers (Nakasone and Takeshita) and two opposition party leaders (Takako Doi of the Social Democratic Party and Naoto Kan of the Democratic Party), signaling an atmosphere of hope for establishing smooth relations with South Korea's new administration.

During 1998, the initial idea of President Kim's state visit to Japan and the announcement of the Partnership Joint Declaration was first broached by the Japanese side. While working-level officials from both countries coordinated their views on this matter, a meeting between the foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan (Foreign Minister Park Jung-soo and Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi) held in Seoul on March 21 agreed to hold a summit during the ASEM summit in early April and to commence negotiations on the fisheries agreement in April. This laid the groundwork for restoring bilateral relations.

The first Korea-Japan summit of the Kim Dae-jung administration took place in London on April 2, during the ASEM summit. Both sides agreed to cooperate for the restoration and development of bilateral relations, and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto invited President Kim for a state visit to Japan. Due to the brevity of the 50-minute meeting, President Kim expressed his desire to meet again soon for a candid discussion. However, this did not materialize as Hashimoto resigned four months later on July 30, taking responsibility for the Liberal Democratic Party's defeat in the Upper House election. Prime Minister Obuchi succeeded Hashimoto, marking the beginning of the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi era. In early August, Minister Hong Soon-young, who succeeded Minister Park Jung-soo (who resigned following the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats between South Korea and Russia), began working with Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, Obuchi's successor.

Japanese media widely reported that the two leaders agreed at the April 2 summit to begin work on a "New Japan-Korea Partnership for the 21st Century." However, the partnership was not discussed during the actual meeting. Consequently, South Korean media reports did not mention any agreement on a partnership. Japanese working-level officials had prepared for Prime Minister Hashimoto to make remarks regarding the partnership, but for some reason, it did not proceed as planned. Thus, the plan to announce the Partnership Joint Declaration during President Kim's state visit in the autumn of 1998 was officially announced as a result of the Korea-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in Tokyo on May 22.

Although the initial idea for the joint declaration proposed by the Japanese side only outlined general directions, it was South Korea that fleshed it out and created its basic framework. The Korea-Japan Directors-General Meeting held in Seoul in late June became a crucial turning point for the working-level process. South Korea proposed drafting the Partnership Joint Declaration in document form for the leaders of both countries to sign, with detailed provisions to be outlined in a separate annex, the "Action Plan," which would be reviewed annually by the foreign ministers at regular meetings. Japan readily agreed, setting the Partnership Joint Declaration on the right track.

Subsequently, in July, South Korea began the full-scale drafting of the joint declaration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade analyzed partnership documents released by Japan and other countries, and incorporated opinions from relevant domestic departments and external agencies to create the draft. Working-level consultations with Japan proceeded through two channels—the Director-General for Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Director of the Northeast Asian Affairs Division—with intensive discussions held in August and September.

Negotiations on the fisheries agreement proceeded through a separate channel from the Partnership Joint Declaration. As the fisheries agreement involved highly conflicting interests among fishermen, both sides prominently featured politicians with influence in the fisheries sector (Kim Bong-ho, Speaker of the National Assembly, for South Korea, and Kōkō Satō, Chairman of the LDP's Special Committee on International Fisheries, for Japan). Working-level negotiations were handled by the Director-General for Asian and Pacific Affairs.

On August 31, amidst the intensive preparation for the joint declaration, North Korea test-fired a Rodong missile. This unprecedented event, involving a foreign missile passing through Japanese airspace, provoked a strong reaction from Japan, which actively demanded that the content of the Partnership Joint Declaration include a strong statement of opposition to North Korea's missile development.

Against this backdrop, the Japanese side placed particular emphasis on strengthening bilateral security cooperation and coordinating North Korea policy within the joint declaration. Japan also strongly desired the inclusion of South Korea's support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, due to strong opposition within South Korea, the joint declaration was limited to stating that "South Korea acknowledges Japan's contributions and role to the international community, including the United Nations, and expresses its expectations for an increase in such contributions and roles in the future." Meanwhile, South Korea's primary focus in the joint declaration was on Japan's reflection and apology for past actions, support for its North Korea policy, and the strengthening of economic cooperation.

Reflection and Apology for Past Actions

The President's Philosophy

President Kim Dae-jung already possessed a clear philosophy regarding Korea-Japan relations prior to his inauguration. For instance, in a speech at the Japan National Press Club on April 12, 1995, in his capacity as chairman of the Asia-Pacific Foundation, President Kim emphasized, "To achieve a new era of national engagement between the peoples of Korea and Japan, there must first be a proper settlement of the past. To this end, Japan must possess accurate knowledge of the historical facts of its past actions in Korea." He further stressed the need for "Japan's voluntary efforts to settle the past, joint research on historical issues by experts from both countries, and proper historical education for the younger generation."

President Kim's remarks highlighted the need for a complete settlement of past issues. After taking office, he stated during his visit to Japan that past issues must be cleanly settled so they are never raised again, and he also emphasized that Japan should learn from Germany's approach to historical reconciliation. Based on past experience, the working-level officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade believed that a clean settlement of historical issues was not something that could be achieved by a single administration. They felt it was necessary to moderate the expression 'settlement,' as it is only through the accumulation of results over a long period that historical issues can truly be resolved. If a settlement were declared and then historical issues resurfaced, South Korea would inevitably argue for a proper settlement, leading Japan to object, asking why an issue already settled was being raised again.

Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade submitted a report to the President recommending that, rather than 'settling' past issues on the occasion of the presidential visit, it would be more appropriate to 'organize' them. Whether this suggestion was effective, President Kim's rhetoric began to shift. Unlike his early statements emphasizing a clean settlement of past issues during his visit to Japan so they would never be raised again, he began to qualify his references to Germany's historical reconciliation by adding phrases like, 'Although they do not like hearing about Germany in Japan...'

A representative example is his interview with the Japanese magazine Sekai in early August, where President Kim adopted a cautious stance, stating, "During my visit to Japan, I will address issues such as 'organizing' the views of both sides on the past." He also remarked, "I will 'complement' what has been insufficient to reach a true relationship of friendship and cooperation during this visit to Japan."

President Kim believed that resolving past issues was essential for opening up the future. He stated, "Koreans do not talk about the past because of the past. If Japan truly understands and reflects on the past today, Koreans will want to be friends. However, if the Japanese people do not receive proper education about the past and do not reflect on it, Japan's power will grow stronger, leading to concerns that the same events might be repeated."

Korea-Japan Both Sides' Stances

From the outset of the new South Korean administration, the Japanese side harbored suspicions about whether South Korea would again demand an apology for past actions, particularly fearing a demand for an apology from the Emperor. Prime Minister Hashimoto's remark at the Korea-Japan summit on April 2, "The history of the past cannot be changed, but the present is built upon the past, and from this foundation, we can change the future," stemmed from this background. While stating that Japan had no intention of evading past issues, the Japanese side emphasized that its historical perspective remained unchanged from the Murayama Statement. This appeared to be an attempt to establish a defensive line at the level of the Murayama Statement.

Meanwhile, South Korean working-level officials believed that while it was essential for Japan to express a clear recognition of past actions, this should not be pursued through pressure or diplomatic negotiations. Engaging in prior diplomatic negotiations over expressions of apology for past actions had historically led to more friction and confrontation than benefits. Fortunately, President Kim held a similar view, allowing the joint declaration preparation process to proceed along these lines. In his August 1998 interview with Sekai magazine, President Kim stated, "Demanding the settlement of past issues from the outside is meaningless. Ultimately, it depends on how the Japanese people and government reflect on and settle the past."

Past Affairs Text Drafting

Ahead of the Korea-Japan Directors-General Meeting in June, the South Korean side conceived the idea of including in the Partnership Joint Declaration, to be announced during the presidential visit, a statement of Japan's reflection and apology for past actions, to be signed by the leaders of both countries. Previously, during the state visits of Presidents Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and Kim Young-sam, Japan had expressed reflection and regret for past actions through the Emperor's banquet speeches, but this was not in the form of an official document.

Consequently, there was a strong sentiment within South Korea that Japan would not agree to formalize its reflection and apology. Some even argued that the issue of reflection and apology for past actions should be kept as leverage for pressuring Japan. However, the working-level officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade believed that formalization was not impossible, given the existence of the Murayama Statement in 1995. The Murayama Statement, issued by a coalition government led by a socialist prime minister and approved by the cabinet, held official status, thus providing Japan with no grounds to object.

Furthermore, they reasoned that if past reflection and apology were formalized in a document signed by the leaders of both countries, South Korea could evaluate it as Japan's first clear expression of historical recognition through a document, and Japan could use this document as a basis to counter future criticisms from South Korea alleging a lack of reflection and apology. This would be advantageous for both sides.

At the Directors-General Meeting in late June, South Korea proposed this idea to the Japanese side. While uncertain if Japan would agree, the Japanese side fortunately expressed its concurrence. Japan hoped that if it expressed its recognition of past actions, South Korea would positively evaluate this and demonstrate a spirit of reconciliation and cooperation for the future. The South Korean working-level officials judged that there would be no problem in accepting Japan's hope, as President Kim had already expressed similar sentiments. The basic structure of the Partnership Joint Declaration and the core direction of the text on past affairs were effectively decided at this point. The remaining task was to flesh out the overall framework.

In the joint declaration text negotiations that intensified in September, South Korea hoped to build upon the Murayama Statement and make it more specific to the context of Korea-Japan relations. They conveyed to the Japanese side their view that it would be beneficial to develop the content of the Murayama Statement, which addressed Asia as a whole, to explicitly mention Japan's colonial rule over Korea and the resulting damages, and to express reflection on these matters.

Subsequently, through active exchanges of opinions between working-level officials, the text on past affairs was finalized. Notably, Japan agreed for the first time in the Partnership Joint Declaration to use the term 'apology' (사죄, sajoe) rather than 'regret' (사과, sagwa). Until then, Japan had consistently used the Japanese term 'owabi' (おわび) when expressing its recognition of past actions. South Korea, meanwhile, had used both 'sagwa' and 'sajoe' in Korean translations. The working-level officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, noting that the Japanese term 'owabi' was translated in Korean dictionaries as either 'sajoe' or interchangeably as 'sajoe' or 'sagwa,' sought to use this as grounds to insist on the term 'sajoe.' After intense debate, Japan agreed to use 'owabi' in the Japanese version of the joint declaration and 'sajoe' in the Korean version. The final text of the Partnership Joint Declaration was only confirmed on October 7, the day President Kim arrived in Japan, due to the last-minute tug-of-war over the term 'sajoe.'

Significance of the Partnership Joint Declaration

On the morning of October 8, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi held a summit at the State Guesthouse in Tokyo and subsequently signed the Partnership Joint Declaration. The official title of the joint declaration is the "Joint Declaration on a New Japan-Korea Partnership for the 21st Century." The original title proposed by Japan was "Joint Declaration on a New Japan-Korea Partnership Towards the 21st Century" (21世紀に向けた新たな日韓パートナーシップ共同宣言). However, after internal review, South Korea decided to use the title "Joint Declaration on a New Japan-Korea Partnership for the 21st Century." Although there was a slight difference in the title, both sides agreed to use their preferred versions.

The Partnership Joint Declaration consists of 11 articles, including principles of cooperation in five areas: politics, security, economy, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and global issues. The "Action Plan for a New Japan-Korea Partnership for the 21st Century," announced as an annex to the joint declaration, outlines 43 specific action items.

The most significant aspect of the Partnership Joint Declaration is that, for the first time in the history of Korea-Japan diplomacy, it clearly articulated Japan's reflection and apology for past actions in an official joint document. The fact that both leaders directly signed the document further solidified its official status. Moreover, by mutually acknowledging and positively evaluating the progress and achievements made by both countries since 1945, it balanced Japan's expression of reflection and apology for past actions. This helped to mitigate internal opposition in Japan, which might have viewed it as Japan unilaterally apologizing, and contributed to the Partnership Joint Declaration receiving broad public support in Japan.

Meanwhile, conservative right-wing elements in Japan interpreted the Partnership Joint Declaration as a promise by South Korea to no longer raise issues related to past actions. The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on October 8 in a front-page evening edition that President Kim had stated during the summit that past issues would be put to rest and would not be raised again. However, as Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka stated on the same day, "We respect the Partnership Joint Declaration and will strive to ensure that no further erroneous remarks regarding history are made between the two countries," the announcement of the joint declaration did not signify the end of the issue. While South Korea would no longer demand expressions of reflection and apology from Japan, the understanding was that Japan should also refrain from words and actions inconsistent with the joint declaration.

Another significance of the Partnership Joint Declaration lies in its comprehensive presentation of the direction for Korea-Japan cooperation. The joint declaration and the action plan cover almost all conceivable areas of cooperation that both countries could pursue. Although times have changed, the scope of Korea-Japan cooperation today is unlikely to deviate significantly from the framework established by the Partnership Joint Declaration.

Among the areas of cooperation that were revitalized following the Partnership Joint Declaration, the opening up to Japanese popular culture is considered to have brought about the most significant change in subsequent Korea-Japan relations. Even before his inauguration, President Kim emphasized that South Korea, with its history of independently adopting and developing foreign cultures, should abandon its isolationist stance towards Japanese popular culture. However, strong opposition to opening up remained not only in public opinion but also within the government. Therefore, without the significant impetus of the presidential state visit and the announcement of the Partnership Joint Declaration, the opening up of Japanese popular culture would likely have taken much longer.

Security cooperation is also a significant area within the Partnership Joint Declaration. Until the mid-1990s, security cooperation between South Korea and Japan was limited to personnel exchanges. However, after the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration, the first Korea-Japan Security Policy Consultations, involving Directors-General from the foreign and defense ministries, were held in June 1998. Given the urgent tasks of deterring North Korea's nuclear development and responding to the Rodong missile test-fire, the Partnership Joint Declaration and Action Plan are considered to have laid the foundation for advancing security cooperation to a new level in a formal and systematic manner.

The announcement of the Partnership Joint Declaration restored Korea-Japan relations, which had hit rock bottom with the termination of the fisheries agreement, to an optimal state within just 10 months. Furthermore, it was evaluated as having marked a new turning point in Korea-Japan relations since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1965. The Partnership Joint Declaration was widely expected to usher in a new era of Korea-Japan relations. However, less than three years later, in 2001, relations faced difficulties again with the outbreak of the Japanese textbook controversy. President Kim expressed his disappointment, stating, "This issue of the Japanese textbook screening is very unsatisfactory in light of the spirit of the Partnership Joint Declaration." It seemed that the roots of conflict between the two countries were too deep to usher in a new era of Korea-Japan relations solely with the Partnership Joint Declaration. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the Partnership Joint Declaration created a distinct milestone in Korea-Japan relations and served as a valuable stepping stone for future cooperation.

Conclusion

Several factors contributed to the successful outcome of President Kim Dae-jung's state visit to Japan in October 1998 and the announcement of the Partnership Joint Declaration. There is no doubt that situational factors, such as overcoming the foreign exchange crisis and responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, played a significant role. Additionally, the working-level capabilities and cooperative relationship between the foreign affairs authorities of both countries, as well as close communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Blue House, can be cited.

However, the author wishes to highlight President Kim Dae-jung's experience and philosophy regarding Korea-Japan relations as the most crucial factors behind the highly regarded Partnership Joint Declaration. President Kim possessed a firm philosophy and vision for Korea-Japan relations and South Korea's general foreign policy even before taking office.

His speech at the Japan National Press Club on April 12, 1995, during his tenure as chairman of the Asia-Pacific Foundation, clearly illustrated President Kim's views on overall Korea-Japan relations. The working-level officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade were able to grasp the new president's foreign policy philosophy through this speech. His interview with the Asahi Shimbun on January 22, one month before his inauguration, encompassed not only Korea-Japan relations but also inter-Korean relations, the necessity of U.S. Forces Korea's presence, and multilateral security in Northeast Asia.

Because the President had a detailed blueprint for foreign policy from the outset, the working-level staff only needed to prepare practical measures in accordance with that direction. Typically, the president adopts the plans formulated by advisors and working-level organizations as his own policies; however, in this case, the order was reversed. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the Partnership Joint Declaration was largely President Kim's own creation. ■

■ Author: Cho Se-young Special Professor at Dongseo University and Director of the Japan Research Center. He served as Director-General for Northeast Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (August 2011-July 2012) and worked at the Embassies in Japan and China. His publications include "50 Years of Korea-Japan Relations: Traces of Conflict and Cooperation" (2014) and "Is Japan Seeking to Remove the Seal? The Issue of Constitutional Revision in Japan Centered on the Japan-US Alliance" (2004).

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-yi, EAI Research Fellow

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