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[EAI Issue Briefing] The Conclusion of a Peace Treaty and the Future of the US Forces Korea

Category
Commentary and Issue Briefing
Published
July 24, 2018
Related Projects
North Korea Comprehensive Strategy

[Editor's Note]

If the ongoing North Korean nuclear negotiations proceed smoothly and a peace treaty is concluded, changes are expected in the status and role of the US Forces Korea (USFK). In this regard, there is a significant debate between the 'withdrawal theory' and the 'maintenance theory' of USFK. The former emphasizes that the rationale for USFK's stationing will disappear upon the conclusion of a peace treaty, while the latter argues that this is not valid from the perspective of the international legal basis for USFK. Accordingly, Professor Kyung-young Chung of Hanyang University's Graduate School of International Studies analyzes this issue from multiple angles, considering not only international law and overseas cases but also the positions of relevant countries and past Korean governments, domestic politics and economy, military security, and international power dynamics. As a result, Professor Chung argues that it is in Korea's national interest to adjust the mission and role of USFK to contribute to stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region even after a peace treaty is concluded.


“The international legal basis for the stationing of USFK lies in the 'Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America,' which entered into force on November 18, 1954. Article 4 of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty states, 'The United States has the right to station its land, sea, and air forces in and about the territory of Korea, and Korea grants this right.' Article 3 stipulates, 'Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties hereto would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.' As such, the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty exists to counter common threats, such as armed attacks in the Pacific region, without explicitly mentioning the North Korean threat. Therefore, the argument that the rationale for USFK's stationing will disappear because North Korea will no longer be an adversary after a peace treaty is concluded is not valid.”

“What are the positions of relevant countries regarding the future of USFK upon the conclusion of a peace treaty?”

“From the US perspective, USFK can serve as a dagger aimed at the strategic centers of China, such as Beijing, Qingdao, and Dalian, in its pursuit of the Indo-Pacific strategy, thus its strategic importance has grown more than ever. USFK also holds significant meaning in terms of its ability to block China's Anti-Access & Area Denial Strategy and Chain Island Strategy.”

“North Korea perceives USFK as the biggest obstacle to achieving its strategy of communizing the South. North Korea occupied up to the Nakdong River during the Korean War, and it believes that it could not achieve unification by force due to US intervention. To achieve its ultimate goal of communizing the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's fundamental perception is that it must first withdraw USFK and sever the ROK-US alliance.”

“China does not wish for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to be established while USFK remains stationed there. China strongly harbors a sense of being encircled by the US and views USFK as having a high potential to infringe upon China's core interests. China's sensitivity to closer ROK-US relations is not unrelated to the case of Vietnam. After North Vietnam, which received military support from China during the Vietnam War, achieved unification by force, it maintained a conflictual relationship with China and eventually aligned with the US sphere of influence, becoming a force to check China. Therefore, China's position is to actively participate in the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”

“Regardless of whether they are progressive or conservative governments, past Korean governments have shown no significant difference in their recognition of the importance of the ROK-US alliance for national security and the continued stationing of USFK even after unification. [...] All past governments have consistently maintained the position that the ROK-US alliance is the fundamental pillar of Korea's security and that USFK should continue to be stationed on the peninsula even after unification.”

“The economic value of USFK and the repercussions of its withdrawal on the economy would also be substantial. The value of equipment held by approximately 28,500 USFK personnel is estimated at around 17 to 31 trillion KRW, and additional expenditures equivalent to this amount are expected to replace this force. In particular, the value of reinforcement forces during wartime is estimated to exceed 120 trillion KRW, and the reserve ammunition, essential for contingency operations held by the US military, alone amounts to 5 trillion KRW.”

“From a military security perspective, USFK is absolutely necessary to secure maritime control in the West Sea during contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and to defend the peninsula from fighter jet bombings and missile attacks. Gaining control of the West Sea has had a decisive impact on the outcome of wars. The victors of the Imjin War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Korean War were all determined by who controlled the West Sea.”

“The mission and role of USFK should be adjusted to contribute not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to regional stability and peace. When USFK undertakes regional roles, it is desirable to operate in close coordination with a multilateral security system. Active consensus-building and strategic communication are necessary to prevent neighboring countries from holding negative perceptions of USFK and its force operations.”

“The UN Command (UNC), which functions as the administrator of the Armistice Agreement, should transition to a peacekeeping mission upon the conclusion of a peace treaty. Upon the transfer of wartime operational control, if a war recurs on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC should perform the role of Force Provider, and the tactical control of combat units participating as members of the UNC should be transferred to the Commander of the future Combined Forces Command to conduct military operations under a single command structure.”


Author

Kyung-young Chung_ Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Maryland. He participated in the development of military strategy at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command and served as a full-time professor at the National Defense University and Catholic University. He has served as a policy advisor to the National Security Council (NSC), the Presidential Transition Committee, and the Ministry of National Defense. His major works include "Security Challenges and Resolve Towards Unification" (2017), "Korea's Centripetal Foreign and Security Policy" (2015), and "The Obama Administration and the ROK-US Strategic Alliance" (2009, co-authored).


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Attachments

  • EAI_IssueBriefing__0727.pdf

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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