Finding a New Path to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

[Editor's Note]

As the confrontation between North Korea and the United States over the North Korean nuclear issue persists, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are escalating daily. However, a breakthrough to resolve this crisis has yet to be found. In response, EAI President Ha Young-sun points out the limitations of the current North Korea policies pursued by the relevant parties and argues for the need to find a new path to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. He emphasizes the need to set a goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) with a freeze as a stepping stone, and to develop a four-pronged, complex solution encompassing sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and self-help, moving beyond the dichotomy of sanctions or engagement. Through this, he adds, North Korea must be led to pursue a path of denuclearized security and prosperity, rather than the path of nuclear weapons and economic development in parallel.

The North Korean nuclear crisis has entered a new phase following North Korea's sixth nuclear test, aimed at developing a hydrogen bomb, and its test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. President Trump's speech at the UN and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's rebuttal statement have further intensified the crisis. In this situation, efforts by South Korea and other relevant parties to resolve the crisis have yielded no significant results. To escape the crisis, we must critically examine the limitations of existing solutions and embark on finding a new path as soon as possible.

Two Major Obstacles to Trump's North Korea Policy

Since taking office, U.S. President Trump has strongly criticized the previous administration's North Korea policy of 'strategic patience' and proposed 'maximum pressure and engagement' as a new solution. The core elements are: first, special emphasis on China's role in denuclearizing North Korea; and second, the consideration of military options as a policy alternative for maximum pressure. President Trump's UN speech does not significantly deviate from the framework of this newly adopted solution. After designating North Korea as a rogue state, he emphasized the importance of military options, stating, "If North Korea attacks the United States or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea."

However, the U.S. quest for North Korean denuclearization faces two major obstacles. Firstly, China will never impose sanctions and pressure on Kim Jong-un at the level the U.S. expects. While China is also negative about North Korea's nuclear weapons development and participates in UN international sanctions, what China truly fears is not the current nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un regime, but the post-Kim Jong-un era after denuclearization. If a post-Kim Jong-un regime of a market democracy emerges and negatively impacts the security and economy of China's Northeast Three Provinces, it could cause greater damage to China's core interests than hydrogen bombs. Therefore, China, though dissatisfied, is pursuing a solution with the Kim Jong-un regime and the North Korean nuclear crisis as the lesser of evils.

Secondly, even if the U.S. actively hints at the possibility of military options, North Korea will not easily back down. As expected, Kim Jong-un's rebuttal statement pointed out, "The remarks of the U.S. leader who explained the U.S. options with frank expression of his intentions not only surprised me or stopped me, but confirmed that the path I have chosen is correct and the path I must take to the end." Having endured sanctions relatively successfully for the past quarter-century, Kim Jong-un has fully anticipated President Trump's moves and has clearly indicated his intention not to easily throw in the towel.

Furthermore, because the North Korean nuclear crisis is unfolding on the divided Korean Peninsula amidst competition between the U.S. and China to shape the Asia-Pacific order, unlike in other regions, the U.S. must find a joint solution in close cooperation with South Korea while also fully considering China's core interests.

Therefore, while President Trump's current efforts are a necessary condition for overcoming the North Korean nuclear crisis, they are unlikely to successfully overcome the two major obstacles, necessitating efforts to find a new path.

False Promises of China's North Korea Policy

Since March of this year, China has been emphasizing 'dual suspension' (suspension of nuclear and missile tests and ROK-U.S. joint military exercises) and 'dual track parallel' (resumption of Six-Party Talks to pursue denuclearization and a peace treaty in parallel) as solutions to the North Korean nuclear crisis.

However, this proposal faces two limitations. Firstly, it is difficult to bridge the gap in perspectives between South Korea/U.S. and North Korea/China at present. 'Dual suspension' has limitations in sincerity and asymmetry. Looking back at the history of negotiations, the South Korea-U.S. desire for a freeze for the sake of a freeze has always encountered sincerity issues, leading to the reversal of agreements to square one. Therefore, a freeze must include the first step demonstrating sincerity towards denuclearization. Moreover, to overcome the asymmetry, adjustments to military exercises must start from improving the military threat between North and South Korea, not just a nuclear freeze.

Secondly, 'dual track parallel' presents dual difficulties. The core content of North Korea's proposed peace treaty has remained unchanged since it was formalized during Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok's visit to Washington in 2000. It posits that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea is unavoidable, the ROK-U.S. military alliance must be dismantled, and the U.S. nuclear threat must be eliminated to transform the North Korea-U.S. relationship from one of hostility to one of peace. Since South Korea and the U.S. cannot accept discussions on such a 'North Korean-style' peace treaty, the parallel pursuit of the dual tracks is practically impossible from the outset. On the other hand, North Korea clearly opposes 'denuclearization first, then peace treaty' and 'parallel discussions on denuclearization and peace treaty,' insisting only on 'North Korean-style peace treaty first, then denuclearization discussions.' Therefore, China's current proposal is difficult to serve as a starting point for discussion as it has not obtained the consent of the core stakeholders.

South Korea's North Korea Policy: Hidden Reefs

In his keynote address at the 72nd UN General Assembly in September, South Korean President Moon Jae-in stated, "We must respond with strong and resolute measures until North Korea voluntarily abandons its nuclear weapons. All countries must thoroughly implement UNSC resolutions, and if North Korea engages in further provocations, we must seek corresponding new measures." He pointed out the inevitability of sanctions in the current situation, while also emphasizing, "Despite North Korea's outright violation of its obligations and commitments under the UN Charter, our government and the international community are making every possible effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through peaceful means."

He further stated that to achieve this peaceful resolution, South Korea does not seek North Korea's collapse or pursue unification by absorption, and is prepared to assist North Korea by pursuing multilateral security cooperation and a Northeast Asian economic community with the international community once North Korea makes a decision. South Korea's North Korea policy is attempting to break free from the prolonged and consumptive debate between sanctions and engagement that has persisted for the past 20 years. President Moon Jae-in's UN address simultaneously emphasized the inevitability of sanctions and peaceful resolution. However, to safely reach the harbor of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, reefs that must be overcome await us: North Korea's parallel pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development. As long as the Kim Jong-un regime maintains its current excessive security-oriented parallel path as its survival strategy for the 21st century, bilateral and multilateral negotiations for North Korean denuclearization will repeatedly return to the starting point rather than reaching the destination. Therefore, for successful negotiations, not only agreement on the conditions for resuming talks is important, but also how to foster North Korea's self-reliant efforts for a new survival strategy is key.

Finding a New Path to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Finding a new path to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis requires clarifying the goal setting first. As North Korea's nuclear weapons development has intensified, there has been confusion in setting goals. With North Korea effectively possessing nuclear weapons, voices calling for a more realistic goal of freeze rather than denuclearization are growing. However, this confusion stems from a lack of understanding of the dual political and military nature of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have been used as a crucial tool for coercive diplomacy on the political stage, no less than their qualitative revolution in destructive power on the military stage. As anticipated, North Korea is already utilizing nuclear weapons as both military and political weapons. Therefore, if the asymmetrical political and military relationship between North and South Korea is unacceptable, the goal of finding a new path must be complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, with a freeze serving as a stepping stone.

The historical efforts over the past 20 years to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have belatedly recognized the limitations of the dichotomy between sanctions and engagement, leading to the rudimentary realization that both must be pursued in parallel. However, finding a new path is not that simple. First, as North Korea's nuclear weapons development progresses, effective deterrence measures must be established. Second, a new peace regime must be constructed that reliably and practically guarantees the survival and prosperity of a denuclearized North Korean regime. Third, the completion of finding a new path can be achieved in conjunction with North Korea's self-reliant efforts to evolve its parallel path of nuclear weapons and economic development into a parallel path of denuclearized security and prosperity. Therefore, we must jointly devise a four-pronged, complex approach—sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and self-help—to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis promptly.

1) SanctionsThe UN Security Council first imposed sanctions on North Korea in 1993 in response to its withdrawal from the NPT and refusal of IAEA inspections. Since then, it has imposed 10 rounds of sanctions over a decade, starting with UNSCR 1695 in 2006 and most recently Resolution 2375, which includes freezing crude oil exports, reducing refined petroleum product exports, banning textile imports, and freezing the employment of North Korean laborers abroad. However, due to China's limited cooperation and North Korea's efforts to circumvent sanctions, the full effect of sanctions has not been achieved.

As long as North Korea adheres to the parallel path of nuclear weapons and economic development, the vicious cycle of continued missile tests and intensified sanctions will persist. In this process, the expectation that sanctions alone can fully resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis is unrealistic. However, intensified sanctions are not useless. They are an indispensable means to ultimately compel North Korea to reconsider the cost-benefit calculation of developing nuclear weapons.

2) Deterrence

In the era of nuclear weapons, due to the revolutionary increase in destructive power, deterrence, which prevents the use of nuclear weapons, is crucial, rather than defense after their use, because of the unbearable human and material damage the adversary would suffer. To deter the rapidly developing North Korean nuclear weapons and render them unusable militarily or politically, a balance of terror based on nuclear weapons must inevitably be established. For this balance of terror, domestic and international discussions are actively underway regarding South Korea's independent nuclear development, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, strengthening extended deterrence through the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets, and reinforcing conventional weapon systems.

However, the theory of South Korea's independent nuclear development, as an attempt to create an unstable balance of terror, would lead to difficulties for not only North Korea but also South Korea itself in terms of economic, technological, and security pressures within the current global non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, it could trigger nuclear proliferation in Japan, leading the regional order surrounding the Korean Peninsula down the path of nuclearization, thereby increasing systemic instability.

Secondly, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, while technically part of extended deterrence in a broad sense, would face a reality far more difficult than the recent deployment of the THAAD system. Therefore, strengthening extended deterrence through the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets is currently important in terms of efficiency and realism. However, it must be remembered that the core of extended deterrence lies in enhancing mutual trust.

Finally, we must make every effort to deter the political and military use of North Korean nuclear weapons by promptly establishing the three-axis system—the Korean-style preemptive strike system, the missile defense system, and the massive retaliation system—and by fully utilizing ROK-U.S. combined capabilities, such as the THAAD system.

3) Engagement

To overcome the North Korean nuclear crisis, active engagement that can increase the benefits of denuclearization is essential, alongside active sanctions and deterrence to increase the costs of nuclearization. It must be demonstrated that while survival and nuclearization lead to death and poverty, denuclearization can instead guarantee life and prosperity.

Most importantly, a genuine 'Korean-style new peace regime' must be established, replacing the unconvincing 'North Korean-style peace regime.' Alternatives must be presented to North Korea, which developed nuclear weapons as a sword of survival amidst the U.S.'s hostile policy towards it, demonstrating that survival can be sufficiently secured without nuclear weapons. To this end, a complex peace regime must be constructed that can adequately guarantee a denuclearized North Korean regime. It is necessary to establish four layers of security locks: bilateral security (North Korea-U.S., North Korea-China, South Korea-North Korea), multilateral security (Six-Party Talks), global security (UN), and domestic security for denuclearization. To enable North Korea to successfully perform on the world stage by seeking a new survival strategy of parallel pursuit of denuclearized security and prosperity, complex economic cooperation must be pursued not only between North and South Korea but also at the Asia-Pacific and global levels.

4) Self-Help

Even if bilateral or multilateral talks for North Korean denuclearization are successfully held through the active efforts of sanctions, deterrence, and engagement by the relevant parties, the dream of North Korean denuclearization through dialogue will be shattered in vain, just like the Agreed Framework of 1994 or the Joint Statement of 2005, unless the Kim Jong-un regime seeks the sincerity of a new survival strategy beyond the parallel path of nuclear weapons and economic development. Therefore, a true escape from the North Korean nuclear crisis is impossible without North Korea's own self-reliant efforts.

For North Korea to evolve its current parallel path of nuclear weapons and economic development into a parallel path of denuclearized security and prosperity through its own efforts, first, marketization is crucial. However, within North Korea's control system, the political impact of marketization will gradually increase. Second, informatization is essential. While currently having a limited impact in North Korea's closed society, the political influence of informatization is bound to rapidly grow due to revolutionary changes in information technology. Finally, to survive on the world stage as a suitable state in the 21st century, North Korea's internal self-organization, or North Korean-style political development, is inevitable. Only when these self-reliant efforts by North Korea and the co-evolution of new North Korea policies by surrounding parties, including South Korea, align can we find a new path to escape the North Korean nuclear crisis. Strengthening the 'three major evolutionary capabilities' suitable for the 21st century is urgently needed.

Therefore, the urgent task for the Moon Jae-in administration is to play the role of a guide in helping the relevant parties, including South Korea, to accurately grasp the limitations of the simplistic solutions currently being pursued and to jointly devise and promptly implement a four-pronged, complex solution encompassing sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and self-help. There is not much time. ■

[Lead Author]

Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He graduated from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, received a Master's degree in Political Science from the Graduate School of Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. He served as a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University (1980-2012) and held positions as a visiting fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies, a visiting fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. His recent books and edited volumes include "Competition to Build the Asia-Pacific Order between the U.S. and China" (2017), "Policy Recommendations for the New Government's Diplomacy" (2017), and "International Politics of the Four Rivers" (2016).

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