[Issue Briefing] The Moon Jae-in Administration's Japan Diplomacy Recommendations: How to Deal with Abe's Assertive Diplomacy?

[Editor's Note]To diagnose the changing international landscape and key issues ahead of the presidential election and the launch of a new administration in 2017, EAI convened a roundtable discussion with experts from various fields to present desirable directions for South Korea's foreign policy. This paper was primarily authored based on the discussions held during the roundtable.

Despite numerous pending issues that require resolution between South Korea and Japan, the current bilateral relationship remains stagnant. Above all, historical issues have eroded mutual trust, preventing any progress. A solution requires both countries to demonstrate a strong will for relationship recovery and to make mutual efforts for change. Flexible handling of the December 28 Comfort Women Agreement is particularly necessary. It needs to be supplemented from a magnanimous perspective that more actively declares the will of both nations to resolve the comfort women issue and emphasizes the spirit of reconciliation. Based on this, opportunities must be created to restore relations and promote cooperation on security, economy, and emerging issues.

With the inauguration of the Trump administration, the East Asian regional order is in flux, and South Korea-Japan relations are entering a new phase. The new administration, based on "America First," is pursuing "peace through strength" by strengthening military power and existing alliance networks in terms of security, while imposing greater maintenance burdens on its allies. Economically, it has declared a proactive trade policy of "buying American and hiring American," announced its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), declared a comprehensive review of existing trade agreements, and is pressuring major trading partners to rectify unfair trade practices. As two key US allies, South Korea and Japan must adapt to the US's military-centric and transaction-oriented security policy, and cautiously respond to the US's aggressive unilateral trade policy. Both countries are at a juncture where they must re-examine their bilateral relations amidst increasing fluidity in East Asian security and economic ties.

Nevertheless, the emotional confrontation surrounding the comfort women issue, specifically the December 28, 2015 agreement, has resurfaced, leading to an unprecedented situation where the Japanese Ambassador to Korea was absent for over three months. The atmosphere for strategic cooperation and dialogue remains elusive. If the Abe administration, which is becoming more assertive and hardline towards South Korea, continues to clash over the comfort women/statue of peace issue and maintain emotional confrontation, South Korea's diplomatic room for maneuver will be severely limited, and it will face the risk of failing to respond adequately to the Trump risk. The new administration must critically examine the nature of the comfort women issue and the essence of the bilateral agreement, address historical issues separately, and take the first step towards co-evolution between South Korea and Japan to strengthen cooperation in security, economy, and culture.

The Pitfalls of Comfort Women Diplomacy

The Park Geun-hye administration's diplomacy towards Japan can be assessed as a failure. Without a single proper summit meeting, it failed to achieve any significant cooperation in security and economy, and public sentiment between the two countries reached its worst state since the normalization of relations. While South Korea's anti-Japanese sentiment is understandable, the deterioration of Japanese sentiment towards Korea is a painful aspect, with an atmosphere of mockery and hatred towards Korea being prevalent. At the root of all these worsening conditions lies the comfort women issue. President Park Geun-hye's hardline stance on past issues, beginning with her March 1, 2013, Independence Movement Day speech stating that the historical positions of perpetrator and victim will not change even after a thousand years, led to the unreasonable precondition of resolving the comfort women issue for improving South Korea-Japan relations. While this gained some domestic support, it became a self-inflicted wound that resulted in diplomatic isolation. A vicious cycle was formed where historical and identity conflicts between South Korea and Japan led to hindrances in security and economic cooperation. As trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan stalled, US dissatisfaction grew. The sharp decline in bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, and tourism led to a situation where enduring the political and economic costs became difficult, ultimately resulting in the December 28 Comfort Women Agreement as a diplomatic compromise.

Of course, this vicious cycle is not solely the fault of the Park Geun-hye administration. It is well known that the Abe administration's historical revisionism and the resulting identity politics provoked strong emotional backlash in Korea. Furthermore, the Abe administration's direct refusal of the comfort women's request for a personal apology or letter, its pressure on Germany to prevent the installation of a statue of peace, and its involvement in the lawsuit to remove the statue of peace in Glendale, USA, all indicate that the Japanese government's attitude is far from proactive efforts for historical reconciliation. Moreover, the Abe administration took extreme measures, such as recalling Ambassador Nagamine Yasumasa in protest of the installation of a statue of peace in Busan and suspending discussions on a currency swap agreement, and continues to pressure the new South Korean administration to abide by the comfort women agreement. This is reminiscent of South Korea's past actions towards Japan.

The problem lies in South Korea's international circumstances. The Abe administration in Japan, through the April 2015 summit with the US, laid a significant foundation for strengthening the alliance and has since formed a close relationship with the Trump administration, leading to an upward trend in its regional strategic standing. Even if external conflicts arise from attempts to build a reactionary conservative identity, the transactional approach of the Trump administration makes active intervention unlikely. Domestically, with virtually no political rivals, it has solidified its solo leadership. In contrast, South Korea's strategic standing is declining, raising concerns about diplomatic isolation ('Korea passing') due to a leadership vacuum.

The Abe administration that the Moon Jae-in administration faces on May 10 will confront historical issues head-on, unlike previous administrations. Depending on how the comfort women agreement is handled, South Korea-Japan relations could deteriorate with further discord. In such a scenario, given the national strength of both countries, their current diplomatic standing in the Asia-Pacific region, and the immediate diplomatic challenges, South Korea will incur significant costs, necessitating a strategic approach.

A Cautious and Flexible Response is Needed

The new administration must carefully observe these trends and handle the processing of the comfort women agreement with caution and flexibility. The starting point should be a clear recognition and acknowledgment of how arduous the task of reaching an agreement on the comfort women issue between South Korea and Japan truly is. The interpretation of history is inherently linked to a nation's identity, and differences in perceptions of the past between South Korea and Japan have often led to clashes of identity. Therefore, reaching an "agreement" (合意) on historical issues, meaning harmonizing the intentions (意) of both peoples, is an arduous task that signifies a certain convergence of identities.

The fundamental limitation of the December 28 agreement lies here. The Park Geun-hye administration, by attempting to reach a settlement within a set deadline on an issue that was essentially impossible to agree upon, had no choice but to engage in backroom negotiations and unilateral decision-making without a process for public consensus. Consequently, a public opinion poll immediately after the agreement showed that 63% of South Koreans opposed it, and currently, an overwhelming majority of over 80% oppose the relocation of the statue of peace.

Before even considering renegotiation, the new administration must engage in domestic dialogue. It must adopt a humble stance, acknowledging that the December 28 agreement was fundamentally a political and diplomatic compromise, and appeal to and persuade the victims and the majority of the public who oppose the government's decision. The new administration should take time to proceed with dialogue with the public from this self-negating perspective, refraining from hasty hardline measures such as abrogating or renegotiating the agreement, and calmly and multidimensionally calculate the gains and losses associated with such actions.

If the new administration proceeds with renegotiation, the repercussions will be significant. Given that the Abe administration has consistently demanded that the South Korean government abide by the comfort women agreement, it is highly likely that they will not agree to renegotiation, leading to a unilateral abrogation. In such a case, international public opinion will not be favorable to South Korea in the face of the Japanese government's diplomatic offensive, and the position of intellectuals within Japan who hold progressive views on historical issues will be significantly weakened.

The new administration needs to maintain a long-term perspective, emphasizing the fundamental spirit of the December 28 agreement—the spirit of historical reconciliation for colonial rule—rather than a narrow interpretation of its content. While suspending government-level criticism and condemnation related to the comfort women history as per the December 28 agreement, efforts should be made through 1.5-track or civilian historical dialogues to address contentious points and promote the implementation and dissemination of the agreement's spirit, thereby broadening public understanding and empathy. In this process, the new administration should respect the knowledge and perspectives gained through decades of conflict and cooperation on historical issues, adopting a humble stance of complementing and building upon the achievements of previous administrations, rather than seeking to present new accomplishments.

Strengthening Security Cooperation

While continuing multi-layered discussions on historical issues, the new administration must strive to restore bilateral relations that have been damaged in the security and economic spheres. In this context, an important consideration is the assessment of Japan's growing influence in the region. The second Abe cabinet, inaugurated in 2012, has, under the slogan of "proactive pacifism based on international cooperation," allowed for collective self-defense and sought to expand its military role through a series of security-related laws. The "Joint Vision Statement between the United States and Japan" (April 28, 2015) declared that "the security and prosperity of our two countries are inextricably linked and cannot be defined by borders," elevating the US-Japan alliance to its highest level. Furthermore, amidst the growing uncertainties and anxieties with the advent of the US Trump administration, Japan has confidently solidified its position as a key partner for the US in the Asia-Pacific region by quickly stabilizing bilateral relations. This confidence is evident in various aspects.

Consequently, Japan is likely to adopt a more assertive stance towards South Korea in security and economic arenas. It will actively pursue the strengthening of a common security cooperation framework to counter the shared threat posed by the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan will be put back on track. In this regard, the signing of the South Korea-Japan GSOMIA in November 2016, similar to the comfort women agreement, faced public opposition due to backroom negotiations and unilateral decisions without sufficient explanation to the public. Nevertheless, as an agreement that provides military information to the other party on a reciprocal basis, it forms the basic foundation of bilateral security cooperation, and its inevitability must be acknowledged. The new administration must expand and develop the trilateral cooperation framework with the US and Japan, including sharing military information on North Korea, enhancing the credibility of the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence, and cooperating on missile defense systems.

Conversely, with the Abe administration's adherence to a containment policy towards China, the Northeast Asian landscape is forming a "US-Japan vs. China" structure. As trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan unfolds to contain China, South Korea may find itself in an undesirable strategic situation. The new administration must exercise extreme caution to prevent trilateral cooperation from evolving into a regional alliance against China, while simultaneously making multifaceted efforts to ensure that trilateral cooperation and the South Korea-China network can coexist and be cooperatively linked.

Expanding Cooperation in Economy and Emerging Issues

The new administration must seize the opportunity to usher in a new era by finding common interests with Japan and cooperating to the greatest extent possible in the economic and emerging issue arenas. Particularly in the economic sphere, the Trump administration, under its "America First" slogan, is pursuing bilateral negotiations and unilateral retaliation that maximize asymmetrical power relations, rather than a liberal approach based on multilateral institutions, norms, and rules. As part of its aggressive unilateralism in trade policy, it has declared withdrawal from the TPP, presenting the challenge of re-establishing a new trade order in the East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions, which have been destabilized by this move. This increases the incentive for cooperation between South Korea and Japan to establish an open and liberal multilateral system.

South Korea and Japan must cooperate in building the post-TPP trade order by working together on regional architecture through agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Korea-China-Japan FTA, and the "TPP 11." Furthermore, they must strengthen cooperation in various international multilateral forums, including the G20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), to defend and expand free trade and liberal multilateral norms and institutions. They must also aim for the coexistence and functional differentiation of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and work on designing an architecture that prevents negative interdependencies between economic/trade interests and strategic interests.

The new administration must prepare to reactivate the long-standing South Korea-Japan FTA. Negotiations for the South Korea-Japan FTA, which were suspended in 2004, saw attempts to resume in 2008 and were also explored during the TPP negotiations. Now, with the TPP suspended, a new momentum for South Korea-Japan FTA negotiations is emerging, and it is necessary to carefully develop a new framing for resuming negotiations and build public consensus.

The South Korea-Japan FTA can be reframed as an FTA for job creation, moving beyond the existing framework focused on manufacturing, large corporations, and liberalization. It is necessary to actively explore new agendas such as identifying items for service sector expansion, measures to promote cooperation in cultural exchange and the cultural industry, cooperation in the medical and bio fields targeting an aging society, establishing rules for digital trade, and cooperation in environmental projects.

Furthermore, an agreement facilitating the free movement of people between the two countries is promising. Both South Korea and Japan are rapidly entering a low birthrate and aging society, facing a decline in the working-age population. Japan, in particular, is experiencing a severe labor shortage due to the retirement of the 'Dankai' generation, while South Korea faces serious youth unemployment. This creates a complementary structure. Through measures such as promoting exchanges between middle and high schools and universities, vocational training, and the liberalization of movement of people (Mode 4), South Korea's quality youth labor force can help fill the shortage in Japan's skilled labor market.

For the Co-evolution of South Korea and Japan

The first challenge facing the new administration is that the Abe administration continues to pursue reactionary identity politics based on historical revisionism even after the comfort women agreement, and is likely to repeat actions that distort the history of colonial rule and aggressive wars. As mentioned earlier, with little likelihood of domestic forces in Japan or the Trump administration intervening to check the Abe administration's historical distortions, and with anti-Korean sentiment and a 'Korea discount' atmosphere still prevalent, the Abe administration will likely adopt a highly offensive stance if the South Korean government responds hastily. Unless the South Korean government can implement a two-track diplomacy that separates historical issues from political and economic issues, it may be difficult to find an exit from historical wars for the entire five-year term.

To resolve historical issues, the will and vision of the top leadership are necessary, but true reconciliation and improved relations between the two countries will be achieved not through the efforts of one side alone, but through their co-evolution. Both countries are experiencing historical conflicts even domestically, and the reality is that history has not been organized to a level that all citizens can share. Therefore, historical reconciliation between the two countries is an excessive expectation at this point. Thus, while pursuing a separation of historical issues from security/economic matters for immediate issue management with the Abe administration, efforts must be made to seek changes and evolution that allow both countries to move towards sharing identities by realizing the values of stability, prosperity, and coexistence in East Asia, free from narrow nationalism and self-centered thinking. ■

[Lead Author]

Son Yeol_ Director of EAI Japan Studies Center, Professor at Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has served as a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His main research areas include Japanese and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and global governance.

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