[Public Opinion Brief No. 135] Key Results of the 2013 Korea-Japan Expert Survey

[Public Opinion Brief No. 135] Jointly by EAI and Yonron NPO

1. Important Yet Negative Korea-Japan Relations

2. Perception of the Other Country Turning Negative

3. Future Outlook for Korea and Japan and Perceptions of China

4. Challenges for Developing Korea-Japan Relations

1. Important Yet Negative Korea-Japan Relations

- Importance of Korea-Japan relations: 90.3% of Korean experts, 81.2% of Japanese experts

- State of Korea-Japan relations: 3.6% of Korean experts, 14.4% of Japanese experts

Experts in both Korea and Japan agreed on the importance of bilateral relations. Among Korean experts, 90.3% (36.9% important + 53.4% relatively important) responded that relations with Japan are important. Among Japanese experts, 81.2% (58.5% important + 22.6% relatively important) responded that relations with Korea are important. While the overall percentage of Korean experts who deemed relations with Japan important was higher compared to Japanese experts, if only the 'important' category is considered excluding 'relatively important,' Japanese experts' response rate was higher than that of Korean experts.

Compared to the general public surveys, experts in both countries placed a relatively higher emphasis on bilateral relations. Among the Korean public, 73.6% (22.6% important + 51.0% relatively important) responded that relations with Japan are important, and among the Japanese public, 74.0% (36.8% important + 37.2% relatively important) responded that relations with Korea are important.

[Figure 1] Perception of the Importance of Bilateral Relations (%)

Note 1) Excludes 'Don't know/No response'

Note 2) 'Korea (Exp.)' refers to Korean experts, and 'Korea (Pub.)' refers to the Korean general public. The same applies to Japan. Same below.

Despite the importance of bilateral relations perceived by experts and the general public in both countries, the current state of bilateral relations was evaluated very negatively. Only 3.6% of Korean experts responded that Korea-Japan relations are good. While the response rate among Japanese experts was relatively higher than that of Korean experts, it was still only 14.4%.

The survey results for the general public were not significantly different from those of the experts. If there was any difference, it was that the proportion of respondents who answered 'bad' was slightly lower compared to the expert surveys.

[Figure 2] Perception of Korea-Japan Relations (%)

Note) Excludes 'Don't know/No response'

The current negative state of Korea-Japan relations was perceived by even experts as having worsened over the past year. Among Korean experts, only 1.5% responded that bilateral relations had improved in the past year, while 76.0% responded that they had worsened. Among Japanese experts, only 3.5% responded that relations had improved, and 67.0% responded that they had worsened. The fact that the proportion of respondents who answered 'worsened' exceeded half was also observed in the survey results of the general public in both countries.

[Figure 3] Perception of Bilateral Relations Over the Past Year (%)

Note) Excludes 'Don't know/No response'

There was a difference between the survey results of Korean experts and Japanese experts regarding the future outlook for bilateral relations. Among Korean experts, 35.2% responded that bilateral relations would improve. The proportions who responded that they would remain the same or worsen were 43.3% and 18.8%, respectively. Among Japanese experts, 42.2% responded that bilateral relations would improve, which was 8.1 percentage points (p) higher than the results of Korean experts. The proportion who responded that they would remain the same was 27.1%, which was 15.3 percentage points (p) lower than the results of Korean experts. The proportion who responded that they would worsen was 16.7%, similar to the results of Korean experts. This indicates that Japanese experts had a relatively more positive future outlook for bilateral relations compared to Korean experts.

The survey results for the general public were even more pessimistic compared to those of the experts. Only 14.0% of Korean citizens responded that bilateral relations would improve, while the proportions who predicted they would remain the same or worsen were 59.5% and 26.6%, respectively. Japanese citizens also showed a higher proportion predicting that the current negative relations would continue rather than an optimistic outlook. The proportion predicting improvement was 23.1%, but the proportions predicting they would remain the same and worsen were 34.6% and 18.2%, respectively.

[Figure 4] Future Outlook for Bilateral Relations (%)

2. Perception of the Other Country Turning Negative

- Positive perception of the other country: 59.5% of Korean experts, 53.4% of Japanese experts

- Worsened over the past year: 37.4% of Korean experts, 31.5% of Japanese experts

Despite the deterioration of relations between the two countries, a significant number of experts in both countries still responded that they had a positive impression of the other country. Among Korean experts, 59.5% (5.3% have a good impression + 54.2% generally have a good impression) responded that they had a good impression of Japan, exceeding half. The proportion who responded that they did not have a good impression was 28.8% (6.4% do not have a good impression + 22.4% generally do not have a good impression).

Among Japanese experts, 53.4% (18.1% have a good impression + 35.3% generally have a good impression) responded that they had a good impression of Korea, exceeding half. The proportion who responded that they did not have a good impression was 27.5% (10.6% do not have a good impression + 16.9% generally do not have a good impression).

Compared to the survey results of experts in both countries, the general public in both countries overwhelmingly responded that they had a negative impression of the other country. Among the Korean public, only 12.2% responded that they had a good impression of Japan, and among the Japanese public, only 31.1% responded that they had a good impression of Korea.

[Figure 5] Impression of the Other Country (%)

This does not mean that the impression of the other country among experts has remained at the same level as in the past. Among Korean experts, the proportion who responded that their impression of Japan had worsened over the past year was 37.4% (5.6% significantly worsened + 31.8% generally worsened), overwhelmingly higher than the 4.1% (0.8% significantly improved + 3.3% generally improved) who responded that it had improved. The proportion who responded 'about the same' was 58.0%, but considering the negative state of Korea-Japan relations last year, it is difficult to interpret this positively. Among Japanese experts, the proportion who responded 'worsened' was 31.5% (6.3% significantly worsened + 25.2% generally worsened), higher than the proportion who responded 'improved,' which was 7.6% (1.9% significantly improved + 5.7% generally improved). The proportion who responded 'about the same' was 56.2%.

The survey results for experts did not show significant differences compared to the general public. Among the Korean public, only 3.6% responded that relations with Japan had improved over the past year, and the response rate among the Japanese public was only 7.4%. This is a significant difference compared to the proportions who responded 'about the same' or 'worsened.'

[Figure 6] Change in Impression of the Other Country Over the Past Year (%)

Note) Excludes 'Don't know/No response'

When asked about the reasons for having a positive impression of the other country, allowing for multiple responses, experts in both countries commonly cited the 'kind and diligent national character' as the primary reason. The response rate for Korean experts was 69.7%, and for Japanese experts, it was 40.4%.

There were differences in other reasons. Korean experts most frequently cited 'being an advanced country with a high standard of living' (33.3%) as the second reason, and 'interest in Japanese culture' (25.6%) as the third. Other responses included 'quality of Japanese products' and 'being a liberal democratic country,' with response rates of 17.1% and 16.7%, respectively.

Japanese experts most frequently cited 'interest in Korean culture such as K-dramas and K-pop' and 'being a liberal democratic country' (33.2%) as the second reason. The proportion citing 'being an advanced country with a high standard of living' was 14.7%.

Looking at the survey results for the general public, Korean citizens responded that 'the quality of Japanese products is good' at a rate of 31.1%, which was relatively higher than the experts' 17.1%. Japanese citizens responded that 'interest in Korean culture such as K-dramas and K-pop' at a rate of 52.4%, which was relatively higher than the experts' 33.2%. Another difference was that the proportion citing 'kind and diligent national character' was 27.0%, which was relatively lower than the experts' 40.4%.

[Figure 7] Reasons for Positive Impression of the Other Country (%)

Note) Excludes 'Other' and 'No response'

When asked about the reasons for having a negative impression of the other country, experts in both countries frequently cited 'historical issues.' Among Korean experts, 88.5% responded that Japan has not properly reflected on its history of invading Korea. Among Japanese experts, 46.8% cited 'criticism of Japan due to historical issues, etc.,' which was higher than other options.

In addition, Korean experts frequently cited the Dokdo/Takeshima issue (41.6%) and Japan's right-wing shift (28.3%). The proportion citing 'Japanese people's duplicitous national character' was 19.5%.

Japanese experts cited 'Koreans' emotional speech and behavior' and 'bringing political issues into sports, etc.' as reasons, with response rates of 46.2% and 32.3%, respectively. The response rates for 'ongoing confrontation over Takeshima' and 'inability to understand Koreans' patriotic actions or way of thinking' were 28.5% and 27.8%, respectively.

The response rates of the general public differed from those of the experts. Both Korean and Japanese citizens showed a relatively high proportion citing the Dokdo/Takeshima issue. Among Korean citizens, the proportion citing the Dokdo/Takeshima issue reached 84.5%, and among Japanese citizens, it was 50.1%. Of course, the proportion citing historical issues was also high. Among Korean citizens, 77.0% responded that Japan has not properly reflected on its history of invading Korea, and among Japanese citizens, 55.8% responded that Japan is criticized due to historical issues.

[Figure 8] Reasons for Negative Impression of the Other Country (%)

Note) Excludes 'Other' and 'No response'

3. Future Outlook for Korea and Japan and Perceptions of China

- Importance of Korea-Japan relations over Korea-China relations: 4.2%

- Importance of Japan-Korea relations over Japan-China relations: 12.5%

- Feel closer to Japan than China: 27.0%, Feel closer to Korea than China: 40.9%

Regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula in 10 years, experts in both Korea and Japan had many opinions suggesting signs of North-South unification or unpredictability. Among Korean experts, 52.9% responded that there would be signs of North-South unification, the highest proportion. The proportion who responded that the current situation would remain unchanged was 21.9%, and 17.0% responded that it was unpredictable. Only 5.6% predicted a worsening of confrontation with North Korea.

Among Japanese experts, 31.3% predicted signs of North-South unification, and 31.0% predicted unpredictability, showing a close split. The proportion who responded that the current situation would remain unchanged was 17.2%, and 9.2% predicted a worsening of confrontation with North Korea.

The predictions of the general public in both countries differed from those of the experts. Among Korean citizens, 39.8% responded that it was unpredictable, the highest proportion, followed by 21.7% who responded that the current situation would remain unchanged. Japanese citizens also had the highest proportion responding that it was unpredictable at 47.1%, followed by 20.7% who responded that the current situation would remain unchanged.

[Figure 9] Situation on the Korean Peninsula in 10 Years (%)

Amidst the prevailing negative perception of current bilateral relations, experts in both countries were also asked about their future outlook for the other country. Among Korean experts, 36.4% predicted that Japan would be a middle power with very strong influence by 2030, the highest proportion, followed by 30.5% who predicted it would be a middle power with very weak influence. The proportion who predicted that Japan would maintain its position as the world's third-largest economy was 21.6%. Only 4.6% predicted that Japan would become a military power.

Among Japanese experts, 34.8% predicted that Korea would be a middle power with very strong influence by 2030, the highest proportion, followed by 17.4% who predicted it would be a middle power with very weak influence. The proportion who predicted Korea would be a small country with strong influence was 10.1%, and 6.3% predicted it would be a small country with no influence.

The results for the general public differed from those of the experts. Korean citizens predicted that Japan would maintain its position as the world's third-largest economy in 2030 at the highest rate of 34.1%, followed by 29.6% who predicted it would be a middle power with very strong influence. This indicates that a high proportion of Korean citizens expect Japan's status to remain strong even in 2030. Among Japanese citizens, 21.3% predicted that Korea would be a middle power with very strong influence by 2030, the highest proportion, followed by 14.9% and 12.7% who responded that it would be a small country with strong influence and an economic power, respectively.

[Figure 10] Status of the Other Country in 2030 (%)

Note) Excludes 'Other' and 'No response'

Regarding the importance of bilateral relations and relations with China, experts in both Korea and Japan commonly responded that both are important, with relations with China being the second most important. Among Korean experts, 49.9% responded that both Korea-Japan and Korea-China relations are important, the highest proportion. The proportion who responded that Korea-China relations are important was also high at 45.5%, but only 4.3% responded that Korea-Japan relations are more important than Korea-China relations.

Among Japanese experts, 47.1% responded that both Japan-Korea and Japan-China relations are important, the highest proportion. The proportion who responded that Japan-China relations are important was 31.1%. The proportion who responded that Japan-Korea relations are important was 12.5%.

The general public in both countries also generally responded that both bilateral relations and relations with China are important, with relations with China being the second most important. The proportion who responded that bilateral relations are more important was 9.3% among Korean citizens and 13.9% among Japanese citizens. This indicates the emphasis placed on the importance of relations with China.

[Figure 11] Perception of Importance of Bilateral Relations and Relations with China (%)

The survey results of experts from both countries generally indicated that relations with China were prioritized compared to relations with their respective neighboring countries. However, these results did not directly translate to a high degree of affinity towards China. Among South Korean experts, the highest percentage (28.0%) responded that they did not feel close to either Japan or China. Nevertheless, the proportion of those who felt closer to Japan (27.0%) was higher than that of those who felt closer to China (18.6%). The percentage of respondents who felt equally close to both countries was 23.7%.

Among Japanese experts, the proportion who felt closer to South Korea was 40.9%, significantly higher than the 11.1% who felt closer to China. The percentage of respondents who felt neither close to either country was 20.0%, while conversely, 18.6% felt close to both. These findings suggest that Japanese experts feel a stronger sense of affinity towards their neighboring country compared to South Korean experts.

[Figure 12] Affinity Towards Neighboring Country vs. China (%)

4. Challenges in Developing South Korea-Japan Relations

- Key obstacles to bilateral relations are historical perception, education, and the Dokdo/Takeshima issue.

Regarding the form of socio-political systems, experts from both countries tended to select options other than capitalism and democracy. When asked with the possibility of multiple responses, South Korean experts indicated that Japan's socio-political system was characterized by nationalism and ethnocentrism, with 52.2% and 50.6% selecting these categories, respectively. These figures were higher than those for capitalism (50.6%) and democracy (28.8%). Militarism (27.5%) and hegemonism (23.2%) also accounted for a considerable proportion of responses.

Japanese experts also indicated that South Korea's socio-political system was characterized by nationalism, with 70.3% selecting this category. Capitalism and democracy were selected by 58.6% and 40.3% of respondents, respectively. Ethnocentrism also accounted for a relatively high proportion of responses at 20.9%.

Compared to experts, the general public in both countries showed relatively lower response rates for democracy and capitalism when describing the neighboring country's socio-political system. Instead, they showed higher response rates for militarism. Specifically, 50.3% of South Korean citizens identified Japan's socio-political system as militaristic, the highest response rate. Among Japanese citizens, 43.3% identified South Korea's socio-political system as nationalistic, while the response rate for militarism was also relatively high at 31.3%.

[Figure 13] Perception of Neighboring Country's Socio-Political System (%)

Note) 'Other' and 'No response' excluded.

When asked with the possibility of multiple responses about the key factors hindering the development of bilateral relations, historical perception, historical education, and the Dokdo issue were identified. South Korean experts cited Japan's historical perception and historical education at 79.4% and the Dokdo issue at 77.6%. The proportion of respondents who pointed to the provocative rhetoric and actions of Japanese politicians fueling anti-Korean sentiment and the lack of trust between the publics of both countries were also relatively high, at 46.1% and 22.1%, respectively. The proportion citing anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean citizens was also not low, at 18.3%.

Among Japanese experts, the Takeshima issue and South Korea's historical perception and education were cited most frequently, at 61.9% and 45.9%, respectively. Anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean citizens was also cited at a high level of 40.0%. Additionally, the proportion citing anti-Japanese reporting by South Korean media was 26.1%, and the lack of trust between the publics of both countries was cited by 20.3%. The proportion pointing to Japan's historical perception and education was also not low, at 20.2%.

The response rates from the general public in both countries were more concentrated on specific items compared to the expert surveys. Among South Korean citizens, the Dokdo issue was overwhelmingly cited, with a response rate of 94.6%. Japan's historical perception and education were also highly cited at 61.1%. The proportion citing provocative rhetoric and actions by Japanese politicians fueling anti-Korean sentiment was 31.1%, ranking third, but showed a significant gap compared to the response rates for other cited factors. Among Japanese citizens, the Takeshima issue was overwhelmingly cited at 83.7%. Anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean citizens followed, at 55.1%.

[Table 1] Factors Hindering Bilateral Relations (%)

Note 1) The translation of the options is directly from the terms used in the actual surveys in both countries.

Note 2) 'Kor. Exp.' denotes South Korean experts, and 'Kor. Cit.' denotes South Korean citizens. 'Jpn. Exp.' and 'Jpn. Cit.' denote the same for Japan.

When asked about the existence of territorial disputes from a public opinion perspective, 75.6% of South Korean experts and 78.6% of Japanese experts responded affirmatively. The general public in both countries also showed a high percentage of affirmative responses.

Regarding solutions, South Korean experts most frequently responded that effective control should be strengthened to protect the territory, with 57.6% selecting this option. The proportion of respondents who advocated for avoiding escalation of confrontation and pursuing peaceful resolution was 31.6%. Only 4.4% each responded that Japan's claims were unjust and that military response should not be ruled out, or that a resolution through international law should be pursued.

Among Japanese experts, the highest response rate (58.0%) was for taking the issue to the International Court of Justice for a resolution under international law. The next highest response rate was for avoiding escalation of confrontation and acknowledging South Korea's effective control, at 16.4%. The proportion advocating for South Korea to acknowledge the existence of the territorial dispute through diplomatic negotiations was 10.0%.

The general public in both countries showed some differences compared to the expert surveys. Among South Korean citizens, 37.7% responded that effective control should be strengthened, and 26.7% advocated for pursuing peaceful resolution. However, the proportion supporting military response was also relatively high at 20.4%. Among Japanese citizens, 60.7% responded that the issue should be taken to the International Court of Justice. In contrast, the proportions supporting military response or acknowledging South Korea's effective control were low, at 1.3% and 2.3%, respectively.

[Figure 14] Existence of Territorial Dispute (%)

[Figure 15] (Respondents who answered 'Territorial dispute exists') Solutions for Territorial Dispute (%)

Note) 'Don't know/No response' excluded.

For reference, regarding experience visiting the other country among survey participants, 82.7% of South Korean experts and 68.3% of Japanese experts responded affirmatively. When asked about the purpose of their visits, with the option to select all applicable categories, 61.8% of South Korean experts cited tourism and travel, and 40.9% cited short-term business trips. 'Other' accounted for 22.2%, study abroad for 4.3%, and long-term business trips of over one year for 4.0%. Among Japanese experts, 63.9% cited short-term business trips, and 58.5% cited tourism and travel. Study abroad accounted for 5.6%, and long-term business trips of over one year for 4.1%.

Regarding the presence of acquaintances in the other country, 21.1% of South Korean experts reported having very close friends or acquaintances, and 39.9% reported having friends or acquaintances with whom they frequently communicate. Among Japanese experts, 40.0% reported having very close friends or acquaintances, and 35.1% reported having friends or acquaintances with whom they frequently communicate.

When asked about how they obtain information about the other country, with the option to select all applicable categories, 69.2% of South Korean experts indicated that they learned about Japan through South Korean media, and 39.9% had direct exposure to Japanese culture. The proportion who had viewed Japanese media or internet content was 36.4%, and those who responded 'hardly any' was 3.6%. Among Japanese experts, 52.2% indicated that they learned about South Korea through Japanese media, and 48.3% had direct exposure to South Korean culture. The proportion who had viewed South Korean media or internet content was 45.9%, and those who responded 'hardly any' was 3.8%.

When asked whether they believed their country's media provided objective and fair reporting on bilateral relations, 56.5% of South Korean experts participating in the survey responded negatively. The proportion who responded affirmatively was 29.5%, and 14.0% responded 'neither/don't know'. Among Japanese experts, 51.7% responded negatively. The proportion who responded affirmatively was 17.6%, and 24.3% responded 'neither/don't know'.