[Public Opinion Brief No. 132] Security Crisis and South Koreans' Security Awareness

[Public Opinion Brief No. 132] EAI 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey

I. Security Awareness Indicators Following North Korea's 3rd Nuclear Test

II. Security Crisis and External Perceptions

III. Security Crisis and Perceptions of North Korea/Unification

IV. Security Crisis and Domestic Politics: Analysis of the Path to Security Cohesion

I. Key Security Indicators in the 2013 Political Security Survey

Security is unstable: 70.6%

Following North Korea's third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, and subsequent actions such as the nullification of the Armistice Agreement on March 5 and the provisional closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex on May 4, tensions between North and South Korea escalated, leading to increased security concerns among South Korean citizens. After the Yeonpyeong shelling incident in November 2010, 81.5% responded that South Korea's security situation was generally unstable. This figure had decreased to 61.0% during the first anniversary survey in 2011 and further dropped to 37.1% in the second anniversary survey in 2012, showing a trend toward stability. However, in the April 2013 survey, it surged to 70.6%.

Military power assessment excluding US Forces Korea: North Korea superior 51.6%, similar 23.3%, South Korea superior 24.6%

This heightened sense of insecurity appears to be a result of the perception that the military balance between North and South Korea has been disrupted by North Korea's proven nuclear capability and missile technology. In this survey, when asked to assess the military balance between North and South Korea excluding US Forces Korea, only 24.6% responded that South Korea was superior, and 23.3% considered them similar, while a significant 51.6% believed North Korea was superior.

Reliance on ROK-US Alliance Deterrence: ROK-US Alliance should be strengthened: 65.6%

The disruption of the military balance between North and South Korea due to North Korea's nuclear armament is leading to increased support for the ROK-US alliance. When asked about the desirable direction of ROK-US relations, 65.6% responded that the alliance should be strengthened compared to the present, while 19.5% favored maintaining the current level, and 14.9% advocated for pursuing independent diplomacy free from US influence.

Distrust of China: In case of North-South conflict, China will support North Korea: 62.1%

Meanwhile, there are significant doubts regarding the stance of China, which is rapidly emerging as a global power alongside the United States. A substantial 62.1% believed China would support North Korea, while only 31.7% expected China to remain neutral. The response that China would support South Korea was a mere 6.2%.

Solution to North Korea's nuclear issue: Six-party talks 51.3% > Economic sanctions 28.0% > North Korea-US dialogue 12.8% > Military action 7.6%

Regarding preferred solutions to North Korea's nuclear issue, diplomatic efforts such as the Six-Party Talks were cited by the largest proportion of respondents at 51.3%. Economic sanctions against North Korea followed at 28.0%. Responses favoring North Korea-US dialogue accounted for 12.8%, indicating low support for solutions excluding South Korea. Military action was favored by 7.6%, suggesting a strong preference to avoid war.

South Korea should also possess nuclear weapons: 73.4%

In response to North Korea's nuclear armament, there appears to be a growing domestic sentiment for South Korea to also possess nuclear weapons, alongside strengthening the ROK-US alliance and pursuing diplomatic solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue through international efforts. Regarding the assertion that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons, 33.7% strongly agreed, and 39.7% generally agreed, indicating a majority positive response towards South Korea acquiring nuclear capabilities.

Reduce/Suspend aid to North Korea: 54.1%

North Korea's security threat is also diminishing South Koreans' willingness to provide aid to North Korea. While 9.4% favored increasing aid to North Korea and 36.3% preferred maintaining the current level, 30.7% advocated for reduction and 23.4% called for suspension, indicating that a majority held a passive or negative stance. Considering the reduction in aid to North Korea by the current government compared to the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, the opinion to maintain the current level is difficult to interpret as active support for aid. Overall, public opinion regarding aid to North Korea can be assessed as lukewarm.

Urgent unification 11.5%, need for speed adjustment 39.4%, no need to rush 31.7%, no need for unification 17.4%

Perceptions of unification have also cooled. Those who believe unification should be pursued urgently accounted for 11.5%, while 39.4% favored proceeding with adjustments to the pace. A significant 31.7% felt there was no need to rush, and 17.4% believed unification was unnecessary. Active attitudes towards unification were a minority opinion, with a majority favoring a cautious approach, while the view that unification is unnecessary was also considerable.

[Figure 1] South Korean Public's Security Perceptions After North Korea's 3rd Nuclear Test

Data: EAI 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

II. Security Crisis and External Perceptions: Coexistence of Strong National Pride and Pro-American Dependence

1. Strong National Pride and Distrust in Defense Capabilities

As shown in [Figure 2], national pride among South Koreans has been on the rise since the 2000s. In the 2000 survey, the proportion agreeing with the statement 'I am proud to be Korean' was 64.1%. This increased to 79.3% in the 2001 survey and 85.4% in the 2003 survey, showing a sharp rise primarily in the early 2000s. Since then, pride in being Korean has steadily increased, reaching 92.2% in the 2013 survey.

However, South Korea's defense capabilities do not support this national pride. In the 2nd <National Identity> Survey conducted by EAI and ARI in 2010, which measured national pride across nine domains including democracy, international standing, economic achievements, social welfare, science and technology, sports, arts/culture, history, and military strength, military strength was the third lowest area of pride, following social welfare (17.0% proud) and international standing (27.3% proud). The response 'proud of South Korea's military strength' was 40.0%, while 'not proud' was 59.5%. This is an improvement from the 2005 survey, where 'proud' was 30.6% and 'not proud' was 65.2%. However, negative perceptions remain prevalent. National pride is primarily driven by science and technology, history, sports, and economic achievements, while political and military areas such as democracy and military strength tend to diminish national pride (EAI <Who Are We Koreans?> 2010).

[Figure 2] Changes in South Koreans' National Pride (%)

Data: Seoul National University Institute for Social Development (2000), Korea Overseas Information Service (2001), East Asia Barometer (2003), EAI 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

In fact, in the current survey regarding the military balance between North and South Korea excluding US Forces Korea, the general public held the view that North Korea was superior until mid-2006, around the time of the first North Korean nuclear test. However, immediately after the inter-Korean summit in December 2007, when expectations for peace and resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue were high, the proportion of public opinion stating that the military balance was achieved between North and South Korea surged to 42.9%. Five years later, with North Korea's successful satellite launch and its third nuclear test, the perception of North Korea's military superiority significantly increased in the 2013 survey.

This anxiety regarding South Korea's military capabilities directly translates into security concerns, necessitating careful attention from the government and military. In this survey, among those who considered South Korea's security situation generally stable, 39.9% believed South Korea's military power was superior to North Korea's. However, among those who felt insecure, only 22.1% believed South Korea held a military advantage over North Korea.

[Figure 3] Changes in Assessment of North-South Military Balance Excluding USFK (%)

Data: National Defense University Public Security Awareness Survey (2000-2004), South Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (2006; 2007; 2013)

2. Changes in External Perceptions: Military Tensions Between North and South Lead to Pro-American Sentiment

In the absence of confidence in the ability to maintain security independently, security anxieties lead the public to rely on external forces, namely the ROK-US alliance. For a time in the mid-2000s, the idea of China as an alternative to the US was briefly discussed in political and civil society circles. However, due to historical issues such as China's Northeast Project, security issues like the North Korean nuclear program, and China's protective stance towards North Korea, the influence of the 'China alternative' theory waned. Particularly with the succession of events including the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, the second in 2009, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 2010, and the third nuclear test in 2013, there has been a strong tendency to rely on the traditional alliance with the United States rather than China.

Favorable impression scores: USA 71, China 53, Japan 41, North Korea 32

Firstly, on an emotional level, the average favorable impression scores of neighboring countries, periodically surveyed by the East Asia Institute since 2004, show that prior to the start of China's Northeast Project in 2004 and the materialization of North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, favorable impressions of the US and China were similar. A score closer to 0 indicates strong dislike, while a score closer to 100 indicates strong liking. A score of 50 represents neutral feelings, neither liking nor disliking.

In the 2004 survey, both the US and China scored 58 points. In the July 2006 survey, just before the first North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the US scored 58 and China 57, showing similar favorability. However, subsequent surveys show a trend of rising favorability towards the US and declining favorability towards China. Favorability towards the US rose to around 61 points in the 2008 survey and the January 2010 survey, prior to the Cheonan incident. Conversely, favorability towards China dropped to 50 and 49 points, similar to the scores for Japan. In the case of the US, favorability rose to 67 points in the 2011 survey, one year after the Cheonan/Yeonpyeong incidents, and further to 71 points in the April 2013 survey following the third North Korean nuclear test. Meanwhile, favorability towards China remained stagnant at 51 and 53 points, respectively, widening the gap in favorable impressions between the US and China felt by South Koreans.

Meanwhile, regarding North Korea, until the early part of the Lee Myung-bak administration, favorable impressions were not high but hovered slightly below neutral (46 points in 2004, 49 in 2006, 49 in February 2008). However, from 2010 onwards, scores dropped significantly: 41 points in the 2010 survey, 32 in 2011, and 32 in 2013, confirming a decline in favorability to the level of dislike. Favorability towards Japan has also been lukewarm, but in the 2011 and 2013 surveys, scores were 40 and 41 points, respectively, a considerable drop from the levels of 50 points in 2008 and 49 in 2010. In summary, the changes in the security situation since 2010 have led to increased favorability towards the US, a lukewarm attitude towards China, and increased dislike towards Japan and North Korea.

[Figure 4] Changes in National Favorability Scores Towards the Four Major Neighboring Powers (Average)

Data: EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004; July 2006; Feb 2008), EAI‧Korea Research Regular Survey (Jan 2010), EAI‧ARI Korea-China Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

In case of US-China conflict, support the US 45.6% vs. maintain neutrality 51.3% vs. support China 3.0%

This strengthening of pro-American and anti-North Korean sentiment is leading to a stronger stance in favor of supporting the US in the event of a US-China conflict. Looking at [Figure 5], in the 2011 survey, 62.1% believed neutrality should be maintained in the event of a serious conflict between the US and China, while support for the US was 35.5% and support for China was only 1.7%. However, in the 2013 survey, the proportion favoring neutrality decreased by over 10 percentage points to 51.3%, while support for the US increased to 45.6%. This appears to be a result of the growing need for a firm security alliance as North Korea's nuclear threat becomes more tangible.

Conversely, in the event of a serious conflict between China and Japan, as shown in [Figure 6], the opinion to maintain neutrality is overwhelmingly dominant at 78.7%, although slightly lower than the 83.0% in the 2011 survey. However, support for China has slightly increased from 12.5% in 2011 to 18.0% in 2013, while support for Japan has remained largely unchanged at 3.7% in 2011 and 3.3% in 2013. This can be attributed to the weakening of the 'China alternative' theory, maintaining a lukewarm attitude towards China, and a continued indifferent attitude towards Japan, unlike in the case of US-China conflict where a neutral stance is maintained.

[Figure 5] South Korea's Response in Case of Serious US-China Conflict (%) [Figure 6] South Korea's Response in Case of Serious China-Japan Conflict (%)

Data: EAI‧ARI Korea-China Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

Positive response to US intervention in case of North Korean instability: 50.4%, positive response to Chinese intervention: 12.8%

Meanwhile, attitudes towards the intervention of major powers in the event of a severe crisis within North Korea serve as an indicator of public trust in those countries. In South Korea, where there is considerable skepticism and a sense of external responsibility for the division of the Korean Peninsula, a favorable attitude towards intervention by a country during a sudden change in North Korea signifies a high level of trust. In [Figure 7], regarding US intervention in the event of a North Korean regime crisis, 38.8% responded positively in the 2011 survey, with 29.4% neutral and 31.5% negative. However, in the 2013 survey, positive responses regarding US intervention surged to 50.4%, with 25.7% neutral and only 23.7% negative. In contrast, regarding China's intervention, the proportion of positive responses was very low, at 12.1% in the 2011 survey and 12.8% in the 2013 survey, when North Korea experienced internal turmoil.

[Figure 7] US Intervention in Case of North Korean Instability (%) [Figure 8] Chinese Intervention in Case of North Korean Instability (%)

Data: EAI‧ARI Korea-China Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

III. Security Crisis and Perceptions of North Korea and Unification

North Korean Nuclear Solution: Diplomatic Solutions Preferred Amidst Rising Public Opinion for Sanctions

The practical confirmation of North Korea's nuclear armament has fueled distrust in diplomatic solutions, such as North Korea-US dialogue and the Six-Party Talks, which have been pursued as ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Until 2004, North Korea-US dialogue, which led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, was perceived by the public as the best solution. However, it was subsequently replaced by the Six-Party Talks format, which included not only North Korea and the US but also South Korea and other relevant parties. In the 2006 survey, 73.4% favored the Six-Party Talks approach, while only 12.1% chose North Korea-US dialogue. Preferences for economic sanctions or military actions, which could escalate tensions and confrontation between North and South Korea, were minority opinions.

However, following two North Korean nuclear tests and the Cheonan/Yeonpyeong incidents, distrust in diplomatic solutions like the Six-Party Talks increased, dropping to 58.6% in the 2011 survey. The preference for economic sanctions against North Korea rose to 23.8%. Support for North Korea-US talks was 9.4%, and although a minority, support for military action, which was only 2-3% in the mid-2000s, increased to 7.5% in the 2011 survey. Thus, public opinion favoring dialogue and diplomatic solutions remains the majority. Nevertheless, it is also true that public opinion demanding stronger responses, such as sanctions or military action, is increasing. This trend has intensified in the 2013 survey. Responses favoring diplomatic solutions like the Six-Party Talks continued to decline, reaching 51.3%. North Korea-US dialogue accounted for 12.8%, while economic sanctions were favored by 28.0%, and military action by 7.6%.

[Figure 9] Desired Method for Resolving North Korea's Nuclear Issue (%)

Data: EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004; July 2006), EAI‧ARI Korea-China Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

North Korean Regime Outlook: Not likely to collapse in the short term: 69.7%, will continue: 17.4%, will collapse soon: 14.5%

Regarding the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea, which emerged after the death of Chairman Kim Jong-il in December 2011, it is not expected to collapse in the short term. This stance was also confirmed in two surveys conducted during the Kim Jong-il era: 2004 and 2010. In the 2004 survey, 7.2% responded that North Korea would collapse within a few years, while 18.7% believed it would continue indefinitely. The remaining 74.1% believed it would eventually collapse but not in the short term. In the survey conducted before Kim Jong-il's death in 2011, 9.1% believed it would collapse in the short term, 15.9% thought it would continue, and 69.5% predicted it would be maintained for a considerable period. In the current survey, conducted in the early Kim Jong-un era, the proportion believing it would collapse in the short term increased to 14.5%, nearly double that of 2004. However, 69.7% still believe it will be maintained for a considerable period, indicating a lack of agreement with the theory of imminent North Korean collapse. While the theory of early collapse was prevalent in South Korean society immediately after the death of President Kim Il-sung in 1994, the regime's persistence until the 2010s has significantly reduced confidence in the theory of early collapse.

[Figure 10] Assessment of North Korean Regime Sustainability (%)

Data: EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004), EAI‧ARI Korea-China Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

Perception of Unification: Rapid Advancement Theory 11.5%, Gradual Advancement Theory 39.4%, Waiting Theory 31.7%, Unnecessary 17.5%

- No need to unify in 20s: 28.6%, No need to rush: 26.9%

Perceptions of unification also showed a strengthening of negative public opinion regarding unification. The rapid advancement theory, advocating for swift unification, or the extreme view that unification is unnecessary, represent minority opinions. Until the mid-2000s, the majority opinion favored a cautious approach, believing that while gradual progress was needed, unification should be pursued. However, following the Cheonan incident, survey results from 2010 and the current survey indicate a continuous decline in support for a cautious, gradual approach, with a concurrent increase in passive opposition, arguing that there is no need to rush.

Notably, there is a temperature difference in attitudes toward unification across different age groups. Specifically, 28.6% of those in their 20s stated, "There is no need to unify," and this figure was 19.5% for those in their 30s. When combined with the opinion that there is no need to rush unification, this means 55.5% of those in their 20s and 59.4% of those in their 30s responded that unification is either unnecessary or not urgent. This indicates a significant weakening of the justification for unification among younger generations. In contrast, the proportion of respondents who felt unification was unnecessary was relatively lower: 15.1% in their 40s, 12.6% in their 50s, and 12.6% for those aged 60 and above. By political party support, supporters of the Saenuri Party showed a stronger passive stance towards unification compared to supporters of the Democratic Party. However, it is noteworthy that 25.0% of supporters of the Unified Progressive Party, which has been vocal on the issue of unification, expressed that unification is unnecessary; this is interpreted as a result of a large proportion of young supporters in their 20s and 30s.

[Figure 11] Stance on Unification (%)

Data: National Defense University Public Security Awareness Survey (2000-2003), EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004), Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

[Figure 12] Stance on Unification by Age Group (%)

Data: Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

[Figure 13] Stance on Unification by Political Party Support

Data: Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

IV. Security Crisis and Domestic Politics: Analysis of Rally-Round-the-Flag Effect

1. Rally-Round-the-Flag Effect: Presidential Approval Rating 60.3%, Saenuri Party Support 46.2%

Presidential approval ratings, which were only in the 50% range at the beginning of the term (or in the 40% range in surveys including a neutral scale), rose to 60.3% in the April survey following the security crisis. Support for the ruling Saenuri Party also reached 46.2%, nearing a majority, while support for the Democratic United Party stood at 23.9%, double that of the ruling party. This is analyzed as the so-called 'rally-round-the-flag effect,' where support for the president and the ruling party coalesces during external security crises. However, it remains questionable whether this effect should be viewed as a natural phenomenon occurring whenever a security crisis arises, or as a conditional phenomenon that occurs when the public's security concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

[Figure 14] Party and Presidential Approval Ratings in April Following North Korea's Nuclear Test (%)

Data: Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

2. Rally-Round-the-Flag Effect: Not a Direct Effect of Security Anxiety

The survey results indicate that the rally-round-the-flag effect, where political support coalesces around the president and the ruling party, is not a phenomenon that naturally occurs when security anxiety factors arise. If the rally-round-the-flag effect were a direct consequence of security anxiety, one would expect higher presidential or party support to correlate with higher levels of personal security anxiety.

As shown in [Figure 15], personal security anxiety does not show a direct correlation with party support or presidential approval ratings. Among those who perceive the security situation as stable, Saenuri Party support is 45.4%, while among those who perceive it as unstable, it is 47.1%. For the Democratic Party, support is 29.6% among those who see the situation as stable and 22.3% among those who see it as unstable. Although Saenuri Party support slightly increases when instability is felt, the difference is not statistically significant. In fact, the chi-square test yielded a significance level (p) above 0.1, indicating that the difference in party support based on perceived security levels is not statistically significant. Similarly, presidential approval ratings showed little difference: 63.9% among those who perceived the situation as stable and 60.6% among those who perceived it as unstable. The chi-square test also found no significant difference in presidential approval ratings based on perceived security levels (p>0.1).

How, then, does the security situation influence the current high presidential approval ratings and ruling party support? Analysis of the survey results suggests that rather than directly contributing to the rise in support for the ruling party and the president, security anxiety triggers changes in attitudes toward security issues, and these attitudinal shifts, mediated by the weakening of existing ideological and political divisions, lead to increased support for the ruling party and the president.

The security crisis of 2013, triggered by North Korea's third nuclear test and threats of war, not only rallied conservatives but also strengthened support for the ROK-US alliance among moderates and even progressives. Furthermore, while the long-term stance favoring dialogue and cooperation with North Korea remains dominant (Jeong Han-wool 2013a), surveys like the current one show a rise in public opinion advocating for the reduction or suspension of aid to North Korea in the short term. For reference, in this survey, 52.4% of conservatives and 46.9% of progressives supported reducing or suspending aid to North Korea, indicating that at least among the general public, the traditional dichotomy of conservative=hardline on North Korea and progressive=conciliatory towards North Korea has significantly weakened (Jeong Han-wool 2013b). For detailed information, refer to Jeong Han-wool's "Security Complacency or Change in Security Awareness?" Report No. 2013-02 (April 29, 2013) and "Is the Security Issue an Ideological Debate? Changes in Korean Security Perceptions Based on Issue Characteristics" Report No. 2013-03 (May 23, 2013).

In other words, in a short-term security crisis, support for the ROK-US alliance strengthens, and negative perceptions of aid to North Korea spread. This implies that support for strengthening the ROK-US alliance and negative attitudes toward aid to North Korea are increasing, particularly among progressives and moderates. The rally-round-the-flag effect can be understood through the pathway where these groups shift their support to the ruling Saenuri Party and President Park Geun-hye.

[Figure 15] Party and Presidential Approval by Perceived Security Level (%)

Data: Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

3. Conversion Effect and Security Rally

Support Defection of Progressive ROK-US Alliance Advocates, Persuasion of Moderate Alliance Advocates towards Ruling Party Support

[Figure 16] shows that among conservatives, Saenuri Party support consistently ranges from 65.2% to 70.4%, regardless of their stance on the ROK-US alliance, indicating that attitudes toward the alliance do not significantly impact party support. However, among moderates and progressives, party support patterns differ based on their attitudes toward the ROK-US alliance. Among moderates, those who emphasize a self-reliant stance as the desirable ROK-US relationship show 37.3% support for the Saenuri Party and 29.4% for the Democratic Party. In contrast, those who believe the ROK-US relationship should be managed at its current level show 35.9% support for the Saenuri Party and 22.8% for the Democratic Party, widening the gap.

However, among ideological moderates, respondents who advocate for strengthening the ROK-US alliance show a clear tendency to rally around the Saenuri Party, with 44.1% support compared to 16.0% for the Democratic Party. Meanwhile, among progressives, attitudes toward the ROK-US relationship do not significantly affect support for the Democratic Party but have a considerable impact on Saenuri Party support.

Among progressives, those emphasizing independent diplomacy show 47.5% support for the Democratic United Party and 16.9% for the Saenuri Party, indicating an anti-Saenuri tendency. Even among those advocating for maintaining the current ROK-US relationship, the Democratic Party receives 44.1% support while the Saenuri Party receives 11.8%. However, among ideological progressives who emphasize the ROK-US alliance—so-called "progressive ROK-US alliance advocates"—support for the Democratic United Party decreases to 42.7%, while support for the Saenuri Party increases to 26.1%. This suggests that while attitudes toward the ROK-US alliance may not significantly influence conservatives, it can lead to a conversion effect among moderates and progressives, causing them to shift their support from the Democratic Party to the Saenuri Party, particularly among the growing number of those advocating for a stronger ROK-US alliance.

[Figure 16] Changes in Party Support by Ideological Tendency Based on Stance on ROK-US Alliance

Data: Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

Support Defection of Progressive Critics of Aid to North Korea, Rallying of Moderate Anti-North Korean Voters to the Saenuri Party

The issue of aid to North Korea shows a similar effect. As seen in [Figure 17], unlike the ROK-US alliance issue, the North Korea aid issue appears to cause rallying and defection effects even among conservatives. Within the conservative group, support for the Saenuri Party is 74.2% among those negative toward aid to North Korea, compared to 63.3% among those who believe aid should be expanded or maintained, indicating a difference. However, similar to the ROK-US alliance issue, the impact of attitudes toward aid to North Korea on party support is increasing among moderates and progressives (the slope is steeper).

Among ideological moderates, those negative toward aid to North Korea show 46.7% support for the Saenuri Party and 16.7% for the Democratic United Party, a wider gap than the average party support rates. Conversely, among those positive toward aid to North Korea, Saenuri Party support is 33.3% and the Democratic United Party support is 23.9%, narrowing the gap. Among progressives, contrary to their traditional stance, those positive toward aid to North Korea show 48.5% support for the Democratic United Party and only 15.2% for the Saenuri Party. However, among progressives who are negative toward aid to North Korea, unlike the traditional progressive stance, the Democratic United Party receives 39.3% support while the Saenuri Party receives 29.1%, significantly narrowing the gap.

Although requiring more rigorous verification, these results strongly suggest that differences in attitudes toward security issues during a security crisis reinforce support for the incumbent party among conservatives (reinforcing effect), persuade moderates to support the incumbent party (persuasion effect), and convert progressives to support the conservative ruling party rather than progressive parties (conversion effect), thereby strengthening support for the ruling party and the president's approval ratings.

Considering the current trend in security issue attitudes—emphasizing the ROK-US alliance, maintaining inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in the long term, yet demanding a tougher stance toward North Korea in the short term—the current high approval ratings for President Park Geun-hye and the Saenuri Party are not merely a product of the security crisis but a result of positioning that aligns with these public demands. Therefore, it is not a reasonable forecast to assume that party support and presidential approval ratings will automatically recover once the sense of security crisis subsides and the wartime situation transitions. This is because, while the government and the ruling party are adapting their policy positions in response to public opinion changes regarding inter-Korean relations, the Democratic United Party appears to maintain fixed policy positions on the ROK-US alliance and aid to North Korea. It is suggested that not only the government and the ruling party but also the Democratic Party need to respond more flexibly to public changes in their security positions and enhance communication with the public. ■

[Figure 17] Changes in Party Support by Ideological Tendency Based on Stance on Aid to North Korea

Data: Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)