[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 132] Security Crisis and Koreans' Security Awareness

[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 132] EAI 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey

I. Security Perceptions Following North Korea's 3rd Nuclear Test

II. Security Crisis and Foreign Perceptions

III. Security Crisis and Perceptions of North Korea/Unification

IV. Security Crisis and Domestic Politics: Analysis of the Path to Security Cohesion

I. Key Security Indicators in the 2013 Political Security Survey

Security is unstable: 70.6%

Following North Korea's third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, and its subsequent actions of nullifying the Armistice Agreement on March 5 and temporarily closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex on May 4, tensions between the two Koreas escalated, leading to increased anxiety among South Korean citizens. After the Yeonpyeong Island shelling in November 2010, 81.5% responded that South Korea's security situation was generally unstable. This figure had decreased to 61.0% in the 2011 survey marking the first anniversary of the Yeonpyeong incident, and further dropped to 37.1% in the 2012 survey, showing a trend towards stability. However, it surged to 70.6% in the April 2013 survey.

Military power assessment excluding US Forces Korea: North Korea superior 51.6%, similar 23.3%, South Korea superior 24.6%

This heightened sense of insecurity appears to stem from the perception that the military balance between the two Koreas has been disrupted by North Korea's nuclear capabilities and its demonstrated missile launch capacity. In this survey, only 24.6% of respondents believed South Korea held a superior military position compared to North Korea when excluding US Forces Korea. Those who assessed the military balance as similar were 23.3%, while a significant 51.6% believed North Korea was superior.

Reliance on ROK-US Alliance deterrence: Strengthen ROK-US Alliance 65.6%

The disruption of the military balance between the two Koreas due to North Korea's nuclear armament has led to increased support for the ROK-US alliance. When asked about the desirable direction of ROK-US relations, 65.6% responded that the alliance should be strengthened, while 19.5% favored maintaining the current level, and 14.9% advocated for pursuing independent diplomacy free from US influence.

Distrust of China: In case of inter-Korean conflict, China will support North Korea 62.1%

Meanwhile, significant doubts were expressed regarding the stance of China, which is rapidly emerging as a global power alongside the United States. A substantial 62.1% anticipated China would support North Korea, while only 31.7% expected China to remain neutral. The proportion expecting China to support South Korea was a mere 6.2%.

Solution to North Korean nuclear issue: Six-party talks 51.3% > Economic sanctions 28.0% > US-North Korea dialogue 12.8% > Military action 7.6%

Regarding preferred solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue, diplomatic efforts such as the Six-Party Talks were favored by the largest proportion of respondents at 51.3%. Economic sanctions against North Korea followed at 28.0%. Support for US-North Korea dialogue was lower at 12.8%, indicating less support for solutions excluding South Korea. Military action was favored by 7.6%, suggesting a strong sentiment to avoid war.

South Korea should also possess nuclear weapons: 73.4%

In response to North Korea's nuclear armament, there appears to be a growing domestic sentiment for South Korea to also possess nuclear weapons, alongside strengthening the ROK-US alliance and pursuing diplomatic solutions to the nuclear issue with the international community. Regarding the proposition that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons, 33.7% strongly agreed, and 39.7% generally agreed, indicating a majority positive response towards South Korea acquiring nuclear capabilities.

Reduce/suspend aid to North Korea: 54.1%

North Korea's security threat is also diminishing the willingness of South Korean citizens to provide aid to North Korea. While 9.4% favored increasing aid and 36.3% preferred maintaining the current level, a combined 54.4% (30.7% for reduction and 23.4% for suspension) expressed a passive or negative stance. Considering the reduced level of aid from the current government compared to the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, even the opinion to maintain the current level is difficult to interpret as active support for aid. Overall, public opinion on aid to North Korea can be assessed as lukewarm.

Urgent unification 11.5%, need to pace unification 39.4%, no need to rush 31.7%, no need for unification 17.4%

Perceptions of unification have also cooled. Those who believe unification should be pursued urgently accounted for 11.5%, while 39.4% favored a paced approach, 31.7% thought there was no need to rush, and 17.4% believed unification was unnecessary. Active support for unification was a minority view, with a majority favoring a cautious approach, while a significant portion also expressed no need for unification.

[Figure 1] South Korean Public's Security Perceptions Following North Korea's 3rd Nuclear Test

Data: EAI 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

II. Security Crisis and Foreign Perceptions: Coexistence of Strong National Pride and Reliance on the US

1. Strong National Pride and Distrust in Defense Capabilities

As shown in [Figure 2], national pride among Koreans has been on the rise since the 2000s. In the 2000 survey, 64.1% agreed with the statement 'I am proud to be Korean.' This figure rose to 79.3% in 2001 and 85.4% in 2003, showing a significant increase primarily in the early 2000s. Since then, national pride has steadily increased, reaching 92.2% in the 2013 survey.

However, South Korea's defense capabilities do not underpin this national pride. In the 2010 EAI‧ARI 2nd <National Identity> Survey, which measured national pride across nine domains including democracy, international standing, economic achievement, social welfare, science and technology, sports, arts/culture, history, and military strength, military strength ranked third lowest in terms of pride, with only 17.0% expressing pride in social welfare and 27.3% in international standing. Only 40.0% responded that they were proud of South Korea's military strength, while 59.5% were not. This is an improvement from the 2005 survey, where 30.6% expressed pride and 65.2% did not. Nevertheless, negative perceptions remain prevalent. Science and technology, history, sports, and economic achievements were the primary drivers of national pride, while political and military domains such as democracy and military strength tended to diminish national pride (EAI <Koreans, Who Are We?> 2010).

[Figure 2] Changes in Koreans' National Pride (%)

Data: Seoul National University Institute for Social Development (2000), Ministry of Government Information (2001), East Asia Barometer (2003), EAI 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

Indeed, in the current survey, regarding the military strength of the two Koreas excluding US Forces Korea, public opinion was that North Korea was superior until mid-2006, around the time of the first North Korean nuclear test. However, immediately after the inter-Korean summit in December 2007, when expectations for peace and resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue were high, public opinion surged, with 42.9% believing the military forces were balanced. Five years later, following North Korea's successful satellite launch and its third nuclear test, the perception of North Korea's military superiority significantly increased in the 2013 survey.

This anxiety regarding South Korea's military capabilities directly translates into security concerns, necessitating close attention from the government and military. In this survey, among those who considered South Korea's security situation generally stable, 39.9% believed South Korea's military was superior to North Korea's. However, among those who felt insecure, only 22.1% believed South Korea held a military advantage over North Korea.

[Figure 3] Changes in Assessment of Inter-Korean Military Power (Excluding USFK) (%)

Data: National Defense University Public Security Awareness Survey (2000-2004), Korean Political Security Awareness Survey (2006; 2007; 2013)

2. Changes in Foreign Perceptions: Inter-Korean Military Tensions Lead to Pro-US Sentiment

In the absence of confidence in self-defense capabilities, security anxieties tend to lead to reliance on external forces, specifically the ROK-US alliance, for psychological security. For a brief period in the mid-2000s, the idea of China as an alternative to the US was discussed in political and civil society circles. However, due to historical issues such as China's Northeast Project and security concerns like the North Korean nuclear issue, coupled with China's protective stance towards North Korea, the influence of the 'China alternative' theory waned. Particularly following the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, the second in 2009, the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong shelling in 2010, and the third nuclear test in 2013, there has been a strong tendency to rely on the traditional alliance with the United States rather than China.

Favorability Scores: USA 71, China 53, Japan 41, North Korea 32

On an emotional level, the average favorability scores towards neighboring countries, periodically surveyed by the East Asia Institute since 2004, show that before the start of China's Northeast Project in 2004 and the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, favorability towards the US and China was similar. A score closer to 0 indicates strong dislike, while a score closer to 100 indicates strong liking. A score of 50 represents neutral feelings, neither liking nor disliking.

In the 2004 survey, both the US and China scored 58. In the July 2006 survey, just before the first North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the US scored 58 and China 57, indicating similar favorability. However, subsequent surveys showed a trend of rising favorability towards the US and declining favorability towards China. Favorability towards the US increased to around 61 in the 2008 survey and the January 2010 survey, before the Cheonan incident. Conversely, favorability towards China dropped to 50 and 49, similar to the scores for Japan. In the case of the US, favorability rose to 67 in the 2011 survey, one year after the Cheonan/Yeonpyeong incidents, and further to 71 in the April 2013 survey following the third North Korean nuclear test. Meanwhile, favorability towards China remained stagnant at 51 and 53, respectively, widening the gap in favorability felt by South Koreans between the US and China.

Favorability towards North Korea, which was not particularly high but hovered around the neutral mark (46 in 2004, 49 in 2006, 49 in February 2008) during the early part of the Lee Myung-bak administration, has significantly declined since 2010, dropping to 41 in 2010, 32 in 2011, and 32 in 2013, indicating a level of dislike. Favorability towards Japan has also been lukewarm, but the 2011 and 2013 surveys showed a considerable drop to 40 and 41, respectively, compared to the levels of 50 in 2008 and 49 in 2010. In summary, the changes in the security landscape since 2010 have led to increased favorability towards the US, a lukewarm attitude towards China, and increased dislike towards Japan and North Korea.

[Figure 4] Changes in National Favorability Scores Towards the Four Major Powers (Average)

Data: EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004; July 2006; Feb 2008), EAI‧Korea Research Regular Survey (Jan 2010), EAI‧ARI China-Korea Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

In case of US-China conflict: Support the US 45.6% vs. Remain neutral 51.3% vs. Support China 3.0%

This strengthening of pro-US and anti-North Korea sentiment is leading to increased support for siding with the US in the event of a US-China conflict. In [Figure 5], the 2011 survey showed that 62.1% favored remaining neutral in the event of a serious conflict between the US and China, while only 35.5% supported the US and 1.7% supported China. However, in the 2013 survey, the proportion favoring neutrality decreased by more than 10 percentage points to 51.3%, while support for the US increased to 45.6%. This appears to be a result of the increased need for a firm security alliance due to the escalating North Korean nuclear threat.

Conversely, in the event of a serious conflict between China and Japan, as shown in [Figure 6], the majority opinion favors remaining neutral at 78.7%, a slight decrease from 83.0% in the 2011 survey. However, support for China has slightly increased from 12.5% in 2011 to 18.0% in 2013, while support for Japan has remained relatively unchanged at 3.7% in 2011 and 3.3% in 2013. This is likely due to the weakening of the 'China alternative' theory, maintaining a lukewarm attitude towards China, and a continued indifferent attitude towards Japan, leading to a neutral stance in the case of a China-Japan conflict, unlike the US-China conflict scenario.

[Figure 5] South Korea's Response in Case of Serious US-China Conflict (%) [Figure 6] South Korea's Response in Case of Serious China-Japan Conflict (%)

Data: EAI‧ARI China-Korea Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

In case of North Korean sudden change: Positive about US intervention 50.4%, Positive about China's intervention 12.8%

Furthermore, attitudes towards the intervention of major powers in the event of a severe crisis in North Korea's regime symbolically represent the level of public trust in those countries. In South Korea, where there is considerable awareness of and concern about external responsibility for the division of the Korean Peninsula, a favorable attitude towards a country's intervention during a sudden change in North Korea signifies a high level of trust. In [Figure 7], regarding US intervention in the event of a North Korean regime crisis, 38.8% responded positively in the 2011 survey, with 29.4% neutral and 31.5% negative. However, in the 2013 survey, 50.4% responded positively, 25.7% neutrally, and only 23.7% negatively, indicating a significant increase in positive perception of US intervention. In contrast, regarding China's intervention during internal turmoil in North Korea, the proportion of positive responses was low, at 12.1% in the 2011 survey and remaining at a similar level of 12.8% in 2013.

[Figure 7] US Intervention in Case of North Korean Sudden Change (%) [Figure 8] China's Intervention in Case of North Korean Sudden Change (%)

Data: EAI‧ARI China-Korea Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

III. Security Crisis and Perceptions of North Korea/Unification

North Korean Nuclear Solution: Diplomatic Solutions Predominate, but Support for Sanctions is Rising

With North Korea's nuclear armament becoming a reality, public trust in diplomatic solutions, such as US-North Korea dialogue and Six-Party Talks, has eroded. Until 2004, the Geneva Accord of 1994 led to US-North Korea dialogue being perceived as the best solution. Subsequently, it was replaced by the Six-Party Talks format, which included South Korea and other relevant parties. In the 2006 survey, 73.4% favored the Six-Party Talks approach, while only 12.1% opted for US-North Korea dialogue. Support for economic sanctions or military actions, which could escalate tensions and confrontation, was a minority view.

However, following two North Korean nuclear tests and the Cheonan/Yeonpyeong incidents, distrust in diplomatic solutions like the Six-Party Talks increased, with support dropping to 58.6% in the 2011 survey. Support for economic sanctions against North Korea rose to 23.8%. Support for US-North Korea talks was 9.4%, and while still a minority, support for military action increased from 2-3% in the mid-2000s to 7.5% in the 2011 survey. Nevertheless, a majority still favored dialogue and diplomatic solutions. However, it is also true that public opinion demanding stronger responses, such as sanctions or military action, is growing. This trend has strengthened in the 2013 survey. Support for diplomatic solutions like the Six-Party Talks continued its downward trend, falling to 51.3%, while US-North Korea dialogue stood at 12.8%. In contrast, support for economic sanctions against North Korea rose to 28.0%, and military action was favored by 7.6%.

[Figure 9] Preferred Solution to North Korean Nuclear Issue (%)

Data: EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004; July 2006), EAI‧ARI China-Korea Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

Prospects for North Korean Regime: Not collapse in the short term 69.7%, will continue 17.4%, will collapse soon 14.5%

Following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the emergence of the Kim Jong-un regime, respondents did not anticipate a short-term collapse. This sentiment was also observed in surveys conducted during the Kim Jong-il era in 2004 and 2010. In the 2004 survey, 7.2% believed North Korea would collapse within a few years, 18.7% believed it would continue, and 74.1% believed it would eventually collapse but not in the short term. In the survey conducted before Kim Jong-il's death in 2011, 9.1% anticipated a short-term collapse, 15.9% believed it would continue, and 69.5% predicted it would last for a considerable period. In the current survey, early in the Kim Jong-un regime, the proportion anticipating a short-term collapse rose to 14.5%, roughly double the 2004 figure. However, 69.7% still believe it will continue for a considerable period, indicating a lack of agreement with the theory of a sudden collapse of North Korea. While the theory of North Korea's imminent collapse was prevalent in South Korean society immediately after Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, the regime's continued existence until the 2010s has significantly reduced confidence in such predictions.

[Figure 10] Assessment of North Korean Regime Sustainability (%)

Data: EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004), EAI‧ARI China-Korea Public Perception Survey (Aug 2011), 2013 Political Security Awareness Survey (April 2013)

Perception de la réunification : 11,5 % pour la théorie de la promotion rapide, 39,4 % pour la théorie de l'ajustement de la vitesse, 31,7 % pour la théorie de l'attente, 17,5 % pour l'inutilité.

- 28,6 % des personnes dans la vingtaine estiment qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de se réunifier, 26,9 % qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de se dépêcher.

La perception de la réunification a également montré un renforcement de l'opinion publique négative à son égard. La théorie de la promotion rapide selon laquelle la réunification devrait être promue rapidement ou la perception extrême selon laquelle la réunification est inutile sont des opinions minoritaires. Jusqu'au milieu des années 2000, la théorie de la promotion prudente, qui soutenait que la vitesse devait être ajustée mais que la réunification devait être promue, constituait l'opinion majoritaire. Cependant, depuis l'enquête de 2010 menée après l'incident du bombardement de Cheonan et l'enquête actuelle, la position selon laquelle la réunification doit être promue prudemment avec un ajustement de la vitesse a continuellement diminué, tandis que l'opinion publique opposée passive, qui estime qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de se dépêcher, a augmenté.

Ce qui mérite d'être souligné, c'est la différence de température dans l'attitude envers la réunification selon les générations. En particulier, 28,6 % des personnes dans la vingtaine ont déclaré qu'il n'était « pas vraiment nécessaire de se réunifier », et 19,5 % des personnes dans la trentaine ont exprimé cette opinion. Si l'on ajoute l'opinion selon laquelle il n'est pas nécessaire de se dépêcher pour la réunification, cela signifie que 55,5 % des personnes dans la vingtaine et 59,4 % des personnes dans la trentaine ont répondu qu'il n'était pas nécessaire de se dépêcher ou de se réunifier. Cela montre que la justification de la réunification est considérablement affaiblie chez les jeunes générations. En revanche, l'opinion selon laquelle il n'est pas vraiment nécessaire de se réunifier était relativement faible, à 15,1 % chez les personnes dans la quarantaine, à 12,6 % chez les personnes dans la cinquantaine et à 12,6 % chez les personnes de 60 ans et plus. En ce qui concerne le soutien aux partis politiques, les partisans du Saenuri Party ont montré une attitude plus passive envers la réunification que les partisans du Democratic Party. Cependant, il est remarquable que 25,0 % des partisans du Unified Progressive Party, qui ont le plus exprimé leur opinion sur la question de la réunification, estiment qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de se réunifier, ce qui est interprété comme un résultat dû à un grand nombre de partisans jeunes des années 20 et 30.

[Figure 11] Attitude towards unification (%)

Data: National Defense University Survey on Public Security Awareness (2000-2003), EAI‧CCGA Global Views (July 2004), Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)

[Figure 12] Attitude towards unification by generation (%)

Data: Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)

[Figure 13] Attitude towards unification by party support

Data: Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)

IV. Security Crisis and Domestic Politics: Analysis of the Path of Security Cohesion

1. Rally-Round-the-Flag Effect: Presidential approval rating 60.3%, Saenuri Party support 46.2%

Presidential approval ratings, which were only in the 50% range (or 40% range in surveys including neutral scales) at the beginning of the term according to surveys by existing polling agencies, rose to 60.3% in the April survey following the security crisis. Support for the ruling party, the Saenuri Party, also reached 46.2%, close to a majority, while support for the Democratic United Party was 23.9%, double that of the Saenuri Party. This is analyzed as the so-called 'rally-round-the-flag effect,' where support for the president and the ruling party coalesces in the event of an external security threat. However, it is questionable whether the rally-round-the-flag effect should be seen as a phenomenon that naturally occurs whenever a security crisis arises, or as a conditional phenomenon that occurs when appropriate responses are provided in a timely manner to the public's security concerns.

[Figure 14] Party support and presidential approval ratings in April after North Korea's nuclear test (%)

Data: Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)

2. Rally-Round-the-Flag Effect: Not a Direct Effect of Security Anxiety

The results of this survey indicate that the rally-round-the-flag effect, where political support coalesces around the president and the ruling party, is not a phenomenon that naturally occurs when security anxiety factors arise. If the rally-round-the-flag effect were a direct consequence of security anxiety, one might expect that higher personal security anxiety would correlate with higher presidential or party support.

As shown in [Figure 15], personal security anxiety shows no direct correlation with party support or presidential approval ratings. For party support, the Saenuri Party received 45.4% support from those who viewed the security situation as stable and 47.1% from those who viewed it as unstable. The Democratic Party received 29.6% support from those who viewed the situation as stable and 22.3% from those who viewed it as unstable. Although Saenuri Party support slightly increased when people felt the situation was unstable, the difference was not statistically significant. In fact, the chi-square test yielded a p-value greater than 0.1, indicating that the difference in party support based on perceived security levels was not statistically significant. Similarly, presidential approval ratings were 63.9% among those who viewed the situation as stable and 60.6% among those who viewed it as unstable, with no significant difference. The chi-square test also showed that the difference in presidential approval ratings based on perceived security levels was not statistically significant (p>0.1).

If so, how does the security situation influence the current high national approval ratings and ruling party support? Analyzing the survey results suggests that rather than security anxiety directly contributing to the rise in support for the ruling party and the president, it induces a change in attitudes towards security issues, and this change in attitude, mediated by the weakening of existing ideological and political divisions, leads to an increase in support for the ruling party and the president.

The security crisis in 2013, triggered by the third North Korean nuclear test and threats of war, not only rallied conservatives but also strengthened support for the ROK-US alliance among moderates and even progressives. Furthermore, while the majority opinion has long prioritized dialogue and cooperation with North Korea (Jeong Han-wool 2013a), this survey shows an increase in public opinion advocating for the reduction or suspension of aid to North Korea in the short term. For reference, in this survey, 52.4% of conservatives and 46.9% of progressives favored reducing or suspending aid to North Korea, indicating that at least at the general public level, the dichotomous boundary of conservative=hardline on North Korea and progressive=conciliatory towards North Korea has significantly weakened (Jeong Han-wool 2013b). For detailed information, refer to Jeong Han-wool's 'Security Complacency? Or Change in Security Awareness?' Issue Paper 2013-02 (April 29, 2013) and 'Is Security an Ideological Issue? Changes in Koreans' Security Perceptions by Issue Characteristics' Issue Paper 2013-03 (May 23, 2013).

In other words, in a short-term security crisis, support for the ROK-US alliance is strengthened, and negative perceptions of aid to North Korea are spreading. This implies that support for strengthening the ROK-US alliance and negative attitudes towards aid to North Korea are increasing, particularly among progressives and moderates. It can be seen that the rally-round-the-flag effect occurs through these groups shifting their support to the ruling Saenuri Party and to President Park Geun-hye.

[Figure 15] Party support and national approval ratings by perceived security level (%)

Data: Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)

3. Conversion Effect and Security Cohesion

Defection of supporters of the progressive ROK-US alliance theory, persuasion of moderate alliance supporters towards the ruling party.

Indeed, as shown in [Figure 16], among conservatives, party support for the Saenuri Party consistently ranges from 65.2% to 70.4%, regardless of their stance on the ROK-US alliance, indicating that their attitude towards the alliance does not significantly impact their party support. However, among moderates and progressives, party support patterns differ based on their attitudes towards the ROK-US alliance. Firstly, among moderates, those who emphasize a self-reliant stance as the desirable ROK-US relationship show 37.3% support for the Saenuri Party and 29.4% for the Democratic Party. However, in the group that believes the ROK-US relationship should be managed at its current level, Saenuri Party support is 35.9% and the Democratic Party's support is 22.8%, widening the gap.

However, among ideological moderates, those who advocate for strengthening the ROK-US alliance show a clear tendency to rally behind the Saenuri Party, with 44.1% support compared to 16.0% for the Democratic Party. Meanwhile, among progressives, attitudes towards the ROK-US relationship do not significantly affect support for the Democratic Party, but have a considerable impact on support for the Saenuri Party.

Among progressive voters, those who emphasize independent diplomacy show 47.5% support for the Democratic United Party and 16.9% for the Saenuri Party, demonstrating anti-Saenuri sentiment. Even among those who advocate for maintaining the current ROK-US relationship, Democratic Party support is 44.1% and Saenuri Party support is 11.8%, with no significant difference. However, among ideological progressives who emphasize the ROK-US alliance, the so-called 'progressive ROK-US alliance proponents,' support for the Democratic United Party decreases to 42.7%, while support for the Saenuri Party increases to 26.1%. This suggests that while attitudes towards the ROK-US alliance may not significantly influence conservatives, it can lead to a conversion effect among moderates and progressives, causing those who increasingly favor strengthening the ROK-US alliance to shift their support from the Democratic Party to the Saenuri Party.

[Figure 16] Changes in party support by ideological orientation according to attitudes towards the ROK-US alliance

Data: Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)

Defection of progressive critics of aid to North Korea, effect of rallying of moderate anti-North Korea voters to the Saenuri Party.

The issue of aid to North Korea shows a similar effect. As shown in [Figure 17], unlike the ROK-US alliance issue, the issue of aid to North Korea appears to have a rallying/defection effect even among conservatives. Among conservatives, support for the Saenuri Party is as high as 74.2% among those negative towards aid to North Korea, while it is 63.3% among those who believe aid should be expanded or maintained, indicating a difference in sentiment. However, similar to the ROK-US alliance issue, the impact of attitudes towards aid to North Korea on party support is becoming greater among moderates and progressives (the slope is steeper).

First, among ideological moderates, those who are negative towards aid to North Korea show 46.7% support for the Saenuri Party and 16.7% for the Democratic United Party, a wider gap than the average party support rates. Among those positive towards aid to North Korea, Saenuri Party support is 33.3% and the Democratic United Party's support is 23.9%, narrowing the gap between the two parties. Even among progressives, contrary to the traditional progressive stance, those positive towards aid to North Korea show only 48.5% support for the Democratic United Party and 15.2% for the Saenuri Party. However, among progressives who are negative towards aid to North Korea, unlike traditional progressives, Democratic United Party support is 39.3% and Saenuri Party support is 29.1%, significantly narrowing the gap.

Although this requires more detailed verification, the differing attitudes towards security issues during a security crisis strongly suggest that it reinforces support for the current ruling party among conservatives, persuades moderates to support the current ruling party, and converts progressives to support the conservative ruling party, thereby strengthening support for the ruling party and the president's national approval base.

In particular, considering the current trend in security issue attitudes, which emphasizes the ROK-US alliance and advocates for maintaining inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in the long term while demanding a tougher stance on North Korea in the short term, the current high approval ratings for President Park Geun-hye and the Saenuri Party are not merely a product of the security crisis but a result of positioning that aligns with these public demands. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect that party support and President Park's approval ratings will automatically recover once the sense of security crisis subsides and the wartime situation transitions. This is because, relatively speaking, while the government and the ruling party are responding to public opinion changes with their policy positions on inter-Korean relations, the Democratic United Party gives the impression of having fixed policy positions on the ROK-US alliance or aid to North Korea. It is therefore suggested that not only the government and the ruling party but also the Democratic Party need to strengthen communication with the public by responding more flexibly to public opinion changes regarding their security positions. ■

[Figure 17] Changes in party support by ideological orientation according to attitudes towards aid to North Korea

Data: Survey on Koreans' Political Security Awareness (April 2013)