[Public Opinion Briefing No. 116] Changes in the Power Map and Prospects for the Presidential Election Based on the 2012 Survey of Powerful Politicians' Trust and Influence

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 116] EAI · Korea Research Joint Planning May Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Survey on Powerful Politicians' Trust and Influence: Park Geun-hye's Solo Run, Ahn Cheol-soo's Challenge

2. Next Presidential Election Race: A Shift to a Pro-Government Advantage Amidst the Opposition's Political Vacuum?

3. Overcoming Political Cynicism is the Top Priority

【Survey on Powerful Politicians' Trust and Influence】Park Geun-hye's Solo Run and Ahn Cheol-soo's Challenge

Park Geun-hye's Influence and Trust Increase Further, Maintaining First Place; Ahn Cheol-soo's Influence and Trust Rank Second

Sohn Hak-kyu Rises to Fourth in Influence, Third in Trust, Surpassing Moon Jae-in; Moon Jae-in Ranks Fifth in Influence and Fourth in Trust

● Since 2007, the East Asia Institute and Korea Research have jointly selected 10 politicians, including the president and major presidential candidates, each year and announced the public's perception of their power. Power is calculated by averaging the scores on a scale of 0 (very low) to 10 (very high) (5 being neutral) for political influence (political power) and general trustworthiness (moral leadership) ([Table 1]).

● The survey results clearly indicate that former Saenuri Party interim leader Park Geun-hye, who renamed the party and successfully led it to maintain its status as the leading party in the April 11 general election, is at the center of the current political power structure in the public's perception. She ranked highest in influence with an average score of 6.77 and received the highest score for trust at 5.80. These figures are higher than her scores in 2011, which were 6.06 for influence (2nd) and 5.68 for trust (1st). Meanwhile, Ahn Cheol-soo, dean of Seoul National University's Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology, who was included in the survey for the first time in 2012, immediately ranked second in influence (5.48) and second in trust (5.34). He was the only politician to score above the neutral 5-point mark in both influence and trust, receiving positive evaluations for both political power and moral leadership. He maintains a gap with Dean Ahn Cheol-soo, who remains outside the political arena ([See Figure 1] Power Structure Position Map).

[Table 1] 2011 Powerful Politicians' Influence and Trust Evaluation (Points)

Note: * The 2012 survey included Ahn Cheol-soo, Moon Jae-in, and Kim Du-gwan, replacing Oh Se-hoon, Lee Hoi-chang, and Han Myeong-sook. Figures in parentheses indicate rankings at the time.

President Lee Myung-bak's influence dropped from 1st (6.25 points) to 3rd (5.25 points), and trust from 2nd (4.93 points) to 5th (3.93 points).

Kim Moon-soo, Chung Mong-joon, Yoo Si-min, and Chung Dong-young are on a downward trend; Kim Du-gwan ranks ninth in influence and ninth in trust, placing him in the bottom tier.

● Among opposition figures, former leader Sohn Hak-kyu, who had trailed Ahn Cheol-soo and Moon Jae-in in previous presidential polls, shows an upward trend, surpassing Moon Jae-in, who has been faltering since the April 11 general election defeat. Sohn ranked fourth in influence with 4.82 points and third in trust with 4.67 points. Meanwhile, Representative Moon Jae-in ranked fifth in influence with 4.06 points and fourth in trust with 3.96 points. Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Du-gwan, who has been actively pursuing a presidential bid, has an influence score of 3.71 and a trust score of 3.70. In the public's perception of the power structure, his presence is still minimal, placing him in the bottom tier alongside Yoo Si-min (influence 3.73, trust 3.70) and former Representative Chung Dong-young (influence 3.6, trust 3.33), ranking from 8th to 10th.

● Conversely, President Lee Myung-bak, who maintained the top position in influence and second in trust until 2011, is now rated lower in influence than Ahn Cheol-soo, dropping to 5.25 points (3rd), and his trust score has fallen to 3.93 points (5th). While his influence score remains above 5, indicating significant perceived influence, his trust score has fallen below that of Sohn Hak-kyu and Moon Jae-in. This clearly demonstrates the lame duck phenomenon as he drifts away from the center of power. Among ruling party candidates, Governor Kim Moon-soo, who had risen to second in influence and tied for first in trust with Park Geun-hye immediately after the 2010 local elections, has continued to decline, ranking sixth in influence with 4.05 points and sixth in trust with 3.75 points in the current survey, placing him in the middle to lower tier. Former Representative Chung Mong-joon has consistently remained in the middle to lower tier since the survey began.

[Figure 1] 2012 Powerful Politicians' Influence and Trust Position Map (Points)

[Figure 2] 2011 Powerful Politicians' Influence and Trust Position Map (Points)

[Figure 3] 2010 Powerful Politicians' Influence and Trust Evaluation (Points)

Trend Over Time

Ruling Party: Park Geun-hye's Leadership Evaluation is Stable; Kim Moon-soo Plummets; Chung Mong-joon Stagnates

● Comparing with the positioning maps from 2011 and 2010 ([Figure 2] and [Figure 3]), only Park Geun-hye has consistently received high scores for both influence and trust each year, indicating a politician who is evaluated positively for both power and moral leadership. President Lee Myung-bak, who exhibited a leadership style characterized by intimidating power (high influence, low trust) in 2011, has rapidly shifted in 2012 towards a leadership style with diminished presence (low influence, low trust), experiencing a significant decline in both influence and trust.

● To examine this in more detail, let us look at the trends in influence and trust scores of ruling party politicians over time ([Figure 4]) and those of major opposition politicians ([Figure 5]). Among ruling party figures, Governor Kim Moon-soo and Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who achieved victories in the Seoul metropolitan area during the opposition's victory in the 2010 local elections, appeared to be competing with Park Geun-hye in terms of influence and trust. However, Mayor Oh Se-hoon fell out of the political spotlight after the 2011 free school lunch referendum, and Governor Kim Moon-soo has also seen a continuous decline in both influence and trust, confirming a significant weakening of his presence in the public's perception.

[Figure 4] Trend of Influence and Trust Scores for Ruling Party Politicians: 2007-2012 (Points)

*Source: EAI･Korea Research Regular Survey. ‣ Unless otherwise indicated, unknown/no response is not shown in the graph.

Opposition: Sohn Hak-kyu Shows Gradual Upward Trend; Yoo Si-min and Chung Dong-young Decline

● Among the traditional opposition presidential contenders, including former leader Sohn Hak-kyu, former United Progressive Party leader Yoo Si-min, and former Representative Chung Dong-young, who have been consistently included in the survey since 2007, Sohn Hak-kyu's upward trend is notable. While Sohn's influence was 3.19 and trust was 3.15 in the 2007 survey, he has steadily risen, reaching 4.82 in influence and 4.62 in trust by 2012. Although he appeared to be significantly trailing behind Chairman Moon Jae-in, who surged in popularity last year, he is the only opposition candidate showing an upward trend in leadership evaluation, measured by both influence and trust, since the April 11 general election. However, his scores still fall short of the 5-point mark in both dimensions, indicating that he has not yet established a clear presence in the minds of voters, and this remains a challenge to overcome in translating into actual support in presidential polls.

● Former leader Yoo Si-min showed a steady upward trend until 2010, and was once considered a strong contender for the next presidential election. However, he began to decline after the 2010 local elections and continued this downward trend, albeit gradually, this year. Former Representative Chung Dong-young has been unable to find a turning point in his leadership evaluation since the 2007 presidential election and remains stagnant. Meanwhile, it is difficult to compare Ahn Cheol-soo, Moon Jae-in, and Kim Du-gwan, who were newly included as opposition candidates in 2012, with past data. Representative Moon Jae-in generally leads Yoo Si-min, Kim Du-gwan, and Chung Dong-young in personal leadership evaluations. The current evaluation of opposition candidates reveals that, with the exception of Ahn Cheol-soo, all others are weak in political power and possess limited trustworthiness, a fact confirmed throughout the Lee Myung-bak administration.

[Figure 5] Trend of Influence and Trust Scores for Opposition Politicians: 2007-2012 (Points)

*Source: EAI･Korea Research Survey

● Park Geun-hye's influence score saw a significant increase this year, but overall, she has maintained a stable level of support throughout the current administration without major fluctuations. This, conversely, indicates a lack of expansion. Furthermore, her trust score, remaining in the 5-point range, is only slightly above the neutral level, and cannot be considered an absolutely high evaluation. Nevertheless, the absence of any ruling party rivals to challenge her contributes to the stability of Park Geun-hye's leadership, allowing her to maintain relative superiority. In particular, if the opposition's lack of a unifying leadership figure persists amidst the fallout from the April 11 general election defeat and the subsequent allegations of election fraud within the United Progressive Party, the current political landscape could become entrenched.

[Table 2] 2007-2012 Powerful Politicians' Trust and Influence Survey Results

*Source: EAI･Korea Research Survey

【Next Presidential Election Race】A Shift to a Pro-Government Advantage Amidst the Opposition's Political Vacuum?

1. Candidate Competition Landscape: Park Geun-hye's Rapid Rise, Ahn Cheol-soo's Stagnation, Moon Jae-in's Decline

Park Geun-hye Enters the 40% Range for the First Time in Regular Surveys: 26.7% (February) → 31.8% (Late March) → 38.8% (Early April) → 41.7% (May)

Ahn Cheol-soo Stagnates at 25.6%; Moon Jae-in Declines to 11.1% After General Election

● The most significant characteristic of the presidential election landscape following the April 11 general election is the rapid surge in support for former Representative Park Geun-hye, the stagnation of support for Ahn Cheol-soo, and the decline in support for Representative Moon Jae-in. Park's approval rating, which had briefly fallen in January, nearly being overtaken by Ahn Cheol-soo, has surged following the interim leadership, the renaming to the Saenuri Party, the promotion of economic democratization through party platform revisions, and the victory in the general election. Her support rose to 31.8% in the first survey of the general election panel conducted by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research in late March to early April, and to 38.8% in the second survey conducted immediately after the April 11 general election. In the current May regular survey, it reached 41.7%. This is the first time her support has exceeded 40% since this research institute began conducting regular presidential approval polls in 2010.

● Meanwhile, Ahn Cheol-soo has remained relatively stable in the low to mid-20% range, recording 25.6%. Moon Jae-in, the leading candidate for the Democratic United Party, saw his support rise to 11.1% in January following the merger of the Democratic Party and the Citizens United Party. His support continued to increase to the mid-14% range after winning his seat in Busan in the March and April general elections. However, the May survey shows a decline to 11.1%. In the aftermath of the general election, amidst internal disputes within the opposition regarding the election results and subsequent chaotic presidential campaign path, there is a lack of assertive leadership demonstrated by Moon Jae-in in navigating the current political situation and solidifying his position as an opposition leader through proactive engagement, especially in light of the shockwaves caused by the United Progressive Party's election fraud allegations and violent incidents, which have impacted not only opposition supporters but also society as a whole.

[Figure 6] Simple Presidential Election Support (Head-to-Head) (%)

[Table 2] Simple Presidential Election Support (Head-to-Head) (%)

Source: EAI･Korea Research Regular Survey. * March data is from the EAI･SBS･JoongAng Ilbo･Korea Research General Election Panel 1st survey; April data is from the 2nd panel survey.

Park Geun-hye: Reverses Lead Against Ahn Cheol-soo in 1:1 Scenarios; Widens Gap with Moon Jae-in

Park Geun-hye vs. Kim Du-gwan 1:1 Scenario: Park 67.2% vs. Kim Du-gwan 22.7%

● Former Representative Park Geun-hye has now taken the lead against Ahn Cheol-soo in one-on-one hypothetical matchups, a reversal from previous polls where she trailed. Park secured 50.4% compared to Ahn's 42.38%. While it is difficult to assign absolute significance to these figures as Ahn Cheol-soo has not officially declared his candidacy, this marks the first time since the so-called 'Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon' in September that Park has achieved a lead in a one-on-one matchup, indicating a recovery in her competitiveness against Ahn Cheol-soo following the general election. Furthermore, the gap between Park and Representative Moon Jae-in has widened since the survey conducted immediately after the April general election, with Park leading 57.4% to Moon's 35.8%, a difference of over 20 percentage points.

[Figure 6] 1:1 Presidential Election Support: Park Geun-hye vs. Ahn Cheol-soo, Park Geun-hye vs. Moon Jae-in (%)

Will the centrist/swing voters experience fatigue with Ahn Cheol-soo? The gap narrows among centrist/swing voters.

● As the political landscape transitions towards the presidential election following the general election, Park Geun-hye's rising support has led to a consolidation of support among other ruling party candidates for her. The narrowing of the support gap among progressive, centrist, and unaffiliated voters, who had previously shown strong support for Ahn Cheol-soo, is a noteworthy development. Examining past third-party candidates like former Prime Minister Goh Kun and candidate Moon Kook-hyun, who generated initial surges based on broad support from progressive and centrist voters in the 2007 presidential election, we observe that they ultimately either abandoned their candidacies or saw their initial momentum wane. This often occurred when prolonged delays in announcing their candidacies led to a form of political fatigue, causing less loyal centrist and unaffiliated voters to defect. This, coupled with a widening gap with opposing candidates or an inability to regain their support, cannot be overlooked.

● Looking at the 1:1 matchup support rates among progressive and unaffiliated voters, compared to April, Park Geun-hye's support has not significantly increased among centrist and unaffiliated voters. However, Ahn Cheol-soo has seen a 5.1 percentage point drop among centrist voters and a 9.2 percentage point drop among unaffiliated voters. While Ahn Cheol-soo still leads unaffiliated voters, who tend to lean opposition but distrust the current opposition parties, by a considerable margin of 23.4 percentage points, the significant narrowing of this gap is unusual. Among ideologically centrist voters, the support levels are nearly tied.

[Figure 7] Park Geun-hye vs. Ahn Cheol-soo 1:1 Support Among Centrist/Unaffiliated Voters (%)

(1) 1:1 Scenario Among Ideologically Centrist Voters (2) 1:1 Scenario Among Unaffiliated Voters

2. Is the Ideological Mood Becoming Unbalanced?

Subjective Ideological Self-Placement: Progressive 25.6% → 19.3%↓; Centrist 39.5% → 43.6%

MB's Approval Rating Rises: January 25.2% → March 30.8% → May 34.4%

● Subjective ideological self-placement and approval ratings for state affairs serve as indicators of changes in the ideological and political mood of the time. While subjective ideological self-placement is a more long-term and stable indicator showing whether public opinion leans towards progressive or conservative ideologies, approval ratings for state affairs are short-term and situationally sensitive indicators reflecting public dissatisfaction and retrospective judgment of the incumbent government.

● The distribution of subjective ideological self-placement has generally shown centrists forming the majority, with a slight edge for conservatives, while conservatives and progressives have maintained a relative balance, with conservatives around 30% and progressives between 23%-28% since the current administration took office. However, following the shockwaves from the United Progressive Party incident, the proportion of respondents identifying as progressive has decreased to 19.3%, while the centrist group has increased to 43.6%, indicating a more fluid shift in the ideological landscape ([Figure 8]).

[Figure 8] Changes in Subjective Social Class Perception Distribution (%)

● Regarding approval ratings for state affairs, in early 2011, the so-called 'security rally effect' following the Yeonpyeong Island shelling at the end of 2010 led to a surge in approval ratings to 49.8%. However, subsequent issues such as the 'housing crisis' and 'price hikes' caused a sharp decline. Although there was a temporary increase following the Pyeongchang Olympics bid, the free school lunch referendum, the defeat in the October 26 by-elections, and a series of corruption scandals and the National Election Commission's DDoS attack scandal starting at the end of the year, the approval rating in 2012 dropped to its lowest level since the 'candlelight protests' of the first year of the term, hovering around 25%. However, the opposition's failure to capitalize on the overwhelming sentiment for 'regime judgment' during the general election, coupled with the Saenuri Party's systematic efforts in party reform and leadership of the general election campaign, has led to a rebound in President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating to 34.4%.

● The current approval ratings should not be taken at face value as indicators of state affairs, given the ongoing scandal of government surveillance of civilians and various corruption cases involving close associates, and the rise in approval during the lame duck period at the end of the term. Rather, it is largely a reflection of the backlash against the opposition, which is struggling with internal divisions and the aftermath of the United Progressive Party incident following the general election. However, the increase in the government's approval rating during its lame duck period will undoubtedly weaken the impact of retrospective judgment votes in the presidential election. While the political landscape was highly favorable to the opposition until the general election, if the current situation, where progressives are shrinking and the opposition lacks a unifying force, becomes entrenched, the dynamics that would favor the opposition in the year-end presidential election (such as a regime judgment scenario or an anti-Grand National Party coalition) may be significantly diminished.

[Figure 9] Changes in President Lee Myung-bak's State Affairs Approval Rating (%)

3. Weakening of the Regime Change and Candidate Unification Frameworks

"I will vote for the Saenuri Party candidate in the presidential election" 45.6% vs. "I will vote for the unified opposition candidate" 42.3%, a reversal.

April 11 General Election: "Unification of Democratic Party/Unified Progressive Party candidates is desirable" 50.7% → December Presidential Election: "Candidate unification is desirable" 37.5%

● Another indicator that warrants attention for a shift in the current political landscape is the expectation of regime change and the desire for a unified opposition candidate, which can be gauged by asking voters whether they would vote for the ruling Saenuri Party (Grand National Party) or a unified opposition candidate, considering only the parties without factoring in individual candidates. A comparison of the results from a Hankook Ilbo/Hankook Research poll conducted in April of the previous year and the current poll in May reveals a reversal: a year ago, the proportion intending to vote for the Grand National Party candidate in the 2012 presidential election was 37.6%, which increased to 45.6% in the current poll, while the proportion intending to vote for a unified opposition candidate dropped from 44.6% to 42.3%. The expected opposition party premium in the general election and presidential election has virtually disappeared.

● Regarding candidate unification, opinions have shifted following the Unified Progressive Party incident. While 50.7% of respondents in the first panel survey just before the April 11 general election believed that the unification of Democratic Party and Unified Progressive Party candidates was desirable, only 37.5% in the current survey expressed that unification of the two parties in the December presidential election would be desirable. Furthermore, 29.7% expressed indifference or stated they did not know, indicating a significant blow to the opposition's strategy for the 2012 presidential election in the current climate. Among undecided voters, who are crucial for the synergy effect of candidate unification, 25.5% found it desirable, 23.5% found it undesirable, and 48.2% expressed no interest.

[Figure 10] Voting Party in the 2012 Presidential Election and Stance on Democratic Party/Unified Progressive Party Integration (%)

4. Erosion of Opposition Party Support Base

General Election: 95.8% of Saenuri Party proportional voters → Current Saenuri Party supporters

Democratic United Party proportional voters: 79.4%, Progressive United Party voters: only 36.4% maintained support

● Differences are also widening in the support mobilization of both political camps. Current support levels show an increase for the Saenuri Party following the general election. In the March survey, the order was Saenuri Party 30.4%, Democratic United Party 28.1%, and Unified Progressive Party 4.9%. Immediately after the general election, it became Saenuri Party 39.1%, Democratic United Party 31.9%, and Unified Progressive Party 9.7%, with the Saenuri Party and Unified Progressive Party, which achieved favorable election results, seeing an increase in support due to post-election momentum. However, subsequent internal strife within the Democratic United Party and the shockwaves from the Unified Progressive Party led to a decrease in the Saenuri Party's support rate to 47.5%, the Democratic United Party's to 33.0%, and the Unified Progressive Party's to 4.5%. While the Saenuri Party's support base is consolidating more strongly, the opposition camp's inability to find a resolution to the Unified Progressive Party situation and the focus of party power on the party leader election, rather than on reorganizing the opposition front and resolving issues, has led to internal divisions and debates about pro-North Korea sentiments. This appears to have resulted in opposition supporters and centrist voters shifting their support towards the Saenuri Party.

● In fact, a significant 95.8% of voters who cast their proportional representation vote for the Saenuri Party in the April 11 general election stated that they currently support the Saenuri Party. Among voters who supported the Democratic United Party, only 79.6% maintained their support, indicating a relatively lower retention rate, with 21.4% having defected. In contrast, only 36.4% of respondents who voted for the Unified Progressive Party stated they continue to support it, while 30.4% supported the Democratic Party, and 16.4% had returned to being unaffiliated. Amidst the contrasting cohesion of the ruling camp and the centrifugal force of the opposition, the opposition's declining support among its base and centrist voters appears to be driven by a political leadership vacuum and the absence of political action to resolve the current predicament.

[Figure 11] Changes in Party Support Rates and Changes in Current Party Support by Proportional Representation Party in the April 11 General Election (%)

(1) Changes in Party Support Rates (2) Changes in Current Party Support by Proportional Representation Party in the General Election

【Political Vacuum: The Top Priority】

19th National Assembly will be not much different from 18th National Assembly: 66.3%, will do well: 25.4%, will do worse: 5.7%

● What all political parties, as well as political leaders competing for the next presidential election, should keep in mind is that while it is important to consider the political gains and losses of the ruling and opposition parties in the current situation and to formulate a winning strategy for the presidential election, the priority appears to be how to address the concerns about a political vacuum since the April 11 general election and the strong political distrust among voters.

● In this survey, when asked about expectations for the 19th National Assembly, despite it being about a month after the election and on the eve of its opening, the response "will do better" was 25.4%, and "will do worse" was 5.7%. However, the most common response, indicating indifference, was "will be no different from the 18th National Assembly" at 66.3%. In fact, the Saenuri Party was considering dissolving itself at the beginning of the year, and the Democratic United Party experienced a crisis and political distrust, evidenced by its inability to field its own candidate in the October 26 by-election. The expectations for Ahn Cheol-soo have also weakened compared to the "Ahn Cheol-soo syndrome" of last year.

● This suggests that any force or leader aiming to advance Korean politics and the future of the Republic of Korea through governance should show extraordinary interest in this issue and engage in fierce efforts, competition, and cooperation to establish countermeasures. If the deepening and consolidation of political distrust and cynicism are left unchecked, not only will achieving power be difficult, but it will also be even harder for the presidential election to be a victory for the people. Furthermore, becoming a successful president after taking office will be nearly impossible.

[Figure 12] Expectations for the 19th National Assembly Compared to the 18th National Assembly (%)