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[Public Opinion Briefing No. 111] Causes and Outlook of Competitive Electoral Districts Between Ruling and Opposition Parties

Category
Commentary and Issue Briefing
Published
April 8, 2012
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Conditions for Presidential Success

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 111] Joint 2012 General Election and Presidential Election Panel Survey by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Hankook Research

1. Electoral Landscape

2. Outlook for the April 11 General Election: Electoral Fluidity Persists


1. Competitive Electoral Landscape: Shift from Overwhelming Opposition Advantage to a Competitive Phase

● The 19th General Election contrasts with the 18th General Election in several aspects. Although the opposition was initially expected to lead due to the revelation of the Presidential Office's surveillance of civilians, which reignited the sentiment for a verdict on the ruling party in the general election, a close contest between the ruling and opposition parties has been maintained even as the election nears.

● In terms of party support for the general election and proportional representation, the Saenuri Party and the Democratic Party are neck and neck. When including progressive parties like the Unified Progressive Party, the opposition holds an advantage. However, compared to the 2007 and 2008 general elections, there is no overwhelming support for the Grand National Party, indicating a balanced state overall.

● In the 18th General Election, public opinion favored supporting the ruling Grand National Party, with 41.8% indicating they would vote for the party and 19.7% for the Democratic Party, more than double. However, in the current survey, support for the Saenuri Party is 30.0% and for the Democratic United Party is 29.0%, indicating a tight race. Unlike the 2007 election where public sentiment to judge the participatory government led to the selection of the Grand National Party as an alternative, voters are currently hesitant to embrace the opposition as a clear alternative. Comparing party favorability scores, the Grand National Party led by over 10 points in the 18th General Election, but in the 19th General Election, the Saenuri Party scored 47 points and the Democratic United Party scored 50 points, showing a close contest.

● In the 18th General Election, the Grand National Party also led in support among the 20-40 age groups, surpassing the Democratic Party. This indicates a prevailing trend favoring the Grand National Party across all age demographics. However, the 19th General Election shows a significant generational divide, with the Democratic United Party leading among the 20-40 age groups and the Grand National Party leading among the 50-60 age groups. This foreshadows serious political conflict leading up to the December presidential election.

[Figure 1] Preference for District vs. Proportional Representation Votes in the 19th General Election

Note: Responses from those intending to vote.

[Figure 2] Comparison of District Candidates by Generation

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18th General Election (1,192 voters intending to vote / March 16-18)19th General Election (1,758 voters intending to vote / March 30-April 1)

[Figure 3] Favorability Score (Converted to 100-point scale: 0 points very unfavorable - 50 points neutral - 100 points very favorable)

● In April 2007 and April 2012, at the same point eight months before the presidential election, presidential approval ratings were similar: 29.8% for former President Roh and 30.8% for President Lee Myung-bak. The consensus on the need for a verdict on the government was also similar, at 60.0% in the 2007 survey and 63.0% in the 2012 survey. While the positive evaluation (expectation) of the opposition's candidate unification, achieved with difficulty, has increased compared to 2007 (when it was for the pro-government camp), it is only 50.7%, a significant 18.3 percentage points lower than in the 2010 local elections, which the opposition won. When including those who oppose or are indifferent, it approaches a majority.

● In terms of party support, the Grand National Party's support rate was close to a majority at 46.8% in the April 2007 survey. However, in the current survey, the Grand National Party garnered 30.4%, the Democratic Party 28.1%, and the Unified Progressive Party 4.9%. When combining the Democratic Party and the Unified Progressive Party, the opposition is either on par or slightly ahead, indicating a balanced situation in terms of party support base. A notable feature is the higher proportion of unaffiliated voters compared to the 2007 presidential election.

[Figure 4] Verdict on Government and Support for Opposition Candidate Unification

Note: Candidate unification options assessed for agreement in the 17th Presidential Election, positively or negatively in the June 2nd Local Elections, and desirability in the 19th General Election.

[Figure 5] Party Support Rate Differences: 2007-2012

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(1) Party Support Rates in April 2007(2) Party Support Rates in April 2012

2. Factors Contributing to the Emergence of a Competitive Phase with Opposition Advantage

1) Coexistence of MB Administration's Maladministration Judgment and Opposition Party Scrutiny: Conflicting Attitudes

● This appears to be the result of conflicting attitudes, where sentiment for judging the administration's failures coexists with criticism of an irresponsible opposition. When cross-analyzing the sentiment for judging the MB administration and the veto against an irresponsible opposition using a 2x2 matrix, we can categorize respondents into those with a one-sided view of judging the MB administration (disagreeing with opposition criticism), those with a one-sided view of criticizing the opposition (disagreeing with judging the MB administration), those with conflicting views (agreeing with both), and those with no particular stance (disagreeing with both). Among these, those who agree with judging the MB administration while also agreeing with the criticism of the opposition not to be given a vote constitute 38.4%, representing the majority. One-sided judgment of the MB administration accounted for 27.2%, one-sided criticism of the opposition for 22.8%, and those who disagreed with both positions were the smallest group at 11.7%. The prevalence of conflicting attitudes towards the administration's judgment and opposition criticism, which are the key issues of this election, and the similar support sizes for these opposing views, appear to be the factors driving the current balanced state.

[Figure 6] Perception Types Based on Attitudes Towards Administration Judgment / Opposition Criticism

Note: Analysis excludes 124 individuals who responded 'don't know' or 'no response'.

● Notably, these conflicting attitudes were more prevalent among the 20-40 age groups and ideological progressives, who are known to support the opposition, compared to the 50-60 age groups and ideological conservatives. Conversely, the sentiment for judging the administration was relatively higher among the 30-40 age groups and progressives, while criticism of the opposition was relatively higher among the 50-60 age groups and conservatives. Among voters in their 20s, those with a negative attitude towards both parties was close to a majority, rather than a one-sided judgment.

● In terms of party support, these conflicting attitudes are forming a middle ground of unaffiliated voters rather than concentrating support towards a specific party. The direction of these voters is expected to break the current balance and serve as a fulcrum determining the outcome of the 19th General Election. They harbor distrust and anxiety towards both major camps, leading to resistance against any single force dominating and a tendency towards 'balancing' votes to prevent one party from gaining excessive power.

[Table 1] Attitude Types Towards Ruling and Opposition Election Campaigns by Generation/Ideology

[Table 2] Ruling and Opposition Judgment Attitudes and Party Support

2) Failed Nomination Processes by Both Parties and Diminished Impact of Candidate Unification

● Contrary to the initial expectation of an overwhelming opposition advantage early this year, the gap has narrowed as the election approaches. This is attributed to the Saenuri Party's successful nomination process, led by its interim committee and with relatively few internal disputes, while the Democratic Party and other opposition parties experienced internal divisions during their nomination processes and controversies over vote manipulation during candidate unification, leading to alienation of opposition supporters and unaffiliated voters. In this survey, the evaluation of the nomination process for the Saenuri Party was 32.4%, and for the Democratic Party was 27.1%, indicating a slightly more favorable assessment of the Saenuri Party.

● This indicates a recent deterioration in the evaluation of the Saenuri Party's nomination process, compared to the favorable assessments in various surveys conducted in March, which significantly favored the Saenuri Party's nomination process over the Democratic Party's. This is likely due to controversies surrounding candidates like Son Su-jo and Moon Dae-sung, which negatively impacted the evaluation of the Saenuri Party's nominations. However, internally, 65.2% of Saenuri Party supporters evaluated their party's nomination process positively, while only 47.3% of Democratic Party supporters evaluated their party's nomination process positively, confirming significant internal divisions within the Democratic Party during its nomination process.

● Furthermore, the weakening legitimacy of the candidate unification process between the Democratic United Party and the Unified Progressive Party, marred by controversies such as the alleged manipulation of opinion polls by Representative Lee Jung-hee's office, is another factor that enabled the Saenuri Party to catch up. As noted earlier, not only has the positive evaluation of opposition candidate unification decreased compared to the 2010 local elections, but it also failed to gain majority support, particularly among unaffiliated voters.

[Figure 7] Evaluation of Nomination Processes by Both Parties

[Figure 8] Evaluation of Unification Between Democratic United Party and Unified Progressive Party Candidates

3. Outlook for the April 11 General Election: Opposition Gains Momentum, Ruling Party Seeks Reversal

1) Impact of the Civilian Surveillance Scandal

● "Bad news for the ruling party, good news for the opposition": As the election campaign began, the scandal of civilian surveillance by the opposition and the KBS labor union has dominated major media outlets. The direction of this issue's impact on the election is relatively clear. Illegal surveillance of civilians occurred under the current administration, and suspicions of a cover-up have emerged. The revelation of records detailing "2,600 cases of illegal surveillance" provided a much-needed opportunity for the opposition, which had struggled to reignite the sentiment for a verdict on the administration, and was undoubtedly a significant blow to the ruling party, which had been steadily narrowing the gap under the leadership of Chairwoman Park Geun-hye. This is particularly true as it could sway centrist voters in the Seoul metropolitan area, who are sensitive to challenges against democratic values, and voters with ambivalent attitudes, towards demanding a verdict on the administration.

● However, the impact of the civilian surveillance incident is diminishing compared to its initial exposure. Most importantly, the Presidential Office revealed that 2,200 of the 2,600 cases of illegal surveillance records were from the Roh Moo-hyun administration. By having the opposition acknowledge this, the Presidential Office and the Saenuri Party were able to counter the narrative, shifting from a position of being unilaterally criticized to one where they could argue that illegal surveillance also occurred during the participatory government era.

● Meanwhile, the opposition, by focusing intensely on the civilian surveillance issue, aimed to reignite the sentiment for a verdict on the administration. However, it appears they have not garnered the expected response from voters. When asked about the most important issues for the general election in this survey, issues related to people's livelihoods and the economy, such as economic growth (22.4%), local development pledges (17.8%), and welfare issues (13.3%), were considered more important than political issues like civilian surveillance and power corruption (13.4%) or the Korea-US FTA (12.1%). There is a significant risk that if both parties become solely preoccupied with current political issues, it could fuel voter dissatisfaction and cynicism. This is particularly relevant given that centrist and unaffiliated voters tend to prioritize economic and livelihood issues over the Presidential Office's surveillance problem.

● Although the scandal's impact has lessened, this issue inherently favors the opposition. After all, evidence of civilian surveillance has emerged under the current administration, and the strong sentiment for a verdict on the administration must be considered. Furthermore, the Presidential Office's direct confrontation with the opposition has inadvertently highlighted the call for a verdict on the administration, counteracting the Saenuri Party's strategy of focusing on "self-reflection and change" to gain an advantage. The ruling party should recall the 2010 local elections, where they initially had an advantageous position until mid-election, but then shifted to a strategy of demanding a verdict on the participatory government and a hardline security stance, which ultimately triggered a backlash from ambivalent voters seeking balance.

● Although the opposition's counterattack began with the controversial remarks made by candidate Kim Yong-min of Naggomsu shortly before the election, this issue is also detached from voters' concerns about "making a living and economic insecurity," limiting its potential to sway voters back to the Saenuri Party. Overall, unlike the 2010 local elections where policy issues such as free school meals and security were significant, the April 11 General Election has failed to meet voters' expectations for policy-based elections, which is likely to intensify political cynicism, particularly among centrist voters.

[Figure 9] Most Important Issues in This General Election (%)

2) Ideological Convergence and Ambivalence: Caution Advised on Ideological Framing

● While the differences in voting preferences by ideology are widening, voters' ideological stances are proving to be very flexible. That is, rather than thinking within the framework of a progressive-conservative dichotomy, they exhibit complex and ambivalent attitudes that transcend ideological boundaries on key issues. When asked about voters' attitudes towards the Korea-US FTA, economic democratization represented by chaebol regulation, North Korea policy, and welfare policies – issues that could become points of contention before and after the election, and even in the next presidential election – the results show that while a majority hold conservative views on the Korea-US FTA and welfare policies, a majority hold progressive-leaning attitudes towards chaebol regulation and North Korea policy.

● Regarding the Korea-US FTA, 6.9% favored immediate abolition, and 34.9% supported renegotiation and re-ratification. In contrast, 46.6% advocated for initial implementation followed by subsequent adjustments, and 8.6% favored proceeding as is. Thus, a majority (55.2%) support implementing the ratified agreement. On the contentious issue of welfare, only 29.8% supported the government providing universal welfare services such as healthcare, childcare, and education. Conversely, 69.4% supported selective welfare, focusing on urgent areas and specific demographics.

● On the other hand, regarding North Korea policy, 61.7% supported a conciliatory approach emphasizing exchange and cooperation, while 35.6% demanded a hardline response, indicating a majority favoring a moderate stance. Particularly on the issue of chaebol reform, which has been a major point of contention in this election, 53.5% (maintaining current level: 10.9%, strengthening regulation: 42.6%) believe that regulation needs to be maintained or strengthened beyond the current level. Conversely, 42.8% (limiting to unfair practices: 36.3%, complete deregulation: 6.5%) believe that chaebol reform should be minimized or relaxed.

● In particular, regarding chaebol regulation, a significant change is evident compared to the 2008 survey. In 2008, only 35.3% believed that chaebol regulation should be maintained at the current level or strengthened (maintaining current level: 14.6%, strengthening regulation: 20.7%), while 53.6% believed it should be minimized or relaxed (limiting to unfair practices: 48.7%, complete deregulation: 14.9%). While the proportion of Democratic Party supporters favoring regulation maintenance/strengthening remained relatively stable at 51.0% in the 2008 general election and 55.3% in the 2012 survey, the proportion among Saenuri Party supporters increased by nearly 20 percentage points, from 24.3% to 43.3%. This confirms that the perception gap based on party support and ideological orientation is narrowing.

[Figure 10] Attitudes Towards Key Policy/Ideological Issues (%)

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Chaebol Reform / North Korea Policy Direction (Progressive-Friendly)Welfare Stance / South Korea-US FTA Direction (Conservative-Friendly)

● Regarding the South Korea-US FTA, immediate abrogation was favored by 6.9%, and renegotiation followed by re-ratification by 34.9%. In contrast, proceeding with the implementation and making subsequent adjustments was supported by 46.6%, and implementing it as is by 8.6%. Thus, a majority (55.2%) favored implementing the ratified agreement. Meanwhile, on the controversial welfare issue, support for the government universally providing welfare services such as healthcare, childcare, and education was only 29.8%. In contrast, selective welfare, which focuses on urgent areas and demographics, garnered support from 69.4%.

● Conversely, regarding North Korea policy, a conciliatory approach emphasizing the strengthening of exchange and cooperation was supported by 61.7%, while a hardline stance was favored by 35.6%, indicating a majority held a moderate view. Notably, on the chaebol reform issue, which was the biggest point of contention in this election, 53.5% believed that regulation beyond the current level is necessary (maintaining current level: 10.9%, strengthening regulation: 42.6%), while 42.8% argued for minimizing or easing chaebol reform (limiting to unfair trade practices: 36.3%, complete deregulation: 6.5%).

● Specifically concerning chaebol regulation, a significant change can be observed compared to the 2008 survey. Overall, only 35.3% responded that chaebol regulation should be maintained at the current level or strengthened (maintain current level: 14.6%, strengthen regulation: 20.7%), while 53.6% advocated for minimizing or easing regulation (limiting to unfair trade practices: 48.7%, complete deregulation: 14.9%). By party support, in the 2008 general election, 51.0% of supporters of the Democratic United Party favored maintaining/strengthening regulation, and this figure remained largely unchanged at 55.3% in the 2012 survey. However, among Saenuri Party supporters, the proportion favoring maintaining/strengthening regulation increased by nearly 20 percentage points, from 24.3% to 43.3%. This confirms that the perception gap based on party support and ideological orientation is narrowing.

3) Changes in Voter Decision Factors: 2008 General Election "Party" → 2012 General Election "Candidate"

● As a factor contributing to the fluidity of this election, it is necessary to examine the changes in voter decision factors. In the 2008 general election, public opinion strongly favored selecting candidates based on their party affiliation, driven by sentiments of judging the incumbent administration and seeking an alternative to the Grand National Party, thus resulting in low electoral fluidity. In the 2008 survey, party affiliation was the most cited criterion for candidate selection at 41.2%, followed by candidate's ability/experience at 32.2%, with party and candidate capability being the primary decision factors. Morality accounted for 7.4%, candidate's ideology and platform for 7.4%, and electability for 5.9%, none of which were primary factors.

[Figure 11] Changes in Candidate Selection Criteria: 2008-2012

Note: The 2008 data is based on a survey of 997 individuals who decided on their preferred candidate, and the 2012 data is based on a survey of 1758 individuals intending to vote.

● However, in the 2012 survey, the proportion of respondents considering party affiliation dropped to 18.5%, while candidate's ability/experience was cited by 36.0%, receiving the highest support. Meanwhile, morality and ideology/policy, which were peripheral factors in the 2008 survey, were cited by 20.4% and 19.7% respectively, demonstrating considerable influence alongside party affiliation.

● Consequently, the fact that a majority of voters indicated they would consider various factors related to the candidate rather than the party-vs-party dynamic is expected to mitigate the influence of the overall ruling-opposition party confrontation on voter choices in individual constituencies. This is anticipated to act as a factor increasing electoral fluidity.

4) Voter Turnout Increase Effect

● Another variable that will determine the direction of this election is voter turnout. Given the distinct differences in voting preferences by generation and ideology, voter turnout within each party's support base becomes a crucial factor significantly influencing the election. The favorable outcomes for opposition parties in various elections since 2010 can largely be attributed to the effect of increased voter turnout, particularly among younger demographics.

● Based on the survey question regarding voting intention, and specifically looking at the pre-election voting intentions from previous panel surveys using the criterion of "will definitely vote," the 2008 general election panel survey indicated that 57.8% of the total respondents intended to vote. This figure rose to 63.8% in the 2010 local elections, where youth participation began to become prominent, and further increased to 75.5% in the current survey.

● While the proportion of those with a strong intention to vote has increased across all age groups compared to the previous local elections, the rise in strong voting intentions among those in their 20s is particularly notable. This figure increased from 34.8% in the 2008 survey to 49.0% in the 2010 survey, and reached 62.1% in the current survey. This is likely a result of increased political efficacy, stemming from the perception that participation can bring about change, coupled with active grassroots mobilization campaigns targeting young voters and parties' mobilization efforts, leading to heightened electoral competition overall.

● However, in this election, not only the youth but also the elderly demographic showed an increased intention to vote compared to previous elections. Considering that the 20s, which showed the largest increase, tend to strongly support the opposition party, but also include a significant number of conflicted voters who harbor distrust towards both the ruling and opposition parties, it remains uncertain whether this will unilaterally benefit the opposition. The net effect of the increased voter turnout will become clearer depending on the outcome of the competition between the ruling and opposition parties to win the votes of these conflicted voters during the remaining campaign period.

[Figure 12] Changes in Proportion of Strong Voting Intentions

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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